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
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BRIEF OUTLINE
OF AN
ANALYSIS
OF
THE HUMAN INTELLECT;
INTENDED TO RECTIFY
THE SCHOLASTIC AND VULGAR PERVERSIONS OF THE
NATURAL PURPOSE, AND METHOD OF THINKING;
BY REJECTING ALTOGETHER
THE THEORETIC CONFUSION, THE UNMEANING ARRANGEMENT,
AND INDEFINITE NOMENCLATURE
OF THE
METAPHYSICIAN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

BY JAMES RUSH, M.D.

AUTHOR OF THE 'PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN VOICE;' AND OF 'HAMLET,
A DRAMATIC PRELUDE IN FIVE ACTS.'

VOLUME FIRST.

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Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

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PREFACE.

IT is always interesting, and frequently useful, in the history of the human intellect, to learn the progress of an invention or discovery, from its origin to its apparent termination: for without this knowledge, the work would be reduced to the condition of the reserved and wary secrecy of an enriching Patent-right. Descriptions of the gradual process in mechanical constructions, have been profitably given in many of the common arts of life; yet the intellectual means which lead to broader and more important discoveries, have rarely been accompanied by prefatory and progressive explanations.

Among the noted characters of the world; there is the Profound Thinker, who is supposed to go-down deepest; the Intuitive Thinker, who tries to come-up quickest; the Imposing Thinker, who makes the credulous believe he can do every thing; and the 'Man of Genius,' who himself thinks, and makes others believe, he works by some gift of Inspiration.* All these are severally

* For the meaning of the new and peculiar sign of punctuation, in the first line of the above sentence, I extract the explanation, given on the xli. page of the fifth edition; of the 'Philosophy of the Human Voice,' in which it was first used.

I here submit the first imprinting, of a Double Comma, as a symbol of Punctuation. The want of a point, for a significant pause between that of a comma and a semicolon, must have been felt by exact and thoughtful writers, in descriptive and explanatory composition. For brevity, and easy rythmus in enumerating the points, it may, from the Greek *δύο*, twice, be called, *Dicomma*. The principal purposes for which I employ: "first; as prefatory to an illustrative instance; or

alike disposed to persuade the world; their special powers are derived from a peculiar 'aptitude,' or inner prompting of a kind of 'Socratic Demon,' which yet not being traceable in its 'occult action,' cannot be described. Whereas the more simple-minded not knowing the efficacious and progressive science of measurable causes, suppose all original works proceed full-formed from the spiritual brain.

But wisdom like experience is at first a child, thriving on slowly acquired knowledge; and though her gatherings may sometimes not be known by men, till completed; she was figuratively, still an infant, a child, and progressive youth, waxing in years and strength, within the expanding intellect.

Foremost of the Profound thinkers as they are called, is the Metaphysician, who groping too deeply among the 'occult causes' and effects of Spirit in the human mind, has been unwilling or unable to retrace, and point-out the confused, and staggering

a question, or the statement of a question; or a condition; to indicate by the symbol, some notable sense, should the mind for the moment ask; what is to follow. Second; for cases when the grammar is prone to run on, and perspicuity requires a special suspension; beyond a point of longer rest than that of the comma. Third; for subdivided short or long periodic sentences, with or without other points; in order to check the haste of grammatical parts; if disposed to run together; and thus by drawing attention to the individuality of members, to relieve the whole from intricacy. Fourth; to bound parenthetical members, and in taking the place of the Dash; which is always a formless linear blemish on the compact neatness of print; to carry over the sense and grammar, through the space between the pauses. Fifth; as a direction to a following proposition; and showing; there are punctuative means for supplying the place of the demonstrative *that*, when this pronoun precedes the word, *there*, or *this*, or *they*, or *itself* repeated, or any other word of striking similarity of sound, which might offend the ear. Sixth; to separate a succession of members; as objects of a previous action; or as the agents of a prospective effect; which may mentally indicate a less pause than a semicolon, and greater than a comma between them.

All these cases and perhaps more, are exemplified throughout this volume. Punctuation partakes in a degree, of the whims of the human mind; and on a subject the reader and writer will in many particulars, have each a whim of his own. Should however, this new point be considered worthy of adoption, others will give more precise rules for its application.

I have used, for my own purposes in manuscript, what I have called a sub-comma, the want of which, exact writers may sometimes have felt; but as there will be so many new things in this Work, to startle, if not to avert the mind of the Formalist, I must leave its symbol, and its printed use to others.

steps, by which he seemed to come-at the supposed truths of his fictional system. Chemists, inventive Engineers, and Mechanics, often with practical benefit, inform us of the gradual progress of their several labors, together with their many disappointments, useless experiments, false suppositions, and waste of time, before the completion of their work. But mental Metaphysicians, though never giving the world a clear, and practical system of the full Art of Thinking, and only differing from one another upon it; have neglected to tell us the manner of beginning and conducting, even their own unsatisfactory efforts; thereby preventing our receiving from this source, the least light, on the causes of their failure. It is indeed an apology for the neglect; though metaphysicians have never offered it; that all their investigations being on the 'faculties and operations' of a spiritual mind, they have rarely shown, whether in their means or their ends, either knowledge or notions worthy a permanent record. For a visionary view of the agency of spirit in the brain, and in human affairs, having produced nothing comprehensible, yet much contradictory opinion, has left theoretic inquirers merely to dispute among themselves.

The following method of investigating the mind, from the beginning to the end of its few and simple functions, is conducted on the ground of their being altogether a physical action of the senses and the brain. And however it may appear to others, the Author considers, and will endeavor to show, that the gradual manner in which the mind proceeds with its inquiry into itself, is, so to speak, a gradual application of its physical Working Plan to explain its own physical phenomena.

To those not familiar with the faltering of the most cautious steps of original inquiry, through ignorance to knowledge; it may not be useless to present an example of the progressive employment of this working plan, or the manner in which unconnected facts, and reflections may be brought to a classified and connected form.

Having preserved the first writing of the suggestions, sketches, observations, hints, doubts, and searching inquiries, as they were originally recorded: having extended and framed these views to a ing Natural History of

the Mind; the Author thought, a few Readers might find it interesting, if not useful, to know by what gradual means a new analysis, arrangement, and nomenclature of its phenomena have been gathered from the first and uncertain gropings after order and truth; designing to show how others with more comprehensive views, and with greater penetration, may do better things, by improving on what may here have been done.

A subjoined Appendix contains a record of the earliest fragment-writing of this, so far progressive work; together with some personal details that could not well be joined with its proper subject. It will be seen that the first writing consists of desultory suggestions for a Natural History of the Mind; with most of the facts and reflections, in their incipient, limited, and often erroneous form; subsequently corrected and amplified into an orderly system; to be rejected, if delusive; or if well founded, to be verified, and still further extended by future investigation.

The pride of human rank sets physical man at the head of the animal kingdom; and a vain conceit of his spiritual mind raises it up to be only second to that of the angels. Whether man fulfils his purposes in creation, better than the sub-animal; and uses his sub-angel-mind, as well as he ought; and thus deserves to be the 'Paragon,' is a question for others: he thinks of himself, looks at his works, and declares that he does. But we must speak without vain-glory of the mind, as it comes before us.

The mind as we only can know it; is an indivisible compound of Thought and Speech or other sign. Which first begins, if they are not co-eval, is a point for metaphysicians. We know that without mind, there would be no significant indication of it; and without speech or other sign of mind, there would be no knowledge of its existence: or if known as a germ, it could not without language, be capable of self-growth or expansion. With a joint agency, however, they give to man, all his power, beyond that of the brute, of greater muscular strength than his own. To describe the mind therefore, it is necessary to show the inseparable connection between thought and the voice; with their influences on each other: for they cannot, separately, be fully known. These two components of the mind, though always exercised together, must be sepa-

The reader of the Ap-

pendix to this Work, will learn, that the Author, in early life, with no reason for his choice, began with the physical investigation of the phenomena of thought. Continuing this, in a desultory manner of observing, reflecting, and recording; and perceiving the intimate tie between speech and thought, it appeared desirable to inquire into them at the same time; that one might assist the development of the other. As the subject of thought was further pursued, he found it essential to his purpose, strictly to watch their connected agency, either in others, or more accurately in himself. This required a broad, and a particular observation, throughout the general field of knowledge; that by perceiving the process of thought and language, in the different sciences and arts, with their mode of truth, and of its perversions; a comparison of their several working plans might aid in solving that greatest of all problems; the Intellect. This induced him to intermit the investigation of thought. During part of the time, designed for these broad and deliberate searches, he turned his attention to the subject of speech. The 'Philosophy of the Human Voice' was the result of that inquiry; and is thus to be considered the Part First executed, of the present 'Outline of an Analysis of the Human Intellect.' And he is not sure, that its preceding development did not assist the investigation of thought, more than the first development of thought would have assisted it. The 'Outline' has occasional allusions to the subject of the 'Philosophy;' the latter has frequent references almost to the special views and purposes of the former. But under the present inadequacy of the mind, and the verbosity of speech, the times for a word to the wise have passed; or much of what the Author has now to offer might, by some hint-taking observer, have been anticipated. If any metaphysician, or other *profound* teacher in elevated station ever opened the work on the voice, it was perhaps, thereby to prove himself to be an accomplished Reader; and not finding this, he immediately closed it; lest it should betray his general incompetence, and his special dulness to the interests of all knowledge, except those of his own. Such, the Author predicts will be the temporary fate of this Second Part of his history of the Human Intellect. Some *Great man*, finding his mind not proved by it, to be greater than he estimated, will lay it on the dusty shelf;

and perhaps lead other *great* men to say; they understand; it is not worth reading.

The old or metaphysical account of the mind being both limited and confused, has only furnished the means for continued disputes; leaving every individual to value his mind, according to his own conceit which merely perpetuates the jealousy and ill-will of a vain and insolent pride. The Author proposes, by his physical description, arrangement, and nomenclature, to enable the individual, without vanity or pride, truly to know his own mind, by the analytic rule of its construction, and working plan; and to apply that universal rule to discriminate the minds of others. And here lies the whole difficulty of the work before the reforming inquirer. For every individual being accustomed to his own mind, thinks it like his own hands and feet, best suited to himself; and having no measure of other minds except that of his own; he thinks his own, as far as it extends, universally the best. This is one cause of the interminable wrangling of the world: since every disputant must necessarily consider the then use of his own mind, superior to that of his antagonist, or he would at once yield to him. In religious and moral concerns, the theologian has been far more successful in teaching modesty, than the mental philosopher; for all who are instructed in the casuistic rules of right and wrong, are ready to confess themselves sinners. But who has so clearly described the mental difference between wisdom and folly, as to induce a single individual to believe he has less sense than another; and to prevent his thinking he has more. The Author waits however, to see what a new method of observation will do for *giving* minds their right positions; and enabling the more inquiring part of mankind to class their own; and mark the place of those who neither think nor inquire.

Nearly forty years ago, the Author gave the majesterial pretenders to intelligence, fifty years, to comprehend the First, or Vocal part of this work. He finds, he mistook their capacity. On this Second Part, he will be more liberal: for as it uproots so many of the notions, habits, and prejudices of the narrow and stringent Lawgivers of Thought; he here allows them three hundred years, to clear away their piles of rubbish, and to try to reconcile themselves :

First part and to it.

The Author thought proper to place at the end of this work; to prevent a confused beginning of it; the part which describes the first steps of his inquiry. Yet it might be interesting if not useful, to an observant Reader, occasionally to compare the first attempts of those desultory *notes*, with their subsequent extension to the fulness, the definition and division, of an explanatory description of the human mind. The Appendix is not very long; and if the Reader will regard the Author's suggestion, he may not be dissatisfied to run over it, after finishing this preface. He will there find; the purpose of the Work was in the Author's thought, after he returned to this Country, in eighteen hundred and eleven; written as a sketch, in eighteen hundred and eighteen; enlarged into desultory notes, in eighteen hundred and twenty-two; then laid-aside and not seen again till eighteen hundred and fifty-seven; thereafter expanded to the present work: which, with the vacancy of about two years, from various events, was finished, in the beginning of the summer of eighteen hundred and sixty-three.

PHILADELPHIA, October 12th, 1864.



INTRODUCTION.

Describing the two different Methods of using the Mind; the Physical or Material; and the Metaphysical or Spiritual: together with the influence of the latter in hiding under a cloud of ignorance and confusion, the true and beautiful history of the Physical Mind.

ALL that man perceives, thinks, pronounces, and performs is respectively through his senses, his brain, and his muscles. From these physical and directive agencies proceed his science and his art; and from their proper or improper use, severally arise his good and his evil, his error and his truth. This fourfold human power, of perceiving, thinking, speaking and acting has received the general name of Mind: and mind, in the form of either Instinct, or Thoughtful design, is therefore the director of the purposes and actions of human life.

Every directive agent acts by its constituent powers. The mind has its powers and constituent means of acting, ordained by Nature, for the production of all its peculiar phenomena. As far as these powers are to be successfully employed, their ways and means of acting should be distinctly known; for whatever is to be effected by the mind, is to be accurately done only by a knowledge of the manner in which it was framed by Nature to fulfil its design: the ways and means of that design being the unsolved problem, or process of the mind.

The simple practical truth, that the working-plan of a natural or artificial construction, to be properly applied, should be sufficiently known, seems to have been disregarded on the subject of

the senses and the brain: and hence the mass of the world employ their mind, just as their momentary interests require a limited use of its design; without a thought of there being a beautiful, simple, and effective system in that design, of which their limited use is often a garbled and perverted application. But as man rises above the unthinking crowd; who employ both senses and brain, exclusively for the particular service of their several appetites and passions; he begins to apply his intellect to the acquisition of general knowledge; and perceiving; there is a broad system in the frame and action of the mind, which enables him to effect the purposes of science, both frame and action become subjects of interesting and useful inquiry.

Upon early observation of the phenomena of cause and effect in the senses and the brain, they were, from an apparent subtlety, assumed to be beyond the means of discrimination. The inquirer who first turned his attention to the state and action of his own mind, and to the effects of mind in others, noticed in himself an act of memory, and a comparison of two acts of memory; to which notice he gave the name of 'consciousness;' and learned by description; there is the like exercise of consciousness in others. And thus arose the general term Consciousness, for our self-knowledge of part of the phenomena of the mind. In the first and imperfect attention to this consciousness, the want of an analytic observation, induced a belief of there being something in its condition, altogether different in kind from the physical perception of external objects. This, at an early period, gave rise to a two-fold and fatal distinction in the means of acquiring knowledge. One by the senses: the other by this consciousness.

The first was called Physical or Natural Science, respectively from the Greek word *phusis*, nature; and the Latin, *natura*, of the same meaning: and was employed on external and perceptible objects, including all the observable things of the universe.

The second, which was employed on the subject of consciousness, or what occurs within our own mind, and we are told, occurs in the minds of others, was called *Metaphysics*, from the Greek words *meta* signifying after, and *phusis*, nature; meaning, that after natural or sensuous things are investigated; things or powers supersensuous
 ral. or beyond the reach of our present

senses, must be sought through metaphysical inquiry; which method we still employ for reasoning and guessing, upon those things which are removed from immediate observation.

This division of the Thinking process into Physical and Metaphysical, gave rise to another and more fatal distinction. Physical or Natural Science being applied to material and measurable things, those things were generalized under the single term *matter*; whereas metaphysical science, being applied to what was supposed to be neither material nor measurable, was founded on the reverse, or the negative of matter. Having introduced this notional distinction; the only means of making this no-thing, or no-matter, at all manageable for idle contention, under an unmeaning term; was figuratively to indicate it by a word for that which seemed to be most unlike perceptible matter. The thing *breath* or air, in Latin, *spiritus*, was taken, as the most impalpable of the four elements, to illustrate this notion of the invisible and immeasurable: and spirit, used at first as an illustrative term, was afterwards adopted as an absolute entity, or thing, about which metaphysics is to employ its refined, and as it were, ethereal inquiry. Other languages may have the like metaphors, designed if possible to signify nothing.

I have endeavored to show, that our terms for Physical or Natural; and for Metaphysical or supersensuous knowledge are derived from the Greeks: and to them we owe the most systematic, detailed, and varied form of this '*spiritual Logic*.' But we are not to suppose the disastrous notion to have originated with them: for it seems to be an *undated* error in the human mind; and is found in the fulest fictional exercise among the Jews, and among the Gentiles connected with or even preceding their earliest history.

The simple unity of inquiry into the simple unity of things and their relationships having been thus unfortunately subdivided; all knowledge was likewise divided into that of things noticeable by the senses, and that noticeable in the conscious mind; and its two subjects distinguished as Matter, and Spirit. On investigating these subjects, first observers could clearly perceive the causes and effects of the external world: and for some reason, only dimly — not at all perceive the causes of consciousness; and therefore

regarded this consciousness, or mental function, as the result of something different from matter and called it spirit. It further appears, that metaphysical inquiry which is only an exercise of the mind on its own notions, is therefore to be distinguished from the perception of external things; and that whenever the mind is employed in reasoning, speculating, theorizing, or conjecturing, as they are called, upon things or actions beyond the direct or indirect reach of the senses; it is essentially effected by the metaphysical Method. For the exercise of thinking on what has never been found to exist, and on future contingencies which cannot be proved till they come to pass, throws the Metaphysician, the Atlantic-Cable stock dealer, and the Almanac Rain-Prophet, into one and the same class, of those who think on what is not known, or who think on nothing existing in Nature, or truly and clearly representable in the mind. Hence we learn that the origin of the false distinction between matter and spirit did not rest upon a real difference in the constitution of the universe of things, but on an ignorance of their Unity. From the earliest date in the history of Thought, to the boasted present period of education and science, the belief in this notional difference, has been nearly universal; and while the physical method in unfolding a knowledge of the causes and effects of external things has been satisfactory and progressive; the metaphysical inquiry into the actions of the spiritual mind, and into other imperceptible things, has produced little more than doubt and controversy. And such will be the sad result, so long as the mind is assumed to be different in its frame and actions, from those of a refined and concealed material organization: or until its frame and actions are subjected to physical investigation.

It is quite foreign to the purpose of the following Essay, to consider particularly, the extended and wasteful application which has been made in every age and nation, of this fiction of metaphysical spiritualism; I only maintain that it has never been able to analyse the mind into its simple and perceptible constituents, under a brief and consistent nomenclature; and that it never will. It has with a jealous pertinacity, worked long and steadily on this its own chosen subject; but after an idle indulgence in its waking dreams, every attempt to them has only brought mischief

or folly on mankind. We find, without exception; the earliest Savage in full *enjoyment* of this poetical illusion; for the ignorant, as well as the so-called philosophers, seem always to have delighted in its Theological and its Fairy Tales. Hence come up, the good and the evil spirits, the Heavenly, the earthly and the infernal Deities; the Shades of Sachems, and Heroes, Ghosts from the graves, Arabian Genii of the Lamp and Ring, Rosicrucian Spirits of all the Elements, German Goblins, and American-Platonic Spirits, to be called by any knavish 'Medium,' from their classified abodes, between the depths of Tophet, and the blessed Chambers of a New Jerusalem. It is impossible to say when or where this metaphysical notion of spirit, and a belief in ghosts began. But its universality is no more a reason against our proposition of an Almighty ordination of a physical mind; than the wide prevalence of drunkenness, among the Anglo-Americans and Irish is a proof that the delusions of this halucinating vice are a natural state of human taste and intellect.*

* In this beginning of the history of the material mind, we refer its effects solely to the physical laws of Nature. These, as far as we can perceive, produce all their phenomena by the relationships or actions and reactions of matter alone, without the agency of what is called Spirit. These laws, we maintain from analogy, operating on the senses and the brain, also produce the mind, in common with all their other material effects. What Nature is, beyond her obvious causes and effects, we know not; but as we have used in the last sentence of the text, the phrase; Almighty ordination of the physical mind, it is proper; this Work should at once, and clearly explain what is to be understood by the terms Nature and the first, or any Almighty antecedent cause of her innumerable secondary causes. We do not here dispute; there being indefinite trains of causes, and one master-cause at their beginning, for there may be a conceit of such a state of things. We do maintain however, that the whole question on first causes, distinct from those of Nature, has arisen out of the metaphysical method of the mind, and therefore to be rejected from the exercise of physical thought. The metaphysicians, who are prone to discard or disown secondary physical causes, turn their notional conceits of this first cause, into a ruling spirit; and have called this spirit by as many several names as there have been, and are conjecturing tongues; all meaning our Jehovah, God, or Lord. We will not add to the endless disputes on this great proposition; for like any thing unknown it may be true, or it may not. All this Note assumes is, that as far as the universe of Nature is perceived, she is found to be omnipotent, for she has power over all her works; to be omniscient for she is present at all she does; and to be omnipresent wherever she acts. This is known by the physical and exact method of the mind. The notional or metaphysical method pretends to know more than is

This Essay regards the notional inquiries of metaphysics on the subject of spirit, chiefly as it has obstructed the investigation of the physical phenomena of the senses and the brain. It has done this in many different ways; and

First. It has created a belief, that Spirit in Mind being a different *entity* or existence, from Matter; they severally require a different process of investigation: one to be conducted by the senses and the brain; the other by the spiritual mind contemplating only itself: thus rejecting those observative and experimental means, which have produced the abundant truth of demonstrative science.

Second. The fictional method, seems in some cases, to have consented to the artifice of mingling conciliating fact with its contentions; and has tried to take to its assistance a vague kind of observation. But this observation, uncertain as it must always be, when not referred exclusively to perceptible things, being confounded by its mystical associate; gives way to conjecture, and thereby perverts or falsifies the true history of the mind.

Third. When difficulty meets us in thought or in the Practical affairs of life, we are prone to look to others for aid. The mind in the uneasiness of a metaphysical doubt, seeks relief in authority. In this way professorial schools, and renowned individuals become the directors of fictional belief, yet never the masters of a truthful conviction: for conviction is the servant only of truth; and metaphysical thought is not the master of conviction, but takes obstinacy; the self-confident prop of ignorance; in its place.

known, and assumes a first cause, with all the attributes of Nature; and investing that cause with all these attributes, presents it as an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent Spirit, under the name of Jehovah, Allah, or God. This was first believed upon analogical reasoning, and subsequently, on the authority of that reasoning. But as the metaphysical method has no ground for believing this; and the physical method no ground for *absolutely* denying it, the two methods owe some Christian Charity to each other; and since the notional method of belief has always had an overwhelming majority; the exact or physical, though no friend to great crowds, will, with its becoming candor, begin in this Work the generous Submission, and at least employ part of the notional language, yet not its belief. It will therefore use the terms Nature and First cause as synonymous; and apply the phrase, First cause, God, and Nature, or Nature, God, and First cause, as the Creative and Continuative power or powers of the mind, as of every phenomenon of the Universe.

The authority of these schools and individuals having been derived from authority, and this again through previous authorities, from its fictional origin, can never end in the unalterable satisfaction of a physical truth. And let us learn; there is more rejoicing hope in the kingdom of Truth, over one Fact of physical experience, than over all the endless Promises of notional metaphysicians who know and care not what a productive physical observation means.

Fourth. The metaphysical inquiry into the spiritual working of the mind has obstructed the advancement of a knowledge of its real frame and action, by the authoritative assumption of its being the more dignified and profound method of investigation; and therefore better adapted to reach the mysterious depths of this important subject. We derive this false and mischievous notion, from the Greeks, who first present us with the attempt to give their fictional philosophy a Scholastic, for it cannot be called an intelligible form. This poetical, artistic, oratorical, and sophistical people, under idle hallucinations which are commonly the result of mental indolence; for nothing is easier than to sit still or to peripatize and wrangle loosely; learned by a short experience, that the acquisition of knowledge through the senses is a slow and laborious process; and thus found it easier to guess at the course of causes and effects than to discover them. The learned among them therefore turned nearly their whole attention to metaphysical theories, and controversy; and with apparent modesty, called themselves Philosophers, or 'lovers of wisdom.' The clearing light of modern physical science shows; they were more enthusiastic lovers of their own disputes in the Academy, and the Porch, than of true wisdom in the well-applied knowledge of physical Nature. Some indeed, and among them Epicurus; who still theorized on his material atoms; did call themselves *Natural* Philosophers; but their views of the Laws of Matter were nearly as fictional as their metaphysical dreams about their Minds, their Morals, and their Gods. For if we except some of their *Esthetic Arts*, which were founded on the observation and experience of the eye and ear; and if we further except the *Arithmetic* numbering, and *Geometric* measurement of physical things; the *exact* method of which they are said however to have

learned from Eastern Masters; not a single physical science has reached us, in a well-embodied form; and scarcely a Natural History that can be relied on. Nay, so far did the Greeks carry their infatuation for their sophistry, that seeming to hold in contempt all inquiry into the Laws of Nature, which was not conducted through the fictional method; they generally assigned the analytic and practical arts, which were founded on observation and experiment, to their slaves. It is therefore consistently recorded of Hippocrates, that he first raised the empiric and vulgar art of Medicine to respectability, by uniting with its practical duties, the fictional doctrines of the Philosophic or the Metaphysical schools. In short this Democratic People seem, like all succeeding dreamers, to have regarded metaphysics as a Patrician, and natural philosophy as a Plebeian science.

With this disposition on the part of the Greeks, to reject the use of physical inquiry in what they allowed to be the palpable things of Nature, it is not surprising; they did not employ it in the investigation of the phenomena of the mind, which they systematically assigned to the metaphysical method: a method which so necessarily restrained the otherwise comprehensive and analytic powers of both Aristotle and Plato; that all their labors, in approaching the subject of the human intellect, were unable to dissipate the obscurity of vulgar notions from around it. This is the method which with all its unproductive errors, and tyrannical fictions, the Greeks overcame the mind of the Roman, who by his physical power had practically enslaved their country; and which both the Greeks, and the Romans introduced into the early Christian Church, to its own corruption, and to the subsequent extinction, for centuries, of every effort to reform it: a method, which on some subjects, the mighty modern power of the experimental philosophy has been able only partially to overthrow; and which continues to be the exclusive mode of inquiry into the supposed spiritual character of the mind. This is the arrogant assumption of dignity and power, by metaphysical pride, that in its driving imbecility, intolerantly denounces every attempt to treat the mind as if it were a fact of universal physical nature.

Fifth. The inference of Theology, and the Church; for I separate
the designed Holiness of P se passions of Fanat-

icism, Avarice, and Pride that have forced themselves upon it; has tended perhaps more than any other cause, to prevent the physical development of the human mind. Every Theology of which we have any account, is founded upon, or has taken to its assistance, the unintelligible metaphysical system; unintelligible even to those who try to think upon it, when they come digestively to describe it. There is then no occasion for this system in a pure, useful, and universal religion; a religion which should only require a mind of a general capacity, to be plainly and briefly taught its humble adoration towards its God, and its active duty towards its neighbor; not a mind of visions, and extacies, into which fictions must be trained to an unalterable habit, to prevent the discovery of the delusion. It is a striking inconsistency among the Theologies of all ages and nations, and an instance of intellectual confusion of the fictional mind, that however differing from each other, and assuming to be respectively the supreme and jealous truth; they should be alike founded on the same metaphysical system, which assuming to be the 'logic' of certainty, or Faith as they call it, produces only doubt, contrariety of opinion, and contention, not only on religion, but on every subject to which it has been applied. When in striking contrast, the system of physical observation and experiment; the only one to be efficaciously preached to the universal Poor and Rich; has produced a general consent among those who employ it: and which the further and more strictly it is applied, the more universal the consent; the greater the development of consistent and unchangeable truth; the greater the admiration, of consistent nature; and the silent adoration of her causative and unchangeable God. But worldly Theology, which to make a word, should be called perverted *Thoughtology*, for it is little more than are unassignable notions, has in no age allowed Physical Science to touch its metaphysical belief: and though it is not our purpose here, to question the power of spiritualism elsewhere in the Heavens above, in the Earth beneath, or in the Waters under the Earth; which we have not investigated; we have assumed to exclude it from all agency in the human mind: and as Theology considers the mind a portion of universal Spirituality it never has allowed, and never will; if fictional argu-

ment and unpunished persecution can prevent it; allow the spreading light of physical science to come near it. Theology, and its ambitious associate the Church, with the interests of its worldly establishments, being always fearful of even remote consequences, has never looked upon independence of opinion, without suspicion and threat. The mere hint of applying physical science to the subject of the mind has been considered by Church-men and Theologians, as the unpardonable sin against, not the Holy, but their intellectual Talismanic Spirit, when indeed no one *in*, or with his senses, has been able to perceive either sense or reality in it.

I have said enough on this point to raise an argument, if not something worse; but I will not anticipate or prepare for either. I do not willingly argue on any subject; designing to do all that falls to my share, by observing and receiving the observations of others, and not to dispute in a school; but to *pro* and *con* with myself for correcting observation. Argument, even in physical inquiries, has always produced more or less waste of time, temper, and obstinacy in self-opinion; a falsity in compromised disputes; and rarely or never a peaceful agreement in truth. But what can argument do against that which has never been shown to have an existence. Could a controversial Metaphysician bring before my senses, the smallest fraction of the least atom of an immaterial mind, I might be induced to try an argument about the rest of its atomism; for the difference being grounded on some infinitesimal division of an atomic fact, it might merely for the sake of peace and quiet, bring us to an argumentative compromise of opinion; though not to a mutual agreement upon the still disputed question of an immaterial mind. Physical science reposes itself on observative inquiry, and reports the answer of Nature. Metaphysics never rests in a universal consent, but answers a question at the desultory will of its own sophistry.

Thus the purpose of the present head, is to intimate the part, that an inquisitorial Church and a notional Theology have taken in preventing a proper and successful investigation of the mental functions of the brain.

Sixth. The metaphysical Theology has had a further effect in obstructing the development of the mind, by its influence on pious

or bigoted natural philosophers, who without fear of their own religious shadow, or a consistorial rod, would have devoted their method of physical science to its proper, and perhaps most important subject of the human intellect. Whether from a really pious impression, or from conformity to surrounding opinion, which is often a self-deceptive religion; there has been so close a connection between a notion of the agency of a spiritual mind, and of our duty towards God and our neighbor, that the very hint of a separation between them, rings the bell of alarm against clear and natural thinking, and so appals the venturing non-conformist, with the threatening outcry on heterodoxy, that if not endued with a martyr's resolution, he is repugnantly turned back to his habit of error. We see this in the Scisms of the Church itself, when doubts of doctrine or rule arise among the Brethren. How then can he hope for safety who attempts to undermine at least one of the outer towers of metaphysical Theology, by questioning its notion of spirituality in the mind? I once knew an Original Intellect, of fervent piety, and theological learning, that in the unbiased exercise of a clear physical observation, could acknowledge no action but that of materiality in life, and in the intellectual functions: and yet from the unrejected prejudices of its Puritanical education in the dogmas of the Theological creed, not from fear of non-conformity; for it was careless of the frowns of man; tried to compromise the difficulty between physical science, and an insubstantial theory, by joining the Theological 'Soul;' another form of the Thinking Spirit; to the material mind, in some manner, and for some purpose, which in the scumbling haste of a metaphysical conclusion, it never took the time, nor thought it necessary to comprehend.

Such confusion and inconsistency in the operations of what should be an equalized power, and self-accordant unity in the natural ordination of the laws of the brain; but within which a fixed and demonstrable truth may exist beside the most unfounded, or fictional opinion; seems to have suggested to the metaphysician that the mind is not strictly subject to the unvarying laws of matter, but must from its discordant acts, be something different from it. The advocates of spirituality have therefore drawn what they call an analogical argument from the assumption

that the thinking properties of mind, being different from the properties of matter, the entities which exhibit these different properties must themselves be different. Not tediously to consider all the branches of this fallacy; we briefly remark, that if difference of property is to imply or prove difference of entity, it must follow that mind and matter are respectively different from themselves. For as weight, hardness, and impenetrability, the properties of matter, all differ from each other; and memory, judgment, and association, the properties of mind, also differ from each other; therefore; difference of property making difference of entity; matter is not matter, and mind is not mind: which is altogether a sophistical absurdity. The notion of the inconsistent properties of wisdom and folly, and of error and truth, in the human mind, does not prove its difference from matter; but that a corrective education has not extended itself to that error, and folly.

This fiction of spiritual agency has not only had a fatal influence over the mind of the pious natural philosopher, but has assumed a jealous and didactic supremacy in pretending, itself, to lead the mind to a knowledge of its own frame and laws. Yet we still see the failure of its long-tried efforts, in its contradictory opinions on the ways and means of its spiritual agency, and on the varied confusion of its arrangement, and nomenclature. On the other hand, give the sole agency to the unerring, unitized and simple laws of matter in the brain, and unless perverted by false education or disease, we shall never be misled to confusion nor to inconsistency in the application of those laws. Man, in the use of his mind, was made to be free from every control except that of the operation of those laws of natural matter, which are by ordination, the Laws of God. But these metaphysical influences; for they are all insubstantial; pride, vanity, ambition, fear, and avarice mingle with the thousand varied purposes of humanity, pervert the mind from its original ordination, and leave it to the errors and corruptions of its own wavering inconsistency.

The general and the particular influence ascribed to Theology under the last two heads, in preventing the proper, and successful development of the system of physical causes and effects in the

brain, was the consequence of an early and false connection of metaphysics with the mind; and of a subsequent connection of the mind with a theological Religion. For that contemplative submission, binding us to the wisdom, power and will of an Almighty cause; which we ought to call Religion; has no relation to secondary cause and action in the mind, and would be equally obligatory, whether the mind is the result of matter, or of some other metaphysical substitute: and in neither case, is that mind less the work of God: whose wisdom and power, a contrary opinion would impiously impune. A true sense of Religion, freed from notions, and devoted to the perception of the omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and universal goodness of Nature in her works, under the direction of her First Almighty Cause, feels with humble reverence, the constant obligation of thoughtful acknowledgment and submission; and pays that silent adoration, which must be to the Being who receives it, far beyond all uncivilized prayer and praise. It is only when the attributes of Almighty Existence become the subject of metaphysical fiction, and sophistry, that Theology must be an abomination to God; to man a miserable uncertainty of hope and fear; and a reality of contention, enmity and persecution. If Theology, the Word of God, is not to be derived from the Works of God, it is the ideal voice of nothing.

I have said so much, but from its relation to the subject before us, perhaps not too much, of the evils of the metaphysical system of inquiry, and of its influence in preventing a physical analysis of the mind; that it may be interesting to those who often have heard of the term, without having a clear comprehension of its meaning, to receive a short explanation of it. If it were possible to describe metaphysics, physically, it might be represented as a new variety of the chameleon, living altogether on the impalpable air, and receiving its false and wavering color from every material object it rests upon. But taking its bodiless apparition as it is, we shall consider it, as it has always laid its bewildering spells on the thoughts, and consequently on the affairs, and conduct of mankind.

It would seem extraordinary, if any metaphysical inconsistencies could surprise us, that this great expounder of the ways of

God and man, in giving its own history of every thing it could lay its fictions upon; should never have given a history and explanation of itself. We will then, First state what it has pretended to be; and Second, endeavor to describe and to illustrate what it is. It has pretended, and still pretends to be the only means for attaining a knowledge of supernatural things; and has disgraced its pretensions, by masking the obvious things of nature with the fictional features of the supernatural. It was called by the Greeks, the First Philosophy, from proposing to begin with First, or General principles of things; which were assumed to be spiritual; under the belief that this is the most noble and successful mode of inquiry. It was also called the High Philosophy from proposing to inquire into the existence, power, and will of the Gods, and to draw from that will the ordination of the duties and destinies of man. In application to physical inquiry; for it did attempt to explain the laws of nature metaphysically; it began with notions of first or universal causes, deduced from them, the secondary, and then the lowest or proximate causes of things. Or otherwise, beginning with the proximate; endeavored by the thinking powers *alone* of the spiritual mind; which they considered a part of the General or Divine mind; to ascend to a knowledge of the designs of Divinity, and thus to learn the origin of all things. The Thinking means by which the High or Metaphysical Philosophy was to attain this sublime knowledge, or knowledge at its source, was called Contemplation. This contemplative method, is only the common, we may call it the vulgar mode of Thinking, employed by the conjectural world, on those subjects which are supposed or known to be beyond the scope of physical investigation. The First or High, as opposed to physical philosophy, is then devoted to the negative of natural things; and as nothing is taken to be the reverse or negative of something so, to speak truly, metaphysics is concerned about nothing. But about nothing there can be neither knowledge nor inquiry. Yet the metaphysician does carry his inquiries into nothing, or that which having no perceptible present, nor as yet a proved future existence, is only a nothing in his figmental mind. There are various occasions on which this insubstantial nothing is made the theme of personal hope, and conceit, and of contemplation by the

First Philosophy. When little Charley, in his childish metaphysics, bestrides his father's cane, he believes his own legs are those of a prancing horse. A foolish girl relies on her rich, and ideal lover, coming before long. Half the ambitious young lawyers, of our country, with only a bright and sharp intellect for votes, fictionally seat themselves in the Presidential Chair. A writer of Newspaper rhymes, has the metaphysical conceit that he is the young Shakspeare of the day. A Bank-credit speculator believes no less, that two five dollar notes make ten, than he does in his own power or luck, to be the richest of all his rich competitors. There are on every Fourth of July, millions vociferously proclaiming; there never was, is not, and never can be, the parallel to our Colonial Revolution; nor to the Courage, Freedom, and Sagacity of the American People. At the time of writing this page, there is before the Court, an 'inward light' woman, under the firm belief that she is the Daughter of God. And no less insane than this, whole hosts of pale-faced Fanatics wait for death and future Beatitude, because their charities have helped to make, and to encourage unnecessary paupers. Now all these delusions under different names, are so similar in their fictional state, that we will give them severally and alike, the name of metaphysical notions; for all are alike beyond Nature, in present perception, or in unobserved and unexperienced futurity.

The particular mental process of the Castle-builder, Fabulist, or Metaphysician is this: he takes his *own notion* of some physical fact, framed from a farrago of authority, not the fact itself. With this, he joins other notions bearing a partial relationship to it: and rambling off to other relationships, that become obscure as they are multiplied; he forms an unmeaning and confused picture, which he vividly contemplates into a seeming reality, and is then ready, right or wrong, to act upon his belief. Let us illustrate this proceeding of the senses and the brain, on a subject altogether beyond physical perception, and therefore as nothing: the mineralogical, and the habitable character of the Moon. These being entirely unknown to him, are properly a subject for metaphysics; since he cannot perceive the structure and properties of its substance, nor its means of supporting animal life. Having no lunar facts, on which to begin his observations, and no oppor-

tunity for making experiments, he draws upon his memory of the facts of the Geology of the Earth, and of its animal life; and with notions always obscure and wavering; from the absence of physical perception; draws a conclusion, that the moon has the like terraqueous structure, and the like human inhabitants with the earth: and thereafter from the influence of his soap-bubble 'logic,' so to call it, thinks of the moon, only under this condition. It may be affirmed too; from the universal habit of employing this metaphysical process, on any and every subject; that no one ever has a thought of the moon, without an analogical picture of its mountains, its forests, its rivers, rocks, and volcanos, together with its inhabitants, if it has any, who may perhaps inquire, by a like metaphysical pretension, about us, as we inquire about them. And where has our perceiver of unperceivable things found all this knowledge as he calls it? In his memory of the physical things of the earth, which he has metaphysically, or in his fictions, properly enough for disordered wits, transferred to the moon. All his wild notions and false conclusions are founded, not on an identical state of things in the earth and the moon, but on a trifling analogy, or likeness between their shapes and motions; which until that likeness is proved by physical perception, is no likeness at all. To speak plainly then, the whole of this feigned investigation is an inquiry into nothing; and serves to illustrate the metaphysical process of the Greeks, and of every age and nation. In this way came their visions about Gods of every degree, throughout the Heavens and the Earth; of virtuous 'souls' in Elysium, and the wicked in Tartarus; that having no perceptible correspondence with physical nature, were like the unreal notions of an idiot. This is the nothing-meaning, and the reality-mischief of that celebrated *word* metaphysics; which has so distracted the thoughts, and purposes of mankind; which, with a pretension to great profundity, has so long deluded those who do not see through its shallowness; which has turned aside inquiry from physical nature, to something that nobody can realize into fact; and which to bring it down to our present subject, has taken the place of proper physical inquiry into the working plan of the material organization of the human mind. There is but one mode of gaining a knowledge of parts of the

Universe and of their great First Cause; the mode of observation and experiment on secondary causes in perceptible things: any other attempt to reach the transcending principles of that Cause, is metaphysically impious, and if we may, for illustration, use its own notional mode of argument, against itself, it seems like that instance of the unproductive Fig-tree, to have borne the curse of Almighty Power, in its barrenness of the fruit of every kind of useful knowledge.

I have endeavored to describe the two opposite modes of acquiring knowledge. The one by the exercise of the senses on the physical things of the universe, which leads by slow and gradual ascent, through the length and breadth of the relationships of cause and effect, to any primary agency, as yet but partially known, in its power and wisdom and goodness, that direct them all. The other, which exercises only ill-assorted notions of things, and beginning with the general relationships of first principles or agencies, has never produced any thing beyond its figmental self. And though it may by analogy have directed an inquiry towards the reality of things, and in the multiplicity of its false conjectures sometimes have guessed loosely at the result; that guess is never that result, till physical science has made it so. By itself then, it leads to dispute, but tells us nothing. Physical science has by itself told us much, and will by undisputing inquiry gradually tell us every thing that is to be known.

In whatever way man first came upon the earth; which is yet altogether a subject for metaphysical, and so far, a fruitless inquiry; he appeared, by every record and tradition, in a state of ignorance, except when instructed, as it is said, by the Gods. From this his progress to useful knowledge, and productive civilization, has been effected solely by physical observation of the perceptible train of actions and events; for the metaphysical mode of dreaming about nothing, could certainly add nothing to that progress: and when the difference between the advancement of the mind under the two methods shall be clearly known, it will be admitted, that the metaphysical has not only opposed and impeded its observative power, but has in a great degree corrupted its strictness, and purity, by artfully infusing into it the leaven of its nothingness. But it may be asked; if knowledge of the

state and action of things is to be gained only by the slow and cautious gathering of physical inquiry; whether the conjectural method may not be combined with it? From past experience, we confidently answer, no. The human mind in acquiring knowledge, is a self-effective power, that deprecates all interference; asks no aid; and accedes to no compromise, in the use of its simple instruments of observation and experiment. The records of pretending science are full of warning examples of the pure and perfect breed of Truth being deformed or terminated by mongrel crossing of the fictional with the physical method: just as the works of esthetic art are often degraded, and brought to ruin at last, by the frivolity of ornament unduly applied to subjects of simplicity and grandeur. Observation and Experiment are always bound by Oath upon the everlasting Book of God and nature, to tell the truth, all the discoverable truth, and nothing but the truth; and it is the duty of the advocates of that truth, to cut short all testimony of mere opinion falsely in her favor, as well as against her: When Pilate on that memorable Trial tauntingly asked; what is truth; he answered the question with silent derision at the metaphysical wrangling of the day; then in full confusion, upon the Jewish, Platonic, Persian, and Greek theology; upon Aristotelian politics, and philology; Hippocratic medicine; and Socratic morality, in the School of Alexandria. Had he known all the maxims of the meek Reformer before him, he could have said aloud; it is to be found, not in the reciprocal evasions of sophistical logicians, but in the brief 'Yea and Nay' of observation and experiment, which assert what the senses teach, and deny what argument so often confuses or falsifies. The only appeal of truth is to the senses: for since the purpose of truth as we use the term, is to direct the thoughts and actions of a percipient being, it is to be properly tested by the senses, which; however obtunded by ignorance, or perverted by delusion; were ordained, in form and function alike, to every percipient. Truth is then to man and the sub-animal, the sensuous, and mental or cerebral perception of the things of Nature and Art, as to a cultivated and exercised sense and mind, they really exist.

To the use of metaphysical notions instead of the rectifying perception of the senses, may be ascribed the caricature of facts,



and the extravagance of opinion, by which the Novelist distorts the view of natural things, events, and characters; and thus leads the mind through possible fictions into a reliance on probable falsehood: such as that of a mystified belief in the existence of political or any kind of liberty, or in a special Theocracy, under which the Fanatic may be impelled by an 'irrepressible' self-will, to plan a Religious Crusade, excite a Slave Insurrection, or murder a whole family, under the hallucination of a metaphysical belief that he is an anointed minister of the purpose and power of God. A belief, the more incorrigible, because it is to be changed only by another state of the same metaphysical mind that directed it. We see no end however, to the folly, mischief, and crime of the fictional Thinking on what cannot be known, and perhaps does not exist; and which through a false process of the mind can never lead to truth.

The Clergy, Schoolmaster, Guardian, and Parent begin betimes to require children to be strict to their word; and punish them for 'telling stories.' How early too, are they cautioned against a certain wicked character who sows his tares of falsehood among the wholesome and sustaining truth of the human mind: for this cunning metaphysical Father of Lies, has an insinuating course with children. He begins with an account of Jack and Gill, in which there is nothing impossible. Then tries a moral tale of a greedy boy who was brought to death's door, by nearly eating up the whole of his plum-cake himself, which might have been strictly true: and of a little girl, who for devotion to her poor mother, was afterwards married to a great Lord, which might have occurred. Then to frighten children from Church, without the purpose being suspected, the story of Lady Ducklington's Ghost, which the whole village believed. Then the adventures of Robinson Crusoe, which, though a fiction, yet very naturally might have happened. All this being well received, and growing confident, he gives out that Jona's spreading gourd sprung up in a night: and that Jack's bean grew to the sky. With the success of these prefatory means for alluring the infant mind to profitable reading; and growing bolder without being suspected, he publishes the Arabian Nights, King Arthur, Nicholas Nickleby, Norma of the Fitful Head, and a biography of himself, with an

attractive portrait of his crooked horns, and his swinging tail. Lastly as a Work of pure Invention, it is presumable, we owe to him the first hints for discovering spiritual things; which if not beyond the bounds of nature, are at least beyond human knowledge; according to the maxim of the Schools; that things not perceptible, are to sense, and reason, the same as those which do not exist.

All this under the name of the First, or High Philosophy among the Greeks, has since governed the greater part of the intellectual world, and confounded every important inquiry after truth; by its fictional 'logic;' which is yet so accommodated to the unenlightened, and therefore imperfect human mind, that it is almost universally received as truth. It is not however by a direct or immediate influence on the ignorant multitude that this system so deceives them. We shall endeavor to show; it has first imposed upon and confounded the prerogative leaders of thought, and through their authority has mystified and contracted the lower and fellow credulous orders, in the knowledge and use of the little intellect they possess. The bold Instigator to wickedness, we are told, goes about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour. But as the Artful Contriver of fiction, he puts on the scholastic garb of the metaphysical philosophy, seeking whom he may, and finding alas, too many whom he does deceive.

Among the confused and misarranged marshaling of the places and honors of the world, we have a remarkable instance in the metaphysician; who, ranked as the special and *profound*, unfold of the faculties and operations of the mind, has been the first to confound by his fictions and nomenclature, the natural frame and functions of the machinery of thought. The good-sense of mankind is often abused by unnecessary or false distinctions of name or character. The prime minister, and Diplomatic agent of a monarchy, are often, under other names, only respectively an overseer and a spy. In our country, Rank is so confounded, that republican rulers, with their titular *Honorables* are often no more than demagogues, with their titular degradation: and the degraded demagogue is often the honorable legislative, judicial, and executive ruler: a metaphysician is a fictionist; and a fictionist, under another name, a metaphysician. If we

were to designate the different classes of men, by the use they make of their minds, we should find; under different names and occupations, that many employ the very same fictional method. It would seem strange to call a rail-road, and a bank speculator, a gambler, a popular statesman, and a broker, metaphysicians; and again, to give the same title to a paper-credit shop-keeper, a manufacturer, land jobber, lottery-dealer, and lover; yet upon mental comparison, wherein should be the difference among them? They all alike, believe in what is unknown, or does not exist; all with a limited amount of perverted facts, argue upon hopes, fears, and wishes, by suppositions, reasonings, and conclusions, which are altogether vain: the traders with their calculations on the occult future of their profits; the metaphysician with his visions of occult causes, on the subjects of government, morals, medicine, theology, and the human mind.

I have been thus particular, perhaps too much so, in explaining the essential meaning of the term metaphysics, strictly considered synonymous with that of fiction, in its numberless uses, from its so called exalted, through its downward variety in form and degree of telling a falsehood under the moderated phrase, of an erroneous theory. A fanatic is the chief Dreamer of metaphysicians: nor will any rank, or position, or Platonic dignity or elegance of mere thought, and style, save his fictitious Logic from the charge of vain, or mischievous, or disastrous misrepresentation. And had Milton, after his Poem was finished, become monomaniac, and believed he had written it with a quill, from the angel Gabriel's wing; it would have been, to use an uncourteous word, a like falsehood with that of his magnificent description of Satan on his imperial throne in Pandemonium. It is proper that I should be thus particular in setting-forth the true character of the metaphysical method; since I shall have to encounter its mighty influence, on the credulous in thwarting the great purposes of observation on the subject of the human mind now before us. For I shall represent it, as a false, contracted and pretending method, which has done little towards the development of its frame and action, and has done every thing within its effective if not deliberate effort to prevent a proper physical investigation from having long ago been made and described, with the

plainness and accuracy of other phenomena in Natural Philosophy.

The physical investigation of things may indeed be slow, but it is cautious and sure; and when metaphysics do not confuse it, produces more practical result, in its shortest given time, than the latter can accomplish, by working on its airy nothings, through the whole of its inconceivable 'eternity.' It is a mistake to suppose the mind must, on certain subjects, act in a measure through a theoretic method, or it cannot act at all. It is true; nine-tenths of mankind, on the most important, and on the common affairs of life, do act only on the conjectural method: for they are not by name aware of another. And we see some of the results, in the folly, mischief, and crime that has followed the use of it, since the fictionary world began; from the silly adventurer, who metaphysically *guesses* he will draw the highest prize in a lottery, to the leading Prize Fighters at Waterloo; who each, obstinately metaphysical on what he knew nothing, was willing to stake his life, his renown, and the fate of his country, on the mingling of his military tactics with his hopeful *guessing* on the chances of his winning the day. Wherein consists the difference between the wise government of a country, and its reckless course to ruin? Between the prudent management of an estate, and its spendthrift dissipation? The use of exact physical observation and experience on the one hand; and of a vain and metaphysical ambition, and a speculative avarice on the other? But when we have not the grounds for positive knowledge, must we do nothing? Yes, in very important affairs we had better do nothing, until we have the knowledge to do right, than metaphysically to think of nothing, and thus; not thinking physically of cause and consequence; to do wrong. The world, particularly the political and the trading world, who require things to be done in haste; and who place dispatch before wisdom, have set a high estimate on what they call, the Man of Business. This important character performs his part in two ways. First, by the rotine of conventional things, whether right or wrong. And Second, when the rotine of convention does not serve him; having no time, or turn for observation; he **gathers up some fragments of uncertain experience, and decides his business, by metaphysical conjecture on**

these. And thus it is, that as Men of Business conduct all the executive and would-be important affairs of the world; those affairs both public and personal, in the majority of instances fail in their purposes, or end in disaster; if not preserved or retrieved by minds skilled in the unerring business of observation and its classifying experience. Look at the 'Atlantean shoulders' of the great *business powers* of the Minister of some mighty Monarchy; at the indefatigable business habits of the here and there and every where President of half a dozen spendthrift rail-roads; and at the business-management of a Government and a Bank-Financier; and do not be surprised to find the grand Empire in the embarrasment of millions upon millions of unpayable debt; of foreign difficulties; and of internal revolution; the rail-road enriching its officials, and swindling its stockholders; the bank by its business-sagacity, and its fictional speculations, turning its material-stock, by some occult causation, into a vanishing metaphysical nothing, and wringing the hearts of the widow and the orphan. All these disasters are the consequence; and not always with a vicious selfishness; of fiction prevailing over observation in the Business-Mind; a mind of stirring pretensions which too often performs its deluding promises, only in folly or crime. But such has been the way of the common mind, and so it will continue, as long as it remains ignorant of itself; and metaphysics alone shall try to instruct it. My purpose therefore, in the present sketch, is not with a vain hope to turn the metaphysician to the method of the observative philosophy; but to show him as a subject of curiosity, what a flimsy *im-material* mind he has, and what he is doing with it, when exercised under the condition of a fanatical theologian; a deluded, and yet still the follower of the Jack-o-lantern light of Liberty; or under that of the vacant notions of the 'motly fool.' For the notional method which has never yet taught him any thing else, will assuredly never teach him that. As our preparation for the subject before us is calculated to offend the prejudices of the unthinking, or rather false thinking mass of Readers; and thus prevent the attention necessary for comprehending our method of investigating the phenomena of the mind; we will risk the charge of repetition, in here giving under a summary recapitulation, another view of the right and the wrong of inquiry.

There have been throughout all recorded and traditional time, two contrary modes of using the mind. The one, by exercising its powers on the natural existences and actions of things; to ascertain thereby, what is to be known; and to apply that knowledge, both for the agreeable and useful purposes of life, and for their further extension. This is the mode employed in the earliest arts, necessary to the support and protection of man. A familiarity with these arts led, by the same process of observation and experiment, to a wider survey of causes and effects; and at last to the discovery of the general laws that direct them; thus unfolding the permanent and commanding principles of physical science. This method alone could have been subservient to the immediate wants of the savage; and to the simply personal and mechanical arts. Without this method, so well adapted to his early necessities, man would never have become civilized; and the savage even in his limited sphere could not have lived: for any other mode of effecting a useful purpose is so utterly incompetent, that it could not have domesticated a single animal; since if caught by the physical contrivance of a snare, nature would have been turned from her instinctive wildness, only by an experimental, not by a fictional taming. We have no authentic record of the date at which this exact method was applied to the measurement of the relationships of quantity, in arithmetic, and geometry. They have come down to us, as the great Patriarchs of truth in the physical system of precise investigation: for a perceptible relationship of any kind, as we shall show hereafter, is a known physical fact. A few of the physical sciences, formerly so called, have only very lately assumed the observative and experimental method: and we see the great result of undisputed truth, in astronomy, chemistry, natural philosophy, with its branches, and the old fictional subject of geology, now under the direction of physical science, sweeping away the idle and conflicting tales of the metaphysical cosmogony; of chaos subsiding into order, darkness starting into light, and of Promethean thefts from Heaven, to warm the sluggish mass of human matter into life. This is the only method of using the mind for the acquisition of useful and permanent knowledge; and of providing every necessary means for human subsistence, every power of the mechanic, and every de-

light of the esthetic arts: wherein the pretensions of any fictional method would have kept the world in ignorance, and doomed it to starvation. And whenever the illuminating power of observation and experiment shall be universally applied to other departments of inquiry, that now only partially employ it; and to other subjects, which reject it entirely; it will reduce all to the like exact and undisputed condition of truth.

The other mode of inquiry, if that can be called inquiry, which by waste of time, in conjecture and irritating controversy, produces nothing but a ground for further conjecture; and therefore not entitled to a scientific name; is that notional method, we have already stigmatized as metaphysics. This limited and perverted use of the mind; which should find its popularity only in the unmeaning poetry of an early and *unthinking*, or of a later and *past-thinking* people; has obtruded itself into every science, except those two bulwarks of truth, Arithmetic, and Geometry. It consists, in most cases, of assumptions without the least foundation, raised only on some dreaming notion, or on some oral or written authority, backwardly derived from former fiction; and which, after ages of encouraging obscurity has, to the ignorant and superstitious, been muffled into an acceptable caricature of truth. Of this kind are the ancient mythological fables, and modern stories of ghosts and goblins, together with the unnumbered tales of popular delusion. These are the necessary products, though not so technically named, of the metaphysical use of the mind. The next is that, which without descending to the vulgar creation of giants and devils, approaches, though distantly towards nature in magnified poetical and prose descriptions of human character; and of events, with a historical foundation on what is not impossible. Of this kind are parts of Homer and Virgil: the description of natural scenery in Milton: a great portion of Shakspeare, in his persons, and their veritable sentiments. I do not notice that great mercenary herd of fictionists, who hardly seem to know, and not much to care, what they write; though they all hold the passing, and perishing pen of the poetical dreamer. The next, and greatest mischief of the metaphysician appears in the arts and sciences. I need not recount what he has done in Theology; how many heavens he has pictured, how

many hells, how many millions of gods, of monstrous and distorted shapes, with passions, vices, loves, jealousies, selfishness, ambition, vain-glory, and revenge, that seem to allure, instead of deterring, by their bad example. And it is remarkable, of all this fictitious creation, that the same master-metaphysical hand which made them, ostensibly for one great purpose; the government, welfare and guardianship of man; should, through all parts and ages of the world, have made the hierarchy of heaven, with its penalties and rewards so different from each other. In the early astronomy, metaphysics found only the judicial influence of the stars. This delusion, once common to the Prince, the Priest, and the People, after having long served the purpose of its inventors, has by natural science, been gradually driven down to the Fortune-teller and his dupes. Geology, till within a century, had no teacher but the metaphysician, confirming to himself his former tales of giants, by digging-up the great bones of the mammoth; and setting nature to work with her plastic hand, at moulding recent fossils, which should not be more than six thousand years old. The theory and practice of medicine, which, in the little it can do, should proceed altogether on observation and experiment, has, since long before the period of the Hippocratic Books, been directed more by the fancies of the metaphysician, than by the fact of the physical observer; hence the sectarian schools, throughout all time, and the disagreement of Doctors, about what neither of the irrefragable parties knew any thing, except their own obstinacy, and their unceasing changes in the opinions, the nomenclature, and the remedies of the art. As to government and the fine arts, the metaphysicians, who conceit so much, never conceit these subjects can be reduced to any thing like the precision of physical observation and experience; for this would take the reins from the hands of the King, the Demagogue, and the self-conceited 'genius' of the pen and the pencil, the bit from the mouth of the people; and although always talking about history and precedent and example, still keep up their own example of a returning circle of fictional contention. The fine arts, as we have said, are the result of observation and experiment by the eye and the ear, or form and color and sound; and are severally the science of these two senses. Far however from being so under-

stood and regarded, the ignorant mass consider Taste as an intuition of the mind; and thus with true metaphysical assumption, self-confidently perhaps, but narrowly judge without rule or precision for themselves.

From the confused and imperfect manner in which the mind has been described by the schools, and exercised in the world, it would not be unfair to say; the greater part of mankind, and women almost without an exception, apply the art of thinking, as the higher classes of sub-animals do their instincts; which are only a fixed pre-arrangement of their minds, to be used, as occasions require the supply of their necessities, and the gratification of their passions. For the human multitude never extend their thinking beyond the contracted circle, within which their business, wants, wishes, and passions are concentrated solely on themselves. The human mind, under the full cultivation of its destined powers, is capable of representing a wide extent of the existences, actions, and relationships of things; and loses in this application, the sub-animal character of its selfish limitation. In every sane, and productive mind; as our analysis will hereafter show; an enlarged and precise mode of thinking on one subject, holds at the same time the effective power of comprehensively thinking on all others. The sub-animals exercise their limited minds, only for their appetites, their enmities, and their self-preservation. From this, together with the want of a discriminative and accumulating language, arises the narrowness of their instinctive thoughts. In the same way, the great masses of mankind employ thinking only on the few subjects of their proper business, their appetites, hopes, and fears, and thus necessarily partake of the character of the sub-animal: for though man has the assistance of a full and significant language; that language, from perversion, and a want of precision, often rather increases than diminishes the defects and errors of a limited mind. It is in this ignorance of its own structure and uses; and of the abundant resources of the physical mode of inquiry, which the vacant and the narrow mind requires, that it is not aware of the means for supplying its wants; and vainly pleased with the metaphysical delusion, hopefully adopts the notional method, which only fixes unalterably, the narrow boundary, it deceptively proposed to remove.

It has been said, perhaps falsely and satirically, that the Rite of ancient sacrifice was first suggested by the poorer Priests, who designed to take the unburnt remnants of the victim. It may be assumed, with greater probability, that the limited and poorer class of thinkers were, and still are, willing to turn from the exact, but laborious physical method of inquiry, to draw their lazy hopes of intellectual subsistence from the insubstantial fragments of metaphysical fiction: which without aiding in the least the powers of the mind, begin by perverting, and end by destroying them.

It is to set this limited and fictional use of the mind in an intelligible light, as prefatory to our future analysis, that I have insisted strongly and repeatedly on the difference between the two methods. The one ascribes a material and mental energy to the senses and the brain. The other assumes that agency to be directed by an immaterial spirit. Were it not for this difference, and for the overbearing influence of the latter opinion, we should long ago have been reconciled, and may still be, to the belief in a material mind. But the great gulf of inconsistency is fixed between them; and until the metaphysician is cured of his hallucinations, there can be no going and coming to each other. It is a forlorn hope to rely on, but perhaps when he finds that all his attempts to analyse the mind, have never taught him the composition of its spirituality, nor how to use it; and on the other hand learns how easily the analysis may be made on the ground, of a material structure, he may regard the sin against the Creator, in rejecting a spiritual agency, less heinous, if not altogether pardonable, by finding in the work before us, the happy result of that rejection. There seems however, to be no other ground for a charge of heresy and sin, against the belief of the mind being a material function, than that the spiritual metaphysician has always been considered as a *man of God*; and the purely physical philosopher, as the child of an unnameable father: for it is the Theological notion, that the human mind being a finite portion of the Infinite Spirit, it must especially represent him. But the Almighty, in his Dispensations, shows no partiality throughout his Works: his *spirit*, which we do not perceive, or, under another and a better name, his *Power*, which we do, pervades equally the



universe, and permits the material senses and the brain to think, and the sparrow to fall, without infusing the spirit of life into one, and the spirit of death into the other. If I had such a limited and therefore degrading notion, so I call it, of the Almighty, as to think he could not, at his will, with the same word that is said to have brought light out of darkness, *speak* percipient thought into a material brain, I would cease to believe in his creative wisdom and un wasteful economy; and certainly would not bow-down to his omnipotence. When God has so openly declared his Attributes, in the language of his material works, it is the impious and shriveled brain of the metaphysician alone that would require him to break through his universal law of construction, and not allow some humble physical adorer to assign the thinking power, to a material agency, as one of the refined applications of his wisdom and power. Trace down with the microscope, and see the minute subtlety of material organization, suited to perform every conceivable purpose of things. Increase the power of the glass, and perceive antecedent material causations, in diminishing subtlety; all of which, to the unassisted eye are as invisible, and to the mind as astonishing and admirable, as any self-hiding and supposed spiritual agency; then do not be surprised, that within our contracted comprehension, the last imperceptible subtlety of matter in the human brain should be in the exercise of the process of thought, which if at all, can be known only as a physical fact. Nature, and the Almighty *power*, not *spirit*, that directs her, have founded the laws of an incipient organization, in the crystalized mineral; and the laws of a full and perfect structure of vegetable and animal life, on the innate functions of matter: and however a metaphysician by his own limited perception, may in imitation of himself, wish to limit Almighty power; I cannot, without a denial of his omnipotence, and the unity of his Godhead and his Hand, doubt that he made the human mind as he made every thing else, without even the thought of the notional spirit of the metaphysician. It is this deadly sin of a belief in physical thought that makes the Theologian abhor both matter and the microscope; for the latter tells him more than he could have conceived, of the refined and subtle power of the former.

What is here said, is to be taken only on the strictest analogy with what is perceptible, in the works of nature, and in the unity of the directing hand of her Almighty Ruler. Nor do I intend to notice, except for purposes of my own, any argument that may hereafter arise against this persuasion; unless it should furnish, by analogical probability, from the existing laws of physical nature, an equal probability of something called a spiritual agency in the senses and the brain. And then the advocates of these opposite opinions; for so, with very different grounds they are; should be silent towards each other; each resting with sufficient reason to himself, for his antagonist conviction.

In the Work before us, the Reader will find, as far as we learn from records, an entirely original view not of all the facts, but of a system of the mind; for it is drawn, with whatever inaccuracies, immediately from Nature. If he is familiar with books on this subject, he will perhaps be disappointed, on finding here, nothing like them, in explanation, or arrangement, and very little in nomenclature. The Outline here given is drawn by direct observation, from my own manner of thinking, and that displayed in the words, writings, and acts of others; the few and only sources of reliable knowledge. Writers on the subject of the mind have so obscured their truth, by the mists of erroneous theory, that with some general facts derived from them, I have directed my attention exclusively to the palpable and undisturbed physical laws of thought; that when master of the ways and means of their simple agency, and thus beyond the influence of scholastic and popular authority; I might safely consult the opinions of others. I was taught at College, a short system of 'Logic;' and a common and superficial notion of the mind, in what was called Moral Philosophy: and afterwards gathered from general reading, and from metaphysical disputes, many of the received truths, and notions of intellectual history. Having, at an early period, turned from these unsatisfactory guides, to the path of physical observation, I abandoned all reference to books: intending, when the ordination of the mind should be ascertained, to compare it with the schemes of the metaphysicians. Years ago before sketching-out this work, and merely because their names were current in the world, I looked into a part of

Mr. Locke, and of Dugald Stewart; and now only recollect, that the former denied what, under a strict physical inquiry, would never have been asserted; the existence of 'Innate Ideas:' and that the latter satisfied himself with the difference between mind and matter, by an *un*-physical, and sophistic argument on the difference of their respective properties. To ascertain however, that I was not about to offer what is already known, it was my intention to consult, before publishing, all accessible books on the subject: when to save this tedious task, I fortunately, met with Mr. Robert Blakey's learned analysis of all the noted metaphysical writers on the mind from the earliest times, to the middle of the present century. Finding in that full survey and able exposition, nothing similar in character and execution, to the system of the following Work, I resolved to look no further into the confounding and irreconcilable differences of the notional theories of the German, French, Scotch, and English schools. If in copying from the Book of Nature alone, I may have ignorantly made use of some of their individual thoughts, or denied myself the light of their unfictionized observations, I have perhaps escaped much of that metaphysical contagion, that seems to have disordered their intellect, by their holding too close a communication with each other.

But let it be remembered; the present attempt is offered merely as an outline of the ordination of the Working Plan of the material mind: leaving others, who may adopt our analysis and arrangement, to correct, enlarge, vary, and complete it, by the accumulated observations of past and future inquiry.

BRIEF OUTLINE
OF
AN ANALYSIS
OF THE
HUMAN INTELLECT.

SECTION I.

Containing Terms, Divisions, and Explanations; with a view of the subjects of Materialism, Spirituality, and of Instinct.

THE human mind is an effect of the organization of the senses, and the brain. This mental function is governed by laws similar to those of other physical phenomena.

We all believe in the facts, and agree in the meaning of the terms of these simple propositions; that we exist; that objects are perceived by the senses; and that knowledge of external things and of their actions is the first process in the production of intellect. If the Reader cannot admit this, our regard to each other ceases; and he may satisfy or confuse himself with any metaphysical notions to the contrary. We will endeavor to show; there is a similar process of perceiving in the brain; and applying the term Perception, for these leading functions of both the senses and the brain, will divide them into the following Five modes;

PRIMARY,
MEMORIAL,
JOINT,
CONCLUSIVE, AND
VERBAL PERCEPTIONS.

These include the constituents both in state, and in action, of that part of the human frame, called the Mind.

As our nomenclature is different from that of other writers, we here, in prefatory explanation, endeavor to impress on the Reader, the leading terms of our analysis, by the following summary; to which he may hereafter refer, should there be any obscurity in our future use of them.

We call the exercises of the senses, and the brain, which constitute the mind, purely Material or Physical.

The five above named physical functions of the senses and the brain, we call the Constituent Perceptions of the mind. They are in order,

- First.* PRIMARY,
- Second.* MEMORIAL,
- Third.* JOINT,
- Fourth.* CONCLUSIVE,
- Fifth.* VERBAL.

The first is exercised by the senses. The second, third, and fourth by the brain. The fifth audibly describes the silent perceptions of the other four; and though not formed within the mind, yet subsequently acting upon it through the sense of hearing, becomes in a peculiar way, as we shall learn, one of its essential constituents.

The five constituent perceptions are practically exercised under varied conditions of form, force, degree, and other obvious changes. These variations, to whatever character, we call the *Qualities* of the constituents.

We employ the word mind, with no reference, except when specified, to its yet hidden structure of matter or spirit; and only as a convenient term, briefly designating the aggregate of states and actions of the five constituents and their qualities; rejecting or forgetting every particular purpose, power, or action of the aggregate. With a similar meaning, and for a variable convenience, the terms Intellect, Mentivity, Thought, and Thinking, together, with the phrase, Intellectual, Mental, and thinking Powers, are occasionally used.

As we might apply the word *sensuous*, adjectively, to a perception by the senses; so we might take the anatomical term *Cerebral*, to denote the adjective-meaning of a perception by the brain.

The word *Image*, is used for the mirrored representation of

external things, in the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions through the sense of *sight*. And though each of the other senses has its several percipient powers; yet the term image is not metaphorically applicable to them; nor am I aware that the difference of the two cases has been technically noticed and named. I can at present think of no better term than that of *Type*, to denote the character of the peculiar impressions; both sensuous and cerebral; made through hearing, touch, taste, and scent.

The word *Idea*, though it might under one view, be classed with that of perception, has yet been so various and vague in its signification, that we reject it together with nine-tenths of the confused technical nomenclature of the metaphysical school.

We call a *Thing*, every physical existence and action, perceivable as an impression on the senses from without, and as an internal type or image on the brain: for we have as positive, though not as marked a perception of an image or type on the memory, as of any thing external. We thus employ the word *Thing*, as the most general term, for an apparent element, or single instance of existence, action, and other obvious relationships, in the physical Universe. These things are perceived either in their apparent singleness, without regard to their connection with other existences and actions; or aggregated under the boundary of form, or as a connected succession of actions. We shall call this assemblage of single things; an *Object* or *Aggregate*, and the individual of an aggregate, a single thing. We reject all the notions of the old intellectual system on this subject; and will try to forget all its terms. If they have a meaning, it is embraced by our comprehensive and simple nomenclature. Some of them however may, as occasions require, be taken as common words, but not as proper to our explanations.

We have no place for that transcendental term '*Ideality*;' nor for '*Genius*,' that assumed and indefinite prerogative of the smaller professors of the inventive and esthetic arts; nor for *Talent*, that inexplicable title for the merit of any body; nor finally for *Profundity*, the deep, and privileged obscurity of a metaphysical plunge into darkness. There are perhaps other terms of the old system, that might be severally taken as synonymous, into our

nomenclature; or altogether dropped as useless or erroneous: but we leave others to determine, by the analysis, and principles of this work, what to make use of, and what to reject.

The preceding Terms are proposed as a simple, and definite nomenclature, in place of the complex, self-conflicting, and therefore uninstructional language of the old philosophical schools; which by their attempts to explain what are called the 'faculties and operations' of the mind, without a radical analysis of their ways and means, have only kept us in ignorance, through the distracting blindness of dispute.

As this work will have to accost some slow, and some repugnant ears, we here to guard against misunderstanding, enlarge our previous explanation of the five generic powers, or constituent perceptions of the mind.

Primary perceptions are produced by external things set before, or applied to the senses. We have no knowledge of the peculiar manner in which external things impress the senses except in sight and hearing. The science of Optics teaches that a visible object impresses on the retina, a material image of its outline, color, motion, and form, similar in manner as we must infer, to the representation of an image on a mirror, by an object placed or moved before it. And we learn from Acoustics, that the impulses of sound do not form images but excite physical vibrations on the drum of the ear, corresponding to those of the vibrating body. Except sight then, the other senses receive, instead of an image or other correspondence, a *type* or indication of the external cause or impression. All these are purely physical facts, respectively, of the eye and of the other senses. After this, the imaged and typical process in the production of thought is beyond observation.

Memorial perceptions are the images and types of objects and actions on the brain; once respectively before the eye, and on the other senses, but now removed; or more briefly, they are perceptions without the presence of their external causative objects. They are fainter than the primary, but the images derived from sight, have still their outline, form, color, and motion. There is the like faintness, in the types, however these may exist or act in the brain. From an analogy that cannot be controverted, we

infer; the memorial perceptions are excited upon some delicate but *unobvious* organization of the brain: and having regarded the primary as physical functions, we must further infer with strong probability; from the homogeneous structure of the sensuous nerves and the brain, and from the correspondence of the images and types with their external things; excepting a fainter degree of the memorial; that until the contrary is proved, the memorial are equally a material process: nor could a different condition have been conceived, had not the notion of spirit been, for some ulterior purpose, invented to produce a distraction from the simple sufficiency of a material organization for every function of the mind. These two percipient powers, the primary and the memorial, furnish the *materials* or means, for employing the joint, the conclusive, and the verbal perceptions.

Joint Perceptions compare, under a simultaneous or successive view, two or more primary or memorial images and types of things on the senses, and on the brain. These may be of primary *alone*, when the senses compare several images and types of the objects before them; or of memorial *alone*, when the images and types of things, now removed from before the senses, are compared. These are respectively called *Unmixed*, when primary are compared with primary and memorial with memorial perceptions; and *Mixed*, when primary images and types on the senses are compared with memorial images and types on the brain. A comparison of the images and types is not merely a simple perception of the existences of things. This would reduce the mind to the state of a common mirror, which makes no comparison of its images.

There is in both the senses and the brain, a joint comparison or measurement between their images and types. As when of two different objects, a locomotive and a car, it is perceived that the former draws, and the latter is drawn. This constitutes a Joint comparison or perception of action between them. In like manner, one thing or object is perceived to be more vivid, of greater magnitude, of graver or acuter sound, of sharper taste, and of stronger scent, than another. And further, when one action has a greater force, quicker motion or longer duration than another, we have a like joint comparison. These comparisons create an intermediate perception between things, and constitute,

what, in want of a better term, is called Relationship. These relationships, as states, conditions, degrees, and agencies between things in nature and in art, are severally those; of identity, similarity, and difference; of kind and its modes; form and its varieties; motion with its changes and directions; the successions of cause and effect, as they are called; and of the incalculable amount of relative and reciprocal bearings, which all the things of the universe present among themselves; and which are clearly perceptible to the senses, and to the memorial organization of the brain.

As we inferred from the strongest analogy; the primary and memorial are functions of matter, however hidden the delicate structure may be; we on like analogy, infer that the joint, and their relationships; which are only a perceptive comparison of the primary and the memorial, and not a change of their essential character; are equally the result of a physical construction.

Conclusive Perceptions are a more limited survey of the relationships between things in their primary impression on the senses, and their memorial images and types on the brain, when presented by the joint. It is the conclusive, whether upon a mixed or unmixed assemblage of the primary and memorial perceptions, that notices their relationships, rejects their difference, scrutinizes their agreements, traces their causations, decides upon them according to their sufficiency for the end in view; and terminates the unuttered and silent exercises of the mind. Here without the disclosing power of language, the hidden wonders of the four constituent actions of the senses and the brain would be a proper inquiry only for the metaphysician. Conclusions being then perceptions of the relationships between physical images and types, we must infer from strong analogy; until the contrary shall be proved; they are equally a physical function of the brain.

Verbal perceptions. We have just said; the silent exercise of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive powers of the mind would be no more than a *Camera Clausa* of images and types noticeable only by the single percipient, who regards them. For the purpose of making known to others, the use of those silent powers, there is at the service of the mind, the means of audibly describing the character, divisions, and manner of exercising

those silent powers; thereby to enable other individual minds, to compare their respective silent perceptions with each other's: and thus through joint comparison, strict conclusion, and a definite nomenclature, to lead to the development of the universal laws of intellectual perception.

Verbal signs, when properly applied to images and types, and to their relationships, come back through the ear, as primary perceptions, to the mind that directed them, as really as any other thing in nature or art impresses its allotted sense; and in their audible and returning types are no less strictly a part of the perceptive mind. As these verbal, and so to call them here, *Reacting signs*, are primary, so are they subsequently, memorial, and with these, perform the purpose of joint, and conclusive perceptions; thus, *speakingly*, as it were, returning among the silent powers of the mind which directed their vocal utterance and their signification. We have therefore, on the ground of a similarity, if not of identity with the other powers of perception, made these verbal signs the *Fifth* constituent of the human mind. They take this essential part, not only as the important means of communicating our own thoughts to others, but by reacting on ourselves, they enable the primary to be more distinct, the memorial more durable and abundant, the joint more clearly comparable, and the conclusive more assignable and exact: thus changing the evanescent images, and types in the *Camera Clausa* of the single and silent percipient, to a distinct and permanent vocal tablet, hung-out for the intelligent perception of all. Without a significant language, or a perception of words, as we properly call it, the other modes of perception would be of limited use to us as intellectual, and progressive beings. I need scarcely here remark, that the verbal signs, acting obviously on the ear, and subsequently becoming memorial types, are by strong analogy to all other perceptions, a similar instance of physical function in the senses and the brain.

To illustrate the process of the five perceptive powers; suppose a line of a certain length to be set before, and to affect the sense of sight. This is primary. Again, set before the sight, a line of different length, as another instance of the primary. These are instances of the first constituent process, in the physical produc-

tion of the mind. When these lines of different length are removed from the eye, there may arise images of them on the brain. This is the exercise of the memorial constituent; the second process of the mind. With these two different lines before the sense, or with their images before the memorial, or while one of the lines is memorial, and the other primary, we have the joint, constituent or means of comparing one perception with another. This is called Unmixed, when the images of both the lines are primary, or both memorial; and Mixed, when one is memorial and the other primary. This joint comparison of images or types whether coexistent or instantaneously successive, mixed or unmixed, is the third constituent process of the mind. The difference perceived between the length of these two lines, on joint comparison, is called their Relationship.

A final decision on the truth of the relationship between the two lines is called a conclusive perception; the fourth constituent function of the mind. These four powers, when silently exercised within the senses and the brain of a single percipient; though necessarily essential to the mind, as observed in uninstructed mutes; are yet feeble and fugitive, and need the assistance of language, or some other sign, to accomplish the scope of their natural ordination. Supposing then, we had no terms for the images of these things and their differences, though we have used the words line and length, let us apply the term *staff*, to each of the different things, and *length* to the measure of their difference; the first by separating the particular form of the staff from all other named or unnamed forms, at once renders the primary perceptions more distinct, and durable. This verbal sign of the staff passes from the primary into the memorial, making its silent images more noticeable, clear, and lasting, for the use of the joint and conclusive. The joint will perceive, and compare the images of many staffs more distinctly, when thus brightened by their cerebral or silent name. By the same verbal light of the term *length*, the conclusive will more readily perceive the relationship of the two staffs, and that one exceeds the other, in some measurable extension.

These five powers of perception direct the whole process of the mind, in exercising itself on the images, and types of all the

existences, actions, and relationships of physical nature; from the broad and useful development of the simple working of its own mechanism, to the analysis of the motion of the atmosphere in a whirlwind, and the delicate resolution of light into the colors of the rain-bow.

We have described the five constituent working powers of the senses and the brain. And though these few generic divisions are sufficient for a general survey of all their included instrumentalities, yet the particular application of these working powers; under their various conditions, agencies, degrees, and peculiar uses; to the universal things and actions of nature and art, makes it necessary to consider the different modifications of these powers, for the explanation of the several differences which appear in the perceptions, language, character, and productions of human intellect. This modification of the general powers of the five constituents into their special conditions, agencies, degrees, and peculiar uses, we called the *Qualities* of perception.

We have learned that all the five modes of perception are respectively, in the sense of sight only mirrored images; and in the other senses, only types, or indications of the external things which produce them: the modifications of these constituent-powers must therefore be represented in the conditions, agencies, degrees, and uses of those images and types. Thus these images and types may be more or less accurate; more or less readily impressed on the senses, or *struck-up* on the brain; they may be transient or enduring; greater or less in number, either coexisting or successive, on the memorial field; there may be a more or less ready and abundant gathering of them for the choice of joint comparison, and for the accuracy of a conclusive decision; a greater tendency to class themselves according to their relationships; a varied power among the images and types, interchangeably to obscure, and to displace each other; and a greater or less readiness and precision in the verbal sign.

The influence of these qualities of perception, or of their images and types, as we shall endeavor to show, produces the greater part of the difference of character in the human mind. And though it may appear, from the above survey of the qualities,

that the term condition, or mode, or agency, might be more appropriate to some of them, yet I shall employ that of Quality, until furnished with one more precise.

Thus we call the five constituents, the *general* powers of the mind; since they are universally necessary for its natural and productive exercise. But it is the difference in the quality of those powers, or in the varieties of condition, agency, degree, and use of their images and types, that makes in greater part, the difference between truth and error, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, ignorance and knowledge, coarseness and refinement, sanity and madness in human character. For brief illustration, let us suppose a given degree of clearness to be required in a primary perception; obscurity in quality would defeat its purpose; and an excess of vividness blind it to every thing else. In the memorial, a limited power in gathering images or types, may produce a narrowness of mind; and a facility in calling up too many, render it unsteady and impracticable. Slowness in collecting related perceptions for joint comparison, may render the mind both feeble and confused. In the conclusive, too rapid and abundant a quality will be apt to precipitate decision into error: and in the verbal sign, too wide a memorial gathering may lead to a loose and fluent verbosity.

The foregoing brief account of the five constituent agencies of the senses and the brain, and of the various qualities, or conditions of image and type, under which they are exercised, includes, as far as I observe, an outline of the whole power and means employed in the purposes of the mind. These few divisions, subdivisions, and terms, as they will be hereafter more particularly explained and applied, are elementary and comprehensive; and sufficient for the work of the intellect, without the pretending, but distracting assistance of those dogmatic notions, and that confounding nomenclature, by which the metaphysician and the theologian have complicated the natural simplicity of its structure and functions. With reference to the preceding divisions, we may for future convenience, call the five leading heads, the Generic perceptions or constituents; and the several Qualities, their species.

On all the five *generic* modes of perception, and their specific

qualification by condition, agency, degree, and use, we again remark, that until the contrary is proved, we must infer; they are purely the result of physical organization of the senses, and the brain. The volumes of argument against this position, have always been obstructive metaphysical assumptions; and if not given up by the sophist himself, will still continue side by side, with the fictional miracles of King Arthur, and with the Thousand and One of the Arabian Tales; not using these notions as a mere pastime amusement, but with intolerant temper, and controversy. The denial of physical agency in the mind, and the argument against it, began with a theoretic nothing; and it is the duty of an observative philosophy to altogether disregard it. The growth of a tree is perceived in nature; and by the true and progressive mode of inquiry, is ascribed to the physical agency of earth, air, heat, light, and moisture; and thereupon, further inquiry is made into the causes of these causes of its growth. But some meddling disturber of the clear course of knowledge, with his own motives, asserts, that the process of nutrition in the tree is effected by something that breathed into the seed the breath of its life, and that annually in the Spring, it renews its vivifying inspiration: thus dispensing with the material causation of earth, air, light, heat, and moisture. So to avoid the necessity of a material and thinking brain, the fictionist, as in allotting a vital principle to plants, has attempted to annul the physical laws that produce the physical phenomena of mind, by the substitution of a metaphysical Spirit. It is the duty of the botanist, who, by observation and experiment, has found nothing besides purely physical effects in vegetation, never to waste his improveable time on such notions of causation. A spiritualist who denies a well-grounded analogical inference in favor of the material agency of mind, is required to *prove* the ground of his own conceit. For without this, physical science would lose its productive labor, by wastefully hearing and disproving denials. But the effects of that unseen organization are in the two cases, of the plant and the mind, analogous; for the deep-seated, and structural causation is equally subtle and unseen in each. It is therefore the wise use of an organized intellect, to consider itself as material, if the contrary is not shown, in the sufficiency of the causes and effects

of some immaterial agency. It is no less the part of physical philosophy, to show, that material objects, and the subtle wonders of their organization exist in innumerable forms, and with innumerable agencies; and until the materiality of the mind is disproved, to turn the back of its regard upon, the obtrusive assumption of a mental power in spirit, which has never been shown to exist. It is the candid declaration of a physical and exact philosophy, which has done so much for knowledge, that; standing on the vantage-ground of acquired and demonstrable truth; it has, and needs no other relief from the impertinent intrusion of a fictional and verbal metaphysic, than to pass by its busy nothings. To argue against it, is in a degree, seemingly to substantiate or give weight to that nothing; and in reality to lessen its own usefulness, dignity, and respect.*

In this particular part of our subject, we entered, in some of its earlier writing, upon a general argument in favor of the materiality, and against the spiritual entity of the mind. But the Reader must have learned; the manner of this argument is contrary to our present view on the proper defense of materiality. For what is to be offered, can be drawn only from an analogy of the functions of the mind, to other agencies of matter; showing a probability that the act of perception may be a part of the unity in the mode of cause and effect, which is found to be the working plan of universal matter. Thus assuming solely upon analogy and unity, yet without proof, that the mind must be part of the material structure and action of all natural things. Leaving the question to him who would violate the law of unity in creation, by trying to satisfy himself with a belief of the entity of a spirit; when materiality with its stricter method of inquiry, would not be disposed to refute it. For without a limitation of the universal law of matter by the ghostly illusion of an untraceable authority; the notion of there being a spiritual agent in any thing physical, could no more have entered into the mind of man,

* Metaphysical argument is that *fictional cat* of a disputatious intellect, not of nine alone, but of unnumbered lives, with always one to take the place of the last destroyed; and as the merciful inquirer after truth should not lose his time, by unavailing efforts to kill them all; it is more hopeful to let them retire to a corner, and for once to be true to a sub-animal habit, by dying thereby a natural death.

than into that of the broadest-thinking sub-animal. But disputive arguments on this subject, when given as *proof* on either side, are all identified by one homogeneous absurdity; nor can the metaphysical Problem; how many angels may dance on the point of a cambric needle, claim precedence in folly, of an equally notional question; whether the spiritual mind ever closes its eyes in the brain. Had the metaphysical school, or the Church; when they first raised the argument between the respective claims of matter and spirit, to their agency in the senses and the brain; handed it over to Epicurus, and to Archimedes, both would have said, they could perceive nothing but matter; and would not have argued against it. He who thinks he perceives spirit in the brain, thinks he must argue against matter being able to think: for it being not positively known that matter cannot think, and that spirit can, all argument must rest upon unmeaning metaphysical words: and under a strict method of inquiry, there never should have been a question on the difference, much less a dispute.

But to show how useless argument is on this subject, we will before throwing away what we had written, select one or two instances of wranglers misunderstanding each other. Thus if a spiritualist ask a materialist with a kind of triumph; can matter think? The materialist instead of flatly saying in like foolish triumph it can; freely confesses that granite and mahogany in a rude state can only respectively serve to build a Castle, and be made into furniture. But adds, there is no regard to music in a stem of box-wood, and no indication of time in a wedge of brass; yet these when respectively organized into a flute and a clock, can, by properly acting causes produce to first observation, their surprising effects.

When a strict method of thought thus presents a physical analogy in the Laws of nature, to the process of the mind; the Spiritualist, dodging from the hint of unity, throws his question, without changing its meaning, into another phrase, and asks with the force of a negation; can matter be conscious of itself? Before the materialist can answer this, he must be told what consciousness is, which the spiritualist cannot inform him; and thus there is a stop and a vacant stare, in the arguments of the wranglers. As however the spiritualist is a copious word-monger, we ask him

whether a change of term might not produce a clearer understanding of his words 'thought and consciousness.' This will open a new path of verbal observation at least, and perhaps lead to some desirable, though as yet unknown results.

Let us ask, whether matter can reflect? If to reflect, when understood of the senses and the brain, is to have image or type, represented or impressed upon them; certainly a block of unpolished granite cannot reflect. But as certainly the matter of a mirror can, under this representative meaning. It is the same with the surface of the human retina; which can reflect a measurable image: and when we consider the extreme minuteness, or mere point of reflecting space on the retina of the smallest seeing insect; we find no objection to the admission, that the structure of the brain, however minute its organic cells or atomic granules, for nature never stops at subtlety, may be clear points for reflecting those images and types of things. Having thus come to the analogical result, that sensuous and cerebral matter under some of its peculiar forms or conditions can reflect or perceive an object; it may be asked; what can reflection or perception of objects on the brain effect? It is readily answered; reflections and perceptions do the important work of Thinking; since we find what is called 'thought' is nothing more than those reflected perceptions: for having shown analogically, that the imaged and typical impressions, or what we call perceptions, fulfil all the functions of the mind, they must constitute Thought, which is here only one of the general terms for mind. Perceptions in their primary and memorial form, therefore represent on the senses and the brain, those images and types of external things with their joint, and conclusive comparisons which we call thinking. With regard then to the question, whether matter can think, we might by changing that term to *reflect* and *perceive*, be disposed to admit, that an image and type, being made on the matter of the brain must by reciprocity of action, be material; and that, what is signified by the word 'thought' being a reflective or perceptive image and type, must be a resembling function of matter. All this may be a new analysis, seeming to carry us close up to the truth. But it signifies nothing, if it does not touch it, for the whole of our present remarks amount only to analogy; w

icet to be something that looks like truth.

In the same way, I tried to derive an analogical 'argument' from the perception of Pain: and though it seemed to approach it, could not bring its seeming, to the truth. When truth is courted, she is as a mistress; and with an ardent and absent lover, she rises in full and vivid image on the slightest resemblance to her. Who with our views of materiality, can avoid recurring to the mind, on seeing the surface of the foil and the glass laid together, making so perfect a representation of what is set before them. If we were not so familiar with the moving image on a mirror, it might at first sight be mistaken for a function of life. When Narcissus saw a similar effect in the fountain, he died in the belief; he saw an animated being. The fable gives what we would consider a picture of animal perception. But much as we might wish to have sensuous proof, on the subject of materiality, we have only encouraging analogy. All this however, except as hints at truth we throw aside; waiting for strict demonstration by the microscope, or other physical means, how the images and types, performing their functions in the brain are not only the proximate cause of thought, but are thought itself. By the preceding views we learn the condition of the whole argument for the claims of the believers respectively in a material and in a spiritual mind. The former from the numerous analogies of the Laws of God and Nature, wishing to believe, that mind is only one of the physical instances of those laws. The latter without a speck of analogy, hanging on some antiquated authority of Gods and men, believe; they have the demonstrated fact of Spirit; and that they might if further proof were necessary, plainly see, hear, touch, taste, and scent it. Having therefore the testimony of Gods and men, and if they so believe, of their own five senses, they proceed to persecute, imprison, burn, and crucify the would-be materialist, because he cannot see positively the working plan of either matter or spirit in the human mind.*

* I derived in childhood, some of the instruction of that period, from a story-book called the *Looking Glass*. Every truth, and unfortunately, every error since learned, has come through that human organization, or physical mirror as I would regard it, of the senses and the brain, reflecting the objects of nature, and the distorted pictures of fiction. In that early play called 'Hunt the Slipper,' we are said to burn, when we come near the place of its concealment. Every time a Beauty vacantly simpers at her own image, and her suitor adjusts

In the rejected argument of the early writing of this first Section, I endeavored to draw a plea for materiality from an analogy of the instinct of the sub-animal, to the exercise of human perception. The metaphysician who, for some design of his own, allots a spiritual mind to one, gives without telling his motive; for it is not derived from analytic observation; to the other a thinking but material agent which he contradistinguishes as Instinct. Our analogical view tended to show, that instinct, and what is called 'reason;' or what we would respectively call the working plan of the sub-animal and of the human mind, is the same. The instinct of the sub-animal does afford the nearest resemblance to the intellect of man: and as the metaphysician assigns instinct to matter, and 'reason' to spirit, we will here give a brief abstract from our view of the analogy, nay, under some conditions, of the identity between them: for every animal mind, from the lowest to the highest, begins in instinct, and if on strict analysis its mode of acting can ever be distinguished from that of reason, it must be by difference of age, wherein each has its allotted time, and each performs its similar and unerring purpose of thought. The sub-animal, with a limited Fifth constituent, wisely through life improves its other four, for all it requires. The 'reasonable' Being, with the 'divine gift' of speech, is ready on leaving the cradle, to be perverted from a wisely ordained intellect: and as he disjoins and changes nature with his experimental arts, he so muddles, contorts, and corrupts his mind, that he has not enough left of the leaven of his natural instinct to raise him above his 'reasonable' and cultivated degradation. If instinct is not, in the sub-animal, the result of spirit, it must be the constructive work of God and Nature, that omnipotent Union of the Great 'Spirit' and matter. And we will here suppose, how its material causation is arranged. Though the Theologian is rather shy of the material-workshop of Nature,

his moustache in the glass, they respectively burn in the analogical neighborhood of those physical images and types of the mind, which the metaphysical school has tried to conceal from observative inquiry. Yet the Beauty and the Fop; and many are like them; in their blaze of selfishness, never feel the burning, and overlook the slipper, in gazing with confident vanity and interest, only on themselves.

which in his spiritual *aspi*-or-inspirations, he would altogether overlook, he will scarcely object to our drawing an inference from the wise foresight and care of providence over his creatures, in pre-arranging their structure and functions for every needed purpose and occasion. Instinct is the form of mind intended to supply the place of experienced, and of communicated knowledge, by the design of a Thinking structure, so to call it, prepared as we here presume to describe it. Theologians tell us Providence foresees and makes every thing. A common builder to turn rain from a wall, projects an eave with a drip or undercut moulding; a common engineer foresees accidents, and provides a protection. Whatever is accommodated to the appetites, passions, hopes, and fears of animals, their Maker foresees, frames them accordingly, and places them under functional laws, that direct them necessarily to act, as their wants wisely require. These, the prepared means for primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions of the animal mind, are all included in its structure. Thus the young swan being destined to the water, its structure of feet, neck and covering, is prepared for its purposes; the sight and touch of water, pre-ordained to be agreeable to its mental perception; and every instinct so pre-adjusted to its every aquatic impression, that without experience or instruction, it goes at once from its nest to the stream: And with a like prepared structure and functional instinct, the young Fox-hound whose scent has known only its earliest nourishment, is *pre*-ready on leaving its mother, to follow the track of its appointed game. These are instances of knowledge in the sub-animal mind, taught by the wisdom of a pre-arranged instinct, yet improveable to the higher condition of 'reason' through the creative contribution of a vocal or a verbal language.*

* Pain has been called a perception, a sensation, an idea, and a feeling, and by the metaphysicians assigned under thought or consciousness, as one of the guardian forms of spirit in the mind. But pain is altogether similar throughout life, in the material sub-animal, and in the spiritual man, as simple instinct is at an early period in both; and therefore to be assumed in analogical argument, as allied to conscious thought, and mechanical instinct. But we waive this argument; to class Pain; whether a spiritual or material effect; with the pre-ordained instincts of the senses and the brain of every animal, so contrived in nervous and muscular structure as to act necessarily, in guarding against, and repelling its injurious cause.

It does not surprise us that a spark should explode gunpowder, which it never touched before, for the instinct, so to speak, of the powder, was ordained thus to act, when burnt by the spark; nor surprise us that the seed, dormant for a thousand years, should thrust out its radicles after moisture; nor further, that particles of matter under chemical action, should in the design of Nature, have peculiar and choosing affinities. Man knows from experience or authority, some of the final causes in such instances, but the potency of their means and purpose was in the scope of Nature, long before its actuality. These are parts of our former views on what we call the general instinct of natural things; alike in principle, necessary causation, and anticipated result, when unchangeable in the mineral and the vegetable kingdoms; no less than in the animal mind, whether doomed to limited improvement, or expanded to the broadest circuit of intellect. As far then as analogy leads us, and with no contrary analogy to confute the probability, there is one great principle of organization and function, applicable alike to instinctive and to mental mechanism; which directs a bird to alarm an enemy with its scream; the sensitive plant, to contract its leaves, to the touch; the root of the willow to push for the stream; the fresh water polypus to clinch its prey; and which directed the Drunken Macedonian to his fatal debauchery, and with scarcely a better instinctive motive or reason, to plan the order of battle, for the vain-glorious field of Arbela.

This is a brief extract from a large amount of unavailing argument, rejected from our early writing; since, which seemingly a defense; like most other *argument*, it decided nothing. And if the Spiritualist will only think of his groundless argument, as we do of our probable analogy, we will, in some future millennium of the human mind, come, like the Lion; which I consider as representing the growling of the materialist's side; to lie down with the Hyena of spirituality, pawing and yawning together over each other's former ferocity.

In passing from the fictitious entity of spirit in the human mind, we cannot omit some other notions of the metaphysical school, which though no less delusive, have not produced the like disastrous effects on the happiness of man, as the meddling, and jealous intolerance of *spirit*.

In our definitions, the term *things* denotes the supposed simple elements of the Universe. An aggregate of these things is called an *object*. The particulars of these objects being their component things, the metaphysical schools, as on the subject of the mind, must have something supersensible, and confounding in the composition of things; and as they made *spirit*; an imperceptible thing; perceptible; so they make the perceptible thing matter, imperceptible. They made in their notions, an 'ideal' entity, spirit for the mind; and an ideal matter, for things; which they called *idea*. This word in Greek signifies, that out of which something might be made; so they made a notion, matter, out of the word *idea*. This central matter, they supposed to be as a core, thus to speak, in every object, or aggregate of things; around which the component things of the aggregate are supposed to adhere. These perceptible components the metaphysicians call the attributes or qualities of this hidden, and imperceptible *idea*, or matter, or core. In our nomenclature, the term quality is applied only to varied states, agencies, and degrees of the five constituent perceptions of the mind: and what the schools call the *attributes* of matter, we call the only perceptible *things* we know. This is a view of the notion of the substratal or underlying matter of Greek science; which is always looking for something out of, or beyond, or after, nature. In observing within the boundary of a sphere, the several things; form, color, hardness, magnitude, weight, and temperature, they called them qualities or attributes, as if they were the adjective states of the noun-substantive *idea*; and not nouns perceptible themselves, as our arrangement regards them.

Having stated this metaphysical notion, I need not trouble the Reader with all my former *arguments* against it, which I now throw away; for on metaphysical subjects, neither my own nor another's are worth remembering.

The metaphysical schools have assigned the term *Infinity* to the things, Time, Space, and Number, which we can understand only as limited and finite, though still progressive; and have attempted to prove it mathematically. But Infinity, Spirit, and invisible substratal matter come from the same school, and are alike unintelligible to the physical method of the mind.

The limitation of the human mind, and the concealments of Nature, offer difficulties to the progress of knowledge that are not easily overcome: it is then desirable, if not obligatory, to reject from inquiry, those causes which to the natural difficulty, add a fictional confusion. There are three great sources of human power: The Mind, to observe, compare, and conclude; The Voice, to inter-commune with the observations, comparisons, and conclusions of others; and the Hand, or other muscular agent, to execute the purposes of the mind and the voice. The hand has never allowed the fictional spirit to interfere with even the least of its fingers: and we know what wonders have been accomplished by its physical power alone; for usefulness in the mechanic, and for taste in the esthetic arts. In language, Philology has in part been free from conjecture; whereas the proprieties and elegancies of Speech have been mistaken, in the conceits of Orators and Players, by a fictional self-reliance on their immaterial 'genius.' But the mind has come down to our day of knowledge, haunted by an all-pretending and disturbing Fiction which has obscured or perverted its original character, and with a sort of exorcising power, seems to have cast the mind fairly out of itself. For should I be successful in describing, from physical observation, what by its simplicity and truth, will appear to be that original character; it will be found; some extraordinary influence must have kept the muddled mind of the world, from observing and understanding that part of itself which has always been, closer than any thing else, before its ordained but blinded natural perception. That influence, I have more than once assigned to the belief of a spiritual agency in the human mind. It may be asked; how a simple belief in spirit could affect a plain inquiry into the functions of the senses and the brain. I here briefly recapitulate some of the reasons already given. First; it is not a simple, but a complicated belief; distracting attention from a simple physical function, by assigning its effects to a fictional agency; from which the Theologian, within the mist of his speculations on the spiritual Power of the Almighty, cannot turn his senses to the manifestations of that power, in the universe of its physical works. Second; this belief has through the pride and conformity of schools, **imposed upon itself** and on the rest of the

world, under a satisfied opinion, that the spirit of the mind is to be contemplated, only by the acute and profound cogitations of a College of metaphysicians, a council of Theologians, or a Faculty of professional Theorists: and not to be reached, certainly not to be touched by the common herd of intellect. And truly, as the subject has been philosophically presented both to the dull and the intelligent, it has been entirely beyond their comprehension. Third; it has prevented the termination of that metaphysical dispute on the subject of the Will, by ascribing to Spirit, a self-acting power, uncontrollable by physical motive: a self-existent being in the mind, and influenced only by a self-existent and superior being in Heaven. In this belief of the spiritual Will; who would uselessly inquire into the operation of physical causes on that, which no physical cause can affect? But the Will, as a spiritual faculty, being exerted on every purpose of thought, and thus an essential constituent of the scholastic mind; the belief in this opinion must have tended to withdraw the natural mind from physical observation and experiment. Fourth; it has created a prejudice in favor of itself, which has operated on the common and moderate conformist, who upon occasions, with less persecuting opposition, might have risen above the delusion. Fifth; it has profanely entangled itself with the holy purposes of religious duty; and with the frowning assistance of its threatening penalties, has, under the influence of an intellectual superstition, prevented that strict and natural use of the mind, which as we find it necessary for the efficient performance of every other duty, should be the only sure foundation of a steady and undivided religion, which looks to peace and good will on earth, and to humble submission and disinterested worship before the Throne of Heaven.

The substitute we offer for the mischievous working of the spirit, throws the mind open to investigation, on the same principles of inquiry that produce all other physical knowledge: having no reference to the *profundity* of Schools, the contracted purpose of the Theologian; nor the narrow charity of subdivided and hide-bound Sectaries. The Great Creator formed the Mind, not to represent the little schemes of prejudiced opinion; but free to examine the unbounded universe, and with untrammelled inde-

pendence, to see what is perceptible, and to say what is seen: made too, the recipient of that mind, to investigate the whole physical form of Nature; more particularly the simple yet wonderful structure and functions of the senses and the brain, not by the dissecting-knife, in pursuit of a fugitive spirit; but more wonderfully to make the brain, by a *proper* physiological observation, look upon and discover itself.

I have spoken of the different results of the working-power of the hand, and of the spiritual intellect: the former fulfilling, with exactness, usefulness, and taste, its unnumbered Natural and artificial Mechanical purposes: the latter, in every age presenting millions of instances of its limited, confused, and perverted efforts, to one, of that acute, and comprehensive exercise of the former which bears witness to the system of its true and natural working-power. It could not have been designed, that thinking and acting, universally so necessary to the whole human race, should not have been put within the easy reach of all. But unfortunately, when they should have gone together, hand and mind, under a similar system of physical instruction; the hand has, by adopting that system, far outstripped the head: and though the hand is employed universally, as if it belonged to its owner; the mind is, on the trust of authority, used under the same restraint as if it were not master of itself, but the submissive slave of others. For, those two Aristocratic Demagogues, Bigotry and Artifice; to save their schools and creeds, from the revolutionary energy of minds that know and independently use themselves; have from an early period, served each other in making the world believe that the mind is a very deep and mysterious subject, to be understood only by the Few; and to keep-off vulgar intruders, have set-up the fiery and blinding sword of the Spirit, which in turning every way against the Many, has equally excluded themselves from the wide-spreading tree of knowledge, and its honest fruit of practical life. Yet such is the hopeless state of exclusion in which the many must remain, until, the same method and rule of observation shall be applied to the senses, and the brain, as to the other physical agencies of the human system.

I have thus endeavored to comment, not to *argue* on the so-called mysterious subject of *Thinking*; a subject of long-passed,

and still to be continued dispute; but which, without the impertinent intrusion of metaphysical notions, would have been purely assigned to physical inquiry. Man in all his obvious structure and functions, exists as a material being. Believing his *Vital* actions to be the effect of a most minute organization, he would by the strictest analogy, have ascribed the phenomena of *Thought*, to some equally minute and imperceptible organization of the senses and the brain. Knowing only a physical power within himself, he would have rested in the belief of there being nothing more. It is then the obligation of those who ascribe the function of the brain to another cause, not merely to *reason* themselves into the causation, but to *present* the cause as equally intelligible with that of the physical structure, by which the vital functions are performed. This has never been done; and the term, Spirit; for it is only an empty word; which has been proposed as the Thinking Agent; should be altogether discarded, as devoid of meaning, and therefore leading to endless contention. The Great Creator has prospectively filled the universe with material things, and their actions; among other purposes, seemingly for the exercise of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive physical perceptions of the senses and the brain: and not having so far, created a peculiar power of sense or brain to perceive what is not matter; we must rest in the belief that such a metaphysical *something* does not exist: holding in exception and reserve however, that when the traceable agency of spirit in the mind, shall be made perceptible, we will give it an assistant influence, or the sole power in the process of Thought.

After saying so much on the difference between the physical observer, and the spiritual metaphysician; I have a few words to offer on the supposition, that there might be a compromise, if not an agreement between them. There is throughout this work, no intention to interfere with the theologian's doctrine of the immortal 'soul,' as distinct from his spiritual figment of the mind. Having exclusively the purpose, to analyse the structure and the working-plan of the intellect; I here consider that department only of Pneumatology, which ascribes the functions of human thought to an immaterial agency. How many subdivisions there may be of what the schools call the *Anima Mundi* or Soul of the

Universe, to spiritualize the Beings of a notional Ontology; and what may be their peculiar and respective purposes and powers, I leave better informed Theologians to describe.

As we consider the influence of the belief of a spiritual agency within the mind, to have heretofore prevented a full analysis and arrangement of its physical perceptions; and having so far freed ourself from that influence, as to offer a simple development of the working plan of the senses, and the brain; the physical system of inquiry being thus pointed out if not established, we may now regard the Guy Fawkes of metaphysical bigotry as seized at last, and the threatening spirit as passing away; without the risk of our heretical Book being burnt, like the enigma-letter to Lord Monteaule, or of not being read by hard-headed obstinacy. Since then the spiritual belief can, among liberal inquirers, no longer necessarily interfere with the further development of our observative system; I am willing to part amicably with the notionalist, and to let him fictionally or in name put his spirit, beside, or around, or within the senses and the brain; provided he will without persecution, quietly allow us to consider the mind as the effect of a physical organization. And may this offer, now harmlessly to divide the agency of thought between the reality of matter, and the fiction of spirit, so appease the metaphysician, as to induce him to begin, for he cannot do it at once, to tear-up the 'old fantastic roots' of his delusion. But in the name of common, if not of Christian charity, let him not doom us to everlasting punishment, if we are not able to perceive, what we really believe he does not; yet what we charitably allow, he most conscientiously, though not very sagaciously is convinced he does perceive. For which conviction, we do not believe he will be held accountable or be punished, except in the folly of his error in having, without the least possible 'reason,' so long believed it.

There was once a belief, derived from Jewish History, that the Earth had been in existence no more than six thousand years. It was formerly thought as impious to deny that, as it is now to deny spirituality to the mind: both these subjects being unfortunately, connected with our duty to God and our Neighbor, the great encompassing scope of a true and holy religion. Since however, by the Geological Revelation of the will and power of

the Creator; as proclaimed in his unmystified works; the intelligent portion of the Mosaic chronologists, liberally accommodating their Faith, to the progress of physical knowledge; the only knowledge that can advance; have endeavored, though with Faith unchanged, to accommodate and adjust the limited and theoretic thousands of Genesis to the Geological epochs of incalculable millions: may the same unprejudiced accommodation to the advancement of physical knowledge, be shown in the genesis of the microcosm of the human mind; and when truth grows too strong for fiction, that the Theological schools may discover; the simple and beautiful system of material perceptions is reverently and religiously accommodated to the Biblical Attributes of the Unity, and Wisdom, and the Power of God.

Having in our Divisions and Explanations, taken a general survey of the five leading powers of Perception, and of their Qualities; we now proceed to treat particularly of the various formations, characters, agencies, and effects of these few and simple constituents of the human mind, which produce the different intellectual conditions of man. And first of Primary Perceptions.

NOTE, on the future possibility of developing, by the microscope, or by other means, the mental working plan, and visible action of the senses and the brain.

A question on the subject of Matter and Spirit, which should never have been raised, cannot be settled by notional, or by analogical argument. Philosophical observation and reflection, by disputing less, endeavor to learn more; and look directly for truth only in the primary perceptions of the senses. These senses in their natural power have a certain educated limit. Physical Assistants, which are natural still, may extend that power, and represent the dimensions and motions of things, altogether invisible to the naked eye.

We have shown, that the relationships of things in the universe; as far as we can perceive; form the whole of our knowledge. One of those relationships is that of the influence of the refrac-

tive function of light, which produces on things, the magnifying effects of the Microscope. This important instrument has already much extended a knowledge of the structure of the senses and the brain: but it has not yet made the peculiarity of their physical motion, apparent or measurable; and it is the effects of this motion, that constitute the process of perception, and the working plan of the human intellect. The relationships of things are however innumerable; and we have yet to await the discovery of the agency of things on things, for adding a further extension of the magnifying power of light; or for any other combination of relationships, that may render the most delicate structure of the brain, and its hidden movements, palpable to every inquiry into the physical problem of the human mind. I should have no convictions, for I have no foresight on this interesting, and; as it may settle an old metaphysical wrangle; very important and peaceful question. We leave it therefore to future discoverers of an enlarged and piercing method of vision, and to the observing, experimenting, and reflective physiologist, not to dodge among cerebral fibers and cells, after an invisible and trackless spirit; but to trace and describe the physical forms, motions, successions, and combinations of images and types, in the working plan of the brain; thus spreading over the mind a descriptive Panorama of its material self.




SECTION II.

Of Primary Perceptions.

PRIMARY perceptions are the first constituent function in the production of mind. They arise from the action or impression of natural things or objects on all the senses, including the artificial sounds of language on the ear. We have named those impressions on the sense of sight, images, when the impression is similar to the thing. -- **object**; and **Types**, on the other senses,

when there is no measurable resemblance between the impressive cause and the perception. For though there is a vibration on the tympanum of the ear; corresponding to that of the vibrating thing or object; it is not metaphorically an image, but an impressive type of the thing, or of the verbal sound it represents. The primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perceptions are, in their several functions, so connected with each other, that we cannot properly describe any one, without occasional reference to one or more of the rest. The Reader must therefore remember our general explanation of the part they respectively bear in contributing to the mind. The primary perceptions are the portals of the intellect. There is no image, or type in the memorial which did not enter through them. They may be produced by every thing or object of the universe, when brought within the scope of the natural or assisted power of the senses. Primary perceptions, though they so extensively gather the impressions of things, are not to be regarded as an effective part of intellect, until they pass into the brain to be mixed with the memorial for the use of the joint, and conclusive: in this, resembling a solitary word, which; if not elliptical, or with an interrogative or an exclamatory intonation; to be the sign of thought or passion, must be joined with others, into concord, and government.

Perceptions purely primary, that is, under no comparison with a memorial, are called *unmixed*; and although they may be compared with each other; they are not then a busy or productive part of the mind. Primary images on the retina, like the images in a mirror, are the passive pictures of things of which we know not the structural or proximate cause; and until sufficient 'reason' to the contrary, they must be classed together. Beyond this there is no resemblance or analogy between the mind and the mirror: for the glass and the foil have no memorial perceptions. Unmixed primary perceptions being as before remarked, the *unthinking* images of things, may be observed in the sub-animal mind. In its limited state, with only a scanty set of vocal, and muscular signs, for denoting it, and when the joint and conclusive perceptions are not exercised, the unthinking retina, with its unmixed images, though part of the mind, is scarcely more in productive function than a common mirror to the things before it. It is the



same with the infant, whose visual images, and typical impressions are equally unthinking: and that we should not, in cases more open to inquiry, be without the analogy to this infantile and sub-animal mind; we perceive in ourselves, and learn from others, that when the memorial and joint are not used, and not represented by language, images and types are no more to the self-spectator, than the temporary, and then vanishing pictures in the looking-glass are to itself. Let an old woman, and a King, or Conqueror, or more aptly, a Candidate for the American Presidency, pass before the most elaborate Pile of Architecture; one being altogether vividly occupied with a perception of her slanderous gossip, and her hopes or fears of salvation; the other with a vivid perception of the number of party-votes, in friendly and opponent states. Though they might both *see* the edifice, as clearly as an accomplished Architect could; yet the impression will be no more part of the mind, than that on the eye of the cat by the side of one, and that on the eye of the horse, carrying the other on his electoral canvass, or that of the mirror which shows them only the anility of their faces when brought before it. For both the foolish old woman, and the mind-fretted Candidate, like the cat, the horse, and the glass, would have no memorial, and only a perishing image of the Fabric; except that the two human mirrors might indeed have a memory of the term Palace, with not the least perception of its parts or of their relations to each other. And it is the same with ninety-nine hundredths of mankind, on every thing, not the immediate, and interesting subject of their passions, and the business support of their lives. The existences of things, denoted by the term noun, produce the unthinking primary perceptions: all the joint, and conclusive, or as we call them, the proper thinking perceptions of the actions and other relationships of the existences of things, under their various forms of case, degree, cause, action, mode, time, force, or other condition, are denoted by the rest of the so-called parts of speech. For the whole mind, from its primary, to its closing verbal perceptions, is occupied on the existences, actions, and comparisons of things; as our further developments will show.

Some minds, like that of childhood, and of the sub-animal, continue through life, in the **unmixed use of primary perception**, with

no more mixed memorial, joint, and conclusive, than barely to keep sense and brain together. These minds see or hear all around; are very flippant among things; but slow and confused when their images and types become entangled with joint perceptions; and soon return to merely looking and listening. They are found in professions, and pursuits, that embrace multitudes of particulars; in naturalists, mineralogists, and botanists who perceive little more than scraps of nature and their names; lynx-eyed observers who multiply atoms, motion, and space with the microscope; physicians who notice nothing but uncomparated symptoms; travelers who by going about in a bustle, see and hear-themselves full, without requiring any more, from quiet and stationary thinking; dandy ladies and gentlemen who perceive nothing but forms and changes of dress, furniture, and equipage; discarding old unfashionable things; and other idlers, seeing harmless mites and motes every where, with no joint reflections in their own mind to prevent their being blinded and crushed by the beam.

The physical character of the unmixed primary perceptions, in which there is only the first rudiments of Thinking, is particularly obvious in the sense of sight; for an image on the retina is visibly to opticians, a physical fact: and this forming the inceptive constituent of the mind, leads to an inference of its whole materiality: since all the primary perceptions and their relationships when they become memorial, joint, and conclusive; thus forming the mind itself; are still under a fainter form, identical with the physical images and types, of the unmixed and unthinking primary perceptions. With this general view, we proceed to the particular senses.



ARTICLE I. *Primary Perceptions, in the Sense of Sight.*

These are more numerous than those of any of the other senses; every thing in the universe, that comes before the eye, being represented upon it. They are contradistinguished as images, from the typical impressions on the other senses. The individual visual perceptions are too numerous to be each nominally em-

ployed in scientific inquiry. The life of man would not suffice, even to count them, much less, to make a system of knowledge out of their unnumbered and unassorted individual differences and similitudes. It therefore became necessary before they could conveniently be a subject for comparison and conclusion, to reduce them to definite classes of all the several identical things perceptible by sight. We have upon the scientific principle, and economy of Classification, made ten heads of the things of sight; and if none have been omitted, and none mistaken, the things of sight can be severally assigned to some one of them.

The following are the different classes of the things of sight:

- Color, its kinds and degrees.
- Light, its degrees to darkness.
- White, its degrees to black.
- Form, its points, lines, surfaces, and solidity.
- Number with its combined units.
- Magnitude, its parts and degrees.
- Space, its parts and distances.
- Time, its divisions and durations.
- Motion, its degrees, durations, and directions.
- Relationships.

Let the Reader here call up any thing that has ever appeared before his sight, and he will find it can be referred to some one of these several heads. And this is the time and labor-saving process of Classification; for the purpose of teaching what is known, and for facilitating further scientific inquiry. Indeed this classification itself, is only an application of the early Egyptian, or still earlier Eastern Principle of the Categories; thus to reduce the individual perceptions of the eye, and make of their sub-infinite number, but ten different kinds with their several relationships. Just as the countless combinations of sounds in speech are arranged under the few divisions of the alphabetic elements, with their relationships. If the above generic divisions are inclusive and correct, they embrace all the perceptions of the existences and actions of things proper to the eye; which passing into the

memorial, constitute by their joint and conclusive exercise, the full power of the silent, or yet unspoken intellect, on that sense.

The First thing we have named among the perceptions of sight is *Color*. And here we may remark, that a simple primary perception can be made known to others, only by placing the thing before the sense: and a term designating an aggregate, called an object, can have no meaning, if the perceptions of its component things have not received conventional names. The term color cannot therefore be defined by words. Color has three differences, or kinds: Red, Yellow, and Blue. These kinds have different degrees, or shades, which when variously mingled; are in primary perception, existences and actions, if we consider a mingling of the kinds, as actions on each other. But until these are the subject of joint perceptions, they are like images on the common mirror, and form no part of the working mind: for though we perceive the resemblance and differences of color, we make no mental use of them, without comparing them as mixed with memorial sight; and this constitutes a joint perception. We will exemplify this condition, in the sub-animal, which has more primary, than joint, and conclusive perceptions. I had a horse, that at the sight of a heap of white lime, would always point his ears, arch his neck, shy, and prepare to run. Here the animal perception was not from unmixed primary, but from a joint comparison of the primary, mixed with a memorial of former danger. Without this, the image of the white heap would have passed over the retina, as over a mirror, if carried past the heap; and leaving no trace of its existence. We shall hereafter inquire; if there can be more than one perception before the senses or the brain at the same time. Should there however be, a joint comparison between unmixed primary images, in the sense of sight; there is, apparently in the other senses, no field for an assemblage of co-existent types and consequently no means for joint comparison of unmixed primary perceptions. Whether the tympanum of the ear has differing coexistent vibrations; the tongue, differing co-existent types of taste; the olfactory membrane differing coexistent types of scent; and the sentient nerves, differing coexistent types of touch; we leave for the inquiry of others.

The above is a short account of the process of primary per-

ceptions, whenever the objects of sight are set before the sense. Under this first constituent of knowledge; for all real knowledge is derived from first perceptions; we class, when primary become memorial, the art of coloring, as exercised with more or less comprehensiveness, precision, and taste, by the Painter; all those arts, which by the ingenious management of color, administer to the passing pleasure of the vulgar eye; but particularly to that refined and reflective art of seeing, which employs the poetic and philosophic sight on all the colored works of Nature. But this application properly belongs to the third division of joint perceptions, and what we call their *Actionary* quality.

Light and Darkness. We separate this second division of the Table, from that of color; there being apparently no analogy between them. The only characteristics of these two things seems to be, that they respectively make color and the things of sight visible; or destroy the perception of them altogether. Complete darkness is only of one kind; but its degree is relative to the susceptibility of the animal eye. Of light there is a varied condition, in vegetable combustion; in the heavenly and in phosphorescent bodies; and from chemical decomposition. Between the full light of the sun, and utter darkness, the only joint perception is of their difference. When darkness and light are, in common language, blended, there is the perception of the degree of variation in the different shades between them. The perception of light though especially the subject of the chemist and the natural philosopher, is universally the means of seeing not only itself, by a separation into color, but of perceiving those other things of sight; Form, Magnitude, Space, and Motion.

There is a fact, connected with the perception of darkness and light, that may have some influence in determining the question to be considered hereafter; whether images and types are always synchronous, or always successive, or of both conditions. The perception of these two things of sight is always successive, both in the primary and memorial, since they cannot certainly be perceived at the same time. Nor is the case altered when they are mixed; as of a primary of light, with a memorial of darkness: for as under any condition, they respectively dissipate, or extinguish each other, they must in denoting the relationship of dif-

ference be necessarily successive. And we shall find hereafter, that in some of the other senses, the joint perceptions, so to call them in this character, are in like manner successive.

White and Black. One is apt to conceit some resemblance of light and darkness, respectively to the perception of white and black. There seems however, to be no other analogy between them, than their being in their respective cases negations of each other. Darkness is the absence of those visual perceptions which light produces; and black is the absence of all perception of white and of its subdivided colors: Yet for the practical uses of their terms each of their negatives is, in its effects, equally a perception, or a thing known by the sense of sight, as its corresponding positive. And with this practical perception my inquiry ends: for I endeavor throughout this Essay, to avoid those metaphysical refinements that have been more productive of irritating disputes, than of a friendly communion of knowledge.

Form is the next object of sight, named in the Table. Form, to the eye is the perception of the meeting of measurable surfaces, lines, and points in colored objects; not of what are called mathematical points, lines, and surfaces; for there is no more meaning in the phrases; a point without dimensions; a line without breadth; and a surface without thickness; than in those of a material, ūle as the peculiar substratum of things, or of an immaterial and thinking Spirit, in the brain. But in the practical uses of knowledge, we consider points, lines, and surfaces, as visible; and natural things, not metaphysical and beyond nature. It would be useless to inquire whether the perceptions of form, are more numerous, and varied than those of any other of the heads of our Table. They may all however be classed under visible points, lines, and surfaces; the point being the meeting of inclined lines, the line the meeting of inclined surfaces, the surface the boundary of solidity. The point if visible, must be a measurable thing; yet for some indirect purposes, it need not be so considered. Lines are straight, or curved, surfaces are plane, curved or combined. The sphere has only surface; the circle only line; and the point only visible and tangible unity. The curve is microscopically, an indefinite number of straight lines, united by point into angle; yet in practical knowledge, it is different in itself

from the straight line. The point furnishes the perceptible element of number; the distance between two points the perception of space; the surface that of magnitude. These form the primary materials of Arithmetic and Geometry. It is of no particular import, into how many species, and varieties, those two genera of what is technically called Quantity may be divided; inclusive of straight lines, curves of Conic Sections, and of every other kind; of surfaces of every sort and dimension, encompassing various aggregates of things into solidity; of every increase, division, and power of number, under the common, and the algebraic symbols; or that of the supposition of its infinitesimal and fluctuatory increments, with its endless application to mixed mathematics and to natural philosophy: these are all embraced in the perception of magnitude and number; those two divisions of Quantity, derived from the three constituents of Form, the point, the line, and the surface.

Number. It was shown under the last head, that in a Point of Form, we have the elemental perception of a unit. A like elementary unit, with its successions in number, is perceptible by all the other senses. Number is the particular subject of the Arithmetician: is an important perception, in the acquisition of knowledge; and mingles itself with perhaps every topic of inquiry. It has no other relationship than that of greater and less; called in common language addition, and subtraction, or in more convenient and briefly-working terms, multiplication and division: any further consideration of number, therefore properly belongs to its place, under joint perception.

Magnitude is a perception, derived as we have said, from the lines, surfaces, and boundary of Form; but is not identical with it. Like number it is divisible into parts. It is the subject of the Geometrician, and is applied to all the purposes of measurement and its practical uses. Its relationships properly belong to the division of joint perceptions.

Space. The knowledge of space may be derived from the solidity of Form. For no one object or aggregate of things, can be penetrated by another aggregate, and be indistinguishable in boundary from it: but must be always outside of it. That which allows one form to be **outside of another**, we call space. It is

therefore no otherwise to be described, than as a perception of where form is, and where form may be, common to all who agree to give it a common name. As form may be of various magnitudes, space is divisible into parts, which have among themselves, only the relation of more and less, and of position. Space with its distances, employs the perceptions of the surveyor, the geographer, and the astronomer; but as every thing must be in, and occupy parts of space, every thing may have relationship to numerical calculations upon it.

Time is another perception of the sense of sight. It is the knowledge of a succession of primary and positive perceptions; or of a negative of the interval between the removal of an object from the eye, and its subsequent restoration. Thus we have a perception of color, or other visible thing. This is removed, and after an interval, restored. This interval of absence of the color is called a negative perception, or that which is *not* a perception. It may perhaps be asked; whether the term negation, which is a metaphysical notion, or a nothing, can produce a perception of time, as in the succession of positive images. In regarding only the primary perception; as there is nothing to see when the color is withdrawn, there can be no visual perception of time, and the nonentity is then purely a metaphysical or indescribable negative. Yet while there is nothing before the sense, there is something on the brain, and this gives a succession of positive memorial images, which serve to measure the otherwise negative interval: and this measurement of what would be negative to sense, by what is positive to memory, gives rise to a positive perception of time; and from the several memorials, we have the knowledge of succession, and of more or fewer of those successions, or of longer or shorter time. Thus we have a knowledge of time from a successive train both of primary and of memorial perceptions. The case here described is taken from images in the sense of sight: but a perception of time is derivable, in the same manner, from the other senses: for we can hear, touch, taste, and scent, a succession of things or objects; and after these are removed, and again restored, the interval in every instance, may be measured by the succession of memorial perceptions. The perceptions of time form an important, and constant

subject of calculation, in the works of nature and art. That great and endless chain of action in what is called cause and effect, is measured by its successions: nor is it less frequently brought into the process of thought, than the perception of Form and of space.

Motion. We have a knowledge of this thing of sight, from the successive perception of objects through parts of space, in both the primary and memorial mirror. With regard to time, it is either quick, or slow: in space, it is various in direction; in the successive action of cause and effect, it has the power of producing new and varied motion. This perception forms part of the subject of Natural Philosophy, in the interchanges of agency, in what the old school called the Elements, of Earth, Air, Fire, and Water; and in the composition and resolution, which unceasingly produce the effects of mechanical power. In short, it is a thing of perception in every action of nature, and in almost every department of human labor and ingenuity; for action and motion are convertible terms. Though more extensively a perception of sight; motion may be known to us through the sense of Touch.

Relationships. The last subject named in the table of the things of sight, is no less a perception than the things of sight themselves: for whatever connections exist; comparisons are made; or actions, reciprocated between two or more things, they must be absolutely perceived or they can be considered only as words signifying nothing, and as applied to metaphysical notions. By the perception of relationships is meant in strict definition, a knowledge of the *Bearings* which all the things of nature, either as individuals or as aggregates have to each other. When two things are regarded at the same moment, or in succession, it may be perceived that one is greater or less than the other; one has a similar or different motion from the other; a similar or different direction in that motion; a different or similar position of things in space, with regard to each other; with a difference or similarity of degree or measure between them; and a similarity or difference in direction, manner and force of action: these with the resemblances, differences, and actions between our other named visual perceptions, and in those we may have overlooked; afford

all the materials for the innumerable relationships perceived by the eye.



ARTICLE II. *Of Primary Perceptions, in the Sense of Hearing.*

Referring to what was said in the first part of the preceding section, on the general character and agency of the primary perceptions; and considering it as applying to all the senses, we pass to the subject of Hearing. The ear has these four kinds of perceptions,

Sound,
Time,
Space, and
Relationships.

The most numerous are those of sound. Sound has been divided into the Noisy, and the Tunable.

Noises are of different species, degrees, and durations: and these are severally innumerable. A tolerance of unnecessary noises denotes a childish, a savage, or an ignorant mind, and an inattentive or *inesthetic* ear. Noise is the vacant amusement of the various passions, particularly the love of idleness and intoxication, of the large unthinking, and vulgar class of mankind; is a nuisance no less to the Industrial than to the quiet and Reflective; and would, especially in our country, long ago have been a subject for Legislative control, if legislators did not make so much ambitious, quarrelsome, distracting, and wasteful noise among themselves.

Tunable sounds are also of different species, degrees, and durations: and these too, are severally innumerable. Both noises and tunable sounds are produced by the percussion or friction of solids, fluids, and of aeriform currents, acting reciprocally on each other; either by the parts of these several objects among themselves, or by the parts of each object on the parts of another: though they are all said to be heard through the medium of the air.

Tunable sounds are in part instrumental, and partly sub-animal, and human. Speech, the most important vocal sound, is in its refined and impressive intonations elegantly and effectively tunable; but in some of its harsher kinds, in its abrupt and short-timed syllables; in an unknown language and on the vulgar and unmeaning tongue, is little better than noise.

The auditory perceptions, like those of the other senses, are primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive; and have the relationships of resemblance in kind, of greater and less in degree, and of longer and shorter in duration.

The perception of noises is widely mingled with the exercise of our useful knowledge; but is otherwise a distracting annoyance: the perception of tunable sound contributes largely to our agreeable entertainment. Tunable sound is the material of two of the Fine Arts; of Music in its various forms of vocal and instrumental; and of Elocution under its forms of Speech, Reading, all the forms of Oratory, of Histrionism, of oral Poetry, and every kind of vocal description.

Primary perceptions by the ear are made of distant and hidden things; and in darkness, when the eye can afford us no knowledge of their agencies. The distant thunder, the mighty sea-foaming breaker, and the deadly rattlesnake concealed, may give us warning of danger; and though shrieks of agony may be painful or appalling, the ear is more frequently the means of our protection and delight. It is practically an idle question; whether we receive more knowledge by the eye, or by the ear. When open to the light, the eye of an Observer is always perceiving, and if we consider the act of ocular Reading as one of its functions; the answer will depend on, whether the eye is restricted to place and subject, or is a general observer and reader of good things, or an inquisitive traveler over all. One point however is certain; that when the eye is sagaciously exercised abroad on Nature, and Art, it detects error, and discovers truth or what may lead to it; and that the ear in the greater part of its occupation, is brought to hear, or is obliged to listen to, falsehood or folly.

One of the most important powers of the mind, in acquiring and accumulating knowledge; for knowledge constitutes power because it constitutes mind; is derived from the audible signs of

perception, in language: since we thus have by the ear, a conventional, verbal, and descriptive sign of the whole process of the intellect; of which we here give a short account.

Primary perceptions, are facts silently known to the percipient; and they alone would be sufficient for a few purposes of one perceiver of things. But there being many, and the perceivers of the same things having practical relations among themselves; it becomes necessary, for an interchange of knowledge, that their perceptions should be known to each other. This is to be effected by two different perceivers agreeing on some sign, to denote the similar perceptions of each. Now, the *sign*; which must be a thing of sense, whether of sight, touch, taste, scent, or hearing; is itself a thing for perception; and if we may conceive for the sake of illustration, that inconceivable event, the Origin of Language, we may conclude, that the first signs would have been applied to the common animal perceptions of hunger, thirst, desire, anger, pleasure, and pain. Certain muscular movements, locomotive acts, expression of countenance, and inarticulate voices, would have been the first few signs of the first few perceptions: and these signs would, to the two perceivers, become a common and significant language. Of all the above named means of appropriating signs; those by sound or voice, would be the most convenient. For they may be made with the least muscular exertion, in the least time, and at distances through which most of the things of perception cannot act; made too in utter darkness, and on those occasions, when communication by sight, except by some luminous sign, is impracticable. This audible or verbal sign, though no image or resemblance of the perception itself; does yet so distinctly denote it, that the verbal sign will, whenever used, excite the memorial of that thing of perception it was intended to denote, as certainly, though not so vividly, as the thing itself, when physically set before the senses for primary perception.

It is to the ear then, through language, we owe that Fifth perceptive power or verbal sign of the senses and the brain; which completes the simple and beautiful system of Perception, in the human mind, by giving it the most comprehensive agency, and by raising it above the mind, or so-called instinct, of the brute:

as we shall have occasion to point out more particularly hereafter.

Time. Hearing has a perception of time: indeed no sense is without it. When associated Schoolmen, incorporated into influence, acquire a habit of false or fictional teaching, they think themselves, from some motive of interest, authority, or ambition, privileged to describe the states of things, as if the knowledge of them were a subject for magisterial dogmas, and not the necessary facts of physical perception: hence the metaphysical manner in which they treat of Time and Space, and of their respective 'infinities.' We can know time only by physical perception, and as a measurer of things; and thus regard it as we do any other means of measuring, by the senses. Time is therefore measured by the perceptions of hearing; and in two ways. First. Of two continued, and so to speak, parallel sounds, we perceive, when one ceases, the linear extent, of the continued sound; to carry on the figure; exceeds in quantity that which had ceased. This creates the relation of more and less between them. In measuring the *more* of the continued line, we apply the term Time to denote the difference; for this is the only means, in the present case, of measuring the relation of more and less in sound. We therefore call Time the perception of more and less, in the extent of the course of motion. Second. As in the perception of time, by sight: when a sound ceases on the ear, and is again renewed, the interval is not a silent negative, but is still measured by the succession of audible memorial-types; this audible perception, we call Time; which when named, its purpose becomes so familiar, that we apply it as a measure of more and less, without thinking under what peculiar means we derive the knowledge of it as a quantity.

I have thus, in the two senses of hearing and sight, yet differently from the fashion of the schools, endeavored to give an analysis of the manner; we derive the knowledge of Time; for time is by the succession of images and types, both on the senses, and the brain, a perceptible thing; and therefore, as much a physical existence or action, as any other obvious fact. The sub-animal, although applying on limited occasions his own necessary indications of time, has generally no perception at all of its

means of measurement. And it is the same, with the sub-human or ignorant classes, in every case except that of their especial occupation; as the horse snuffles for his oats, and pigs squeal for their food at an expected time; or of the ignorant, who carry in their appetites a perceptive sign of their dinner hour, but cannot be punctual to a less personal appointment. They miss time, because like the brute they have few purposes that require its service or its term: and we know, even with minds of general interests and intelligence, that instruments for the regular measurement of time are necessary for exactness. The application of the perception of time by the ear, is one of the great sources of pleasure in music, and in the rythmus of speech.

Space is made known to the sense of hearing, by the experience of two perceptions of sound produced under similar circumstances, by the like vibration of things or objects, but different in their degree of impression on the ear, which difference the ear traces to a certain condition of things that by further experience is found to be a general fact. This fact we use for general purposes and call it *Space*.

The perception of space, or distance, or difference in the moments of sounds, is of constant application in all the sciences, and on almost every occasion of life.

The knowledge of Time, and Space, through both the primary and memorial indications of the ear, is widely employed in the various exercises of the mind; in which the fictional perversion of the verbal sign; that should always represent the truth; has given rise to the farrago of metaphysical speculations on the Infinity of time and of space. On these infinities the scholastic Legion knows nothing, besides their magisterial halucinations; resembling in this, the Demoniactal Spirit, in the Scripture, that tore itself, and then, conjuror-like, prestissimo, seizing a whole herd of swine; that could no more comprehend its being possessed by the mad spirit, than the be-swined intellect of the scholar does really understand the infinity of notions forced upon it by its metaphysical masters.

Relationships perceived by the ear. We have shown that the eye physically perceives the bearing of its objects to each other, as certainly and as clearly as it perceives the objects themselves.

The ear has an inferential knowledge of time, and space, but its direct and practical perception is of sound. The relationship of the various degrees of force; of the various extents of quantity; and the various kinds of both tunable sound, and of noise, are innumerable. From one are derived, the agreeable relationships of perception in music, whether vocal or instrumental; and in the intonations of speech. From the other are derived indeed many disagreeable perceptions of the ear; yet others that afford serviceable knowledge, and protective warning, by their relationships to science and art, and to the incalculable purposes of human life. Thus these perceptions of sound, and of the relationships of its several degrees, kinds, and quantities furnish through the ear, a second primary agent, in the broad working plan of the physical structure of the human mind.



ARTICLE III. *Of Primary Perceptions, in the Sense of Touch.*

We make fifteen different kinds of things perceptible by the sense of Touch:

Heat, its degrees to cold.
Hard, its degrees to soft.
Solid, its degrees to fluid.
Rough, its degrees to smooth.
Pain, its kinds and degrees.
Weight, its degrees.
Elasticity, its degrees.
Force, its degrees.
Form, its points, lines, surfaces, and solidity.
Magnitude, its parts and degrees.
Number, its units.
Time, its divisions and durations.
Space, its divisions and distances.
Motion, its degrees and durations.
Relationships.

The perceptions of Sight, and of Hearing, are of things at various distances from these senses. The things of Touch have no appreciable distance from its organ, which is diffused over the body.

In treating of sight, I purposely avoided the question; why an object felt by touch, and seen by the eye, to have a like direction in space, should be inverted on the retina; and that with a single perception of touch from a single object, there should be with two ears, and two eyes, but a single perception in each case. These are indeed subjects worthy of inquiry, and may be of interest, when we have no more important occupation. But as their solution has no immediate reference to the question; how we may resolve the present vague and complicated description of the human mind, into the simple and comprehensive system of a few general laws; we pass it by however useful, to be gleaned by those who come after: and proceed with the reapers to the full and awaiting harvest of Truth.

Heat, and its degrees to cold. We perceive heat by the sense of touch; both within the body, and on its surface. The primary perception of heat, in whatever way produced, is a subject for the physician and the chemist; and of an observer of its useful or injurious relations to himself. Heat is the cause of unnumbered facts in science, and the practical arts. The perception of heat by touch, in its effects on common objects, assisted by other senses, is of various modes, degrees, and durations, which we leave for the investigation of those who may think the subject worthy of attention. We do not wish to raise the metaphysical question; whether cold is a positive thing, or only an absence of heat. In relation to our purposes, it is a subject for idle schoolmen. Looking at perception, as the process of representing every existence, and action or relationship, on the mirror of the senses and the brain; cold being like every thing else, known only by perception, must be as positive as heat. In the internal parts of the body it is imperceptible in a healthy state; on its external surface, it is a subject for the physician; and in common things and objects; where touch is assisted by sight; for science and the useful arts.

Hard, and its degrees to soft. These are purely perceptions of

touch. Other senses have no recognitions of them: and the ineffectual efforts to use a sense, metaphorically, for what it was not ordained, has induced the metaphysician, and his followers; who are rather shy of the senses; to apologise for their own visionary falacies, and to persevere in them, by assuming the uncertainty of primary perception. The senses, when properly directed, and experimentally used, are rarely deceptive to the careful observer; and without these five witnesses to the will and works of God and of Nature, there would be no unanimous verdict in the cause of truth; and the courts of scholastic opinions would always be confounded by new and still to be renewed litigious trials: for 'reasoning,' as it is called, even in Geometry and Arithmetic, are only comparisons, and applications of physical perception to the modes of quantity, in the acquisition of their unalterable truth. The resistance of hardness, and the plastic yielding of softness are of general application to almost every art.

Solid, and its degrees to fluid. We have a different perception of solidity, and of hardness. The latter resists in the minutest of its parts; the former, in the magnitude and weight of a whole mass. We certainly apply the terms differently: for we conventionally call the grain of sand hard, and the rock, solid. The particles of a steel spring are hard; but the spring itself is not solid. Between hard and soft there is, to touch, no separating line: but solid and fluid are distinct in character, without an imperceptible transition. Water which is moveable by an immeasurable force, is, as water, never solid. It may give resistance, and reaction, as in the rudder and the oar, and partially perform the service of solidity, without having its formal cause, and character. The solid and the fluid have extended application to science, to the arts, and to life.

Rough to smooth. In the general outline here offered of the human intellect, it is unnecessary to specify all the conditions of this perception of touch. Independently of the subject of friction in the arts, it has no important application, as we observe, beyond what may be disagreeable or agreeable to the skin.

Pain. The perception of pain is exclusively by the sense of touch in the human body. Its effects in the sub-animal are perceived by the eye and ear. Like heat it has variations in kind, degrees, and duration.

Weight is a primary perception of touch alone; both by the external surface, and by a certain perception in its muscular parts, and throughout the whole body. Thus we have what is called heaviness or weight in a swelled limb, and in a general lassitude; from their resemblance to the perception of a supported burthen. This is a personal concern to the sufferer; and for its cure a subject of professional skill, with his physician. The measurement of weight for all its purposes in science and the arts, when connected with motion, and force, belongs to the natural philosopher.

Elasticity is perceptible to touch alone. In its effects, it is through motion, the subject of sight. Its impression on touch is made by resistance and reaction. Bodies have been divided, for the convenience of description, into elastic, and nonelastic, as set-forth, with their laws, in books. The elastic are found in all the kingdoms of nature; and has its purpose for the advancement of science, as applied to the service of man, in the boundless range of the compressed, and directed power of the atmosphere and of steam; so far beyond the wasteful efforts of the boasted old *organon*, or engine, never in the right track, never in clear and unconfused working-order; and kept from both, by the perpetual contentions of the engineer and the stoker, and the varying views of the directors, stockholders, and the speculation in the whole concern.

Force is a perception of touch, yet known in its effects, by the sense of sight, and of hearing. In its efficiency, it is always united with the perception of motion. It belongs to the natural philosopher, to observe the details of all its applications. We here only give it a place, in our outline of a new view of the simple working plan of the physical mind.

Form. By the mediation of time and space, touch gives a perception of form, or of the direction of lines, and surfaces, and of the position of points; and, I know not where else to class them, of the sharp, and the obtuse.

All that was said of form, under the First Article of the present section, may be applied to the perception of it, by touch; except that in this instance, the perception is successive, instead of instant, as it is apparently in that of sight.

From experiments on the eyes, of those who have been relieved of blindness, it is assumed that touch corrects the errors of vision, when first opened to light; for this first impression, it is said, does not produce on the retina, an exact image of the object, nor of its distance. I would not; from a few obscurely recorded cases; pretend to say how this is. But if outlined form or shape, light and shade, tinted color, linear and aerial perspective, produce a picture, with the exactness of reality, on a plane tablet; I have yet to learn, why those lines, surfaces, light, shades, and tinted colors, all in accurate keeping, when projected on the retina, cannot, after experience on itself; for this is necessary in every sense; convey to the brain, as they exist in the tablet, a perception of perspective distances, without the tedious and clumsy assistance of touch.

The perception of form by touch, is of great and useful application to the Blind; and to common cases of darkness; but is not of much importance on other occasions.

Magnitude is a primary perception of Touch, though encompassing directly a less extent than that of sight. Touch knows only what is immediately under the sense; and therefore to have a perception of all magnitude within its reach, it must be successive, and consequently a mixed perception of primary and memorial. We refer the Reader to what is said under the sense of sight for its uses in science and art.

Number. Points, from which through sight, we derived unity, are a subject of perception to touch, and may give us a knowledge of number. Referring to what was said, in the First Article of this section, on the manner of deriving this knowledge; we here only remark that the perception of number by touch, is employed by the Blind; but is of little importance in science and the arts.

Time. We derived the knowledge of time, from memorial successions during the interval between the removal, and the return, severally of a thing of sight and of hearing. We draw the same knowledge from the successions of touch. Thus sight, hearing, and touch measure time; and time in turn, measures the perceptions of these several senses: and we here refer to their respective places in the First Article.

Space. Referring to the account of space, under the heads of sight and of hearing; and having from them derived the perception of distance, we learn, how touch may come to have by like means, a perception of space. Thus space is the measure of the successive movements of touch. We make however, little use of this manner of perceiving space; having other more ready and applicable measurements.

Motion. Again referring to what was said under the Article of Sight, we in a similar way, acquire, by succession, a knowledge of motion through the sense of touch.

Relationships in the sense of touch. Referring to the table of the objects of this sense; and supposing the Reader now to understand, that the relationship of things is only the perception of their resemblance and difference in form; their degrees, measurements, motions, positions, and reciprocal actions; with many other bearings towards each other; he will be able to apply the principle of relationship to the objects of touch, as we have endeavored to explain its perceptive process in the senses of sight and hearing. The relationship of the degrees and agencies of heat and cold, solid and fluid, rough and smooth, of the influence of weight, elasticity, and force, in regard to science and art; and of pain to life, health, and comfort; can be typified on the touch of any reflective observer of this sense, under our view of perception; and thus furnish a third primary agent of the mind.



ARTICLE IV. *Primary Perceptions, in the Sense of Taste.*

By this sense, we perceive the existence of external things, the subjects of our Nourishing appetite, with their Relationships, and Time. We call the former two, Sapidity. Its things are therefore;

Sapidity,
Time, and
Relationships.

Sapidity. The perceptions of Taste are of various kinds, degrees, and durations. The kinds generally known, are those

of sweet, sour, bitter, salt, astringent, and some others. They are so common, and so important, that they have been selected from the number of sapid things, and classed under these well-known terms. Others existing only in a few aggregates of things, have not been generally classed and named: as the taste of a salted olive, of a strawberry, of bread, and of wine, of brass, cedar, and clay.

In external objects, taste gives us knowledge of what would be concealed in an aggregate of things.

Primary perceptions of taste for Food and Drinks, inform us, either by an organized instinct, or an educated experience, what is necessary for our welfare and happiness. They are of the same kinds, degrees, and durations, and have the same names, when used for scientific discrimination. The tongue is said to be the organ of taste; but the perception seems to be exercised by the lips, palate, and fauces; certain kinds being more especially perceptible on one surface than on another; as the taste of rancid butter by the fauces and the pharynx. Some, whether from the force of their impression, or from their peculiarity in kind, remain longer on the sense than others.

Time. The perception of time by taste, though exercised perhaps to measure the duration of this taste, is acquired through the supposed vacancy between the distinct primary, counted, as it were, by the memorial, that successively occupy the vacancy. The perception of time by this sense, forms but a small part of the useful or esthetic reflection in the mirror of the senses and the brain.

Relationships of the things of taste. We have said enough on the relationships of the objects of primary perception, to let the term explain itself in application to this fourth sense. The amount and character of sapidities must defy any attempt to count and describe them. Their relationships of kinds and degrees to each other, are alike innumerable. They have a useful application to science and art; and afford a humble pleasure to the palate: but from the perverted and corrupted taste of the greater part of mankind, they add, perhaps more to its misery than to its gratification.



ARTICLE V. *Of Primary Perception in Scent.*

This sense perceives only the existence of,

Odors,
Time, and
Relationships.

Odors. Primary perception by what we call scent; a term adopted with its sub-animal meaning, as less exceptionable than the word commonly used; is of various kinds, degrees, and durations. These have been observed, obscurely classed, and named. Thus we have pungent, aromatic, sickening, and smoky; with a few other generic terms. All the rest take their name from the objects that produce them; as sulphurous, brassy, and vinous; together with the culinary odors, and those of plants, flowers, and fruits. The perceptions of scent are the means, both of our scientific knowledge, and of our own personal pleasure and protection. They are agreeable, disagreeable, or indifferent.

It has long been observed, that the perceptions of sight, hearing, and touch, have no resemblance to each other, nor to those of taste and scent. These are thought to have a slight similarity; some perceptions by one of these senses having a kind of metaphorical resemblance to those of the other. This is the common opinion. We cannot however say; the resemblance is immediate, and not the effect, arising from the surfaces of these perceptions, being close to each other. Taste and scent being constantly exercised together, their perceptions are so intermingled, as by habit to lead to the belief; they are really alike, and not seemingly so, by a mere metaphorical transfer between the proximate seats of two different types. For the strictly unrelated senses are subject to a similar habit; when a well-known voice reminds us of the sight of the person, from the voice and the person, having been so long respectively heard and seen together. But the senses of sight and hearing are so constantly exercised on their surrounding things, that the impressions cease to be vivid, and the habit immediate and strong. Whereas, the senses of taste and scent, being more rarely exercised; their particular per-

ceptions are not worn to faintness by frequency; and are consequently more forcible on the few occasions for mingling the perceptions of one of these senses with those of the other. This is more remarkably the case with scent, which in a refined condition of life, is more quiescent, or less frequently exercised than the rest of the senses.

Time. Scent has, as in some of the other senses, its perception of time by withdrawing an impression then returning it, and measuring the absence of the primary, by memorial images and types. If this is the process of the senses and the brain in the perception of time by every sense, and of space, in some, we learn that these two things would have no existence in our knowledge, were they not measured by perceptions; and again perception, reciprocally measured by them. The only difference between the knowledge of these and of all other things being this; other perception is apparent by an *instant* process; that of time and space is successive.

Relationship in Scent. The relationships of odors to each other, are as numerous and as perceptible as the odors themselves. They are usefully employed in science, and the arts; are sometimes protective of human life, and against many of its inconveniences; are of lucrative importance to the perfumer, and wine-tester; a source of delight to the snuff-taker, and to ladies who carry smelling bottles.

The foregoing portion of our outline includes the first of the five constituent powers of the mind. It is comparatively brief and simple; but to the sagacious observer, it is a sketch to be corrected if required, and to be extended, if satisfactory.

If the Reader will recur to the enumerated things with their relationships, under the head of the several senses, he will perceive they amount to thirty-five: but as this simple view of a Classification of the primary perceptions, may be perplexingly new to him; and as some of the names of the perceptions are repeated under the heads of the several senses; I here, to aid the understanding and the memory, give a tabular survey of the whole of the perceptions of all the senses; distinguishing those, repeated in the several senses, and those which make the sole primary elements.

TABLE OF THE CLASSES OF PHYSICAL THINGS.

I. Things perceived collectively by all the senses, amounting to thirty-five.			
<i>In Sight.</i> Color. Light. White. Form. Magnitude. Number. Space. Time. Motion.	Relationships. <i>In Hearing.</i> Sound. Time. Space. Relationships. <i>In Touch.</i> Heat. Hard. Solid.	Rough. Pain. Weight. Elasticity. Force. Form. Magnitude. Number. Time. Space.	Motion. Relationships. <i>In Taste.</i> Sapidity. Time. Relationships. <i>In Scent.</i> Odor. Time. Relationships.
II. Of these we cancel fourteen, which are found to be the same in the other senses, as in-sight.			
<i>In Hearing.</i> Time. Space. Relationships. <i>In Touch.</i>	Form. Magnitude. Number. Time. Space.	Motion. Relationships. <i>In Taste.</i> Time. Relationships.	<i>In Scent.</i> Time. Relationships.
III. Leaving twenty-one classes of things, as the primary and elementary materials of perception; enumerating however the corresponding things, only of the sense of sight.			
<i>In Sight.</i> Color. Light. White. Form. Magnitude. Number.	Space. Time. Motion. Relationships. <i>In Hearing.</i> Sound. <i>In Touch.</i>	Heat. Hard. Solid. Rough. Pain. Weight. Elasticity.	Force. <i>In Taste.</i> Sapidity. <i>In Scent.</i> Odor.

I endeavor to give here, the ground and outline of an arrangement of the primary perceptions of the senses; and leave others with a closer analysis to add to, or to lessen the number of its divisions: hoping however, they may not uselessly refine on our purpose of furnishing, not a disputation, but a practical history of the mind. Our classification is taken, perhaps imperfectly, from the universe of things at present known, and is offered as cate-

gories, or most general heads of physical; and there is no other; perception. If it is full and exact, it includes every element of the materials of human knowledge; since the Reader may perceive that two or more of them, with their relationships to each other, form the traceable foundation of every part of all he knows.

These are the first lines, of our laying-down the Working plan of thought. But it may here be asked; whether the lines of this plan can be made intelligible and instructive. Concluding from the darkness or confusion of former experience on this subject, perhaps they cannot. Through all ages, metaphysical schools, with their endless contrarities of doctrine, have taught every thing within the limits of their theoretic inquiry; yet nothing satisfactory seems to have been learned. The mind is the omnipotent Director, for good or for evil in man, and therefore in nations. But where is this great yet still deficient Director taught that first essential of his duty; to know himself? A few, and very few, in all ages alike, by a happy ordination, and an improving experience; have without being clearly conscious of the process, and without describing it to others; possessed the broader and higher working powers of thought. Yet what University, or College of Professors, learned as we will suppose, in all things, except in that which must teach them all they can really know? or what private or public school following its high example, has ever even pretended to instruct men, or women, or children, on the subject of that simple constituency of the mind, which God and Nature have given the means, but which profound professorial authority has destroyed the power of knowing? Our Outline is a simple sketch from Nature, embracing what can be practically taught at a juvenile period: for like the four rules of arithmetic, the constituents of thought, and the relationships of their images and types can be made intelligible, and useful, by systematic, physical, and progressive instruction. But what theologic, or metaphysical instructor of youth, has ever thought of teaching them the structure and working plan of the mind, which he himself did not understand? A common consent in ignorance has properly made him avoid it. We therefore, at this point offer, and as we advance, will give an example of the means

of teaching a child of the proper age and capacity, by an elementary recapitulation of our several perceptive divisions. I suppose the child, and it is also adapted to the ignorant but capable adult, to be addressed thus:

Any one of the various conditions of color, sound, hardness, sapidity, and odor, is called a Thing: for they are only a part of the great universe of existences, actions, and comparative things; and are known in the same way. Any aggregate of these things of color, sound, sapidity, and odor, united into a sphere or other boundary of form that can be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or scented is called an aggregate, or object. All these particulars of the existence of things, being perceived severally through each and all of the senses, are called perceptions. These perceptions are produced by pictures or images in the eye; and by types in the other senses. The things of nature, when compared, have resemblances and differences, in color, position, direction in space, form, magnitude, and number; in action on each other, as the causes of subsequent actions or effects; have differences and resemblances in character and action, of all the twenty-one enumerated things of the several senses. These are therefore to be perceived, at the moment, and in the same way, that the compared things are perceived; and are thus properly a part of perception. They are the intercommunion of the conditions, and agencies of things among each other; and are called Relationships. The images of things we thus *see*, and their types, we otherwise perceive; together with their relationships, are therefore part of the physical materials of the human mind.

These images and types, being with their relationships, clearly impressive on the senses, and being the first contributions to the mind, we call Primary perceptions. They furnish the mind with all the materials for its subsequent work. Call to mind every thing you know of the existence, conditions, actions, and relationships of things, and they will severally come under the general head of one of the senses, and its particular perception. A further explanatory detail by a competent master of this summary, will make you familiar with the rudimental principles of your own mind; and you will thus be prepared for the reappearance of all these primary images and types with their relationships, in a second constituent of the mind; the Memorial perceptions.

I have thus endeavored to describe and to classify among the perceptions of the five senses, the essential perception of Relationships between their several things; and thus with them to set forth, what appears to be the entire function of the first constituent of the mind.

As the second or memorial constituent, which is next to be described, consists of the images and types of the primary perceptions, transferred to the brain, it follows that the relationships of those images and types should form a part of the memorial. But we shall defer a more particular view of the whole of this subject to the head of Joint Perception; the third constituent of the mind, which shows exclusively the proper functional exercise of the perception of Relationship.



SECTION III.

Of Memorial Perceptions.

IN the first section, under a brief prefatory view of the five constituents of the mind, it was shown that memorial perceptions are the images and types we have, when the things which produce the primary are removed from before the senses. These, so far as we can assign the locality of their functions, seem to be performed in some part of the material structure of the brain: but of the place of its efficient organization and its mode of action; we are entirely ignorant; nor shall we be disposed to inquire into these secrets of science until we have the preparatory knowledge and means within our perceptive reach; believing, that in all inquiry, the unknown comes by the known, not metaphysically by the reverse. The organization of the senses of *sight* and *hearing*, and the mode of action of external objects upon them, are however not beyond observation. But when these primary images and types pass to the brain we have no

knowledge of the cause by which they arrive there, nor of the manner in which they perform their memorial functions. Still they are as obvious to the brain itself, as the similar primary perceptions of color, sound, pain, sapidity, and odor are to the several senses. It is of the memorial, unmixed, or mixed with the primary, that the brain makes its joint and conclusive perceptions. The memorial images and types are fainter than the primary; but they may occasionally equal the latter in vividness. There is always a memorial image or type on the waking brain. Dreams consist only of the unmixed memorial. Their total absence constitutes mental sleep. Sometimes the memorial perceptions, after appearing once or oftener in the brain, pass away, and are lost forever: some perish after various terms of duration; some continue revivable during life. In a mind enlarged by the habit of observation, there is an unbounded resource for memorial images and types. Those not present, are revived for joint and conclusive purposes, by means unknown; or only referrible to a general fact, or law of instinct: and though the metaphysical school pretends; they arise by the relationships of various kinds of 'association,' this still leaves the cause of the 'association' unknown.

Since the memorial are derived solely from primary perceptions, they are divided by the terms of the several senses, and subdivided by the things and objects of those senses. Although it is not in strict nomenclature; to mingle the terms of two different constituents of the mind; yet it will be intelligible, to employ the phrases memorial sight, hearing, touch, taste, and scent. We have learned, that the primary furnish the images and types for the memorial perceptions. The memorial furnish the like images and types for the joint and conclusive. The two former of these constituent powers provide what may be called, the materials, the two latter, the efficient causes of thinking. The memorial are an unbounded assemblage of images and types, from which the joint are to select those of things related in Nature: the conclusive decide upon the condition, character, and degree of that relationship; thereupon to direct the verbal sign for communicating that conclusion to others. As the memorial perceptions differ from the primary, only in being images and types on the brain less defined in form, and fainter in degree, we can add little to what is said

under the divisions and subdivisions of the primary of the five senses. We there made ten subdivisions of perceptible things, in the sense of sight; and have the same number, for the memorial images and types; including the heads of the several senses, and the subdivisions of their things.



ARTICLE I. *Of Memorial Perception, in the Sense of Sight.*

Memorial color,
 Memorial light,
 Memorial white,
 Memorial form,
 Memorial number,
 Memorial magnitude,
 Memorial space,
 Memorial time,
 Memorial motion,
 Memorial relationship.

It appears by this table, that the memorial are employed on the same things and objects, and with the same difference in kind and degree, as the primary; both being, as before said, identical in every condition, except; the former, as cerebral images and types are not produced immediately by the presence of the object; and are more faint and indistinct in their pictures of things.

Of Memorial Color. With an exception of the stated differences, all that is said of primary sight, so to call it, in the second section, is true of the memorial perceptions of color; not only on its general phenomena, but on their exercises in the various useful and elegant arts.

Memorial Light to Darkness. In primary perception, light enables us to see objects; darkness deprives us of sight. In darkness we have the memorial alone: and though in the primary, it is perhaps impossible to prevent the sight of objects, with the eyes open; yet it is difficult in the memorial, to avoid the mingling

of visual perceptions with that of the term darkness; in which case, we should have only a verbal perception in the word darkness; it being then merely an *unsignificant* vocal sound, not a subject of knowledge. Still under the head of primary sight, I considered darkness as a perceptible thing. In the absence of light with the eyes open, or when shut in the midst of light, there is equally perceptible, a sort of faint and indefinite something, with the character of color; generally obscure, but sometimes brighter, of indescribable boundary, and changeable in form, motion, and hue. This would seem to make total darkness, imperceptible; and a like nonentity, with the Greek, *úle*, or substratal matter, infinity of time and space, and the immaterial spirit of human thought. We leave others to say, whether this case of 'darkness visible' is the result of a peculiar circulation through the retina, or of some other cause.

Memorial White to Black. What is said under this head, in primary perception, applies in a great measure to its images on the brain.

Memorial Form. We have the conditions of form, enumerated and described under its primary head. All, there stated of points, lines, surfaces, in their unnumbered aggregates and shapes; every application of the knowledge of these things, to the purposes of science and of life, is, with the exception already stated, true of the memorial, as of primary perceptions: we therefore refer the Reader to the head of visual form, in the Second Section.

Memorial Number. This is again only the cerebral perception of those images, that by the sense of sight, inform us of the existence of number. What is said under its head in that Section, may be applied to the present subject. From the simple mode in which we have the perception of number in the primary; and from its simple image in the memorial, being less complicated with unrelated things, and their aggregates, we consider it as a *single* or unconnected thing; or what the old school call it, an *abstraction* from other things.

Memorial Magnitude. Take magnitude from before the eye, it still by that unknown organization and cause of the memorial perception, appears like a primary image on the brain, together with all the conditions of the primary; except with their visual

clearness and force; prepared to perform the functions of joint and conclusive perceptions. A reference to the head of primary magnitude, in the second section, will show its purposes and application.

Memorial Space. We derive the knowledge of space from the primary perception of two successive sounds, in the manner described in the second section; which when once acquired, appears again in the memorial, ready to be applied, through the joint, and conclusive, in all its practical purposes to science, and to the common services of life.

Memorial Time. From a previous account, under its primary head, of our manner of perceiving time, the Reader will recollect; we derived it from the successions of memorial images and types, during an interval of absence in the primary. Under this view, our knowledge of time arises directly and exclusively from memorial perceptions; to be subsequently employed, as occasions for the joint and conclusive may require.

Memorial Motion is but a copy of its primary image or type. The perception of motion, as we have formerly shown, is derived equally from the successions of the primary, and memorial. What was said of its practical use, under its primary head, is here applicable to the memorial, through all the joint and conclusive occasions of science or art. Neither the memorial, nor the primary furnish us with the least glimpse of an interminable *infinity* of space, magnitude, number, motion or time.

Memorial Relationship in Sight. We have so far explained the term relationship, in our prefatory synopsis, of the five constituents, and in the detail of the primary; that we need only remark in this section, as previously stated, that the same term applies to the bearing of the memorial images and types to each other, as to the things of nature themselves, under primary perception. We shall therefore on the memorial of the other senses not set down the head of relationship: leaving the Reader, from what we have already stated, to make here the detail for himself.

ARTICLE II. *Of Memorial Perception, in the Sense of Hearing.*

Under the preceding division of memorial sight and its objects, we exemplified the manner of treating the general subject of this class of cerebral perception, by showing, that in being derived from the primary, they are in most of their conditions identical with them. This second in order of the perceptive powers of the mind, furnishes the important material for the subsequent joint comparisons, and conclusive decisions of thought: and we shall hereafter more particularly show, that from the respective *qualities* of these memorial images and types, arise in greater part, the differences of the human intellect. In considering the divisions of the memorial perceptions, produced through the other senses; their similarity to the primary, justify us, for the sake of brevity, in referring the Reader to what is said of the latter, in the second section.

The Memorial Perceptions through the Ear are the same as those of the primary;


Memorial Sound,
Memorial Time,
Memorial Space.

Memorial Sound. Regarding memorial sound, as divided like the primary into the Noisy and Tunable; their types are identical, except, the memorial being more faint than the primary. In comparing memorial *sight* with memorial *hearing*, the latter is found to be much less distinct, and the number of perceptions fewer. There are always things to be seen, but not always sounds to be heard: and the ear though always open, being not always occupied with primary types, is less frequently and less distinctly impressed, than the sense of sight, by its images. The eye being generally open, is then subject to impress when closed, has still its memorial perceptions. W distinct memorial of the face of a friend, and of a church organ, than of the voice of that friend, the instrument: and in dreams, where all memorial; except those produced by occa

without, and by pain from within; most of the dream is of things of sight and rarely of sound. I have for years, dreamed almost constantly; and sometimes of the voice in the speech of others; but oftener of speaking myself. I once dreamed of the ringing of church bells; and occasionally of music: yet with music so often before me, in interesting primary perception, at the opera, in the concert-room, in the parlor, and in my own singing, whistling, and instrumental performance, indifferent as these may be; I very rarely dream of it, or of song. Others, particularly musicians; if they will speak accurately, and not in conceited opposition; must say how it is with them. Referring to the head of the primary perception of sound, we remark here, that the memorial types are the materials of musical invention, preparatory for its practical application; particularly in the adjustment of the tone, time, unity and contrast, of various instruments to the character of the subject, and to each other, in the construction of harmony.

Memorial Time, in Hearing. Under the head of primary time, in hearing, we endeavored to explain, how we have the perception of its successions, by the ear: the Reader is therefore referred to that account in the second section. It is in the fictional use of the memorial types of the ear, that we attempt, in vain, to form a perception of the infinite, in the duration of sound.

Memorial Space, in Hearing. The perception of space by this sense, is derived from a peculiar impression of sound, as we have endeavored to show, in the explanation under its primary head; to which we refer. It is through the memorial types in this; as through those of the images and types of the other senses; the mind metaphysically imposes on itself the belief, that it can have the impossible perception of the extremes of an infinity, which by its definition has neither beginning nor end.



ARTICLE III. *Of Memorial Perception, in the Sense of Touch.*




In the Second Section, we named fifteen things of primary perception, in the sense of touch :

Heat, its degrees to cold.
Hard, its degrees to soft.
Solid, its degrees to fluid.
Rough, its degrees to smooth.
Pain, its kinds and degrees.
Weight, its degrees.
Elasticity, its degrees.
Force, its degrees.
Form, its points, lines, surfaces, and solidity.
Magnitude, its parts and degrees.
Number, its units.
Time, its divisions and durations.
Space, its divisions and distances.
Motion, its degrees and durations.

All these; by a law of the mind, that repeats in the brain, the types on the senses; appear in the memorials of touch; yet as we rarely exercise the latter, we do not here consider them in detail, but refer the Reader to the enumeration and description under the primary head, which when transferred to the brain, he may apply, as the occasions for their use require. The memorials of this sense are employed for many of the purposes of the primary, and as the means of our convenience and safety, in blindness, and in the dark. In these cases, memorial touch may receive assistance from primary hearing and scent, but cannot from taste and sight. Yet in the light, primary perceptions of the eye may help memorial perceptions of touch, and thus afford means to guard us against inconvenience and danger. Thus if a bridge is to be crossed, the only conclusive test of which, by a solid, or yielding primary perception of touch, might be dangerous and difficult, or impossible; our knowledge of the strength of the timbers by visual perception of their size, material, and bond, might give confidence

in their sufficiency, under the bearing touch of a passing weight. I have here given an illustration of a case of the assistance, in the acquisition of knowledge, that one sense affords another; but this under its proper term will be more particularly noticed hereafter.

Memorial touch contributes its proper portion, to the types of things which help to form the mirror of the mind; that microcosm of reflection. I leave others to look more closely into this subject, and to amplify its details. It is a wise consequence, or a co-operating wisdom, in the purposes of Nature, that the memorials of touch are so faint or obscure, as to prevent the disagreeable revival of many of its primary perceptions. We have very little more than the term, or verbal sign of pain, in a memorial of it: and certainly, no dream of the application of the causes that produce it ever raises a clear and acute type of it on the brain. When we dream of pain, and feel it, it is, because that pain is at the moment, a primary perception of touch, in our sleeping but suffering body; and thereupon, from its active degree, we generally awake. This obscurity of the memorials of touch explains why they form so small a part of the types of the sleeping brain; when compared with the images of sight, which furnish, as it were, almost the whole picture-gallery of our dreams. I cannot say, how it is with maniacs, for they exhibit a strange perversion both in their primary and memorial perceptions. I have still a clear memorial, that before my fifth year, I dreamed, with a distinct perception of her figure, her knife, and her operation, that an intruder into our nursery cut off my leg, without causing a sensation: and although we dream of falling from a height, we never come to touch the ground. Persons do dream of their teeth being loose, and easily dropping out; but, has any one ever dreamed of their being forcibly drawn by a dentist, and suffering pain from it? The mind in these as in similar instances of memorial touch, seems to be under a chloroform influence, with a perception of only the verbal sign of pain.



ARTICLE IV. *Of Memorial Perceptions, in the Sense of Taste.*

There belong to the memorials of this sense, as to its primary, the perceptions of Time, and of the various kinds, degrees, and durations of sapidity; whether of external objects, or those of our nourishing appetites. They constitute however, a small part of the functions of the brain, in persons of education and refinement. How brightly, and how often, the memorial perceptions of the Epicure are exercised on his feeding, and his drinks, we leave him to describe: but as he rarely regards any thing, except the debasing taste of his palate, we are not likely to have an accurate, and certainly not a very profitable account of all he may know.

ARTICLE V. *Of Memorial Perceptions, in Scent.*

The memorial, like the primary perceptions of this sense, are of time, and of the various kinds, and degrees, of odors; and these conditions are so related, that if a primary perception is of an intense degree, its memorial will be of unusual duration: though the duration may sometimes depend on the kind of perception, or on the rarity of its occurrence. A new and intense impression will on occasions, haunt as it were, the scent, by coming and going through its memorial, for hours, and even for days after it has been experienced. The connection of scent with the perceptions of other senses is often so close, as to vividly bring up their memorials. This arises from the fact previously stated, that scent, being only occasionally exercised, is not weakened, or crossed-out, by frequent connection with other perceptions. It is not however reversely true, that the memorial of the other senses will certainly bring up the perceptions of scent: for the abundance of perceptions on the senses of sight and hearing, taken as generally and actively in use, weakens or overrules any thing of scent that may have been severally impressed upon them. And this suggests the cause of our rarely dreaming of scent; for when odor is not forced on a sleeper's mind, the scent must be excited by connection with some memorial of another sense: particularly,

that of sight, and of hearing. But waking sight being always, and hearing often in exercise, any one of the perceptions of these senses, which has been connected with a particular scent, may be so indefinite, or altogether lost from that connection, as not to be readily if at all brought back. Thus the reverse of that cause which connects scent strongly with sight; the rarity of its occurrence; does by the constant exercise of the latter sense destroy the connection of any one perception of sight with that of scent.

Mixed primary and memorial perceptions of scent are employed for scientific knowledge, and for our personal pleasure and protection, in the same manner as primary with memorial, or as memorial with primary, as we described the process under preceding heads.

In here closing the view of memorial perceptions; we may remark on the conditions of the duration of both these and the primary, on the senses, and on the brain; that the primary are perceptible only when they are before the sense, their duration being measured by their continuance. Some of them pass to the brain, and others perish in the sense. Those which pass to the brain to be memorial, remain there, though unperceived, till their revival is required; others are altogether lost, and are restorable only by presenting to the sense, the things or objects that originally produced them. We shall hereafter consider these several cases, when we speak of what we shall call the *Evanescent* and the *Durable* quality of perceptions.

We here recapitulate, what may thus far be made intelligible to the two pupils we have supposed; the Juvenile and the full-grown Ignorant. They learned under the preceding section, the first process in the plan of the intellect; the Primary Perception of things or objects before the senses. Now as there is no one, who with common vanity will admit; he cannot see and think; he has therefore, the ready means for understanding all I may here briefly describe. Let the Learner look on an object at once new and interesting, but without a name; that the image may be one of primary perception alone. Let him close his eyes; there will still, for this happens to all, be to his 'mind's eye,' a faint and indefinite likeness of what he has just seen. This picture, we call a memorial perception. These two conditions of the senses and

the brain have the same generic name of Perception, because the last is known to the brain by a function similar to that which perceives the impression of external things and objects, on the senses. Let him become familiar with this view of the primary and memorial function, and he will have a plain and intelligible knowledge of the first two constituent powers of the mind: and this too with no more claim to a so-called profundity of comprehension, than that required for the earliest lesson of a trade-apprentice, or the simplest rules of a juvenile game.

These first two constituents furnish what may be called the materials for the working-plan of the mind; preparatory, if the distinction can be made, to the subsequent and more intellectual uses of mere materials by the other three.

We now pass to the third constituent, or Joint Perceptions, as exercised on those materials.

SECTION IV.

Of Joint Perceptions.

JOINT perception is the perception of two or more primary and memorial images and types; either as altogether primary, or altogether memorial; or as embracing at the same time or jointly, a view of one with the other. The former condition we called unmixed and the latter mixed. From a joint exercise on these three images and types of things, in primary perception alone, or memorial alone, or these viewed together; is derived a knowledge of those resemblances, differences, actions, and reactions, with their effects and degrees, embracing those numerous bearings of things and of their images and types to each other, which are called Relationships. As these things and their relationships constitute the whole circuit of human knowledge, in science, in art and in life, this knowledge must be gathered from those exercises of the

mind; we shall hereafter call the *Excursive* and the *Elective* qualities. The flight of the joint perceptions through this ~~excursive~~ *excursive* field, is over an extent proportioned to the broad or the limited character of the intellect. It perceives the multitude of things and their relationships, selects those, accordant in nature with the train of the subject or purpose in view, and rejects those which are unrelated to it. These accordant relationships are sifted as it were, from the discordant, and in their several degrees of relationships are in the working plan of the mind, passed over; using a book-binder's term; to the *Forwarding*, of the conclusive constituent, thereafter to receive the *Finishing* truth and elegance of the verbal sign.

As joint perception is employed on all the primary and memorial images and types, with their relationships; thus bringing together and comparing the perceptive materials, for a final conclusion, which constitutes a definite and comprehensive knowledge; we shall consider the joint as exercised under the heads of the several senses and their objects, as enumerated and classed under the two preceding sections.

I regret to state here, though it seems to be true, that the simple system of this work, like the development of other simplicities in nature which do not produce an immediate hope of gain, elementary and plain as it may be, is not intended for the million; nor, bigoted as they are to their sovereign selves, will it ever reach them, until it has first passed through the instructive agency of the finally authoritative minds of the Few. We therefore here and generally throughout this Natural History, look to the old time-saving maxim of 'a word to the wise;' since to a listening ear, and a craving observation, it is enough; whereas words without end will never convey knowledge to the idle, and unwilling intellect.



ARTICLE I. *Of Joint Perception, in the Sense of Sight.*

We made ten things for primary, and memorial sight, and have the same number for our present ¹ 1;

Color.
Light and darkness.
White and black.
Form.
Magnitude.
Number.
Time.
Space.
Motion.
Relationships.

We add, perhaps unnecessarily, this last term to the list: since the sole purpose of the Joint constituent is to perceive and collect the relationships of things; and thus to include all that might be said on this subject, under the head of each of the senses: in short, the joint constituent might be called the joint comparison of relationships.

Joint perceptions being the means of bringing together primary images and types alone, or memorial alone, or of one with the other; these images and types; representing the boundless things of Nature, preparatory to the shorter comparison by the conclusive constituent; it must afford the unbounded materials for endless comparison. As we are presenting an Outline of the working plan of the mind, we shall illustrate only the manner of comparison under each of the heads, and not give a full detail of their several instances. And as for brevity, we used the term memorial, in the last section; we here for joint perception of the things of the several senses use the phrase;

Joint Comparison of Color. A comparison of the various kinds of color in all their tints, shades, and degrees, shows the relationships of identity, or similarity, or difference; and of the effect of these on the animated, and the inanimate departments of nature; constituting an interesting branch of knowledge. This applies to both the mixed and unmixed primary and memorial; the perceptions of the former being clearer and more impressive. And hence the distinctness of the primary may give an accurate comparison and conclusion; by shedding as it might seem, its

brighter influence on the faintness of the memorial. If this is so, it suggests the cause; why the primary is in the Baconian system, the essential corrective of Contemplation, which too frequently uses the memorial alone: thus presenting an important subject to the metaphysician, who with his Spirit, deals not even with an imaged or typical memorial; but in a fictional ideality, without a decent respect to the sensuous touch-stone of truth, which his beneficent Creator has vouchsafed to afford him.

Joint Comparison of Light and Darkness. The comparison of these, whether mixed or unmixed, primary or memorial, is made on the relationship of the degrees of their shades, and of their influence over other things. Light and darkness have many relationships to the animated, and inanimate agencies of Nature; and their application to Painting, in all its branches, is an essential point for just discrimination on the subject of Light and Shade, and of Aerial Keeping.

Joint Comparison of White and Black. Referring to this head under primary perception, we briefly add that joint comparisons on the various shades or degrees of these things, are the subjects of general Nature, Science, Art, and Life.

Joint Comparison of Form. We learned in the second section, to which we refer the Reader, that without metaphysical refinement, Form is made up of measurable surfaces, lines, and points. We derive the perception of number, from a joint comparison of its points; of space, from its impenetrability; and of magnitude, from the space it occupies. All these things of form have the relationship of more and less; of position and direction in space; and thus of innumerable conditions toward each other; for the subdivisions of lines into points, and of surfaces into lines and parts, are in the comparison of their fractions and multiples, under the same law of similar relationship. But Form, besides these conditions, has the wide and important relationships of its action, in cause and effect, under motion and force, as in obvious mechanical power; or in imperceptible self-motion producing other imperceptible motion, as in chemical affinity and repulsion. From all these relationships of the conditions of form to each other, or of the actions of these conditions of form on other things, arise the unnumbered images and types for the exercise

of joint perception; and whatever this embraces constitutes as far as it extends, so much of our knowledge. To illustrate this in the simplest case: suppose we would cover a square aperture. We seek among surfaces, that which will cover the aperture. This is done by a joint comparison of different forms, and their dimensions with that of the aperture, and we have by primary experiment or trial, a conclusive perception of the equality of the surface and the open space of the aperture. Here the mental process is finished. This may seem to be a trifling illustration; yet it is only a simple example of the working plan of the mind in ascertaining a practical truth; and is a pattern of the simple process for universally employing the lines and surfaces of form, in all their kinds, innumerable actions or causations.

Of all forms the Sphere has the fewest relationships within itself. It has no points, and but one apparent curved surface: and its notional lines are only diversely polar and equatorial, of greater and less: itself, as an object, has only the relationship of equal and of unequal, and all the degrees of similarity: on all which the rule of joint perception is applied for practical purposes. As measurable and concreted points make up lines, lines are concreted into surfaces and surfaces concreted into solids, they have among themselves the relationship of greater and less, of lines to surfaces, of surfaces to boundary, and of boundaries to distances from each other in space.

The joint perceptions of measurable form are exercised in all the sciences, in the mechanical, and esthetic arts, and are employed in nearly every part of human life.

Joint Comparison of Number. We derived number from the unit in a point of Form: and from a joint perception of several units, the relationship of more and less. This is termed in practical Arithmetic Addition and Subtraction; or for brief calculation in higher numbers, Multiplication and Division. Though number is the means of enumerating the assembled things of nature and art; if art is not nature still; yet itself has but one relationship, for the application of joint comparison; the greater and the less: and therein only a relationship to numerable units among themselves; and not at all to their Infinity, which is only a word, and represents no perceptible thing. No unit can there-

fore bear a relation to an *un*significant word except; that both are one, and each is different from the other: which nearly allies the condition to that of an algebraic surd.

Number is especially the subject of the Arithmetician, in all its functions and powers, from the diminishing fractions of a unit, to its unexhausted multiplication; whether represented by numeral or algebraic symbols, from the simple relation, of one to three, to the calculated *Arenarius* of Archimedes; or to the still greater reach of the Arithmetic of Infinities, and of the Differential and Integral calculus. For these even when pushed to their theoretic and almost metaphysical extent, are but the work of joint perception, or the original and simple relationship of more and less. And all these processes, apparently so profound to the novice, are to the intelligent mind; when gradually led-on by elementary instruction, allowing only reflective time; as simple and easy as the subtraction of five from seven, or the addition of ten to twelve: since with all their various modes, they are only an exercise of the joint comparison on the differences between more and less.

Proficients in the use of the higher functions of numbers, sometimes, it is to be regretted, pursue their refined abstractions, only to please their own laborious ingenuity, or to gain the credit of doing what others cannot; and from the employment of only a part of their minds on a single form of joint relationship, often so contract their intellect, as to deprive them of the power, if they ever had it, of doing any thing else. But however important their labors may have been to science, it seems; from the limitation of their minds to the single relation of more and less, in the problems of quantity; that something has prevented their profundity from solving the greatest problem of problems; the Problem of the Human Mind.

Joint Comparison of Magnitude. Magnitude is derived from the surfaces and boundary of Form. It has the relationship to other magnitudes, of equality and the degrees of similarity and difference. It is divided into parts, and has thereby the relationship of more and less, within itself. There is no joint relationship between its parts, and their supposed infinity, of which we have no knowledge; and yet **only conclude we have, by com-**

binning two unrelated perceptions together; as when we apply the phrase infinite number to the parts of magnitude; as if infinite number were something, less vague than a continued extension. But magnitude is incommensurable with infinity: for one is a perception of sight and of touch, the other of the sound of a word, that conveys no conceivable meaning: there being thus between them no comparative measure of greater and less. Magnitude which is in its subdivisions, measured by the parts of space, is the peculiar subject of the Geometer, whose joint perception of the relationships of lines, surfaces, and of boundary, and of its contents are of general use in science, and practical life.

The subject of the joint comparison of magnitude and its parts, like that of number is altogether of the greater and the less. But from the joint perception of magnitude, not being so purely an abstraction from other sensible things as number, it is less apt to contract the mind when exercised on the forms of objects, in their various uses in nature and art. We see it exemplified in the Money-Broker, whose joint perceptions are employed almost exclusively on the less and the greater of his loss and his gain; and of the Manufacturer, who together with his loss and gain, employs his joint perceptions on the things of color and form, and on the abundant relationships of productive mechanism. And here we may refer to our introduction; where we endeavored to show that metaphysics and theology; if there is any difference between them; have been the troublesome intermeddlers with the subject of the mind; the one in blindly trying to explain its supposed difficulty; the other by turning every fiction of the former to the narrow purpose of his delusions. We have now learned enough on the working plan of primary, memorial, and joint perception, not only to justify what was there maintained, but to say further, why it sadly should be so. The essential dogma of the metaphysical sophist, for he looks not to the proofs of natural philosophy, is that the whole directive agency of mind resides in a spiritual power. If the agency of the mind is derived from knowledge, and knowledge consists in the perception of the relationships of things, metaphysical knowledge must consist in its recognition of the relationships of a spiritual working plan in the mind. But the relationships to its own images and types, or to

those of matter, are not only unknown, but incomprehensible. We however drop the argument, and say, that to a metaphysical theologian, contracted by the shrivelling influence of the word spirit; it would be as difficult to see into the broad and real relationships of the physical mind; as for him who is devoted exclusively to the relationships of more and less, to invent and execute in all their ingenuity and taste, such structures as the Flavian Amphitheater and Westminster Abbey. No transcendental Architect with his indefinite relationships on every thing, can in his impracticable 'Idealities' ever raise even a seemly phantom in his art, except an invisible 'Castle in the Air.'

Joint Comparison of Space. Referring to what was said on primary and memorial space, we learn that without metaphysical refinement, space is measured by where Form is, and where it may be. As form is divisible into various magnitudes, so space which is measured by it, has its subdivisions, and thus admits of the joint relationships of greater and less, and of position. Space is to us a thing of limited perception; therefore its parts, or the whole of them can have no more relationship to what is called infinite space, than to color, and indeed, if possible less, for to this there is the relationship of difference; whereas there is no joint comparison between space and an unmeaning word. The infinite fluency of space, and time and number, in the calculations of the Higher Mathematics, is the assumption of an indirect mode of inquiry, for the proof of a half concealed fact, as the Dialectic supposition of the *ducens in absurdum* is used in proof of other relationships: which purpose in both cases, could under a clearer use of the mind in both reasoner and auditor be more easily and effectually accomplished in the direct way, by simple and unfictionized perception. For the animal mind could no more have been ordained by the associated design of God and Nature, to be exercised by the supposition of fable, and the practice of falsehood; than a wise Law-giver would ordain a Government to be conducted by the open lying of Party, the occult chicanery of Diplomats, or a combustible and explosive *financiering* with paper money, and its ruinous panics and confusion.

Joint perceptions of space are of constant use in all the departments of science, and art, and life. The Geographer and

other measurers of the earth, arrange and construct by its divisions. The Astronomer by joint perceptions of form, light, space, and motion, observes and discovers a new realm of knowledge in the visible Heavens, within the reach of his telescope; and beyond that, to his too often named Infinity, the humblest groper on the earth, is his equal in knowing nothing.

Joint Comparison of Time. I said under the head of time, in the second section, to which we refer, that we may have the knowledge of Time through all the sensuous perceptions, with the assistance of the memorial. It is divided into parts, which have unnumbered relationships for joint comparison with themselves, but none with infinity. Time is one of the measurers of the actions of the whole universe of things. We exercise the perception of it, in every bodily motion, and in every successive thought: consequently the more extended the joint perception, the more exact and delicate will be our measurement of its divisions. The great subject of joint perception on time, is in the succession of those connected actions called Cause and Effect. To the broad and acute observer, every act conveys the joint perception of a previous and a subsequent point of time, and by this coincidence and measurement of causations, discoveries are made of the simplest facts, and of the most comprehensive Laws of Nature.

The vast amount of detail embraced by this subject, does not fall within the purpose of this Outline. It briefly shows only the place to which it belongs, and leaves it to be made out by others.

Joint Comparison of Motion. Motion appears of various degrees, from the least assignable, to an immeasurable velocity.

Joint perceptions are exercised on its degrees of greater and less, on its different kinds, and directions, and on the relationships of its causations or influences in producing other motions. We know not that any thing is even at momentary rest; therefore the relationships of motion at one extreme of its degrees, to a supposed infinite velocity at the other are alike removed beyond joint perception.

Motion and its degrees with their applications, form a large part of the joint perceptions of Natural Philosophy, and of the experimental development of chemical affinities and repulsions;

of expansion and contraction; and is a general element in the calculations, joint comparisons, and accurate measurements of the Astronomer. But I leave others under our arrangement and nomenclature, to pursue this yet inexhaustible subject.

From the preceding notice of number, magnitude, time, space, and motion, we have rejected the scholastic delusion of a possible joint comparison, of them severally in their degrees of more and less with that incomprehensible word infinity; for the senses and the brain have no more image and type of this nonentity, than they have of an image or type of a material substratum or *ûle* within an aggregate of things; or of an unsubstantial spirit within the brain. The metaphysical system, being as we have endeavored to show, a false reasoning on nothing, produces all these nothings. Physical observation rejects them altogether; and as their several terms mean nothing they might under a clearer method of the mind, be properly expunged from every dictionary, with claims to meaning and truth.



ARTICLE II. *Of Joint Perception, in the Sense of Hearing.*

The Reader is referred to the preceding heads of primary and memorial hearing, for what may be assistant to the present subject of joint perception on this sense. The things of hearing are

Sound,
Time, and
Space:

and the joint perceptions of their several relationships form a large part of both useful and agreeable knowledge; and not an inconsiderable part of our annoyance: and hereupon sounds have been distinguished, as Tunable and Noisy.

Joint Comparison of Sound. The relationships of Sound under joint perception, afford much useful knowledge; indicate many of the unseen operations of nature; and warn us of coming danger to property and life. In the form of noise, when not necessary or useful in the purposes of civilization, it is an affliction to the

human ear, a sore disturber of the quiet and employed mind; a distraction to contemplative thought; and even annoying to the skilful direction of manual occupation. Unnecessary noise is a pastime with the savage of the wigwam, and a vulgar vice with the savage in civilization. The ignorant and the idle, having nothing to contribute to the benefit or pleasure of others, use their throats and hands to disturb them. The voice was intended to denote the mind, and the hand to execute its purposes. And thus it happens that the more destitute the thought; the more noisy the voice, and mischievous the hands of the human animal. Hence children, the ignorant multitude, the drunkard, and the maniac, are noisy from the absence of intellect; and better men when they occasionally lay aside or forget their mind, become noisy. Vanity, which has little thought and no quietude, is always buzzing about, and annoying the ear. Children screech loud; the vulgar sneeze loud, talk loud, laugh loud, quarrel loud; at camp meetings pray, shout, and groan loud; and in that greatest audible abomination, think their obtrusive follies and ignorance aloud. As men become cultivated and reflective, they become more quiet; for intellectual vacancy and selfishness tries to fill its ear with noise of its own making; hence Savages and civilized Ignorants, being equally vacant, have an intercommunication of emptiness, by unintelligible noise. Hanno the Carthaginian, who sailed more than two thousand years ago, along the western coast of Africa, heard night after night the vociferations of the Negroes, dancing around their fires; and where Christian Kidnappers have not driven these rejoicings from the shore; there, as modern sailors tell us, they nightly dance about their fires, in noise rejoicing still. Other animals make few and only necessary noises, and always to denote an instinctive purpose of their lives; and when it is more continued, and might seem idle, as in birds, it is more or less tunable, except from the cage of the Parrot, and from the Rookery, not unfrequently a companionable break-silence severally to the Ignorant, and to the Great. Man is the only one of his animal tribe, that is noisy in his want of thought: in his infancy, his youth, his drunkenness, and insanity; and upon that great confusion of intellect and passion, an Anglo-Saxon election, whether English or American; where worse than vacant

Politicians, with bells and drums, vociferating speeches and huzzas, try to penetrate by the ear, the vacancy of unthinking voters. It is calculated; there is more ambitious and ill tempered noise, with no more clear and useful intellect, made by the American Congress, all the State Legislators and City Councils, political meetings and scaffold vociferations, in the United States, than by all the frogs, crickets, and 'katy-dids' of the country. These for some instinct of nature, croak, and scratch their creaking membranes, only through the nights of Spring and Summer; the others, without regard to the republican equality of rights and happiness, with no benefit to others or themselves, disturb its quietude forever.

But the joint perception of all these human noises, is foreign to the subject of this Work, for it gains no knowledge; and we leave it, with the remark, that our joint perceptions of noise are rather upon the relationships of good sense and refinement, to the personal vulgarity and folly that create and permit it, than upon the nuisance itself.

The joint perceptions of tunable sounds are of quite another character; for they embrace the subjects of music and speech; though they again, differ from each other. For the former, except indirectly through some connected perception, conveys no intellectual purpose of the mind. Whereas Speech is full of significancy, and largely assists to make the mind what it is. The joint perceptions of Music show more remarkably than those of the mathematical greater and less, the manner; our useful and applicable knowledge is derived directly from joint comparison; for besides the relationships of stronger and weaker in sound, and of longer and shorter in time, its principal element of Tune, is measured only by what is agreeable to the ear. In these forms of relationships then, of tunable sound; the strong and the weak, the long and the short, and the variety of intonated notes, the whole knowledge and pleasure of music consists. And as it employs no element for a significant joint perception, to lead to a conclusive proposition; it produces in the mind only a primary and memorial state or condition, that, for want of a better name, we may call *Feeling*, as distinct from *thought*. It is from this cause; the professional Musician and Singer, who are so con-



stantly and exclusively employed on the relationships of insignificant sound, that although they may not be destitute of the indefinite state of mind, we call *Musical Feeling*, and may be vain and sensual; they have never, as history shows, with all their wayward 'Genius,' and the 'inspiration of the Muse,' received an over share of intellect, from any other source.

The joint perception of the tunable sound of Speech is employed on the relationships of the Vocality or kind, Force, Time, and Intonation of the voice: and of all these varieties respectively to each other.

It is not necessary for the Author of this work, here to repeat himself. If the Reader will refer to his Essay on the Human Voice, published as a Fifth Edition, in eighteen hundred and fifty nine, he will find a full detail of the relationships of Speech, under the modes of Vocality, Force, Time, Abruptness, and Pitch; and of their application to the principles and practice of Vocal Expression. It is there shown; by what described vocal means, the different mental states of plain thought, and of passion may be communicated to others. But this plainly descriptive, simply declaratory, or narrative, and unexcited thought; and this passionate excitement of perception called 'passion' include the two different states of the silent mind to be audibly expressed. We learn then, that as speech may be the vocal representation of all our perceptions; a joint perception of all that language represents must be a joint perception of the relationships of all our knowledge; consequently that language affords the shortest means, for furnishing the mind with the most extended survey of the relationships of things.

Comparing the knowledge derived from a joint perception of the vocal sign, with what we derive from the relationships of more and less in number and magnitude; we find the former much more extensive than the latter. For we shall hereafter describe the verbal sign as equally the subject of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive exercise of the senses and the brain, upon every thing named in nature; thus forming a constituent of the mind, by there imprinting its images and types, in like manner as the images and types of external things are impressed. For an example. When a mountain and a tree excite a primary, memorial,

joint, and conclusive perception, the verbal perception, or words mountain and tree, create in the minds of those who hear; and by reacting through the ear, equally on the mind of the speaker; similar primary and memorial perceptions, and prepare them for the joint and conclusive. All this is produced through the ear, by words, as certainly and as clearly as images and types are produced by external things: thus furnishing the mind with an extended verbal survey, of the relationships of those images and types, which so to speak, had been previously recorded in the first and *natural* edition of primary and memorial perception.

From our having so often remarked that knowledge is more immediately derived through the joint constituent, it must be obvious to the Reader, in what manner the joint perception of the verbal sign is the source of more knowledge, or more facilitates its revival, than that derived from any one subject of perceptive relationship. He will therefore understand why the mind; when well provided with accurate and abundant primary and memorial perceptions, and extensive joint comparisons; will, with precise and copious verbal signs, have the most accurate conclusions; and with the full effect of the five constituents of intellect and their qualities, have the greatest power for all its various purposes.

Joint Comparison of Time. Under the preceding head, we spoke of the most agreeable relationships of audible time in music, and in speech. But its purposes are more common and important. Science and art make frequent use of the ear, as well as of numerical calculation, and motional measurement, for the influence of time, in their various processes. And the joint discriminations of the time of sounds by the ear are too obvious to deserve present notice.

Joint Comparison of Space. We derived the perception of Space, from one mode of Form, the impenetrability of matter. We also inferred; from two sounds of the same number of vibrations, but of different degrees of force; a different *Spacial* position in the vibrating bodies; and from the different impressions on the ear. Joint perception of space, as measured by sound, is exercised in science, and in arts, and is of constant application, to the practical use

ARTICLE III. *Of Joint Perception, in the Sense of Touch.*

Under the head of primary perception by Touch, in the Second section, ten divisions of its things were made. Some are perceived directly; as,

Heat, and its degrees to cold,
Hard, and its degrees to soft,
Rough, and its degrees to smooth,
Solid, and its degrees to fluid,
Pain,
Weight, and
Elasticity.

The others,

Force,
Form,
Magnitude,
Number,
Time,
Space, and
Motion;

being more commonly, direct objects of perception by the sense of sight, than of touch; I shall do little more than class them with the joint perceptions of the present head.

Joint Comparison of Heat and Cold. The relationships of heat and cold, with their kinds and degrees, to the things and objects of creation within their influence, are important and unnumbered in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. It belongs to the physiologist, the botanist, the chemist, and the natural philosopher severally to acquire, and to advance his knowledge; by the exercise of joint perceptions on their relationships. Perhaps we are fulfilling the subject of this Outline, by thus placing it under a new view, and with new connections, and in an analysis of the working plan of the mind; that others when less encumbered and confounded by old technicalities of division and nomen-

clature, may by the order and the light of nature, hereafter pursue it.

Joint Comparison of Hard and Soft. The relationships of the modes and degrees of these things within themselves, and in their influence on other things, are the subject of science, of art, and of practical life. Our outline merely classes it here, as a suggestion of the manner of arrangement for further detail.

Joint Comparison of Rough and Smooth. These two perceptions are of limited application to science and art; and are to be regarded rather as respectively agreeable and disagreeable primary perceptions of touch than as important in their other relationships.

Having given the Reader a distinct term to represent that joint constituent of the mind, which compares the existences and actions of things; and having shown that Conclusions upon their relationships to each other, constitute the principal purpose of the brain, he will be able to recognize, and describe his own joint perception of things. We therefore leave him to say, from personal observation, what he knows of the rough and the smooth.

Joint Comparison of Solid and Fluid. We have only to refer here to what is said on this head under Primary perception; and to say that the joint perceptions of the relationships of solid and fluid have extensive application, in their various kinds and degrees, to Science, to the various arts, and to the purposes of daily life.

Joint Comparison of Pain. This is a perception limited to the sentient animal: and conventional agreement has assigned it to the nervous system. Pain is a disease, of numberless seats, kinds, and degrees. The description of its causes and effects, its relief and its cure, together with the relationships of these, are subjects for the physician. Pain is a sentinel over animal life; yet after warning it of danger, sometimes perverts that protective power to its destruction. Every one has felt, and must continue to feel pain; many perhaps like to complain of it: and some in the absence of other exciting interests, it would seem, are positively kept alive by it. Pain is almost exclusively a primary perception of touch. Its memorial type is so feeble, that it is more a perception of its verbal sign than of the type of pain itself: and

consequently, there seems to be no mixed joint perceptions of it: for the vivid primary impression obscures or destroys, not only the faint memorial types, but for the moment, the perception of even its verbal sign. I leave the history of the joint relationships of pain to those who study the forms of human suffering, and the means of its cure.

Joint Comparison of Weight. This subject is sufficiently noticed, under primary perception: to which we may add; there is a perception of weight in a feeble muscle, and in a limb half-paralyzed by pressure on its nerve; in fatigue; in the heavy eyelids of awaking and of going to sleep; in a dying inspiration; and in what is called a *gravedo*, or dull pain in the head. The joint perceptions of weight in the human functions are subjects for observation with the patient and the physician. Common scale-measured weight employs the experimental inquiries of natural philosophy: and daily life has constant reference to the joint perception of its relationships.

Joint Comparison of Elasticity. Joint perception of the relationships of Elasticity, or yielding resistance to compression, and an effect of reaction, is a peculiar perception of touch; and its power is a great and general agent in nature. It is at work in the air, on the earth, and in the waters under the earth. And where indeed, from the influence of heat and electricity in their various forms, is it not at work? Joint comparison of the kinds and degrees of elasticity is a subject of natural philosophy; and though the knowledge derived from this comparison is more productively applied by science, it is still employed in the practice of uneducated life, without its cause being better understood in one case than in the other.

Joint perception of Touch, in Force, Form, Magnitude, Number, Time, Space, and Motion, are here briefly classed together: since these things are more readily perceived through some of the other senses: and we are therefore rarely called upon to exercise joint perceptions on them through the sense of touch. Motion is however, to the sense of touch, of noticeable importance, in producing the perception of force more remarkably than in the sense of sight; where force is visible only in the momentum of weight, within the boundary of form.

ARTICLE IV. *Of Joint Perception, in the Sense of Taste.*

By reference to the primary and memorial account of this sense, in the second and third sections, the Reader will recall what was said of the kinds, degrees, and divisions of the objects of taste. This sense has a perception of,

Sapidity, and
Time.

The latter is employed, only to measure the duration of the former.

Joint Comparison of Sapidity. Comparison of the unnumbered forms of sapidity, is almost exclusively on the pleasures of the appetite, leading to the choice of food for the support of life; and is exercised by the mass of the world, without regard to control or consequence. The sub-animal is directed to this nourishing support, by the instinct of his organization. But man; the contorted and debased image of what he exaltingly idealizes, as the Form of his Creator; among the perversions of his natural ordination, has so confused the regular and wholesome indication of his tastes, that it ceases on many occasions to be the guide to his proper nourishment. Safety in his choice of food must therefore be founded on experience and instruction. Thus instead of living on what nature designed for his support, through his pleasure; the greater part of his joint perceptions of taste is employed on what he likes, and not what is proper for him. There are some applications of the perception of taste; though not common relationships; which are yet contributions to knowledge: as when the Blind recognize by taste, the character of things they cannot see. But this is a condition of limited occurrence.

The sub-animal being a wise and sufficient feeder, would be disgusted; did he know it; at the foolish Epicure, gorging himself, both in deleterious kind and quantity, and taking the consequence, in akes, indolence, and stupidity. Such an inferior-animal has no joint perception, except of a gulping selfishness in his dinner: and then only compares his state with that of others, to have a conclusion in favor of his own; but with no care of that

self by following the instinct of nature; like the foolish mother of mankind turns to some flattering Devil of the Dish, tempting him against a law of his health, and happiness and life.

Joint Comparison of Time. Time, as remarked above, is employed in the sense of taste, only perhaps as a measure of the duration of sapidity; we do not therefore here regard its joint relationships.



ARTICLE V. *Of Joint Perception of the Things of Scent.*

Referring the Reader to the subject of primary scent, in the second section, for an account of the kinds and degrees, and of the nomenclature of the things of this sense; we here recall the subject of

Odor, and
Time.

The latter is employed to measure the former.

Joint Comparison of Odor. I said formerly; the seeming relationship between scent and taste, is no more than a connected perception, produced by the proximity of the organs of these senses. The joint perception of the relationships of odors to human life, gives us knowledge of their agreeable, disagreeable, and noxious influence. If man had escaped the perversion, and corruption of his ordained constituent powers, and by the rule of sub-animal instinct, kept himself, under the wise direction of Nature, to a sagacious choice, for a just, and wholesome life; he would then have eaten what he liked, and what he liked would have been nourishing and wholesome. When he *fell from Nature*, he was obliged to live by his own experience, or by that of others. But of natural things, not chemically altered, it is a general Law, with some exceptions, that things disagreeable to scent are disagreeable to taste; and perhaps, with reference to this, the entrance to the organ of scent projects over the entrance of the organ of taste; ready to inhale any agreeable or noxious *aura* or vapor of an *unexperienced* food. It is in accordance with this view, that by a physiological accommodation, or final cause, we

are induced, or required, when closing the mouth in mastication; to inhale through the nose. It is on the relationship between these two senses, that the only joint perception of scent is made: for there is little useful knowledge to be derived from a comparison of the kind, degrees, and durations of the perceptions of scent among themselves; nor can we hope for useful observation, from those who make the most indolent of all enjoyments; the snuffing of Cologne, and Honey-water, of Attar of roses, and Volatile salts, by the laziness of holding the bottle under the nostril. Such persons can learn and teach nothing; for they are too senseless to perceive by their senses, and too thoughtless to think.

Joint Comparison of Time. For the sake of the classification of this work, we give this head a place. It is not however, yet of sufficient importance, to receive further notice here.

From the brevity of our remarks on the subject of the two preceding articles; the Reader may infer what a comparatively small part of the relationships of things, they furnish to the circuit of our physical knowledge; however important that may be to animal support and safety. It is sight and hearing that raise perceptions above sensuality, and lay open the two great fields of science and art; with all their usefulness, and their means for personal enjoyment.

Under the section on the primary constituent; we noticed at the close of the table or list of things of the several senses, the Relationships these things and objects have to each other. After describing the relationships of things of sight, under the memorial constituent; we left to the Reader, their application to the things of the other senses.

In the list of the things of sight, under the present section on the joint constituent, we merely named without separately describing the function of relationship: since this Joint constituent is the very discoverer, and exponent, of the relationships of things. These relationships are therefore embraced in every use of the joint constituent upon each of the senses. When the application of the joint constituency is made, it is to be considered as presenting a picture of all the relationships of things it has in view.

But I must not forget our **recapitulate to our sup-**

posed Juvenile, and full-grown Ignorance, the leading points of the natural ordination of the physical, and so far describable mind.

We have learned how simple a perception it is, First, to know external things; by their images and types on the senses, which we call Primary; Second, to know that these images and types are somehow conveyed to the brain, and are there perceptible, in the absence of the things that produced them on the senses; which we called Memorial; Third, to understand, that when these images and types perceived as only primary, or as only memorial are called unmixed; and mixed, when they are perceived together.

But we perceive something additional to these perceptions: as when we have a primary perception of a King on his Throne, and at the same time a memorial of the detail of his duties. Or when with a primary perception of a selfish Despot, we have the memorial of his egotism and its destructive effects. And again when we have a primary perception of the staves of a barrel, with a memorial that hoops would strongly encircle the individual staves, to a united and useful purpose. Or when we perceive a crouching tiger within springing-distance of a fawn, and a memorial of a bloody design. We have in these several cases, unmixed and mixed perceptions of things doing, or to be done, between agents and the subjects they are to act upon. Like these cases, there are throughout nature, endless agencies, and other conditions between things, as clearly perceptible to the senses and the brain; as the things themselves, between which these intermediate conditions exist, and intermediate agencies occur. It is, in a perception of the existence of things, together with the agencies and other conditions between them; that constitutes the whole of the great circuit of human knowledge. Let us look into the minutest secret of the microscope, and to the Telescope's wide field of worlds, and we shall find nothing but the vasty and atomic things, and objects of nature, and the endless agencies and conditions severally between them. These intermediate agencies and conditions, are perceived, or they could not be known, and are called the *Relationships* of things; and might be synonymously called our *knowledge* of things, for these

constitute every thing we know. All this knowledge or relationship is collected by joint perception, from its survey of the unbounded fields of primary and memorial perception. Thus the Primary and Memorial or First and Second Constituents furnish all the materials of the mind: the Third or Joint Constituent, runs over and compares these materials, or things; gathers those which have various degrees of concurring relationships; and directed by what we shall describe as its *Elective* Quality, selects those having the closest connection with the subject of inquiry; for the conclusive or Fourth Constituent to narrow the ground of observation, by deciding among a few Relationships, those which lead directly to the truth of things.

It may perhaps be asked; cannot a single thing be perceived, without perceiving its relationships to some other thing? If this should be; the human mind would not equal that of the humblest animal; and would certainly be reduced to the state of the common mirror, which may have a single image reflected upon it, but has, in our meaning of the term, no joint relationship.



SECTION V.

Of the Conclusive Constituent.

THE conclusive though still a joint perception, is a comparison of a limited number of the images and types of things, which the joint perception under what will be called the *Excursive* Quality, has gathered; and which with what will be called the *Elective*, it has selected from among things related in their actions and other functions. From these selections, the Conclusive rejects the more remote relationships, and decides upon those two or more, which by a closer tie, lead directly to the affirmation or denial of a proposition. As the joint comparison rejects from the field of its observation, all those images and types of things that are unrelated to the subject of inquiry; in like manner the conclusive



compares the related images and types selected by the joint, and with, as it were, a second sifting, rejecting those which are less striking in their relationship; selects and decides on those which offer the nearest and brightest picture of truth if not her very self.

The Reader is here referred to the second section for a brief and varied definition of the purpose of this fourth Constituent.

When joint perception has extensively gathered, as we have said, images and types of things, either mixed or unmixed, co-existent or successive, related in their conditions and actions; the Conclusive perception strictly determines the sought condition of their relationships between two or more images and types, and this terminates the silent exercises of the mind.

The Reader may however ask; what is the purpose of the distinction here made between a joint and a conclusive perception; as images and types are in each case alike compared? We remark that the Joint is a preparatory, and the conclusive, a final function. The Joint by its excursive, and its elective quality, broadly surveys the unnumbered relationships of things, either co-existent or successive, and selects those, concordant with the then purpose of the mind. From these related concordancies, the conclusive by its elective quality, contracts the field of relationship to two or more images and types, so closely connected as to seem to be nearly identical, in an effective purpose; thus satisfying the mind, and requiring no further search after truth. Without the separate process of these functions, the Joint would in one continued effort be obliged to make its flight through the field of promiscuous images and types; to reject those which seemed unrelated; to gather, and class those which are related; and then conclusively to select from this wider class, any two or more relationships strictly adapted to the purpose of inquiry.

But further; the joint and the conclusive functions are distinguished from each other, and thus properly separated in arrangement; by the former furnishing the yet undetermined materials of knowledge; whereas the latter, under the meaning of its etymology, terminates inquiry, by figuratively *shutting-up* the mind in a **satisfactory** conclusion that it has obtained all the knowledge it **desired**. The question of the absolute truth of the

conclusion, does not affect the propriety of its place in classification. For though a metaphysician may come to his conclusions on the subject of his fictions; as the physical observer on the certainty of his; they are both respectively, conclusions; one a false, and the other a true decision. Thus it happens, that the mind of man, in its present distracted condition, has two modes of what it calls truth; a scholastic or conventional belief, which is always changing; and a physical conviction, which knows itself to be enduring.

From this process of joint comparison, we have; in our arrangement and nomenclature; merely separated the last or conclusive act, into a fourth constituent, of the mind; and at least made the classification of our subject, more readily measurable; if it does not render the function of the conclusive constituent, more traceable in the working plan of the mind; even by this, though no more than nominal separation.

We consider the Syllogistic Process as a pretending, imperfect, and useless substitute for physical observation and experiment; yet may allude to its systematic form and terms, for illustration; and say; preparatory joint perceptions are as antecedents, or premises, or a major proposition, embracing many related particulars, which are set, so to speak, in the eye of the conclusion, to declare the positive or negative result by its own independent and final proposition. Or in other words, the joint is a *species* of comparison; the conclusive an *individual* case of it. Thus it appears, that the joint exercise of perception, is encompassing, but indecisive; the conclusive, a limited but determinate power of the mind.

The relationships of things described in the last section, are no less the essential ground of conclusive, than of joint perception; and in both cases, are derived from physical images and types of things on the senses and on the brain. For the relationships in each being perceptible things; constituting with the verbal sign, the greater part or the whole of knowledge; are as strictly physical as the primary and memorial perceptions of things, on which they are founded.

Conclusive perceptions, being like the joint, made up of the primary and memorial, we shall ~~arran~~ them as we arranged

these, on the divisions of the senses, and the subdivisions of their things and objects. But as the detailed view we have taken of the subjects of primary, memorial, and joint perceptions, and of the innumerable relationships embraced under the last, must be, in a measure, familiar to the intelligent and attentive Reader, it is not necessary we should be extended or particular in the more limited, though similar application of conclusive comparisons.



ARTICLE I. *Of Conclusive Perceptions, in the Sense of Sight.*

In concluding on the things of sight, we employ the same mode of comparison as in Joint perception; except, in the conclusive, we reject the less consonant, and the inapplicable images and types, and decide on those few agencies and conditions more immediately and strictly related.

In the wise and frugal unity of Nature, things of conclusive, are the same as those of primary, memorial, and joint perception: the twenty-one elementary things, enumerated under the third division of the table of the primary perception, at the close of the second section, being the common working materials of them all. Thus the conclusive perceptions of sight are on,

Color,
Light,
White,
Form,
Number,
Magnitude,
Space, and
Motion.

As the conclusive constituent is exercised comparingly like the joint, but with that comparison limited to fewer images and types; what was said in the last section on the relationship of these things of sight, applies to our present head. We shall here do scarcely more than severally name the things of conclusive sight.

Conclusive Color. To conclude on color, is accurately to discriminate and decide on its kinds, and degrees; its effects on the eye, and the relationship it bears to other things of Nature; the property of its different kinds, in imbibing the heat of the sun; its radiating common heat with greater or less facility; its relationship to time and light, for its durability; to space and air, for its variation by distance; and to the endless shades and tints of itself. Color is a wide subject for discovery and conclusion, in Painting, and in the Esthetic Branches, so to call them, of the manufacturing arts.

Conclusive Light, and White. We class these two things together: for though they have their relationships as every thing in nature has, they are fewer, or not so open to view, as to make them yet, very important subjects for conclusion.

Through conclusions on light, we obtain the knowledge of its effects on the human eye, and skin; on the sub-animal, particularly the insect tribe; and on vegetable growth and color. Conclusions on white, teach us its slowly conducting and radiating power over heat, as exemplified in the retention of warmth by the ground under snow; and in the white covering of some Polar animals.

Conclusive Form. The knowledge obtained by conclusions on form, is of its application, for the construction of other forms; and of its capacity for receiving and communicating motion. Relationships on these subjects exercise the conclusive perceptions of the natural philosopher, the engineer, the mechanic, and of the humbler workman.

Conclusive Magnitude, and Number. The knowledge of these things of sight, which is applicable to so many of the meditative calculations, and practical arts of life; is the result of comparing perceptions on that great and abundant relationship of nature; the greater and the less. These are considered, by a kind of appropriating and magisterial pride and vanity, the 'profound' closet-occupation of the geometer and the arithmetician. But it is a limited, though useful subject for intellect, and is employed for its own purposes, by the world, from the plainest Dealer, down to the 'Merchant-Prince,' who, in speculating with means collected *any how*, engrosses, and stores up the tea, coffee, sugar, cotton;

and every Necessary of life, to withhold from industrious producers the common resources of their enjoyment, or their need.

Conclusive Motion. The knowledge of the relationships of motion is derived from the effects of attraction and repulsion, in invisible causes; and from the action and reaction of all other things and objects on each other. Conclusive perceptions in motion are the purpose of chemistry, and natural philosophy, and are applicable to all physical existence; for perhaps there is nothing in the universe completely at rest. The metaphysician having failed to show us, or to perceive himself, the workings of spiritual motions, we conclude, that neither he, nor we; the unbelievers in his figment; can have any conclusion upon it.

We pass-by here a notice of conclusive perceptions on time and space. And leave the Reader himself, to apply to them the principles of relationship, as we have endeavored to explain them.



ARTICLE II. *Of Conclusive Perception, in the Sense of Hearing.*

The comparisons and conclusions on the subject of this sense, are of extensive employment in science, and in common life. They are made on,

Sound,
Time, and
Space.

Conclusive Sound. This is applied to the subject of Acoustics, in all its branches; and to those forms of nature and art that are used as musical instruments. Among the sub-animals it is of constant service, for protection, and for communication with each other.

The knowledge derived from conclusions on the sounds of human language, is exercised in conveying the silent perceptions of one mind to the minds of others.

Conclusive Time. Conclusions on Time produce much agreeable knowledge in music, both vocal and instrumental; in oratory, elocution, and common speech; taste in Melody and Harmony; in the varied and elegant adjustment of the Rythmus of metrical,

literary, and scientific composition; and when esthetically studied; a true, thoughtful, and expressive elocution of the Stage, the Pulpit, the Senate, and even the better Stump-*speechifying* of the worthless demagogue; is largely dependent on a knowledge derived from the conclusive comparisons on time.

Conclusive Space. Conclusions on space under the sense of hearing are few; and a knowledge of them perhaps assists us only in measuring distance by sound.



ARTICLE III. *Of Conclusive Perceptions, in the Sense of Touch.*

If the Reader will refer to the article on primary perception in this sense; he will find a list of elemental things, on which the conclusive decision is exercised for personal pleasure and protection, and for purposes and actions, in science, and in the mechanic arts. From the fifteen things, assigned to the primary perception of Touch, we select for this head;

Heat,
Solidity,
Pain,
Elasticity, and
Force;

for these are more immediately perceptions of touch; the rest being equally, and perhaps more readily perceived severally by the other senses. And enough has been said on their primary, memorial, and joint application, to render their employment easy, if necessary here.

Conclusive Heat, and its Degrees. A knowledge of the relationships of Heat to animal and vegetable existence; and we may say, to the great purposes and actions of universal nature; is so pervading and important, that science and art are constantly calling for the exercise of conclusive perceptions, on the general and useful, or the injurious effects of heat: and may we say uncriticised and unblamed, that Nature herself; who in all her work makes every thing for **beneficence, and nothing unfit or injurious;**

is constantly using her creative hand in directing the congenial influence of a sensible or a latent heat.

Conclusive Solidity. This element of the twenty-one things of perception is exclusively a subject of touch. Its relationships in every Science, and mechanical art, and in the constant occurrences of daily life, furnish instances for the exercise of conclusive perception. If we take softness and fluidity, as one extreme of the degrees of solidity, they are no less subjects for conclusive comparison and knowledge.

Conclusive Pain. A conclusive knowledge of the relationships of Pain is derived exclusively from the functions of a sentient animal-organization; and these being known only by instinctive sign, in the sub-species, and by a conventional language in man; the conclusive perceptions have reference, chiefly to the individual, to his sympathising attendants and friends, and to the means of relief. Practically however, conclusions, whether on the causes, seats, degrees, consequences and cure of pain, are within the duty of the Nurse, and the Physician.

Conclusive Elasticity. Some modes of Elasticity are perceived by the eye, in some objects of nature, and in some artificial structures: but it is more definitely known under the pressure of touch. The comparisons and conclusions on its functions are employed, in many sciences, and mechanical arts; and throughout the course of practical life.

Conclusive Force. We have just considered Elastic force. We here speak of dead or inelastic force. And though an inelastic object is always swayed by force, it does not appear; there can be any force, in that thing or object which is absolutely at rest. Force is either invisible, or known only by its effects; as in the chemical agencies of attraction, and repulsion: or obvious; as in the mechanical action of solid Form; which is the subject of natural philosophy, in its various branches; except that of astronomy, the moving forces in which do not come under the conclusive perception of touch: and are restricted to sight alone. The extremes of known force are exemplified in the momentum of the largest planet, and in the secondary accent of a whispered dissyllable.

There is a belief, of the greater accuracy in the conclusions of touch, than in those of sight. But this is probably a scholastic

or physiological error: for when we do not conclude in the dark, or in a mist, or through other interference with vision, sight is as unerring as touch; and its errors from these confusing causes, are no more the sign of imperfection in that sense, than it is of the imperfection of touch, when needles pass into the body, without being felt; or when the smart is not felt, of plucking-out a hair, at the moment of receiving a blow. We have a memorable instance of this false 'logic,' in the slow assent; as it is said; of Thomas, who would not believe in the identity of his Master, until he touched the wound in his side; though he knew, by what he *saw*, that the more serious and convincing marks were in his hands and feet. There is another instance of which I do not wish to speak so gravely. Physicians, among other of the changing theories, nomenclature, and drugs, have at this time, given-up in a great measure, the *Touch* of the pulse as an indication, for the cure of disease of the blood-vessels; and substituting the *modern* improvement of *touching* the tenderness of the spine; *kneading* the abdomen with their knuckles; and listening through a small pipe to what the lungs have to say of themselves: throwing-away the lancet, and other vigorous, and efficient remedies, of measurable effects; for the modern wholesale use of morphia, quinine, and cod-liver oil; and hankering perhaps, after the revival of the once *fashionable* remedies of *album grecum* and the *bellies* of *skinks*.



ARTICLE IV. *Of Conclusive Perceptions, in the Sense of Taste.*

Under the sections upon the first three constituents, we allotted, to the sense of Touch, exclusive of their relationships, two of the twenty-one elemental things of nature:

Sapidity, and
Time.

The knowledge derived from conclusions on the relationships of *Time*, under this sense, refers only to the comparative durations of tastes, and is scarcely worthy of attention here.

Conclusive Sapidity. This directs to the agreeable, and the

reverse; to the choice of wholesome, and the rejection of deleterious food, in man and the sub-animal.

Conclusive knowledge on taste is sometimes applied to the useful arts. We leave those of our Readers who are fond of *good things* in this way, to make conclusive comparisons on their tastes. To man however; except when sapidity is turned aside to the service of the gourmand, the French Cook, and the stomach-spoiling confectioner; the relationships of taste may be a subject of conclusive knowledge, for his enjoyment, and his support.



ARTICLE V. *Of Conclusive Perception, in Scent.*

Conclusive comparisons by this sense, are made upon the elementary things of

Odor, and
Time.

From the limited application of the relationships of time to scent, we take no particular notice of its duration, here.

Conclusive Odor. With man, partly through his experience; and with the sub-animal, from the pre-ordained organization of his instinct, the conclusive perception of odors is intimately connected with his support and protection. Whether the sub-animal instinct or mind, exercises a discrimination of time, in the scent of a track, is not known. Those who are particularly interested in the relationships of taste to other things, may snuff, observe, and conclude accordingly. However important that inquiry may be, our Outline; which proposes to set-forth an entirely new method of observing the ways and means of the mind; does not consider further detail necessary on this subject. We leave all this female luxury of inhaling, to the Perfumer, with his aromatics and pungents; for it would be too great a contrast to connect their passing decisions, with the exalted purposes of more useful conclusive perceptions.

In recapitulating the subject of Conclusive perceptions, to the juvenile and full-grown scholar, we suppose; with a desire to

learn, what has been set before them of the working plan of the mind; they may not now be altogether in the dark, on the subject of the great directive powers of the senses and the brain, in which their Parents; News-papers; Sunday, Charity, and High Schools; Colleges, Universities, and those greatest extinguishers of the light of physical science, the disputatious schools of Metaphysical Theology; themselves all equally in the dark; had ignorantly kept them. I have then only to ask; if with a knowledge of the first three perceptive powers, they do not understand how by the fourth or conclusive, they can 'make up their minds' as it is called, between two or more things with their relationships; when brought before them, by the abundant images and types of the joint? Or in other words; if one thing resembles another or is different, or one thing is fitted to act upon another, they are not able to decide upon those conditions of agreement or difference, and of agency: for this constitutes an act of the mind, which in the nomenclature we have proposed; is called a conclusive perception of the relationship of things.

We have thus by general description and illustration endeavored to explain the manner in which the mind, by its four silent working-powers, ascertains the existence of things of nature, with their relationships to each other; collects from them all the knowledge we possess: nor finds in all its wide survey of perceptions, a fictional atom-spot, wherein the metaphysician might productively root his spiritual tree, not of 'good and of evil' but of evil alone, which has brought, if not death, at least a dreaming sleep upon the mind, and the greater part of our woe of error.

We have called the four constituents, the silent powers of the mind, to the exercise of which the percipient alone is privy; with none besides to tell the secret of their process. And as Nature, without the physical exploring of observation and experiment, would be hidden from the greater part of mankind; so the brain which was ordained to be a representative of Nature, would, without the means for declaring itself, present even to the percipient; as will be presently shown; only feeble, if any impressions of images and types; and could not to others convey the least indication of thought. The effective agencies of Nature, undeveloped by Science, are a blank to the unperceiving senses

of the savage. But as Nature speaks plainly to the wise, who in all ages know how to interpret her language; so the mind, the representative of Nature, has provided itself with the invented means of communicating to others, what it silently knows of the process and results of the working plan of itself. It is then by some conventional signs, these silent exercises are known. The most convenient are those of Verbal Sounds, and Written Symbols. These audible sounds and visible symbols being things respectively perceptible by the ear and the eye, become in a kind of reactionary types and images upon the mind, and are therefore properly called Verbal Signs.

These we proceed, in the four following sections, particularly to describe.



SECTION VI.

Of Verbal Perceptions.

WE have enumerated what we call the verbal sign of perception, or Language, as one of the Five Constituents that make the whole of the Rudimental functions of the senses and the brain, represented by the term Mind.

It may here be asked; why we include as parts of the mind, those sounds, which like other sounds are formed externally to the mind, and therefore, apparently not a part of it; nor in any way to be classed as one of its rudimental parts or constituents? The habit of Error is slow to yield; since nothing, except rarely-found Truth, can drive-out prevalent error; and it is the watchful purpose of prevalent error, to drive-out even the rarity of truth. The philosophic, as well as the common herd; for all the mischief on this subject comes from the philosophers of the mind; have so fixed the notion of the mind being neither a single thing, nor an aggregate of the physical things of Nature, that the mind; ~~this choice ordination~~ and favorite of its maker; but the neglected,

deformed, and half-starved foster-child of man; has to go through the difficult task of first unknowing its emaciated, and then of knowing its fictitious self; before it can even approach towards allowing a verbal sign or sound, the mere vibration of the air, to be part of an unseen, unheard, untouched, untasted, unscented, and undescribable spirit. It is then necessary to be more particular, in meeting any scrupulous and obstinate habit of thinking, or rather of not observing and thinking, on this great metaphysical and worldly point.

To make it obvious then, how verbal signs when employed by the mind can be a physical part of it, we have only to consider, how its other four constituents are formed. We endeavored to show; they are respectively primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions of all the things and objects of Nature and of Art, within the reach of their knowledge and power. Now, the verbal sign we conventionally use is a sound, which is one of the physical things of Nature, formed by the vocal organs. Thus a verbal sign as a physical thing of Nature, may be perceived; or reflected in the mirror of the senses and the brain. That is, we may have through the ear the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive types of words, as well as of the images or types of color, heat, or any of the other twenty-one elementary things of Nature; and these types of words, appearing in the reflective mirror, under the several forms of the four divisions of perceptions.

To show how the verbal sign is interwoven with the proper working plan of the mind; thereby to justify its being considered a constituent part of it; we must here anticipate a future explanation of our nomenclature.

In the tenth section, on the Qualities, or forms, and degrees, under which the Constituents appear; we shall learn that perceptions are sometimes Quiescent or silent; in being known only to the mind of the Percipient; at other times Actionary, in declaring his silent thought by words, or other conventional sign, and transferring to a Hearer, the images and types of his own silent mind. At its origin, in infancy, it appears; the mind has silent perceptions before it has signs for them; and silent, before it has actionary signs; since the actionary can represent only antecedent silent perceptions and signs. In this way, the Hearer re-

ceives by descriptive language, a transfer of the silent primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, which the Percipient had previously derived from the external things and objects of Nature.

But the supposed Percipient and the Hearer, are each alike sentient; alike excitable in all their senses; and alike impressible under all their images and types on the brain. And while the significant words of the Percipient produce by transfer to the Hearer, the working plan of the whole five constituents; they come back upon the ear of the Percipient himself, producing in him the like primary; memorial, joint, and conclusive perception; with this difference. The Hearer may receive perceptions by the verbal sign that are more or less new to him. What the Percipient communicates, is well-known to himself in the previously silent state of his mind. Thus the former hears what he never heard before; the latter is the hearer of words formed into a significant train of language, within the silent process of his mind; which when uttered, reacts on the ear of him who uttered it. But as in this process, the silent mind of the Percipient passes over, by its actionary sign, to the mind of the Hearer, and as its verbal sign is returned to the Percipient from his own mouth, they are now on this point, both alike in the communicated knowledge. There are then under our present view, three forms of perception. An actionary or an audible language; a silent perception; and a silent verbal sign of it: each condition being properly a part of the mind. But the two latter, being within the mind, and silent, seem to be more particularly part of its constituents. With these three forms of perception; regarding their application to the working plan of language with thought; we know; they are vividly impressed, and readily revived by the audible or actionary sign. And we may here, begin to perceive, that Nature may have provided the same impressive and reviving process, for the use of silent perceptions as they occur in dreams; by connecting with them, silent verbal signs, to brighten the pictures on the silent mind. Without these silent verbal signs for perception, human thought would be but slightly raised above that of the sub-animal; which having

comparatively few actionary, can have few and feeble quiescent signs, to brighten and to extend the scope of its perception.

These silent verbal signs are a great assistant to what we shall hereafter call, the *Necessary* or *Natural Tie* of perceptions, in reviving, continuing, and clustering primary and memorial materials, for the use of joint comparison, and conclusion. The Reader will perceive the existence and importance of this silent verbal sign, in the familiar effort at 'recollection;' when in the silence of his mind, he has an indefinite perception of a silent image or type, of a thing or event, which he cannot revive till it comes-up by the involuntary occurrence of the silent verbal sign of it. What then brings up this sign? It is no actionary sign of the forgotten perception; and what other known 'association,' as the old school calls it; can it be, except the involuntary, but natural Tie; to be shown hereafter; between the silent verbal sign and the lost perception; not only revived but brightened by the silent verbal sign. And perhaps the Reader may now perceive, in this silent working plan of the mind, the great preparatory process, by which every sane and orderly intellect begins with acquiring silent perceptions; invents verbal signs or a conventional language for them; and then silently uses both perception and language, to direct itself to its acts of wisdom or of folly; of virtue or of vice; and to convey to others by actionary language, the truths it has silently discovered; or the great and agreeable, or the vain and mischievous fictions it has invented.

We have thus endeavored to explain, how not only the actionary, but the silent verbal sign is interwoven with the working plan of the mind; and thereby claims to be an indispensable part of it, as a fifth constituent.

It is upon the silent exercises of the verbal sign; that the 'logical' instrument called 'Abstraction,' is contrived for facilitating the working plan of thought; by selecting, or *taking-from* an aggregate of things some one of its particulars, for a then especial purpose, to the temporary exclusion of all the rest. But from some facility of management in the silent mind, the abstraction is more readily made under the silent ~~than~~ under the actionary condition: and as every perception is ~~the~~ the silent state of the mind, as exemplified in infancy; ~~v.~~ for a time at



least, perception may exist, though obscurely without either a silent or actionary verbal sign of it. This power of using a perception without a silent verbal sign, leads in time to the power of shutting out the notice of the perception itself; and thus becomes a necessary and important means for acquiring and communicating knowledge, which is partially and occasionally continued through life; when the mind for a particular purpose in directing attention to a single thing, has the power of separating one or more silent perceptions, with their verbal sign, from any number, of the united things of an aggregate: to the exclusion of all the other clustered particulars of the aggregate; and of every thing else, not necessary to the purpose of a special concentrated attention. And this is called the 'logical' process of Abstraction; or as the Perceptive System would call it, the contemplation of the image or type of one thing *drawn-away* from its connection with all other images and types: as signified by that phrase of the older Logicians, '*E pluribus unum*;' meaning in plain English one species formed out of many individuals, or one genus, out of many species; as we here apply it; one primary perception selected out of many, for further memorial, joint, and conclusive use.

We will endeavor to illustrate this subject. With an eagle before us, we have a silent, primary, visual image of it. And through a similar process of the sense of hearing, a silent primary type of the verbal and significant term eagle. The eagle is now removed, and we have a silent memorial image of it; nor can we have a clear perception of the eagle, without having at the same time a silent memorial type of its *name*. Again, we cannot, at the same time, have the images of an eagle and a dove, and of their relative sizes, without silent joint images of the sizes of the two birds. And further, we cannot have a joint perception that one is larger than the other, without a silent conclusive perception of the words *larger*, or *greater*, or *less*, as the sign of that relationship. After this case, in which the mind perceives, all silently, the birds, and the relationships of their sizes; together with their names; let us; as in the habit of the mind with arithmetic and algebraic signs; take the names only of the birds, the terms only of greater or less, and the conclusive term only of their relationship, with a faint, or no perceptive reference to the

images of the birds themselves. We then plainly learn; that the verbal sign, as an 'abstraction' from the images of the birds, and as a substitute for them; may give; under the forms of their silent memorial, joint, and conclusive exercise; without the image, a similar process of perception, to that of the image without the verbal sign: by which I mean in general terms, that the mind can make the like abstract use of silent verbal signs without reference to the image, as it can of the silent abstract image without a silent sign: for a silent image, as we know, exists in early infancy, without the silent verbal sign. But more imperfectly in the latter case, yet otherwise similar; for the image might be faint or altogether wanting, in the infant and the sub-animal, without a vocal or other sign; and the vocal sign would be useless, without the image to be represented. Thus showing; they are both necessary to the perfect state of the human mind and therefore both respectively a constituent, and essential part of it.

If the above explanations should not satisfy the Reader, I will give an arithmetical example, to which I above alluded: for here, from habit, we have the numerical types of words, without the images or types of things they *abstractedly* as it is called represent. Look at a number on the multiplication-table. You have a primary perception of the symbol; this symbol represents only a verbal term: and this term, the image or type of one or any number of things. Close your eyes, and you perceive the verbal term, ten, or whatever it may be, as your memorial of it. Annex the memorial of a higher or lower numeral term, as a joint verbal perception: then perceive that one verbal term represents more or less than the other; and you make a conclusive perception on the relationships of the compared verbal signs. Here then is a full exercise of the perceptive powers, by the silent verbal sign alone, so far as number is from habit, an abstraction by symbol or term, of the thing it represents. I have thus endeavored to answer the question; how a mere sound under the form of a verbal perception, can exercise the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive powers of the mind; and be one of its essential constituents, as we have made it, in our Fifth Division.

Without the use of the verbal sign, to re-impress and to rouse the quiescent images and types of the senses and the brain,

through the ear, by a sound significant of their unnamed, and therefore feeble perceptions; and then to communicate them to others; the human mind would be as limited, and unimprovable as that of the sub-animal.

There is however, to me an embarrassment in investigating, and describing the subject of the signs of perceptions; and it may be so with others, in comprehending it; from our being sometimes obliged to suppose them unknown, when they are so habitually joined with their images and types, that it is almost impossible to dissolve the connection by forgetting or rejecting the verbal sign. We have the like difficulty in this case, that the Astronomer would have in trying to convince a savage, that the earth does not stand-still, and the sun not move absolutely to the west. But whatever may be the difficulty of unraveling our habits of observing and reflecting on the subject of vocal signs, quiescent or actionary, as an essential part of the mind, and of their co-efficient equality with its other powers; the hesitating Reader may perhaps be reconciled to our explanation of their efficacy, by showing the limited and imperfect state of the mind without them.

Under this view, let us consider the other four perceptive powers both with and without the use of the verbal sign. The most simple case for illustration is that of the striking of a clock. As it is commonly heard, and counted, the several sounds are by habit abstracted from the types of time they represent, and are significant only of numbers; each having its own term. When *eight* is pronounced, we know there have been eight separate sounds. These sounds or signs produce primary perceptions, and these, with their verbal signs, may become memorial, and with any relationships, joint, and conclusive. But when the sounds are not signified by definite numerical terms, there can be no primary nor memorial counting. The number of sounds will be indefinite, the sounds weak, or not perceptible at all, even though the clock is just over our head; and there will be few and faint, if any, of the memorial, joint, and conclusive. It is the same with the indifference of the ear to the ticking of a watch, which we rarely or never numerically name. If the names of the sounds of the clock are not given, either in silent or actionary

primary or memorial perception, the time of day cannot be kept by them.*

In the foregoing case of the unnamed sounds of the clock, we made only an approximation towards the full and real knowledge of the use of verbal signs, in the constituency of the mind. There is however a fact within the experience of all who pass their eye, so to speak, over objects, for the whole or parts of which, they have no nomenclature: and which in the instance of savage ignorance, more plainly illustrates the impressive importance of verbal terms, and of the feeble and evanescent character, even of primary perceptions without them. Take a savage into a depository of every kind of machinery, and instrument, for which he has no names. Except there is a named and well-known hatchet or bow in the collection; he will properly *see* few of the things his eye passes over; will scarcely have a full primary perception of them; and the faint impression of what he does perceive will hardly produce in their absence, a memorial, and much less, a joint comparison, and conclusion on their uses. The case will be different with a man of knowledge and observation, an inventor, or an engineer, who with verbal signs or terms, for forms, connections, powers, and effects, will have clear primary perceptions on all that arrests his attention; and nearly every thing does arrest it; with full memorial, and with related joint comparisons, and just conclusions.

The two preceding illustrations refer chiefly to *primary* perceptions; and are intended to show, that terms are necessary for an impressive representation and clear recognition even of these. As however precise views are important to every part of our subject; I add two other examples. The First, of the application of signs to memorial perceptions; the Second, to those of joint and conclusive in the sense of sight.

* On this ground it may be questioned, whether, without the terms, *time* and *sound*, we could have a joint, and conclusive perception of the strict difference between ten and twenty successive sounds: and we may further inquire; whether the minds of sub-animals are not, with regard to many things, in a similar condition to that of the human mind without its verbal signs. It would be an interesting, and to our subject, a profitable experiment; to feed an animal regularly at the stroke of nine. -- any other number, to ascertain, if it has the means of counting time by the exact number of sounds.

And *First*, to show the difference between memorial perceptions, without, and with, their verbal signs. Let us suppose, with closed eyes that see nothing, the memorial perception of a Greek doric peripteral temple, successively with that of Westminster Abbey, cleared of its desecrating rubbish, of monumental vanity. The memorials of the exteriors of the fabrics, and their details, are as the primary perceptions of them by a sub-animal or a child, being that of an indefinite image of something white, or grey, without even its shaded parts in one; and only a scumbled and somber image in the other. For supposing there had been formerly, some unnamed and obscure primary perception, the memorial would be still more indefinite and faint. In extending the memorial to the respective interiors of the structures, its images, without their verbal signs, would be as limited and vague. The internal walls of the Temple would barely rise in dull memorial semblance; and the columnar aisles of the Cathedral would make a somewhat different, but not a clearer and more lasting impression. With this limited and confused memorial, there could be no joint perception of the whole external and internal compass, respectively of the two buildings, with their several parts, nor of the parts with each other; and therefore no useful conclusions upon them: nor would there be perhaps, a more particular designation of the difference between them, than by the pronominal generality of *this* and *that*.

When the memorial brings up the several images, let it bring up at the same time, the memorial of their verbal signs; then the word *whole*, with its meaning in one case, can in succession, be perceived with the word *whole*, in the other; and their now definite outlines, with the named images of their several parts, be compared with each other. Thus through the pictures of verbal signs, there is a distinct memorial perception of the simple external unity of the Temple, in the unending return of its entablature, with its channeled triglyphs, in varied but accordant unity with a channeled peristyle; its unobtrusive roof, elevated to an unaspiring pediment, tile-ridged from flatness, into a linear similarity, with the sharp arris of its columns; a wall, continued in the reality of strength, and only broken into variety of shadow, by the essential supports of its portico; the similarity with a dif-

ference for contrast, between front and flank; and the ever-beautiful proportion of the length to the breadth of its plan.

On the other hand, a memorial of the nothing-but-parts, on the external Cathedral brings-up a picture of the *dis*-unity of the whole; in an affectation of the *Upward*, with *level* and *projecting* lines and corners everywhere, that will not let the vision rise; swarming pinacles, doors, and windows, with names for all their parts; secondaries without a principal; fractions without an integer; and gables pretending to lightness, upholding steeply, their heavy sheets of roof, to look in plainness like nothing else below.

On regarding the interiors of the Pagan, and the Christian Fane, in memorial perception, and its verbal sign, we find by joint comparison, nothing but an unmeaning plainness in the Temple, with perhaps a gaudy statue, unfitted to its shrine; or with all the trumpery of processional ensigns; yet differing from the vicious profusion on the exterior of the Gothic Church. On the other hand, the unity, simplicity, grandeur, grace, variety, contrast, harmony, and resolvable intricacy of the Cathedral Aisles, and their Transcepts, governed by the same rules of distribution and taste which directed the exterior of the Temple, create the conclusive perception; that the interior of one, and the exterior of the other, were designed by the same refined principles of composition, varied to the several purposes, and fitness of Architectural invention.

The above case is intended to show the power of definite and abundant memorial perceptions, with the impressive assistance of their verbal signs: without which, the endeavor of the human mind, to form an exact and definite knowledge, would be as ineffectual, as a like endeavor by the comparatively limited and useless memorial perception of the brute.

Perhaps the preceding example may not be accommodated to the Collegiate, and self-education of most metaphysicians; who assuming to themselves the character of a Grave Profundity, may think the subject of the Fine Arts, not within the scope of their all-absorbing, narrow, and jealous theme of spirituality: such Readers may not be able or willing to follow-up the detail of the illustration. With this, I cannot avoid remarking, that

whoever would undertake an analysis of the mind, will be best fitted for the task, by a knowledge of the principles of its working plan on all things; and by some acquaintance with the practical application of them: for mind is by our interpretation, *knowledge*, or the relationships of images and types of Nature and art; and its highest condition would be that which embraces, and exercises the greatest, and most accurate amount of all the five perceptions, within the comprehensive circle of every science and art.

To show, in a *Second* instance the necessity of verbal signs, for the proper exercise of the joint and conclusive perceptions; we give the case of an infant, who with instinctive sounds for its pains, pleasures, and wants, has no perception of conventional verbal signs. Let us suppose the infant's eye to pass over a linear figure of four equal and parallel opposite sides; and though we cannot say the eye has not a primary perception of the figure, there is no proof of it; and from the analogy of the older mind; which never sees clearly, what it has not a name for; we venture to assert, that the infant's primary perception, without the assistance of the verbal sign, is very faint and evanescent. It is barely possible, that with his faint and evanescent primary, he can have proper memorial; and more than probable, no joint and conclusive, at all. When however, he is taught to name his perceptions, let a figure of four equal sides be presented to him, and his primary perception of it be called a *square*. Set another figure before him and call it an *oblong*. When these are removed, he may have a memorial of them; and at the same time of their verbal signs. He is now able to have a named joint perception of the two memorials; and concludes, that one will cover an aperture just *double* the outline of the other. By this process, the child obtains from primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, assisted by the audible perception of verbal signs, a knowledge of two distinct figures, and of the relationships between their magnitudes. Without the actionary verbal sign, the child, like the brute, would have only an evanescent perception.

The above examples are intended to show the *use* of verbal signs in the perceptions of the sense of sight. But the effects

are similar in all the senses. And first, of the influence of signs on perceptions;

Through Hearing. We cannot suppose, that in the old Greek Free-masonry; or rather masonic slavery to the Holy secrecy, and self-interest of the Collegiate Cave of Trophonius, or of the Temple of Elusis; the ignorant Novice could have had more than a faint discrimination of the gibber and jargon, which, with quaking pavements, and with impressive and mysterious sacraments, were employed to bewilder the dupe to personal, or priestly, or political craft: for these sounds were unusual and insignificant noises; leaving scarcely a memorial perception, and not a trace of the joint and conclusive. It would be similar with an individual of unobservant habits, and without a musical ear, upon his first presence at an Opera. He could have only confused primary perceptions, no precise memorials, no joint comparison, and consequently no conclusion on the intonation, measures, melodies, and harmonic phrases, unnamed to him; but which to an instructed taste, produce, by the fulness and accuracy of terms, impressive primary and memorial with definite joint and conclusive perceptions, for critical discrimination.

Through Touch. Let the hand be passed over a number of objects, and none will be definitely perceived which have not names, or which have no analogy with those that have. You can never give a medical pupil, nor Professional teachers of the present day a precise primary perception of the Pulse, until you exemplify by touch, the meaning of the terms; hard, soft, quick, frequent, slow, full, round, sharp, oppressed, strong, weak, double, and other practical distinctions, that *possibly* may be recognized at present, here and there, among the perpetually varying, and contending schools of diagnostic pathology; but which, as in the times of Hippocrates, and Sydenham, are still regarded by the studious and observative physician.

Through Taste. There are, comparatively, few objects of taste, that come over the palate: for this is a sense, as far as we use it, of very limited perceptions; and these from their early and important influence on human life, have always been conventionally named; or when new tastes do occur, they may be often recognized, as analogous to ~~those~~ which have been named, and

thus the resemblance of them may serve the useful purpose of a term. We cannot then exemplify in the case of this sense, as we have done in the others; that without the use of signs, there can be but a transient primary, and few or none of the other three forms of perception: still, as far as the experiment may be made, the effect will be similar.

Through Scent. Here the illustration of the indispensable usefulness of verbal signs to the purposes of human thought, is as clear as in the senses of sight and hearing. The variety of the objects of taste, may be no less numerous perhaps than those of the other senses; but we do not or dare not, choose to try them all. Whereas scent though not always harmless, is open to every air. Suppose then, unnamed odors to pass by the sense, having no resemblance to those already named; the primary and memorial of such odors will be evanescent; and I need not say; the joint and conclusive, like those of the other senses, will be altogether wanting, when not signified by verbal terms; and cannot therefore be the means of useful knowledge.

We have learned, in the preceding pages, how the verbal signs represent things to the ear. We will next show how sight furnishes *visual* symbols of sound, which as primary images pass to the brain, there, to form memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions: and further, how a system of signs might be addressed to each of the other three senses.

Signs to Sight. Signs are addressed to this sense, in two ways: First, by impressing on the eye an exact picture of the physical thing signified; which method may be extended to every thing of nature and art, except sound, heat, hardness, sapidity, and odor, which are not directly picturable. This manner of representing objects to the sense and the brain, is called Picture-Writing. It is used by Savages; and in the progress of civilization, has been altered from an exact likeness of the thing signified, through unnumbered forms of representation, to that of a conventional Alphabet; which is in nowise a picture, but the visible symbol of a sound; and constitutes the Second Method of visible signs. These symbols, from representing sounds, are called Phonetic Writing. Thus far, Writing is a symbol of primary perception to the sense of sight; but without the use of terms, for its ele-

ments, and their combination into words; the symbol cannot properly be a sign of thought. This is done by picture-writing; since primary and memorial perceptions are themselves pictures of things, and thus, prepared materials for the joint and conclusive. But how by the requisitions of the mind, can an arbitrary symbol serve the purposes of thought? For it is a picture or type of nothing. The sense and brain might have a primary and memorial perception of these linear shapes of the visual symbols *h, o, u, s, e*; for these shapes are things: yet they signify, without being combined into a word, no more to us, than they do to the sub-animal. Arbitrary marks in writing have then no perceptive meaning, if they are not symbols of a *verbal* sign; and to render written language significant, these signs must have pre-existed. Let then the verbal sound, *house*, as previously used be applied to the above linear shapes; and that term becomes the sign of the object, house; and being thus significant, it creates a definite primary perception; and when this term; for it is now, as sound, a physical thing; is not present to the ear, there may be a memorial type of it; and if a memorial type, then a joint, and conclusive type of its relationships to others, either mixed or unmixed.

Of the same kind with their written symbols, are those of all the geometric elements, and figures, which by the lines alone would signify nothing: but when designated by audible terms, become clear primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions; and by mixed and unmixed comparison, the source of our knowledge in the abstract, and accurate science of Magnitude. In like manner the numerical symbols, 1, 2, 3, are altogether without meaning, until denoted by verbal signs: for in this case, they are the symbols of sound of the term, *one*; and various other symbols, singly and combined, severally of all numbers. Thus too, those symbols in algebraic notation, which as letters, common numerals, marks of plus, minus, equality, powers, and roots, with other symbols of the higher calculus, have, as it has been shown, no meaning in themselves; do, as significant and visible representations of verbal signs, by primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception, furnish a knowledge of the exact, and important practical relationships of nu

As an exception to the gen-

eral law of visual signs, symbols are employed for intercommunication of thought with Mutes, to whom there can be no verbal sign. But since the Mute has silent perceptions, feeble as they may be, of every thing except sound, it is necessary for him to connect these silent exercises with the types of the visual symbol; which for representing the grammatical and rhetorical connection of thought, is more limited, imperfect, and embarrassing, than when made by the more manageable sound of the verbal sign.

Signs to Touch. We have by this sense, as by all the others, a primary perception; and a system of signs might be made for it. Thus the endless forms of tangible solids, the striking degrees of heat and cold, hard and soft, and of motion, might afford an arrangement of symbols; significant indeed, but tediously applicable to any extended purpose of knowledge; and useful only under particular circumstances, to a few of the physical wants of life. Yet without the assistance of verbal signs, the memorial and subsequent perceptions of touch would be faint or altogether wanting; and the use of its primary, only an awkward blessing to him who might be at the same time, deaf, and dumb, and blind.

Signs to Taste. It would be idle, to say more of signs addressed to this sense, than we are allowed, from there being persons with a pliancy of tongue, to tie a thread-knot with it; which some inventor of 'notions' might, by an application of its tip to the variety of tastes, make it speak a sapid language of its own; for this is possible. And it might in some possible case of defective sensation, be even more useful, and far less wasteful, and ill-natured, than School-contentions about, 'Innate Ideas,' the 'Freedom of the Will,' and the Mysterious question on the ways and means, by which the 'Spiritual Mind' first got *into* the brain, and finally at death, gets *out* of it.

Signs to Scent. The thousand different things of this sense, that might be presented to it, could possibly be worked into an *Aromatic language*: and, indeed, there is something like such a perceptive recognition, in that of which the modern chemical perfumer, with the aid of his nomenclature of scents, does conventionally with his assistants, and his customers, make a practical and profitable use. The systematic purpose of this history calls

upon me thus to notice, this apparently trifling and fantastic topic: and whenever I find any of the graver subjects of inquiry, particularly school-theology, and other metaphysics; for each is the other; free from still greater impracticable refinements, than those I have just supposed, I shall, from a similarity in foolishness, be thoroughly repentant upon them.

From the preceding view of the signs of perception, we learn; though Nature has given the structure, and the functional capacity for a proper language, whether written or oral; its invention and use, is purely an artificial and conventional institute of man. We learn too, that with a partial exception of tangible symbols, addressed to the unfortunate blind, the signs are derived from those exalted and wide-watching ministers of knowledge the Eye and the Ear, and that the Ear is the Prime Receiver general, and Recorder before the Intellectual Throne. The symbols of sight though addressing Posterity, as well as the present time, are obliged to carry with them, the ever-necessary significancy of the verbal sign, or all the speaking wisdom of Books would not convey as much conclusive knowledge, as the unnamed animal, and, so to call them, fossil *tracks*, in the old red sandstone.

In regarding the senses, it appears, that sight and hearing have, if we may make the distinction, the exciting cause of perception, at a distance from their respective organs. This does not however, affect their accuracy: though school men have here raised a question, by supposing; sight requires the assistance of touch, to perfect the representation of its pictures. In touch, taste, and scent, there is no assignable distance between the proximate cause of the perception, and the organ. And though the cases of remote causation furnish the greatest amount of knowledge, for our enlarged benefit, and agreeable contemplation; yet there might be on one general principle, however imperfect in some cases, a system of signs, by every sense, respectively, for every thing. Those addressed to the eye and ear, have however, been adopted as most convenient, to convey to the senses and the brain, in one instance, panoramic images of external objects; and in the other, pan-acoustic types of those objects by verbal signs: thus; to amplify a Grecian thought; presenting a fourfold view of creation; a world of external ^{physical} things; a world in primary

and memorial perception of them; a world in descriptive writing; and a world in representative types of verbal signs.

Having shown, that one of the effects of verbal signs, is to render primary and memorial representation more distinct, and again; like the effect of a *mordant*, in fixing the colors of the Dyer; to give the things of Nature, a lasting hold upon the mind; and having further learned that sound affords the most efficacious sign for rendering them cognizable; we may ask, rather for curiosity than practically; in what manner, verbal signs do give perceptions the power of producing more impressive, enduring, rousing, and restorable sensuous and cerebral types. I have given examples enough, to prove that the fact is so. Yet in the present imperfect state of our knowledge, this power of the sign appears to be an elemental or ultimate fact; or a phenomenon, unassignable to its real proximate cause, and not referable to a general class of effects. I have however on this subject, some questions, scattered through the disorderly pages of my investigating waste-book, but as they do not suggest, to me at least, the means for comprehending how the verbal sign; again to use the metaphor; gives to perception, a *mordant hold* upon the senses and the brain: and as it might perhaps lead us astray to some such metaphysical notions as those which have prevented a clear natural history of the mind, I leave the subject for those who prefer the old method of inquiry; and to use the barely possible truth, resulting from their interminable labors. Without therefore marring the purpose of our history, by conjectures on the hidden process of perceptions and their signs, we confine our attention to those developments, which lead to a practical knowledge of the working powers of the mind; and will show us hereafter, how the distinctions among men are derived from the physical functions of the senses and the brain, assisted by the verbal sign; and how the peculiar exercises of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, in all their several *Qualities*, make the mind and character of each Individual, that which it is. After the primary perceptions of the literal symbol of writing and of the verbal sign, have long been connected with the symbol and the sign, they bring these up so quickly, that they seem to slip into the mind almost unperceived by the eye and the ear. Thus persons

even of common education catch in a moment, the meaning conveyed by print and speech, from an evanescent and scarcely recognized attention. Whereas it is the reverse, with children and the ignorant when learning to read: for the concentration of the eye being intense, on the single letter, they are altogether insensible to those which follow. It is upon this principle, that with the scholar, however ready in eye and ear, the occurrence of a new, or an unusual word brings up, as with the child, so vivid a primary perception of the word, as to produce confusion in the memorial, the joint, and the conclusive: and from the primary thus strongly occupying attention, the meaning of what follows in discourse, is lost, till the primary vividness passes off. In a preceding page, I endeavored to illustrate the simplicity of the functions of the senses and the brain, by that of the mechanism of the hand: for in its instrumental division into four fingers, and a thumb, it possesses its varied powers, and produces its multiplied effects. And thus in the use of the Four constituents of the mind; its primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, and of the Fifth, with its verbal signs; we have that great 'Solitary Instance,' or fact in nature; the physical mirror of the human intellect, and the All-alone working-power of its images, and types. Nor is this correspondence merely numerical: for as the thumb is a peculiar member of the hand and by its application to the other four, is the essential means, equally of its miniature, and of its gigantic productions; and without which, the forceps-fingers would have no more than the flat ineffectual grasp of the four-handed sub-animal: so the verbal sign of perceptions, as a peculiar constituent of the mind, does, by its application to each of the other four, grasp, deeply impress, and hold-up to light their perceptive images and types; thus extending the scope of human power and knowledge, immeasurable beyond the limited instinct or reason of the Brute. And had he; who in a late *premium-treatise*, showing the Providence of God, in the physiology of the human hand; not closed his thought and work with the fame of its reward; but risen with a higher inquiry, into that exalted instance of the physiological power, and providence, which under God and Nature, rules that hand, he might have shown an equally providential unity, wisdom, and strict economy, in the five-parted

agency of the mind, directing the five-fingered instrument of its work.

In explaining the character and use of the signs of perceptions, it has been shown; there might be a system addressed to every sense; but those of sight and hearing have in the forms of literal symbols, and the voice, been selected as most convenient for that purpose. To the visual may be added those furnished by the countenance, and by universal gesture: which if not as numerous as those of letters and the verbal sign, regard an important part of our personal relations. I shall hereafter show, that a vivid degree of perception in the senses and the brain, is by animal instinct, so connected with other parts of the physical frame, as to produce effects in the Nervous, the Muscular, and the Circulating systems, which are felt, or self-perceived by the individual, and observed as signs by others. The intensity or vividness of a perception which thus governs, and directs the subjected parts of the animal body, I shall more particularly describe hereafter, under the term, *Actionary Quality* of perception; and will then endeavor to show its influence on the self-percipient agency; and on the externally obvious effect in the countenance, gesture and voice; forming that important division of animal character and action; the Expression of thought and Passion.

But we leave this subject at present, to describe more particularly the manner in which the verbal signs are developed in the human voice, for the full purposes of conventional Language.



SECTION VII.

Of the Origin and Successive Formation of the Verbal Sign.

It has always been, and perhaps always will be a subject of dispute among metaphysicians; but not among physical inquirers; what was the origin of man, and what will be his final destiny? It has been too, a common question; whence come up so suddenly

the great swarms of full-grown flies? And what become of all the pins? We may with no less wonder, inquire; whence arises that incalculable number of proper, and common names, that seems to have exhausted all the permutative function of the alphabetic elements? Ask a boy; whence come the countless leaves of that huge Elm, which might enclose nearly his whole school, within the hollow of its aged trunk? He, with his school, would answer; from its roots. So with all those words which overspread the nations; they grew up from their few but *natural roots*, to supply, by cultivating care, the intellectual wants of man. And though it may not be here, our proper duty to trace all their individual stems, it may not be irrelevant, to observe the general manner in which the seeds are sown, and how they spring up and branch-off for every perceptive purpose of the mind. Although I reject every fictional date; and they are all fictional; for the origin of Language; and every ethnological supposition of one or more parts of the earth, for its beginning, as well as of the manner in which it did begin, still its succession, in the instinctive efforts of present infant speech, is freely open to investigation.

This subject, of the origin of Language, and of its progressive extension, has on many points, been so successfully developed by the philologist, and the rhetorician, that I shall trace, only some of the leading lines of their history; with a view to apply our simple classification of perceptions, for explaining parts of their systems, and to add some further facts; if not principles, or general facts; to their observations.

Preparatory to our view of the origin of the verbal sign, I must endeavor to explain the formation, the meaning, and the intellectual use of the physical system of Genus, and Species; or the Abstracting Classification, and designating Nomenclature of Things. For it is by the peculiar influence of the verbal sign, in imprinting and fixing the images and types of perceptions; the mind is enabled to make those abstractions of similar things, from different aggregates, which give an extension and accuracy to the working plan of the four percipient powers, and which form, if I may use the term, the leading *Diagnostic* between the capability of the human and of the sub-animal mind.

By Classification is meant; collecting, under a single term, perceptions of things which resemble each other, wherever existing throughout Nature and art. But similar things are generally scattered among varying aggregates of other different things; and the classification is made by abstracting, or selecting, as it were, from innumerable aggregates, all the similar things, and arranging them under one verbal sign. Thus there are innumerable animals with four feet. In the aggregated, and different parts of their structures, there is one thing alike in all; the number of the feet. If without making a classification of these similar things, we should endeavor to designate four-footed animals, we must give them all individually, proper names, which would be a tedious task. But each may be classed under a single term, by taking the resemblance among them all, and calling the class a quadruped. This makes the arrangement of a Genus. Since however, the quadruped-resemblance, may be aggregated with different things, we modify the genus according to the particular form of the fact, and thus make the Species of solid, or of cloven-footed animals, or of any other existing difference.

To give a more elementary view of this subject; and to offer a simple method of classification, suggested by the preceding analysis of the five perceptive powers; it is to be remembered, that, what is perceived by each and all of the senses, we called a Thing; and a collection of two or more things within the boundary of form, an aggregate, or object; or to avoid a repetition, we might otherwise call them, simple and combined. Individual things, as we find them combined or aggregated under different forms in nature, are however, to human time, innumerable. If therefore the amount is not limited by a single collective term, denoting those which are identical in the various aggregates, they cannot be availably named; and if not named, they can, according to our account of perceptions, and their verbal signs, be only faintly known, as primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive images and types; and consequently, can never, under this view, contribute to the purposes of science and art. For without classification, every individual thing being a different perception, should have a different name; and countless instances of color and form, and of every perceptible thing, must have a countless amount of proper

names. We do not say with the old 'logical' maxim; 'there is no science of the *infinite*,' for there is no meaning in this word; but it is obvious; there can be no science of the nameless, and the innumerable. Thus with the countless objects or aggregates of things, much less of the extra-countless things themselves, each with its *proper* name; for until classification begins, there are no names *common* to resembling things; an attempt to enumerate them, would be as idle, as to search for a meaning in the verbal sound, *infinity*. But there is a method for avoiding this difficulty, by bringing their countless numbers within the limit of intellectual management and discriminative nomenclature.

Nature, in creating her multitude of individual things, has frugally employed her materials of construction, in copying herself. Nearly every object or aggregate, has therefore been made to embrace one or more of the things of nearly every other object. That is, identical colors, sounds, heat, sapidities, and odors may be perceived in aggregate combination with fewer or more of the different things of all the senses; innumerable if taken as individuals, but reducible to distinct genera, if classed by their respective identities. Thus by a first and natural classification, every thing in existence or in action, can be designated as a thing of one or other of the five senses; and to this extent be definitely surveyed. As far then as the senses teach us, there is nothing else to be classed; *mind* being only a general term for the whole function of sensuous, cerebral, and verbal perceptions. And as we have no additional sense, or brain, to perceive the *nothing*, called spirit, we have no place for even it, in our first, nor in any subsequent classification depending upon it. This arrangement by the five senses, which is both natural and comprehensive, we call the Categories of the Senses; for every thing in the perceptible universe must fall under one or more of its divisions.

The term Category is properly applied to a mode of classifying the universe of things, which we are told, was first proposed by the Egyptian, or other earlier school; borrowed by the Greek Philosophers; and subsequently, called Predicament, Primary Genera, Philosophical Arrangements, and Universal Genera. The purpose was to limit the designation of all things by having

a few terms for their classified similarities. The number of the categories was various in the Sects of the Grecian School. The most comprehensive were those of Substance and Attribute: meaning; there is nothing in nature; these two words would not denote. Some again made three; others four; Plato proposed five; Substance, Identity, Diversity, Motion, and Rest. Others made nine; and lastly the Peripatetics, ten; Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Passion, When, Where, Position, and Habit. Thus we learn; the ancient methods of universal classification were dependent on metaphysical caprice, and on the love of contention among their several votaries. For *Substance*, as distinguished from *Attribute*, being entirely an assumption; and the whole system being framed on the slippery 'logic' of the Greeks, we are not to be surprised at its variation and instability.

We have endeavored to found our first and most general division or Categories, on the five senses, which by their several uniform perceptions, must represent the classification of things, above dispute, to all inquiry, at every time: and by this process, all the perceptible things of the universe may be reduced to things seen, heard, touched, tasted, and scented.

These Categories, by the five senses, are however, to be considered as only an unchangeable ground for other classifications more particular and useful: for though by the former, we are enabled to assign any individual thing, to some one of the five divisions; yet each division embraces things having no resemblance among themselves: thus the class of sight contains, color, form, number, and magnitude, with no relationship, except that of difference from each other. And it is the same, with the other four divisions. This preparatory arrangement is then too general and indefinite for scientific use. It is necessary therefore to contract this generality to more restricted divisions of the leading perceptive heads.

In our section on the senses, we endeavored to assign the several different things perceptible by each. These were assumed; though there may be more or less; to be twenty-one. For a particular account of which, the Reader is referred to the second section, under the head of primary perception, or more definitely to the tabular view, at the close of that section: since the pur-

pose of this Outline is; without unnecessary repetition, and detail; to turn observation, and experiment, from an old and unproductive, to a new and hopeful inquiry into the natural method of the mind.

Allowing then, the difference in the kinds of things recognized by the senses to be twenty-one, more or less; for if more, they are by classification still limited; it is obvious, that applying a name to each of them, we can designate all resembling and perceptible things. And this is the second method by which the innumerable individuals of nature may be brought under a general classification. We call its heads; the Categories of Primary Perceptions. This second classification by the twenty-one things of the senses; it must be remembered, is formed from primary perceptions only, and being rather a division for contemplative survey, than for scientific purposes, we must endeavor to bring it down to the practical uses of observation.

I have said more than once; the primary perceptions inform us merely of the existence of things. It is only when the primary and memorial, either as unmixed or mixed, are compared, and the conclusive exercised upon them, that the silent purpose of the mind is accomplished; preparatory to its announcement by the verbal sign, for the practical intercommunion of thought, and the progressive enlargement of knowledge. It appears then we require a third kind of classification, founded on a joint perception of the *Relationships* of things: and thus we learn; there is a class of perceptions, by which the resemblances, differences, proportional forms, numbers, and degrees, active influences, positions, times, motions, and other comparative conditions of things, may be viewed under the term, Categories of *Relationship*. For in the same manner, that all nature may be first classed under the terms of the five senses; then by the names of the twenty-one things; so may her works be arranged by the divisions, which their several relationships suggest.

We said, in our fourth section, under the head of joint comparison, that relationships, when recognized by the senses and the brain, are as truly physical as the things themselves which give rise to them. And as all things are, in general Category, represented by the twenty-one **primary** perceptions; there may be a

classification, of the relationships, between them. Thus we may make a division, of the relationships of Color to itself, and to each of the other available twenty: so of Form to itself, and to each of the available twenty: and in like manner, of Number, Magnitude, Sound, Heat, Taste, Scent, Time, Space, Motion, and the rest, in relationship to itself, and interchangeably to each of the others. But this classification is too extensive for our present view, and we leave future observation to divide and subdivide, as the realities of distinct relationship in nature, and its representation by the verbal perception of language may require. I need scarcely here add the reflection; that the whole arrangement of the Categories of the Five senses; of the twenty-one categories, more or less, of Perception; and of the numerous categories of Relationships, more or less; under which we have endeavored to comprehend the functions, and working plan of the mind, on the universe of things; does present a beautiful illustration of the systematic unity, and unembarrassed simplicity, discoverable in every ordination of nature.

The human mind then, does, or may employ three kinds of divisions: Categories of the Five Senses; Categories of the twenty-one primary perceptions; and Categories of the joint Relationships. The first is a natural but too general a division. The second, which is founded on the first, extends the particulars of things to twenty-one. The third embracing divisions for the last silent process, in the working plan of the mind. And we will presently show a further classification of the verbal sign, for the intelligent communication of minds with each other.

The categories of relationship, with their verbal signs, are those by which the mind is ordained to direct its inquiries into the great system of nature, and the smaller circles of art. It is the classification which intellects of the highest order always endeavor to make for themselves, in regarding the promiscuous assemblage of things, among the objects or aggregates of nature. Whereas the great majority of mankind can see these things, only as they are presented to them, in insulated aggregates; or as they are found in some of the common artificial and often discordant systems of the schools; under the changeable subdivisions of things, into the **Animal**, the vegetable, and the mineral kingdoms;

and into those of the intellectual, the mechanical, and the esthetic works of man. The natural similarities, and other relationships, thus, in a great measure, artificially classified, they cannot themselves perceive; and in most cases, not even when they are pointed-out by others more sagacious than themselves.

It is by the classification of natural relationships, that the intellectual process, called Analysis is performed. Analysis is the separation of a system of aggregate things, actions, and relationships, into its components. But it appears, that things in one set of aggregates have similarities to things in other aggregates, not only as individuals, but in their various relationships to each other. Hence, besides the mere mechanical separation of a mass or aggregate of things, into its like integrant parts; as of sandstone into its grains; philosophical analysis, perceiving within different aggregates, like conditions, actions, and relationships; abstracts, and classifies them as similarities to other conditions, actions, and relationships. It is this method of analysis, which endeavors to imitate the all-discriminating perception of nature, as she surveys the relationships of things, unconfounded by other particulars of those various aggregates, into which the unbounded scope, and final causes of Almighty Wisdom may have found it necessary severally to unite them. And if we may look into the omniscience of God and Nature, we must find; it requires no classification. It sees things as Omnipotence made them, and needs no memory of verbal divisions to keep them in their proper places, for the great ends of creation; unembarrassed by their aggregate combinations. But the limited power of human perception is obliged with slow and difficult inquiry, to verbally class the similarities of things; and discover their relationships by joint comparison and conclusion. Still there is, among human minds, great variation even in that limited power. For some make a wider survey, and a more accurate choice from the relationships of things, and their actions, by what I shall hereafter severally call the *Excursive* and the *Elective* Qualities of perception; others are able to perceive them, only as they exist already classified, in the conventional and contracted divisions of the schools, not of discovery, but of learned instruction. It is this wide-reaching and identifying method of **analysis and classification**, that brings

to light the discoverable truth of nature, and the reformable errors of science and art; which without that identifying, and abstracting perception, are unobserved by the common classes of mankind.

It is for the purpose of accommodating the limited intelligence of the majority, that a method of classification has universally prevailed, which passes over or rejects the Natural method of regarding things by the identity of their relationships; and employs what we here call the Conventional. The natural classification leads the way to discovery and truth, for it is finding-out the real relationships of things. The artificial, or conventional, though intended to facilitate instruction; for it rarely or never discovers; seems in most cases to have limited, or prevented the advancement of the mind. This obstructive or misleading method was founded on the imperfection of the perceptive powers; and accidentally arose in ignorant ages, under the gradual progress of knowledge. For subjects imperfectly observed, were erroneously joined together, or improperly separated from each other. Thus artificial division began, which habit established; and though it was accommodated to the undiscerning multitude of the Learned, it tended both by example and authority, to prevent their renouncing the conventional arrangement, for that founded on the relationships of things in nature, and in the perceptions of the human mind. The artificial which thus took the place of a classification, founded on the resemblances and other relationships of things, are those universally received. Some being partly founded on general resemblances as they have been developed by independent observation and experiment. Thus the science of Mathematics, or Quantity; the greater part of what is strictly called Natural Philosophy; and the Mechanic Arts; have been so founded, and are so advanced: again some departments of human Interest; I cannot call it science; as that of the Mind, Government, Law, Religion, Morals, Medicine, and the Social Compact, present so deplorable an assemblage of contradiction, error, and absurdity, that whatever method of classification may have brought them to their present state of sad insufficiency, there seems to be a great necessity for a use of the categories

of a true and useful relationship, to revolutionize and correct them.*

* We here attempt to illustrate the method of thought and inquiry, by a conventional, contracted, and fixed classification; and that formed, as observation and experiment require, by a perception of the identity of things, and their relationships wherever presented. I might make cases of the manner of Shakespeare, and of Bacon; both equally Recording 'Secretaries' of Nature: who each, for a different purpose, classified, or brought things together by the similarity of their conditions and uses. One, without regard to the conventional classes, metaphorically showing the resemblance of things; for the characters, actions, and philosophical reflections of the Drama; the other in his classification of *Instances*, or of Corresponding Facts, from universal nature, for the truth of science, and the practical benefit of man: each severally in striking contrast to the literary and scientific compiler, who gathers his staleness, however learnedly useful, from the worn out images of conventional poetry, and the common verbal divisions of the schools. I rather select from the worldly list of subjects, the Empirical, and contentious Art of Medicine; which equally with those of Government, and Theology, has been founded on a system of thought, and nomenclature, adapted to the unobserving, and unreflective majority of mankind.

The art of medicine consists in a knowledge of the deviations from health, in the human functions, and of the means of palliating, or removing them. Those deviations are perceptible things called symptoms. These symptoms are of many kinds, and conditions; and occur in every variable connection of number, and degree, in every part of the body; but with no constancy in the aggregate of the symptoms, and no regularity in their succession. On this basis of promiscuous permutation of symptoms, the Physician has undertaken to found a permanent classification of disease. Thus he calls an uncertain aggregate of symptoms, a Pleurisy; another, a Typhus fever; another, a Rheumatism; a Gout; Neuralgia; and a thousand other aggregates of symptoms; each with its distinguishing name. This mode of classification is called the 'Methodic Nosology! Taking the leading genera and species of diseases, under this system, they are found, with a few exceptions, to be made-up of identical symptoms. For example; a pleurisy; to constitute its nosologic character, has a pain in the side; a bilious fever, a local symptom in the liver for its character; when all the other symptoms, in the two cases, may be identical. And thus it appears, that in any two or more aggregates of symptoms, or diseases, as they are called; one or more are different, in each, the rest being more or less common to them all. This is the artificial, conventional, or vulgar method of medical classification, which has prevailed from the earliest record of the Art: and shame to its intellect! no one in all that time, so forcibly struck with its falsehood, folly, and mischief, as by a serious, and comprehensive effort to attempt to expose and overthrow it. This absurd system, then, in pretending to divide diseases by their *differences*, or by what is called a peculiar 'diagnostic' or 'pathognomonic' sign or symptom; overlooks altogether, innumerable symptoms, on which their *identity* might more properly be affirmed.

There happened to be, at the close of the last, and the beginning of the pre-

It is this natural classification of the identity of the instances of nature, which is directly employed in the broad investigation of truth; embraces every department of knowledge; and enables the conclusive perceptions to affirm the strict relationships and classification of things.

We have said; the Categories are also called Predicaments, from its being found, that without classification, there could be no predication, or general affirmation of the character of a particular thing. For if solitary individuals have no general names, it could be affirmed, only that they are different; and this would be to no purpose of serviceable knowledge. But when things are classed by their identities, under all their relationships to each other; we are prepared, to predicate, and conclude, to affirm or deny the resemblance, identity, difference, number, degree, motion, and causation of things, from which all real knowledge is derived.

sent Century, a Professor of the Practice of Medicine, in the University of Pennsylvania; who being born, and happily influenced, as few are, to 'observe, read, and think for himself,' was, after a short experience, induced to look into the identities of nature; and perceiving the radical error of the nosologic system in affirming a *difference* among the aggregates of disease, from the difference of a *single* symptom; assumed to classify identical symptoms: and affirmed from them, a *Unity*, or identity in the symptoms of the greater part of the so-called different diseases. The practical benefit from this, as from every rule of nature, was his essentially discarding the nosologic nomenclature, and substituting the philosophical view of identical symptoms, and their relationships; and to lay-down the practical formula of treating all identical symptoms; without regard to a generic name for their aggregates; upon the same remedial indication. And although this view, original, at least among the indolent creeds of Professorial Chairs, raised at once, an outcry of 'Parrots, Apes, and Owls;' the original and persevering Professor kept-on. But he was succeeded by a lineage of his sub-animal opponents, uttering articulate sounds, of little meaning; or performing professorial antics; or doing nothing, under the pretensions of a wisdom-mocking stupidity: and withal, more concerned with getting their pictures into a college-museum, than in trying, vain as it might be, to present their pupils with a representation of the true and beautiful features of Nature. Thus for the fifty years of its restored succession, has this false classification deprived us of the benefit of a Natural History and System of Disease, so auspiciously begun; which would long ere this, have overthrown an absurd, a contentious, a vulgar and emperical method of the mind; and thereby rendered an inquiry into the purpose and practice of the Healing art, in some degree, less generally unworthy of the attention of a Philosopher, a Scholar, and a Gentleman.

For illustration; if we know only individuals in nature, we could conclude, affirm, or predicate, merely that the individualities; snow, lime, milk, foam, cotton, and paper, are not the same; but when we abstract from their several combinations with other things, a like thing common to all, we can under a common term, predicate *whiteness* of each. And further, with a classification by relationships of identical agencies and effects, we can affirm, that whiteness fatigues the eye; repels certain rays of the sun; prevents the radiation of heat; and many other relationships, founded on an experience of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions of identical things, scattered throughout unnumbered aggregates. It is in Propositions, or verbal predications, drawn from the general law of a natural classification, that we have the beginning of knowledge or science, in its daily purposes, as well as in its power of displaying the simple truth of the microcosm of the human mind, and of the equally simple system of the great universe: for a communicable knowledge of these is only an affirmation of sameness, and a rejection of difference, among the aggregates of individual things, by exact joint comparison and arrangement.

It is from this predicative power on the identity of things, and their relationships; we derive what are called the *Principles* of science, of art, and of life. A Principle; from the Latin, *principium*, meaning both a beginning, and a rule; is the first indication of the power of the mind to frame a classification of the identity of things, for affirming the general rule, or Law of their conditions and actions. But from the term being commonly connected with the vague notion of cause, it is considered as a sort of sub-spiritual agency, in *producing* that class of identical conditions of things, which it merely names. The term Principles then represents no more than our knowledge of the existence, throughout nature and art, of classes of like conditions and relationships of things. When therefore we ascribe the descent of a stone, to the principle of Gravity, we mean, only to affirm or predicate, that by a rule or Law of classification, the descent will be identical every where. When we say the principle of chemical Attraction is the cause of composition and resolution of aggregates, we mean to affirm; that **actions** have been classed under

that term. In like manner, when we assume the principle of harmony and unity in the fine arts, to be a *cause* of pleasure; we mean that certain conditions and relationships of Form, Color, and Sound, have been classed with what I shall call hereafter, the Agreeable Quality of perception. And when we speak of the cause or motive of human conduct as founded on the principles of Government, Law, Religion, and Morals; if there is any thing in these subjects permanent enough to deserve the name; we can only mean, that a partial and changeable classification has been made of virtues arising from one course of action, and of vices from the reverse. It is this Principle, or Rule, or Law, or Fact, of identical classification which enables us to affirm the gravitation of all things; the chemical attraction of invisible particles; the unity and harmony of the higher works of taste; and to affirm or predicate that compound confusion, of right and wrong, sense and folly, happiness and misery, in every government, religion, and social compact, which has, in all ages, under every hopeful effort of reformation, been always found to exist.

It is on the selecting and identifying formation of Genus, and Species; those two essential working powers of science, Division, and Definition, are founded. We have already described division, or classification. Definition is the manner of assigning a thing with its conditions, to its true place in the ranks of genus and species.

If we consider the universe of things, as unclassified individuals, they can be severally described as singly different; and as existing each with its *proper* name, applicable only to itself. In this case the noted existence of that individual thing by its proper name, is for science and practical application merely a useless fact; having no action on other individuals; and being in no way influenced by them; with no stated similitude, or other relationship of time, position, number, and magnitude.

Now, the only way of making a thing known by its place, and other related conditions; since it has these in nature; is to class it by its similitudes, its connections by action, and its other relationships; and to assign it with all these conditions, to its place. This is the process called Definition: and it is performed after a wide progress in knowledge; for the first effort at definition, was to say;

a thing is like another; and afterwards in the progress of perceptive observation, and a full description of things by their many resemblances, and relationships, to predicate the true and entire definition. It appears, that in the purpose of perception and language; description, explanation, and definition, though technically distinguished, are various forms of propositions signifying the same purpose of the mind. For as words only represent the perception of a thing, and its relationships; the more or fewer words used to convey their meaning, makes no essential difference of case: thus to describe, and define, apply equally to the perception of things, and to the terms that convey a knowledge of them.

Under an unclassified state with only a proper name, we could point out, and say; Socrates, and Iron: yet nothing could be predicated of them, as to other proper names; and to other relationships. But under classification we both mentally, and verbally define them by saying in the first instance; Socrates is of the class, or genus, Animal; of the species human; and further, descending to varieties, as metaphysician; as a Greek individual; and as Socrates himself: this proper name being the *specific* difference of Socrates from all other animals. He is then defined or described as a Grecian, a sophisticating, and human animal. And all these several characters can be predicated of him, together with the condition and relationships of the individual Socrates. And thus Iron is defined to be a solid metal, useful in the arts, fusible, malleable, oxydable, of a certain specific gravity, and convertible into steel; which last property is its *specific* difference from all other metals. In like manner by division and definition, exact predication is made of all the known things of nature, and of art. The Predications are made in verbal terms, by what are called Propositions, or statements of our perceptions of things. Collections of these propositions, connected by their true relationships, form those representations of the general Facts, or Principles, or Laws of nature, called the Sciences; and the application of these Laws, called the practical Arts of man. Propositions then are the verbal announcement of conclusive perception: but this single conclusive proposition is only an item of knowledge: and this item or truth of nature has its relationships to other items or truths; in J^r **anner as the single perceptions**

of things have their relationships. The various relationships of propositions, when subjected to the just attention and discrimination of the primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perceptions, form the whole compass of knowledge, and the systematic arrangement of science and art. This process of the mind, with its series of related propositions, is in the schools, called Demonstration. We here learn, how and why it is so. It is demonstration, because it is *shown* to be derived from the pure and only fountain of truth; as well as we can ever know it; in the senses and the brain, through the five perceptive powers. The verbal signs of these perceptions being formed into propositions, are united into series, to represent all the things of nature, brought within the field of knowledge. This is the manner of communicating and conveying known, and of discovering unknown truth. But a falacious use of perception, and of its verbal sign, has made it necessary to scrutinize the single verbal term, its combination into propositions, and their connected series with each other.

There is with the wise, one, and only one, legitimate means of rectifying the errors of the mind; and that is, to review with greater attention, the exercise of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions: as the errors of an algebraic calculation are to be corrected only by a reconsideration of the conditions, and again going over the equations of the problem. But the inventors of Deception; for it does not belong to the ordained and natural mind; began by substituting Rhetorical Argument, for perceptive Demonstration, and gave to verbal terms, to propositions, and to their connected series, a delusive influence over the Ignorant, the Unobservant, and the Unthinking. This means of deception was called Sophism. The proper refutation of Sophism, by reference to the accuracy of perceptions; verbal signs; propositions; and their connected demonstrations; led to a knowledge of the unvarying law of truth; a systematic classification of the causes of falacy; and suggested the means of instructively preventing, or correcting their effects. This great analytic development, which, from the snail-pace progress of the mind, must have been the gradual work of generations of observers, was arranged and completed at last, in the Grecian Schools, as it is said by the acute and comprehensive intellect of Aristotle; thus forming the

celebrated, truth-serving, and discriminative Art of Syllogism: an *Organon*, or 'logical' instrument, invented to point-out the sources of falacious perception, and language; and not for the discovery of truth: an instrument that would scarcely have been thought of, much less sharpened as it was, except as a corrective, in an age of notional metaphysicians, necessarily subject to a confusion of intellect; and then to be unavoidably driven into the chicanery of contentious argument; thereby converting the honest syllogism, to that falsifying sophism, it was intended to refute. It is not our intention to speak of the dark days of syllogistic anarchy, in the human mind; when it banished every observative trace of science; and working on the visions of Plato, turned the simplicity of the Christian Religion into a Chaos of doctrinal jargon; in which a clearer light of knowledge on other subjects, has not yet been able to show any thing like a return to consistency and order. Since the prevalence of the observative and experimental Philosophy, the syllogism, as an instrument of thought, has passed away. It is not; as the Baconian method, by classing identicals; the discoverer of truth; though it may serve to confirm and defend it, against insidious sophistry. Knowledge is originally made, by a classification of newly discovered relationships. Syllogism is founded on classifications already arranged, and commonly known. Taking something like these as premises to its conclusions, it has, in government, law, religion, medicine, morals, and the esthetic arts, by weak and incompetent minds, been perverted to an idle, argumentative, and mischievous semblance of truth, for minds of unsuspecting ignorance.

We here give a common example of the Syllogistic principle, embraced in its systematic and perspicuous arrangement, under the numerous combinations of its figures, modes, and varieties:

All animals are mortal;
Man is an animal;
Therefore man is mortal.

From observation it was *known*, and by classification, universally predicable, that all animals die. It was also *known*, that man belongs to the class of animals; it was therefore *known*, before the conclusion told us. **that man is mortal; the syllogism,**

with both verbosity and parade of terms, telling, not teaching us, the law of Nature; that mortals are mortal: or as from experience, briefly, and more impressively pronounced, in the summary proposition; 'It is appointed unto all men, to die.'

I have thus endeavored to show, that the subject of Genus and species, or the classification of things is essentially founded on the several similarities of the twenty-one perceptions of the five senses, and of their relationships of every kind and degree; and how this earliest creative principle of knowledge accompanies every subsequent purpose of the mind, in the scientific development of the Laws of Nature; and is still found directing all the inventive works of man; assisted, if not essentially rendered efficacious, solely by the abstracting power of the Verbal sign. Verbal signs are things of Sound; and must like the things they represent, be themselves subjects of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions: and as objects of perception have their method of arrangement. Indeed the classification of perceptions, and of their signs must be coexistent and co-necessary in the cultivated mind: for it is the verbal sign that in a great measure, abstracts, or carries-off, as it were, for perceptive convenience, like-things from numberless different objects or aggregates; and by a *single term* impresses or imposes on the mind, the perception of *one*, in a collection or class of identical things, represented by the phrase of the older logicians; 'E pluribus unum,' or, one general perception, and one general term, for any number of individual things. Thus the terms, class, order, genus, and species, according to the divisions required, are only the classifications of signs which represent classifications of things. Were a different sign applied to every individual thing, it would overwhelm perception with its multitude; and nothing could be predicated, except the difference between every individual, so especially named. For it must be remembered, that predication is a conclusive perception, with its verbal proposition, usefully made only on the resemblance, identity, and other relationships of things.

When five different verbal signs are applied to the arrangement by the five senses, it does indeed reduce in number, the multitude of things; and they are further restricted under the terms of the twenty-one primary perceptions; still nothing can be predicated

Having shown that terms must accompany the classification of Genus and Species; we pass to the subject of the origin and successive formation of those terms, in the production of Language.

I had occasion in the part of this work first published, to make some remarks on the primary roots of language, with reference to the Expression of Speech.*

One or two of the terms, taken from the system of Intonation, embraced by that work may not, when thus out of place, be quite clear to the reader. This will not however affect our present purpose; and we here repeat the substance, and generally the words of our former explanation. It is shown throughout our history of the voice, that all its effects as a verbal sign are produced under these five general Modes of Sound; Vocality, Force, Time, Abruptness, and Pitch, or Intonation. And we could inform our present Reader, that every vocal sign denoting severally both *Thought*, and *Passion*, as we have contradistinguished these two states of mind, is audibly and measurably derived from some form or degree of these Modes. Thus every elemental or alphabetic sound used in language, must fall within this classification.

The first audible effects of Infant expression are purely vowel sounds, under the forms of Cry, Scream, and the familiar vocalities called humming and crowing; in a varied kind, force, time, and intonation, of these sounds; and even with their sudden break into abruptness for the intensity of perception. These vowel signs, as well as we observe them, respectively denote the child's first perceptions of pleasure or pain or of its physical wants. So far then, these individual elements have a meaning;

lar and accumulate; and by the incurable obliquity of all popular vision, an original observer and thinker, if poor and unpopular, with his long 'start' of the unmajestic world, is always overlooked as unnoticeably behind it. Nor are we alone, in all this. When the mind in any age, has bowed down to popularity and wealth, it has caught their vices. And now Royal, Imperial; England is sailing close in our wake, with only a safer ballast, and a better command of sails and steerage than ourselves.

* See the Forty-ninth Section of the 'Philosophy of the Human Voice' in a note to the Fifth Edition, of Eighteen hundred and fifty-nine; where I designed respectfully to notice the Observations of Mr. Charles Richardson, who in the introduction to his English Etymological Dictionary, was the first, as far as I have learned, to assign the alphabetic Elements, as in many cases, the roots, or as I would rather call them, the earliest significant sounds of Speech.

and are the real and the simplest roots of language; in the expression of infant sensation and passion; for we cannot give to its then state of mind, the name of connected Thought.

The consonants next follow in the progress of infant vocal signs: and still to found the origin of language on Nature; there are certain instinctive muscular functions, that prepare the mechanism for the vocal production of these elements. The early act of drawing its nourishment, strongly exercises the muscles that open and close the lips; and thus furnish the organic means, which, with the accompaniment of vocality and aspiration, already prepared; produce, by imitative effort, in the case of vocality, severally the elements *b*, *m*, and *v*; and under aspiration, *f*, and *p*. In the same act, the application of the tongue to the soft palate, and to the upper and the lower teeth, constitutes the mechanism, that with vocality, and aspiration, severally forms *g*, *k*, *d*, *t*, *n*, *v*, *th*-in, and *th*-en.

The next elemental sign with the child, would, perhaps be the incipient sob, and tremor on the semitone for the expression of distress. Satisfaction would actively lead to laughter in the tremor on the *Second* or other wider interval of pitch. Coughing would early give a command over abruptness, and thus prepare for an explosive stress, and for distinct and forcible articulation; all gradually leading to perfect speech. We do not regard single consonants, as signs of thought; nor can we say they are, except in some cases of abrupt accent, expressive of passion: and as it would be stepping aside from the caution of strict inquiry, to say that in some infant effort, they may be so; we leave the subject for the investigation of others. The vowel cries in their kinds, forces, times, and intonations, are variously, natural signs of pleasure, suffering, and physical wants in infancy; and they indicate these perceptions, as certainly as they are denoted by the full-formed words of conventional language. There is a further addition to incipient speech, when the consonants are accidentally combined with vowels, into the syllabic impulse: as in *am*, and *ba*; or reversely, into *ab*, and *ma*. The sense of hearing then becomes observant: imitation follows; and monosyllabic language, with its capacity for uncounted combination into longer or shorter words begins.



It may then seem, from Mr. Richardson's observations, as we have endeavored to illustrate them, that significant elements are the deepest roots of language. Under this view, the roots of all languages must have a like, and universal germ: thus displaying the unity of Nature, not only in the *prevalence* of the same principles of Articulation and of vocal Expression, in every age and country; as upon strict physiology, we have represented it, in the part of this work, first published; but likewise, in the *origin* of that articulation, and expression. Should future observation confirm Mr. Richardson's view, and our present additional suggestions, it will be learned, that the five Modes of the voice which combine to make the vast variety of mature and expressive language, are found, in limited use, to constitute what on like principles we may call, the incipient expression of infantile wants, and pleasure, and pain.

We remarked in a preceding page, that the verbal sign, like the perception which it represents, has a method of classification. For there can be no other intelligent and convenient exercise of the mind, on the innumerable individuals, in any department of nature; and without a classification of the vast amount of apparently different articulate sounds, by reducing them severally to identical divisions, they would be beyond the discriminating power of both primary, and memorial perception. At a period beyond all record and tradition this classification was made by an analysis which reduced the audible sounds of language to a limited number of what are called Phonetic or Alphabetic elements. The number of these elements varies throughout rude, and cultivated speech. I have in the work, above referred to, adopted from previous authority, in the English language, thirty-five, as sufficient for grammatical and philosophical investigation. They have been subdivided into vowels, and consonants. This Category of the alphabetic elements is the first, and most limiting abstraction of identical sounds, from the innumerable individual articulations of speech. These vowels and consonants are combinable with each other; and this forms the second Category of more numerous, though still limited and calculable division called syllables. The combination of syllables with each other, in varying numbers, produces innumerable words. And as the innumerable

sounds from which elements and syllables were classified, required their respective Categories; so it was necessary, for grammatical convenience, to reduce words within the bounds of manageable calculation. But words being the significant representatives of perceptions, and consequently of things themselves, are like things, reducible to the three divisions representing; Existing things; things in Action; and things under the joint comparison of Relationships. And hence, all the innumerable words of every intelligible language may be reduced to three corresponding divisions; under the name of the Noun, representing the simple existence of things; the Verb, denoting their actions; and the Adjective, their comparative relationships. The whole subject of the verbal sign may then be viewed under this simple abstracting and limiting classification; Categories of the Elemental, and Syllabic sounds, and of significant Words.

But to return to the infantile progress. The child has so few perceptions, and so few signs for them, that he has no need of classification, either, for extending his perceptions, or assisting his memory. As his perceptions multiply, some are found to resemble each other, in being either agreeable or disagreeable; for he makes no other distinction among them; and when a new one occurs, he classes it with the agreeable, or the disagreeable, as his vowel sounds, with their modified intonations furnish its proper sign. And it will be found universally, that a vowel intonation of the semitone is instinctively used for pain and distress; and an intonation on some other interval in the musical scale, as the sign of an agreeable perception. Thus under identical vowel intonations, or identical vowel and consonant names, classification begins with the child. An increase of pleasures, pains, and wants, creates the necessity for other elemental and intonated signs; and from the first few intonations and names by an analogous use of some of the literal elements of those names, by pre-and-post positions of their literal and syllabic parts, by median additions or elisions, and by the substitution of elements for facility of pronunciation, has the uncounted number of proper and common names grown from their original roots, by changes from each other. It is the inquiry that retraces this successive growth, throughout the interwoven branches of syllables and elements,

with their self-multiplying and self-varying verbal constructions, which constitutes the always interesting, and sometimes useful Art of Analytic Etymology.

Having found in vowels and consonants, the natural roots of language for subsequent cultivation; and knowing what a multitude of significant words have sprung from them; it may seem incredible, that so limited a number of elements could have produced them. But we must consider, that the twelve vowels, and twenty-three consonants; with one vowel, and no more, to each syllable, and the proportion of from one to four consonants to each vowel; furnish ample combinations, not only for the many syllables which the prattle of the child is constantly forming; but for the further conventional use of all the purposes of human maturity.*

And further, though all the significant sounds that have passed the lips of man, may, in the common phrase, seem to be 'infinite;' yet this supposed infinity may be greatly reduced, by a classification of identical syllables: thus whatever may be the number of identical syllables; for instance in the English language; they would not be increased, by adopting those which are identical with them, in every civilized and savage tongue. And I might almost say; they contain no syllable, except it has a peculiar element, that does not belong to our own. Thus we find; the amount of roots may be reduced to comparatively few; that the number of syllables into which the elements are first formed are not indefinitely increased; that the countless multitude of words of all languages are only permutations of a limited amount of syllables, changed by elipsis, addition, and substitution; accommodated through unassignable ages, to that slowest of all progressions, the enlargement of the working-method of the human mind; and even the multitude of words limited in Category, to Three or; as will be shown in our ninth section; at most expanded by the common grammatical divisions, into Nine genera or Parts of Speech. The progressive formation of the verbal sign has

* See the third section of the 'Philosophy of the Human Voice,' for a classification of the alphabetic elements; which may seem 'a stumbling block, or foolishness,' to those, who following the old divisions of the grammar schools, cannot perceive its just and extensive application to the uses of speech.

been natural and regular, but indefinitely slow; and parallel with the mental demand has been the vocal production: for as no nation has yet invented, and in slavish conformity of thought, can invent at once a full and esthetic Order of Architecture; or indeed any finished system of knowledge; so no nation could, by the impossibility of the case, even think of beginning to form verbal signs, for a mind not yet created by their necessary assistance. Both are in like manner the growth of time: in one case, to meet the increasing desire for protection, for comfort, and for the pleasures of constructive taste; in the other, to supply significant sounds, for the expression of infant pleasure and pain; and for conveying to others, the thoughts, passions, reflections, and the science of a more mature individual, and national age.



SECTION VIII.

Continuation of the Successive Formation of Language.

It is to be kept in mind, that our present purpose is only to illustrate. For although the primary roots, as expressive signs, are at present clearly obvious in infancy; and before proper Thought begins, are plainly significant of personal wants, and of pleasure and pain; yet we can have no case of the further course of language, by a gradual succession of instinctive endeavors, unaided by imitation, or by instructive means. We might indeed, from some facts in conventional language, conjecture what its formative course may have been; but this would be only a metaphysical picture; wanting that reality which, on this subject, may never be brought within decisive perception. Perceptions exercised through their verbal signs, give rise to further mental efforts: and as the images and types of the child increase, so must the intonated and verbal signs; if it wishes to communi-

cate its perceptions to others, or by a reaction of the voice on the ear, to impress them on itself. But when new perceptions occur, how is the gradual addition to the first expressive elemental roots to be made?

Without further search after what may be found in Sanscrit, Hebrew, Greek, and polyglot etymologies, which is beyond the design of this Section; I shall only point-out the general principle on which such additions might be made in a supposed case, where imitation and direct instruction are unavailable.

Past history, and present observation of the humblest savage life, tell us of the almost imperceptible progress, through ages, of the physical, social, and mental capacity of man: and we may infer a like necessary delay of ages, for the additional application of a single term, when there was as rarely, a new perception to name. The physical functions, the wants, pains, and pleasures of the infant, and of the lowest savage are few; and we know, that the like functions, and passions, and their vocal signs, in the sub-animals, except through the influence of domestication, are never increased, in the species. But man having at command a greater number of vowel and consonant sounds, than any one species or genus of all other animals, it allows a more varied and multiplied combination of elements to meet the calls for additional signs. From the very slow progress of an early language, there could not have been much difficulty in its gradual construction. For if we consider the unnumbered succession of ages man has been upon the earth, and engaged in word-making, one can scarcely allow an average increase of more than a single syllable in a century or more; through the countless ages of savagism, under its almost imperceptible improvement: and this would be sufficient to furnish from all the different tribes, the whole amount of the several kinds of identical syllables, in all the vocabularies of the Earth. To account for the growth and extension of the elemental roots of language, it must be remarked that before vowel and consonant utterance in infancy; and we will assume it of savagism, if it ever existed without its infancy; has become fixed and precise, the elements are often used indiscriminately for each other in denoting their pleasures, pains, and wants; *ah*, *e*, *ou*, and the rest of the vowels; and the consonants, *b*, *p*, *k*, *g*, *t*, *r*, *th*, with

some others, being from physiological causes, readily changeable. When an infant cries, it will sometimes employ one of these elements for another; as in mature language, we still express pain, variously by *oh*, *ah*, and *au*. Should a new perception arise, resembling one already named, it would be indicated by a literal, or syllabic sign, analogically related to the named sign. For example; let the degree of force, in a new perception in one sense, resemble a known and named *degree* of force in the perception of another sense; the new perception in this case would take the name of the degree denoted in the old term, or a new name would be formed of part of the elements of the old term, including its degree. When a child has a new perception, with a certain degree of force in one sense, and has no sign for it, the new perception takes by analogy, the old vowel and consonant sign, or both united into a syllable, which it formerly used for its forcible vocal effort; and by their pre, post, and middle positions, and by substitution, forms a syllabic sign for a forcible perception in another sense. From our view of the organic roots of language, it appears to be an ordination of the infantile, and the savage voice, to employ an explosive utterance of the vowels, and of the abrupt elements, *b*, *k*, *p*, *t*, *d*, and hard *g* for the forcible expression of its wants, pleasures, and pains. As an increase of knowledge is by a growth upon itself; when a new forcible perception occurs in any one of the senses, there is no other natural means of denoting it, than by the sign previously employed for its *degree* of force. On this principle, a forcible perception in the sense of seeing, might take the word, *bright*, or *glare*, or *spark*; in hearing, *crack* or *explosion*; in touch, *pain*, *pinch*, *smart*, or *ake*; *acrid*, in taste; and *pungent*, in scent. In all which cases, the verbal sign is composed of a short explosive vowel, and of one or more abrupt elements.

I have here applied the supposition of a natural germ, growth, and multiplying power of roots, to the English language; that the illustration might be more readily understood by the first readers of this work, if indeed escaping the fate of works of a like revolutionary character, it should ever find its early readers: and I have not philological learning, nor time enough, to test the probability of the case ^{throughout} other languages. All I here



offer, is only a suggestion; and I leave future observation to determine, whether the subject as here proposed, deserves further inquiry. Should it appear; the first syllables of speech have arisen among savage tribes, from their making use of the same elements, variously applied, it may account for the syllabic sounds of language being the same in all. But we go no further with our supposition. A word, whether of falsehood or of truth, to the wise, is sufficient to guard them against the one and to lead them to the other. I have more than once, called the preceding views, and to prevent misapprehension, I call them again, conjectures and not truths. They are however such assistants to inquiry, as will always be cautiously employed in investigating the processes of Nature and of art, by a comprehensive, penetrating, and productive intellect; in its observations on its own memorial, joint, and final proof in conclusive perceptions; through which it becomes at last, the master of exalted, and of useful knowledge.

To describe, or rather to illustrate our *supposition* of the first progress of language from its elemental roots, to the formation of syllables, and words, we were obliged to suppose, without being able to demonstrate, the process employed by the early savage, and the present infant; having, only in the latter case, a few points for observation. We come now to that subsequent condition of speech, in which the progress of conventional language is more obvious and traceable. Proper verbal signs, of thought and passion, in which the derivation from elemental roots is less direct, are constructed in several different ways.

First. As verbal signs are vocal sounds; the varied character of the alphabetic elements, and some guttural noises, enable the human voice to imitate nearly every other sound, both sub-animal and mechanical. And by this imitation, a verbal sign may be formed for every primary perception of an *audible* thing. From many of these imitative signs, still remaining in all languages, there is some cause to infer, that imitation was an early source of words. In this way, the wings of the larger bee, and fly, the voice of the rook, and the abrupt guttural explosion of the dog, have produced the signs of these voices, in the imitative *buzz*, *caw*, and *bark*, or as the child calls it, *bow*, *wow*. Again, as the time or *duration* of sound is measured by the ear, it follows, that

together with the resemblance in kind of sound, there may be that of long and short syllabic quantity: as exemplified by the difference between *peak* and *roar*; *trip* and *fall*; *stutter* and *drawl*; or as we have the principle beautifully applied, in the second book of *Paradise Lost*; where Milton, with some of his finest phrases, arrangement, and imagery, compares the classic picture of the Rocks of Scylla, to the formidable appearance of Sin, before the Gates of Hell.

About her middle round,
A cry of Hell-hounds never ceasing bark'd
With wide Cerberean mouths full-loud, and rung
A hideous peal; yet when they list, would creep,
If aught disturbed their noise, into her womb,
And kennel there; yet there still *bark'd* and *howl'd*
Within unseen.

Second. When a new perception is to be named, it may receive its verbal sign from its resemblance to some perception, already exercised and named under the *same* sense. Thus we have by the sense of hearing, the perception of a certain musical interval, called a *second* or *tone*. Subsequently we perceive in speech, a sound as yet without a name, resembling that second or tone. To this analogous voice of speech, we apply the verbal sign, *tone*; and with this *new-old* term for it; by a classification of identical things, under the same name, our knowledge of the human voice becomes more extended and precise. And by further resemblances between music and speech with its five modes, of Vocality, Time, Force, Abruptness, and Intonation, we simplify the system of tunable sounds, by classing their identity in music and speech under identical terms.

In like manner for the sense of sight; the scientific world was long familiar with certain perceptions of light and its motion, under the name of Electricity; and observing something in the clouds which resembles them, but without a name, or a name for classified effects, it was ascertained through an ingenious and simple experiment by Franklin, that the phenomena of Lightning and Electricity are identical. The latter term was then applied to designate this *new* perception of identity, and the previously distinguished things were thus assigned to the true char-

acter of their relationships, and to the propriety of their nomenclature.

With these examples, the Reader may apply the principle of this second manner of forming new names, under each of the other senses. In Touch he may find analogies, and apply identical terms to them, on the subject of Heat, of Hardness, and of Pain; of Aromatic in Taste; of Pungent in Scent; and by terms, to identify resemblances, wherever they exist; and to employ a term already known, in a new scientific arrangement of things.

Third. The new perception may receive a verbal sign, from a resemblance between the *degree* of force, of the action, or other relationship, in the things of *one* sense, and that of *another*; for between things themselves, under the perception of different senses, there appears to be no relationship except that of difference; therefore light, sound, heat, sour, and aromatic, can receive only the verbal sign of that difference; as we have them in some words, compounded of *un*, and *dis*, as in unlike and disagree; and of *a*, in anomaly, and in other words, adopted by our language, from the Greek prefix, *a* or *alpha*, signifying a contrariety of character, which cannot be compared with its opposite, under any condition. But the Quantity or degree of a thing or of its action, is a subject of comparison with all the senses, and presents the relationships of equality and of greater and less; on which joint comparisons may be made under the different senses, and new verbal signs applied to them, according to their resemblance therein. The degree of shade or tint in color may be compared with the degree of extent in space; duration in taste with that of sound; the degrees of sharpness in taste and scent, with those of pain: and so with the co-relations of degree or quantity, throughout the other senses. It is in this way, by comparing the degree of impression of a thing, or of its action on the several senses; we may apply the term of the degree of force in any one, to denote the degree of force in another; as we make the new verbal sign or epithet, *bitter-cold*, to represent an excessive degree of perception in touch, by an excessive degree of perception in taste; and from a like intercommunion of the different senses, through the relationship of degree, we have by the same constructive law of language; *penetrating* taste, *sharp* sound,

and *striking* odor. It is by a discriminative perception of the relationships of the several senses to each other, under the tie of equality and of degree in quantity and in action, that a varied and beautiful grouping-together of the images and types of the five different primary perceptions, appears in the metaphorical language of the Higher Poets.

Fourth. This manner of forming the verbal sign from a comparison of the degrees in the quantity and action under the perception of the different senses, is called Metaphor; and is founded on the material structure and functions of the mind. Again then, to shock the notions of the Old School, I repeat, that what is commonly called, 'Idea, thought, sentiment, feeling, emotion, and passion,' being terms for the various perceptions, of material things, and thus capable of increase and diminution, may be a subject for calculable proportion. In other words, the metaphysician's ineffable spirit, is only his notional and perverted view of what, we consider as describable physical phenomena, and measurable by magnitude and number; a condition common to the things of every sense, and showing the interchanging relationships between them. It is part of our view, that the function of the brain, constituting the unexcited condition we call *thought*, and that excited condition which raises simple thought, through various degrees of perceptive force, till it becomes a *passion*; are purely physical, and are made outwardly obvious, in nervous, muscular, and vocal action. These various perceptions, from simple unexcited thought, to the highest energy of passion, may under all the different senses, be physically compared, by measuring their relative quantity or degrees. As an example; take that metaphorical term of Virgil, in calling the two Scipios, 'Those Thunder-bolts of War.' To show the physical origin, and propriety of this phrase, we must consider; the acts of the Heroes are directed not by a spiritual but by a physical mind, and that, the memorial perception of these visible acts, like the actions themselves, have different degrees of force, or energy. But memorial perceptions of sight have no resemblance, nor other relationships, to an audible perception of sound: yet by taking the proportional quantity of physical force in the transcending military energy of the Scipios; and the transcending report of

the thunder-bolt, the Poet found he could in no way so precisely describe the force of character in his Heroes, as by identifying it in name, with the forcible, and overpowering effect of that report.

We will show hereafter, that an *agreeable* form of perception, and its reverse, are ultimate physical facts; and like every other form have their variable degrees. On this ground, new vocal signs may be metaphorically applied to the perception of things, from their agreeable effects, although the things themselves may be essentially different.

Suppose a statue to be placed before a savage. It has to him the shape of a man, is purely white, and unlike the color of his own skin. Perceiving no resemblance to life in it, his indifference will prevent him from giving it even the name of *white man*. He has however some acquired perceptions of the circumstances of War and the Chase, which are agreeable, or in a stronger word *delightful* to him. If he has any of that joint and conclusive perception called Taste, and desires to give a verbal sign to the pleasure he receives from the statue, he calls it *delightful*; although there is no relationship between the form and color of the statue and the circumstances of his triumphant battle. In this case the metaphor is formed upon the agreeable *quality*, common to the perception of all the senses; and here brought into comparison, between the primary perception of the statue, and the memorial perception of the bloody vanity of war.

In the preceding limited and imperfect account of the rise and progress of language; we have stated, partly upon inference, and partly from obvious construction, that verbal signs spring from elemental roots; then spread by vocal imitation of the sound made by the thing signified; and subsequently extended by their application to resembling perceptions under the same sense; and to resembling *degrees* of quantity, or force, or agency, or of an agreeable, or disagreeable quality, in perceptions, under different senses. The process of word-making, described under the second, third, and fourth of the preceding heads, is similar, and is called metaphorical; and though usually regarded as only a rhetorical ornament, it has, with a much more extended purpose, been provided by nature, for an easy and gradual enlargement of

the resources of language. There are as we have shown, never-ending analogies and relationships among the universe of things, and objects, in their agencies, and degrees; and when these are to be represented by words; if the signs are not direct imitations of sounds, or not taken from another tongue; the effort begins with the metaphorical method of applying them. Nor has nature indicated, nor accident discovered any other way, so ready and so agreeable to the mind. But the additions to language by metaphor are successive, and keep pace with the slow, and gradual progress of our knowledge of things. Therefore the method, said to have been employed by the progenitor, Adam, in naming *all at once*, the vast multitude of animals, utterly unknown to him, would have been contrary to the Law of God and Nature, in the human mind, and therefore never did take place. And whenever a full development of perceptions, and of the construction of their signs shall be made, this strange piece of early history will appear to be as unfounded, as it now does to a Geological survey of the subterranean works of God, that the world was first created from chaos, six or a hundred thousand years ago.

The metaphorical process being as far as we perceive, the design of nature, does not, when properly employed upon joint and conclusive perceptions, necessarily produce inconvenience or error. Yet Philologists have sometimes objected to this natural, or as they call it, *figurative* use of words. Whenever error does occur, it is from a wrong application of the metaphor; which obscures our joint, and conclusive perceptions, or as they express it, our 'ideas' and 'reasonings.' In a truly philosophic language, like perceptions should have like signs; and indeed without being made in the metaphorical manner, they could not, with the exceptions already stated, be in any wise made. For as nature seems to have created every thing upon a wide generic principle; acting by its endless species and individualities; so language which represents our perceptions of things, and their agencies, with other relationships, seems to be directed in greater part, by this classifying principle of resemblance. The confounding of 'ideas' and 'reasonings,' when it does occur, seems to arise, from our not keeping in mind, the different methods of constructing a

metaphor under the same sense, and under different senses. For metaphor is only the verbal means of briefly denoting joint and conclusive perceptions. Let us consider, under this view, the example given above, *Thunder-bolt of war*. The relationships between Scipio, and the Thunder-bolt, are the subjects of a joint perception; and the similarity; or as here assumed, the identity in *degree of power*; the conclusive perception. Or give it the syllogistic form: which is only a circuitous, and often, a sophistic exercise of the mind. Thus,

He who destroys the enemy's towers with force and fire may be called a Thunder-bolt of war, from the identical degree of power in the two cases.
Scipio destroyed the enemy's towers with force and fire.
Therefore Scipio may be called a Thunder-bolt of war.

If then, in classifying perceptions, either for a passing metaphor, or for the discovery of permanent truth, we have no regard to the different character of our joint perceptions, when made between things and their agencies under the *same* sense; and the character of joint perceptions, when made between the *degrees* of quantity or force, or between the agreeable, in things, under *different* senses, we shall necessarily fall into some old mode of fallacy. For these modes have; except in Geometry, Arithmetic, a few of the so-called Natural sciences, and in the Mechanic arts; always kept-up an intellectual chaos, in which, like the Epicurean notion of the jumbling of matter, the atoms of thought are in perpetual conflict with each other.

For an example of these sources of metaphorical error, let us endeavor to show, how most nations may have come to the fiction, that Hell, the burning prison of the wicked, is situated in the recesses of the Earth. Experience soon taught, that offences which cannot be prevented by imbecile Law, or notional Honor among the masses, high or low, should be punished, in various ways. The most painful suffering known to the Savage is that by Fire. So far then the process being by observation and experiment, the joint and conclusive perceptions are free from error. Some unusual offences, and of the highest degree, called *sin*, requiring the attention of the Lawgiver, his perceptions metaphorically seeking a degree of punishment, resembling, in excess of painful touch,

the excess of *degree* in the sin, to his sight; he finds that *degree*, in the excessive severity of fire; and the sinner is burned at the stake. Here again, the joint and conclusive perceptions are strictly applied to the proportional degrees of force, in different senses; and the result is practically efficacious: for the sinful man *can be so* no more; and his obvious suffering may be a warning to others. Now however begins the fallacy of the Logician's 'reasoning,' or of our metaphor; which should be a joint comparison of two perceptions, and a conclusive decision on their resemblance. A Lawgiver, by a dream, or other means, has a vague notion of what he calls, After-life, and Eternity; for even the most ancient holy Revelations afford us no primary and precise perceptions on this point; and on some new and extraordinary sin, far exceeding that for which the former sinner had suffered at the stake; the Lawgiver assigns to its enormity, a certain duration of his burning punishment. But any joint and allotted punishment of a hundred, a thousand, or any number of years, far exceeding the term of human life; the sinner *must therefore* be punished beyond that life. The Lawgiver's process of reasoning, or to speak plainly, his conclusive perception here ceases to be exact; and though he may have a true visual perception of the sinner and his sin, he cannot by sight, nor by any other sense, have a knowledge of the punishment, and its duration. For there is not yet a primary, and therefore can be no conclusive perception; or it must be false. The sophistical Lawgiver with his fallacious 'reasoning,' or metaphor, adopts it as true.

Another Lawgiver, though he admits this 'reasoning,' cannot satisfy himself as to the locality of the Fiery Furnace. In his difficulty, he happens to have a strict primary and visual perception of a mountain that has for ages thrown out its sulphurous vapor and flames. Of this he makes a joint comparison, with his fictitious, and barely possible memorial perception of the sinner and his endless punishment; and by an assumed conclusion of the perfect agreement of the degree of the punishment, with that of the sin, he puts the sinner dead or alive, to toss forever, in his burning cavern. Having done so much by the aid of false perception; metaphysical Poets easily take up his Theme; and thus,

we have the *beautiful* fiction, as classical scholars call it, of Brimstone, Pluto, Minos, and Radamanthus.

I need not proceed further with this subject; since on the principle here exemplified, the earnest and intelligent Reader may for himself, illustrate cases of the true, and the falacious metaphor here described. The especial object of this work is to offer a purely physical investigation of the mind, in a new, and yet untraveled path; which, although it may have been frequently crossed by other inquirers; yet they have never rested long enough in passing, to observe what else lay-along it; or to perceive, without embarrassment what they had always seen, with confusing obstacles, in their thousand conventional and distracting roads. For ourself, we leave others to rectify all useless deviations, and unavoidable delusions, into which the first glimpses of the course and termination of his path may have led the Pioneer.

After the preceding hasty view of the origin and progress of language; I am about to offer a brief etymology of the grammatical part, if I may so call it, of the human mind: having time to furnish only an outline and example of its common divisions. If what I do is insufficient, further explanation would be useless to the Unwilling and the Indolent: the wise and willing; to whom I regret to find myself obliged, at first exclusively to write; want only the pass-word of thought, for the new vistas opened before them.



SECTION IX.

Of the Division of Language into the Parts of Speech.

WE have described the mind as consisting of physical perceptions, and of their physical signs. All its intellectual functions and products, whether of thought, or passion, properly so distinguished; or of passion carried into nervous, muscular, or vocal

action, are the effects, the whole effects, and nothing but the effects of these. Having also brought the history of Signs to that point, at which they become the grammatical material of the mind, we may begin to perceive, how the syntax, or concord and government of these signs among one another, must immediately suggest a corresponding concord and government, so to speak, of the perceptions, they represent. For if there is not an orderly relationship, or a *putting together* of perceptions, to be signified by the syntax or putting together of words; verbal signs would make but a broken, if not a senseless discourse.

Perceptions, as we have described them in their primary, and memorial forms, represent things as they simply exist, independently of all relative agency. The joint and conclusive forms, regard them, as they bear comparative relationships to each other. Language being then, the means of representing perceptions, and their uses, the course and form of its relationships must follow those of perceptions.

The world of things, and our various perceptions, which are only the identical images and types of things, together with the verbal signs, or the countless significant words that represent them, may be reduced, as we formerly stated, into three generic divisions, or Parts of Speech.

First. Things in *still life*, if I may so speak, that are simply perceived, in any and every place, under every condition of aggregate: but without regarding their relationships. The verbal sign or part of speech, representing this mere existence is called the Noun.

Second. Things or objects, as we perceive them, in a succession of causative actions among one another; thereby producing new things or objects. The sign that represents these successive actions is called the Verb.

Third. Our perception of the comprehensive relationships, which things and their actions bear to each other, as to magnitude, number, time, position, and degree; are signified by the verbal term, Adjective.*

* In the twelfth section of the 'Philosophy of the Human Voice'; or more properly, the Philosophy of the Verbal Sign of intellect; on the 'Intonation at Pauses,' I have made but two generic divisions of the Parts of Speech. This

These are the three leading Parts of Speech, which represent, respectively, the three essential, and striking characters of the perceptive functions of the mind: the primary and memorial being signified by the noun; the joint and conclusive, by the verb and the adjective.

The ancient Philologists, according to the refinements of their metaphysical 'ideality,' or the pride of their contentious schools, arranged the parts of speech, under varying divisions, from one, to nine. We divide them as the analysis of perception directs us: and we should never have chosen from the philosophical grammar of the Greeks, its division of *Three*, if it were not the strict and clear representative of the three divisions of the State, Agency, and Relationships, of Natural things, as they are pictured in the Four conditions of perception. For the purpose however, of grammatical detail, and for practical application to the rules of syntax, the three are conveniently extended to the common divisions. Hence by variations, and substitutions, and by sub-relations of the Noun, Verb, and Adjective, to time, space, manner, connection, number, and degree, the nine may be obtained. Thus:

The Article *a*, or *an* is only a separable part of the still-life Noun, of the participial Verb, and of the comparing Adjective. It adds no meaning severally to them; and is no part of the mental syntax: *a* house, *an* acting, and *a* degree being the same, as house, acting, and degree.

The Pronoun, both personal and relative, is a substitute for the noun; and having precisely its meaning, though practically useful in grammatical constructions, is superfluous in the *syntax of perception*.

The Article *The*, as part of the noun, is a demonstrative pronoun: as, *house*, meaning any house; *the* house, a designated house. It is also part of the verb; as *acting* generally; *the* acting, a particular acting. And in like manner, part of the adjective, in the relationship of number; as house, one house, the houses.

was sufficient for illustrating the subject, then under consideration. Nor would the threefold classification, here founded on the proper syntax of perceptions, have been then clearly recognized or understood.

The Participle still represents the acting and suffering, by the agency of the verb; with a relationship to the perception of past, present, and future time; as having been sold, selling, and to be sold. The substantive verb *to be*, is a peculiar, and in grammar, a solitary mode of stating the simple noun-existence of persons, and things in relation to time; invented perhaps, for the multiplied occasions on which vanity, and selfishness in our own existence, lead us to speak and be busy about ourselves.

The Adverb represents a grammatical endeavor to render the Adjective more definite in the degree of its relationship; and to give to the verb, a more varied indication of the time, degree, and manner of its action. Yet in both cases it denotes, and that indefinitely, only a few points, within two of the general functions of the *Mental syntax*.

The Preposition represents the perception of the relationship of space or position, cause, and motion, affecting the noun and the verb.

The Conjunction denotes a perception of the relationship of conditionality; of connection, and separation in space, and in agency; severally among nouns, and verbs, and adjectives, and therefore neither takes from, nor adds to, those three self-sufficient and generic principles of grammatical and perceptive syntax.

The Interjection, which is however no grammatical part of speech, is merely the sign of degrees of perception, agreeably or disagreeably impressive, and producing an actionary effect on the voice, under the relationship of things, with their actions and degrees, represented by the terms adjective and verb.

The Declensions, Conjugations, Numbers, Persons, and other variations of the common grammar, are the result of the relationships under the three leading genera; and form, as others have long ago shown, the useful and rhetorical distinctions in the scholastic Parts of Speech. But for a detailed knowledge on this subject, the Reader is referred to the able Philologists, who have more broadly treated it, than lies within either my ability or time. If in all that has been said on the origin, the construction, and the progress of language, there should be found any thing worthy of further consideration, others will be able to

extend and complete it. Should however this analysis have gone beyond the purpose of offering a short and simple history of the mind; let it pass as merely an attempt, to give the whole a systematic form, by showing, in connection with the fourfold division of perceptions, the particular manner in which verbal signs form an essential, and the Fifth constituent of that simplicity.

Here concludes the account of verbal perception: and as the world has been, and perhaps for ever will be governed by words significant of craft, hypocrisy, error, and passion; rather than by a language of thoughtful simplicity and truth; it may be well to set before our supposed juvenile, and our older pupil, a momentary review of the higher purpose, and the succession of the proper language of intellect.

Perceptions represent the things of Nature and Art, under all their relationships: and verbal signs represent perceptions. The first perceptions of the infant are of its wants, its pleasures, and its pains; and are expressed by vowel sounds. These are true and natural signs, common to man and the sub-animal. The joining of vowels with consonants forms the first monosyllabic words, for denoting quiet or unexcited thoughts. As these increase, words of two or more syllables are required. Quiet thought, with its signs, then becomes mingled with earnest thought or passion and its signs; and here begins the confusion of perceptions, and the consequent errors of language. Verbal signs though thus representing perceptions, are yet themselves perceptions: since the verbal sign is a sound; and this sound, being perceptible by the ear, is a primary, and in succession, a memorial, a joint, and a conclusive perception. Thus verbal signs are through hearing, in like manner the Fifth constituent of the mind, as the other Four through any and all the senses. Though the verbal sign becomes, indirectly, a silent perception, it acts directly on the other perceptions, to render them more impressive and durable on the senses and the brain. This command over perceptions prepares them for ready communication, by language, from one mind, to the minds of others; is the means for a precise use of present, and an unlimited increase of future knowledge:

forming thus, the great and essential distinction between the capacity of the human and of the sub-animal mind.

The roots of the verbal sign are the phonetic or alphabetic elements. These roots when extended by stem and branch, grow into syllables and words. As words represent perceptions, and perceptions represent things, we are enabled, by the assistance of the sign, to make an orderly classification of the incalculable number of things into the abstractive limitation of Genus, and species. But words are perceptible things of hearing; and may themselves be classified, by their own assistant instrumentality: and by this means, be reduced to three leading genera; the Noun, the Verb, and the Adjective; denoting severally, Things that simply exist; Things that act; and Things in their relationships to each other. These, for a more particular investigation of their concordant and governing influence among themselves, are further subdivided into what are called the nine grammatical Parts of Speech.

Language as we have represented it, is not an Invention, as contradistinguished from a Discovery. It is at its origin purely a preordained Instinct. It is extended by the instinct of analogy; and by that same analogy, like other unities of Creation, is as I have endeavored to describe it, a varied enlarging upon itself.

I have here taken a brief and general survey of the part performed by the senses and the brain, in that representation of the things of nature, and of the works, and the voice of man, which constitute the results of the human mind. I therefore maintain that all its constituents have been enumerated; and the general Outline of its Working Plan described.

From all the Author has been able to learn, by diligent inquiry, the preceding outline, though drawn from nature, is altogether unlike any and every other description of the human intellect, no less in its arrangement and nomenclature; than in its rejection of all the Dogmas of the Metaphysical Schools; as announced and promised in his Title Page. But however consonant his history may be to the Ordination of Nature; that difference from the conventional books of all Philosophers, will be to their habit of thinking, its great and unpardonable fault. It is to meet this disposition of the Learned, to consider every thing to be unintel-

ligible; which is intellectually new, that I have endeavored by more than seemly repetitions; by frequent reference to preceding facts and principles; and recapitulations of their arrangements; not only to facilitate instruction, and thereby earlier to appease their ill-humor at Novelty; but by letting them hear some unusual truths so often repeated, they might deceive themselves with the inference, that the truths are to them unobjectionably old; and thus save the scruples of their common brotherhood in belief, by independently adopting them.

With this purpose, of Recapitulation, I here again repeat the description of the Five constituents; of their precise nomenclature, and their orderly arrangement; together with that of the simple and productive working plan of the mind. These constituents are First. Primary perceptions of things before the senses. Second. Memorial perceptions after their removal. Third. Joint perceptions; by which primary are compared with primary, or memorial with memorials which we called unmixed; and mixed, when these two different forms are compared with each other. Fourth. Conclusive perceptions, or those by which we come finally to a knowledge of the relationships of two or more of the primary and memorial to each other; from their agreement or identity to classify the things of nature; affirm their laws; and apply them to the purpose of science, of art, and of our physical, moral, and intellectual selves. Fifth. Verbal perceptions, or vocal and written signs of all the other four different forms; without which allotted and manageable-signs; or in common phrase, without a language of sound, or of symbol, for thought, and passion; the human mind would be as limited as that of the brute.

We call the Working-plan of the mind, for it is a physical process; the adjusted employment of the Five perceptions. The Primary furnishes the images, and types of things, as the intellectual material. The Memorial holds these images and types, in a manner concealed, but *re*perceptible, by some instinctive power over their relationships. The Joint instinctively selects and compares those relationships. The Conclusive fixes their true connection and influence. The Verbal renders the images and types of the other four more impressive and durable; and com-

municates the result of the silent working of one mind, to the perceptions of another. It might appear from the characters of the first four; that the primary and memorial are the passive; and the joint and conclusive, the active constituents of the mind. But they are all equally passive, under the cause or motive that produces them; and are equally with every other work of God and Nature, a Necessity: the assumption of a self-directive, and Free-willing sovereignty in the mind, being no more than a classified case with that mischievous Royal and Democratic delusion of human vanity, which would arrogate an uncontrollable power to itself. These constituents, and working powers appear to be the only rudimental, and thinking functions of the senses and the brain, required to furnish us with a knowledge of the universal things of nature, and of the works and purposes of man. This knowledge, so derived, is actually and exclusively the Mind: and the old proposition; of there being no mind without the senses, is convertible with that, of there being no mind without knowledge, received through the sensuous, and cerebral perception of things; and of their relationships, which are only a peculiar condition of things. All those terms thrown-out among the ignorant by the Metaphysical Schools, such as; 'Innate ideas, intuition, genius, beatitude of contemplation, original sin before the brain had its origin, internal, or second sight, apocalypse, visions of prophecy, supernatural illuminations, and spiritual communions,' are directly contrary to the Law of God and Nature, in the human mind; as far as we can understand the purpose of its ordination, and perceive by its strict employment in the discovery, that it is only a part of the unbroken unity of physical Creation.

The things both of nature and of art, generally appear in aggregates under the boundary of various forms. The Greek Philosophy and Modern Metaphysics, which have been the great Factory of Delusion, make a distinction between matter and what they call its attributes, in the assumption of there being a substratum of matter holding together the attributes that make-up the perceptible parts of the aggregates. We use the word things; independently of all theory; without reference to a central core, but only to the perceptible particulars of the aggregate. Thus taking a sphere an aggregate of things, we have a primary

perception of the individuals; form, color, weight, and magnitude; and as there is nothing to be perceived, either by observation or experiment, within the boundary of the aggregate, we believe the whole to be a cluster only of things: and the metaphysician must tell, if he can, how it came into his first ancestor's head, to say; an imperceptible something found its way into the aggregate; and what it could possibly find to do after it got there.

The universe of things, whether of nature, of art, or, to make a distinction, of intellectual man; for art and intellect, when unperturbed, are rightful Nature still; produces perception either as individuals, or as aggregates; though apparent individuals may be undistinguishable aggregates. From among these individuals and aggregates, by imaged and typical representation on the senses and the brain, all knowledge is derived. It begins in primary perception. Through the memorial and joint, identical things are selected, or, as it is called, abstracted. These abstractions are classified, according to their extent, and to the relationships of things, into genus and species; and are signified by verbal terms. By these identities of genus and of species, Predications, or statements are made of the resemblances, and other relationships of the perceptions of things. These predications, in verbal terms, form Propositions. True propositions; affirm the general facts, or Laws of Nature, and the rules of art. A series of propositions constitutes what is called Demonstration. From the identities of genus and of species, and from the former including the latter are formed those propositions called Definitions. A series of definitions, or propositions of greater or less extent; the known truth of the major *genus*, embracing the known truth of the minor *species*; forms the Circuitous conclusion, or Argument called Syllogism. The syllogism is then the predication or statement, in a technical and verbose language of what is already known: and it would seem; the Leader of a Grecian School, if not the accredited discoverer, or full and accurate describer of the syllogistic process, was in that metaphysical age, at least deluded into the belief, of its being a 'logical' instrument of proof. One would suppose that Aristotle, with all his knowledge; if so much of it, had not been the gathering of previous, and of cotemporary *learning*; would have independently

turned from the impotent opinions of his time, to search analytically through the mind; and from its ordained structure, materials, and working plan, to perceive that the vaunted syllogism is no more than an ingenious manner of contending with those who employed its own process for Confusing, not for Discovering truth. But Aristotle, though well knowing the unavoidable ignorance and notions of the popular mind, of every rank; could not free his own from the current delusion of metaphysics; which permitted him to go no further, in the investigation of the functions of the senses and the brain, than to acknowledge generally, without defining and arranging, the powers of sensation, perception, memory, reminiscence, association, judgment, and reasoning; facts which must have been a subject of varied opinion and dispute, with the Egyptian Hierarchy, the Persian Magi, and the earlier Sanscrit Philosophers of the East.

Having from a new point of observation, taken a new view of the physical functions of the mind; and having endeavored to keep that survey, beyond the influence of the old theoretic and distracting nomenclature; let us compare the vague and redundant terms of the metaphysical system, with those of our natural history; and learn how far the preceding outline has been drawn with truth and simplicity; whether we have omitted any necessary terms; and wherein those of the old and the new descriptions differ from each other. And,

First. The term Mind, in metaphysical language, means an independent Entity, or thing, with spiritually innate, and self-constituted powers, that acting on the physical brain produce the phenomena of thought. In our view, it is an abstract term of classification, signifying only a genus of intellectual functions, which we have called perceptions; a term that represents no single *entity* or thing; and is totally without meaning and use, when we contemplate any one of its species, and that vanishes, when we regard only that species; as the term species takes flight, when we regard only one of its individuals; the 'winged' but bodiless word, in each case, returning to its purpose, only when we consider *something* possessed in *common*, respectively by the several individuals, or species. With the same meaning as the general term Mind, abstracted from any notion of its particular 'entity,'

or from any special application; we employ the words, thought, thinking, and intellect, together with those of mental and intellectual. They represent no special notional 'entity,' nor particular action; but imply only a general agency of the senses and the brain.

Second. The old school supposes this self-existing Entity, to be what they call Spirit; which produces, by its action on the *matter* of the brain, the peculiar phenomena of mind; or that spirit, has a perceptive power, beyond the ultimate fact, of a perceptive power in the organization of the senses and the brain; such as the ultimate fact of our perception of a functional power of a muscle, in the flexion, and extension of a limb; beyond which we know nothing. This agency of spirit, and the necessity of regarding it, in a description of the mind, we entirely reject. For the notion of spirit is contrary to every existing and known Law of Nature, and her inseparable, and co-existing, or directive God. We must therefore, have more than the assumed fact of the presence of spirit in the human brain, to reconcile the misnomer; that a law to be ordained upon many facts, should have been made for only a single one. The notion is an absurdity to human thought; and a heinous charge against the wisdom of God, to be classed only with the supposed unpardonable sin. A law passed for the single spirituality of the mind, would be an exceptional and unconstitutional law of physical nature.

But further. In place of this assumed agency of spirit, which we do not know and cannot conceive; we have an analogical inference in favor of the material phenomena of Mind from the physical, mirror-like, and typical functions of the senses and the brain, which we know do exist: and at the present time we look for nothing more. Whatever the Greek and earlier Philosophy meant by its vague conceit of the Divinity stirring within the mind; is all included under the purpose, and means of physical Perception. We do not notice here; the rhapsodies of intellectual pride, which revolt at the suggestion that the sublime discoveries of Science, and the empyrean soaring of ambition could arise from the unworthy clods of the brain: though we are told by ancient and high authority, that man himself, the Lord of Creation; was formed from the like *material* Dust.

Third. The term Perception has been employed by metaphysicians, as the sign of a physical function directed by a spiritual agent. We have adopted the word, and thank them for it: but use it, with a wider meaning and a more precise application. Thus the first steps of their observation were upon the *matter* of the Mind; for they seemed by the term; to recognize in the *senses*, the physical images, and types of physical things. Four other terms of inquiry, hand in hand with nature, would have brought them around the full circle of material perception. But the Evil *Spirit* tempted them to a visionary, and distracting, though a seeming path to knowledge; and then left them to wrangle about light, in the darkness of their mazes.

Fourth. The old school employs the terms, Faculty, and Operation. Here is an instance, in the nomenclature of the mind, of those refining metaphysical distinctions, that affect to make for practical use, two things out of one. The terms faculty and operation, or the unknown cause that acts, and the visible effect that is acted, to be physically intelligible, must mean only a perception: since the *faculty* of producing an action or *operation* in the mind, must be some function, physical, or spiritual. If that function is unknown, the faculty is unknown. We therefore know nothing, except the obvious action or operation; and perceiving this, we call it perception.

Fifth. The several scholastic terms, Idea, sensible species, Internal sense, sensation, and conception, are all signified by our single term perception. Indeed, some of them represent literally, the physical illustration we have given of the reflective mirror of the senses and the brain. We owe the useless multiplication of metaphysical distinctions, or variations under this head, to the spiritual obscurity through which the mind has been viewed; together with the theoretic, and analogical attempt to explain it under that obscurity.

Sixth. Memory, reminiscence, and recollection; which have occupied a wide and conspicuous place, among the verbal signs, and actions of the mind; are represented in the whole extent of their functions, by the term of our second constituent, the memorial perceptions; which unites and simplifies them to a place, among the five **constituents**.

Seventh. Imagination. This is only the exercise of memorial and joint perceptions; whether mixed or unmixed; through all their various permutations with each other.

Eighth. Judgment. This term is embraced by that of our fourth division; or those perceptions of the relationships of the purposes and actions of things, which we called conclusive.

Ninth. Reasoning. This is only a series of related conclusive perceptions of the purposes and actions of things.

Tenth. The Will. This term, which like that of Mind, represents no entity or thing; is a generic and convenient word for classing certain perceptions, that are so vivid, or forcible in degree, as to influence an animal; for in this we are all alike; to one act rather than to another. I shall call those perceptions, which under their vivid condition, produce vocal, or muscular, or other obvious effects; the *Actionary* Quality of Perceptions. Thus, what is called, Will, is as we can only know it, an actionary perception, raised to its force, or vividness, by some material agency. But the metaphysician, who like the theologian, seems to abhor every thing like physical causation, has made the Will, as it seems, a secondary spirit, or Demon of the Mind, with an innate and independent power to act as he pleases. We here reject the term Will, except as a convenient abstract and generic word for a numerous species of animal actions, directed by agreeable or disagreeable perceptions; for this surrounds all that has been or can be said on this voluminous subject. If we use the terms voluntary and involuntary, it will be only with distinctive reference to metaphysical theory, and to the language of scholastic litigation.

Eleventh. Passion. This term is in some respects synonymous with that of Will: for it is what we call, an actionary perception, so vivid as to direct speech or other muscular action.

Twelfth. Consciousness is another name for self-perception; but by a theoretic etymology, from *con* and *scio*; to know together; descriptive of a mutual knowledge, between our real physical selves, and a fictional mind.

Thirteenth. Logic. This term has for ages past, been applied to a limited use of the intellect; and early framed into the assumptive form of syllogism, for the endless contentions of sophists.

The schools used it with a narrow and indefinite signification, for what we call the whole working plan of the constituents of the mind. If we employ it, it is only like the words, intellect, thought, and their adjectives; intellectual, mental, thinking, and some other words; as a general term for the proper exercise of the effectual functions of the senses and the brain.

Fourteenth. The term Association, which has been so generally used, for the explanation of many phenomena of thought; we do not technically employ. It states only the ultimate fact that perceptions do involuntarily come-up before the mind by a Law of Nature; and which we shall consider hereafter, under the term, *Elective Quality of Perception*.

I say nothing of what is called the Moral Faculty, the sense of Deity, and of other multiplied '*internal senses*,' which are all metaphysical liberties taken with the memorial perceptions; nor of the scores of Phrenological, and Transcendental terms which verbally mince up the mind into a vocabulary, without a syntax, to join, and to construe its sounds into sense.

On this comparison of the old conventional nomenclature, with that of the present Work, the Reader is left to decide by joint and conclusive perception, between the simplicity and unity of a physical view of the mind; and the vague and disorderly system of spiritual causation, with its redundant, deficient, loose, and confounding terms. I have called the various forms marked in the Five Divisions, the constituent functions of the mind performed by the senses and the brain: and though the peculiar organization, producing these functions is entirely unknown, the effects within the brain are as obvious to internal perception, as external things are to the senses: perceptions both of without and within, being by like images and types on the senses and the brain. And we have endeavored to show, that the laws of what we call the mind, are only classifications of the five several forms of perceptions, employed on the things and objects of nature, the various works of art, and on the mind in unfolding itself.

SECTION X.

Of the Varied Qualities of Perceptions.

WE have described the several constituents, as each invariable in itself; and as so exercised in the greater part of sub-animals. For though their five perceptions, with their limited vocal and muscular signs, are found of various conditions and degrees in different kinds; yet each condition and degree scarcely varies in the species. Of a thousand wild-pigeons, and a thousand antelopes, their respective perceptions of all the things that come before them, are alike in each. Whereas of a thousand mingled men and women, there will be five hundred, if not more, of varied Quality of perceptions, scarcely two individuals having the like condition and character, in their images and types. With a view to our gradual manner of analytic explanation, we have, to this moment, represented human perceptions, each as an unvaried function. The general law of these functions; under a supposed golden age of intellect; might indeed, as in the sub-animal, have been unchangeable, and yet sufficient for its purpose. But the iron-age of what is called Civilization has so sadly maimed, dislocated, and perverted the natural structure and order of perception, that with its partial excellence and its unnumbered depravities, we are obliged, for a full description of our subject, to mark the variations, as we here present them, under the name of Qualities. We shall therefore distinguish between the many imperfections and deficiencies; and those rare instances of effective power, in human perception, that occasionally arise upon the world, to insure a progressive development in the science of natural things; boldly to overthrow for a time, the vice and folly, equally of Royal and of Popular governments; and with greater heroism, to reform absurd, ambitious, and trading religions, to a humble and holy adoration of the Creator; which must follow a knowledge of the universal wisdom and beneficence of his Works.

To avoid complicating what was intended to be a simple outline of the history of the silent exercise of perception, together with its actionary vocal, nervous, and muscular effects; we barely alluded to the fact, that perceptions might individually vary from the uniform character, under which they were then respectively represented; by being either weaker or stronger, or as called, vivid or faint; actionary or silent; agreeable or disagreeable. And though this view of the uniform character of the five generic perceptions, would be sufficient to render the working plan of the mind plainly traceable throughout its whole process; still under a closer and more precise observation, there are manifest differences between their humble and their higher exercise, that cannot be accounted for, without ascribing them to a varied quality of the five several perceptions. The metaphysician, modern misty Transcendentalist, and the unthinking multitude who follow their authority, usually pretend to explain the more remarkable intellectual productions; particularly the Fictional, which they hold in sympathetic, and especial favor; by assigning them to what they call the 'Powers of Genius:' not using this word, merely as a convenient term, for some extraordinary and rapid effort of perception; but meaning by Genius, some spirit of the Empyrean of intellect. Nor has there been wanting in the schools, from the Chinese, the Assyrian, and the Egyptian, downward; those who ascribe to Inspiration, every physical effect, the cause of which they cannot otherwise explain. The prose and poetical Transcendentalist, despising the importance, and abhorring the vulgarity of matter, cannot admit genius to be one of the physical exercises of the senses and the brain; believing it to be like other spiritual effluence, something resident in the upper and unassignable regions. And hence its epithet of 'Heaven-born' among the younger aspirants at the foot of the Prose, as well as of the Poetical Parnassus. Nor have some whose wings of perception have carried them figuratively nearer Heaven, been altogether free from this physiological and not merely rhetorical delusion. This account of superior intelligence, founded on the notion of 'inborn or inspired genius;' and so easily conceited; flatters the ignorance and vanity of man, and puts at his mental disposal a juggling wand, which opens the way for his impudence in de-



ceiving himself, and directs him to the mischievous trick of imposing on others.*

The 'exalted works of Genius,' which are a mystery to the wondering multitude, are with a little intelligent analysis, resolvable into the obvious exercise of certain qualities of perception: and perceptions being of different qualities, some minds have a quickness and power, far above that of the equalized majority; hard as it may be in these times for the conceited and self-confident majority to believe it. All the world uses the same five constituents; but as the mass uses them at random, under varied inferior degree, and with great confusion of quality, their thoughts and acts lose the character of that mind, which in the beautiful ordination of its simplicity and precision, was intended to be easily understood and exercised by its possessor; that he might thereby learn the only essential method and means, to direct himself aright.

As the whole mind consists of but five generic forms of percep-

* If perceptions, in their primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive functions, are of one uniform character; mind being the true, and only representative of man; then the apparently strange assumption of the American Declaration of Independence, that 'all men are born equal,' may be true. For as perceptions constitute what are called the thinking and directive powers of men, these perceptions being severally the identical images and types of invariable things; and having as here supposed a uniform character; all men are destined like the sub-animals to be born and to continue ever afterwards alike. If however there is a difference in the *quality* of perceptions, according to the physical structure or manner of acting of the senses and the brain of different individuals; then instead of the universal declaration, that all men are born equal, taken from the old popular retort of self measurement; 'I am as good, as great, and as wise as you are;' it should have been limited to this; The *majority* of men are born equal, and so continue ever after: and this is plainly shown from the Political, Religious, Medical, Moral, Social, and all except the Mathematical, and Mechanical systems of every age and nation; having been tried through continuous misery; and having failed in their promises and end. But though perceptions seem to have been uniform in character, with the majority; they are not, as will be shown hereafter, of the same *quality* in all: and therefore our 'self-evident' Fourth of July proposition, cannot, by the Laws of the human mind, be true. Yet it shows; the whole Fifty-six endorsers of that notion; though earnest and heroic in their purpose, and wise enough for their hazardous enterprise, must still have belonged to the common and *equalized majority*, or there would have been among them, at least one with the sagacity, as he would then have had the independence, to protest against the egregious error.

tions, with their several species of qualities and their verbal signs, its differences must arise from a varied use of these genera and qualities, and from the character of those verbal signs; for though these last are as we have contradistinguished them, a *conventional* system of audible perceptions, they must be influenced, as will be particularly shown hereafter, by a similar law of varied quality, as the first four constituents.

In order to have a clearer view of the several qualities of perceptions, we must gather in their effects, as they variously appear in the works of intellect: for these qualities exist as Facts; and from their true character, we may learn the history of the mind. This history is written only from what we perceive in our own mind; what others perceive in theirs; and what we learn from their descriptive and actionary works; the whole mind being thus practically set before us, in an outline of the five perceptions and their varied qualities. From knowledge of the mind, obtained by this simple and sufficient method, we perceive that all intellectual differences are produced by the varied Qualities of perceptive images and types, as they are applied to their primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive uses; and as the verbal signs properly and clearly represent them. We are totally ignorant of the cause of the difference in quality: and as it is not a subject of observation; any theorist can have a notion of his own, and dispute to no end upon it. Nor could a knowledge of its proximate cause; except it should afford the means for physically influencing the nascent perception; contribute to the practical purposes of this essay; neither could it assist the mind in perceiving the process of its own work, or in discriminating the intellectual work of others. Our practical ends are to be gained, by perceiving what is to be perceived, within an outline of the simple working plan of the physical mind.

To impress our divisions distinctly, we gave in the first section, three progressive views of the five Generic constituents. First, a visual table or column of their terms. Second, a brief explanation of these terms. Third, a fuller detail of their forms and uses. We here, in like manner, set, in the single scope of the Reader, a columnar list of their specific Qualities; next, a sum-

mary definition of their purposes; then an enlarged detail of their powers and degrees, in forming the Character of the mind.

Terms of the Varied Qualities of Perception.

I. Vividness or Force.	X. Durable and Evanescent.
II. Quick and Slow.	XI. Mutative.
III. Excursion.	XII. Conformity and Independence.
IV. Election.	XIII. Truth and Falsehood.
V. Agreeable and Disagreeable.	XIV. Exaggerative.
VI. Quiescent and Actionary.	XV. Mixed and Unmixed.
VII. Synchronous and Successive.	XVI. Foresight.
VIII. Single or Few, and the Manifold.	XVII. Habit.
IX. Involuntary.	XVIII. Selfishness.

Summary Definition of these Terms.

First. We know within ourselves, and we hear from others, that some perceptions both sensuous and cerebral are more distinct, vivid or forcible than others; and that the images and types of the same thing, have at different times, and in different persons a different brightness or force. We call this the varied *Vividness* or *Force* of quality.

Second. Some more quickly perform their functions; in suddenly receiving the primary impression; in readily reviving the memorial, in a rapid comparison of the joint; and by an instant determination in the conclusive. These we call the qualities of *Quick* and *Slow*.

Third. Some perceptions are more excursive than others in their flight over the field of primary and memorial images and types, thus making a wider circuit to gather more abundant images and types, for fuller joint comparison. This is the *Excursive* quality.

Fourth. Some in their excursive search, have a stronger elective affinity than others, in successively drawing or clustering around themselves, those images and types which, either as near or remote on the memorial field, have particular relationships under joint comparison, and under conclusive decision. This is the *Elective* quality.

Fifth. Some qualities, as an ultimate fact, of which we know not the proximate cause, are *Agreeable* or *Disagreeable* to the percipient.

Sixth. Some qualities are *Quiescent*, or *Silent*, and known only to the percipient; others again, *Actionary*, with the power to raise the nervous, vocal, and various muscular functions, into effects audible, or visible to the percipient himself, and to others.

Seventh. Some perceptions are apparently *Synchronous*, or existent at the same time; others are really known to be *Successive*.

Eighth. Some perceptions are single or limited to a few, and again they are many. These we call the *Single* or *Few*, and the *Manifold*. Nor is this the same as the last head, as shall be shown hereafter.

Ninth. Perceptions are, as an ultimate fact, *Involuntary*; and exist as they arise, without other apparent proximate cause, than that of joint comparison, or relationship, by which they are brought together.

Tenth. Some are *Durable*: others are *Evanescent*.

Eleventh. They are different, accordingly as the primary and memorial are *Mixed* or *Unmixed* in joint perception; the mixed having the primary, brighter or more impressive than the memorial in a natural and healthy state of the mind.

Twelfth. The five constituents in their variable Qualities, are reciprocally influenced by each other. In the preceding enumeration, they are described as if their power, in its just exercise is in each case restricted to their single capacity under their several heads. These several constituents do indeed, in their single and uninfluenced state, give a character to the mind, which is however always limited. When the constituents are varied by quality, it is sometimes either a useless or a dangerous one. Thus single-vivid, or forcible quality, when uninfluenced or not tempered by one or more corrective qualities, leads to self-will, obstinacy, or fanaticism. But when the manifold or the excursive is brought to act on the vivid, it presents such a number of images and types, as to weaken the power of the singly-vivid or forcible; which might otherwise remain unchangeable in its single perception, or as " " " " "fixed idea" of self-will, Obsti-

nacy or Faith. Thus, again, when the perceptions are excursive and manifold, yet feeble or obscure, the mind may be filled with images, and types; but these being, indistinct and distracting; the joint may be unrelated, and the conclusive erroneous, from their scumbled multiplicity. Yet the confused and feeble may be impressed by a more vivid or forcible perception, or may be changed by the influence of the forcible, the bright, and the clear. The quality by which perceptions thus reciprocally take the place of each other, we call the *Mutative*. On this subject however, we shall have more to say hereafter. Still the Reader may through this illustration, now understand, to what the simple system of perceptions, and the various single and combined use of their qualities is to lead, in a keen, and comprehensive view of every exercise of the human mind.

Thirteenth. There is a tendency in the individual human mind, under its vulgar organization, and its imperfect exercise; inconsiderately to unite itself with other minds, into a uniform, and often a vicious mode of using the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions. This adopted uniformity, and narrow limitation of thought, when varied and extended views of the relationships of things are required, destroys the ordained purpose of the senses and the brain, to represent truly what comes before them, without being disturbed by the notions, or words, or acts of others. Such a perversion of the mind from the broad rule of freedom in the use of natural perception; and such sheep-herding by the mere authority of aggregate-opinion; I call *Conformity* in ignorance or error. Its opposite is *Independence* of observation and thought.

Fourteenth. Causes connected with the organization of the senses and the brain, or with the exercise of their functions, may produce the different conditions of truth and error in the imaged, and typical representation of things. We do not pretend to know, how or why these causes act; nor do we see at present, that much practical benefit would result from this knowledge: but experience shows, their obvious effect, in the limited amount of truth, and the unbounded prevalence of error in the human mind. Metaphysical Theologians may try to explain all this: still from the endless train of delusions in their own minds; and

from their universal failures in all such explanations, they should prudently abstain from the inquiry. These two conditions of the mind, we call the qualities of *Truth* and *Falsehood* in perception. They are directly opposite in their influence; and respectively produce either the greatest benefit, or the greatest evil to the human race.

Fifteenth. There is a state of the constituents nearly allied to the quick and vivid quality; if not derived from them; in which the five perceptions, particularly those of the primary and memorial, are magnified in a greater or less degree by the percipient, to the annoyance of himself and his friends, but more frequently to his own extreme distress. This in the vague language of physicians is indefinitely termed the 'nervous temperament.' We will call it the *Exaggerative* quality.

Sixteenth. When the five forms of perception are properly employed, they are not only the means for learning the existences and relationships of things already known; they are further, the more important means for discovering those which are unknown. We call this the quality of *Foresight*.

Seventeenth. It has been found that, perceptions, being often repeated, are more readily exercised in the primary, revived in the memorial, compared in the joint, and decided upon in the conclusive. This condition is the quality of *Habit*.

Eighteenth. Every thing in nature is made to take care of itself; a due regard being kept to the rights of other things; an example of wisdom and justice, to the Framers of the Political, Moral, and Religious Law that has never been usefully followed. When Actionary perceptions are exercised for the wants and pleasures of one percipient, without interfering with the wants and pleasures of other percipients; the ordination of the principles and practice of virtue between mind and mind; for mind represents the man; is fulfilled. When however this law is violated, the consequence is reversely an evil equality to the agent, and the subject of the violation. This actionary exercise of the inordinate claims of the rights of support, protection, and enjoyment of one mind over those of another, we call a *Selfish* quality.

I might further enumerate the actionary perception of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Vengeance, and Religious feeling towards the

Great First Cause of all things; together with every other passion, which when carried beyond the limits of individual right, should be classed as peculiar characters or qualities of the perceptive constituents of the mind: but these may be all included under the head of selfishness.

These are general views of the characters or qualities of perception, which produce the differences of our minds; and which may be applied to solve some of those problems that have for ages, puzzled the Metaphysical spiritualist, and the Transcendental dreamer; who by groping after a *nonentity*, have missed the physical *actuality* of a simple working plan of the intellect. My purpose is to suggest the plain observative path of inquiry: for every step in the right way, brings us nearer to its satisfactory end. A more extended survey of the subject might embrace other qualities than those here enumerated; but this is left to future observers; who with undisturbed leisure, a wider *excursive* survey, and a more precise *elective* discrimination, may modify those I have named, by a clearer description, and arrangement.



SECTION XI.

A more particular Detail of the Qualities of Perception.

HAVING in the preceding section, merely enumerated the qualities of perception; and given, under their appropriate terms, summary definitions of their several characters, in the human mind; I proceed to describe more in detail, the purpose, the application, and the effect of each. And First;

Of the Varied Vividness or Force in Quality.

As the agency of the four forms of perceptions, with their verbal signs, essentially constitutes the mind, and as the qualities

of these perceptions, in their various degrees produce all the differences of intellect; there may not seem to be a ground, for priority in arranging these qualities. But the vivid or forcible is the most influential; and as we shall find this vividness or force, in its uncontrollable agency, to be the very despot of the mind; and that it has produced, and with the present corruption of the art of thinking, will continue to produce the greatest part of the folly, error, and wickedness of the world; we will begin with it. For if there was a beginning to the great round of human vice, we shall by a study of the agency of vivid perceptions, come nearest to a decision, upon the true date, place, and character of that old metaphysical phantasm, the 'origin of evil;' and of that marrowless bone of theological contention 'Original sin.'

We call the vivid quality, that character of perception, which by its bright and forcible impressive images and types, nearly, or altogether effaces from the senses and the brain, those images and types which would otherwise have been perceptible. We prefer the term vivid, or forcible, or bright, as more precisely denoting the character of its excluding impression; and as less objectionable when applied to images and types of all the senses; for there may be metaphorically, by the common use of the term, an excited, lively, and vivid perception of the things of scent, touch, hearing, and taste, as well as those of sight: it must therefore be understood that what we here say of this quality, applies in a greater or less degree, like that of forcible, to all the perceptions of every sense.

The primary are always more vivid and impressive than the memorial, except in the temporary conditions of delirium, extacy, and dreaming. Thus no memorial perception of the sun, bears comparison with a primary. It is similar with the memory of a heavy peal of thunder, the piercing pain of frost or fire; an excess of bitterness, and the pungent odor of ammonia. And thus by a wise ordination, the mind, if I may so speak, is saved from memorial misery, and from dying under an excruciating recollection of sensual pain. The primary vivid are employed, when we earnestly look at one thing of an aggregate, either at rest, or in procession, **and at the moment** see nothing else. In like manner when we earnestly direct the ear to the successions of a



melody, we may not perceive the synchronous notes of the harmony that accompanies it. Thus too a side or elbow-justle by a pickpocket, or a forcible impression on another sense, prevents the victim feeling the wrenching-away of his watch. It is the same with the functions of taste and scent, when vividly excited; although the excluding influence is here not so obvious, from these senses universally receiving at the same moment, but one distinct primary impression. And further, this excluding power applies not only to the things of a single sense, as we have above considered it; but the vivid quality in one sense may equally exclude the primary perception of things in each and all the other senses; and of the verbal signs that represent them. Thus under a strong and occupying impression of a thing of sight, we may not perceive an ordinary impression, by things on any of the other senses; and as all the images and types of all the senses may respectively assume a vividness; the other perceptions are weakened or altogether destroyed: the vividness thus producing a form of Abstraction.

In regarding the human mind under its several conditions of inflexible ignorance, and of the broad exercise of its powers on a true representation of the relationships of things, we may make a threefold division of the bright or forcible perception, according to its degrees; into the Vivid, the Faint, and the Neutral: as this will be sufficiently discriminative for the purposes of our present history.

For the convenience of systematic description, the eighteen qualities were arranged under separate heads: and generally they may be so regarded; but in their practical uses, they are so intermingled, and reciprocally overruling, and mutative, among one another, that it is not possible to consider the existence, and agency of any one, without perceiving the co-influence of one or more, in producing the various results of human intellect. Hence in a faithful account of the qualities of perception, I shall not be able to avoid, under any of the various heads, making occasional reference to the character, assistance, and mutative influence severally of the rest; and to meet this occasion, I gave a prefatory explanation of them all. The three shades or degrees of the vividness or force of perceptions have their respective influence

in directing the mind, either to truth and usefulness, or to error and its inevitable evils. For though Quality and its degrees, are here arranged separately from the unmodified form of the constituent, as we described it, yet the quality presents the constituent changed into varied means for producing either right or wrong in the human mind. When we have well considered this subject, it will appear, that quality is inseparable from perception, and that without it, an invariable perception, were such a case conceivable, would produce, if any thing, only a monotonous, a worse than brutish, and not much above an oyster-mind. From a strict meaning of the terms for the degrees of quality we are now considering, they might seem to refer only to things of sight; yet vivid, neutral, and faint are no less applicable to the images and types of all the senses. We begin then with Vividness, the highest degree of this quality in each and every sense.

There are, as it appears, two causes of vividness. One instinctive; dependent on the organization of the senses, and the brain. The other acquired: and this either directly, from a habit of employing that quality: or indirectly, from the exclusion of other perceptions; for a single image or type before the mind, may acquire a kind of vividness, when unsubdued or unmodified by the influence of other images and types. In whatever way vivid perceptions may arise they are, under some conditions of the mind, instinctively employed for the support and welfare of man and the sub-animal: and are though on limited occasions, and in a limited degree, contributive to usefulness and truth. Yet if we may judge from the prevalence of folly and vice, of which the vivid perceptions are a very frequent cause, we must say; they are generally deluding, and sometimes fatal in their influence on the mind. In their proper place and for a limited purpose, they perform a part in the keen and searching use of the senses and the brain, by condensing the scattered rays of perception to a single luminous point: but employed beyond their restricted purposes, they often, nay always, blind perception, to the single path of right, mislead it to the thousand ways of wrong; and thus by flooding out the more moderate light of other necessary perceptions, allow only limited comparisons, and consequently produce **imperfect or erroneous** conclusions. The concentration

of the vivid quality is a vulgar, as well as an unnatural and unproductive use of perception. It is dangerous too, not only as the common and vicious function of vulgar minds, both humble and exalted; but it destroys in these last, other perceptions that might limit the pernicious effects of their ignorance and incapacity.*

Vividness is one of the causes of the Actionary quality, as it appears in violent and disorderly passion, and its outward muscular and vocal signs. It is by its excluding character, the associate of ignorance in the human mind. For the abundance of well balanced perceptions, is the same as an abundance of knowledge, and always tends to lessen that over-brightness of any one perception, which is so often the cause as well as the comparison of ignorance and vice. This brightness should then be controlled by other perceptions, and never suffered to overrule the mind: and though we admit, it has its certain use and importance; yet, as said of that most vivid element, fire, it is a good servant, but may be a very bad master.

I shall hereafter consider the vivid, with the other qualities, as they necessarily co-operate, inter-mutate with, or overrule each other, both in perceptions by the same sense, and by different senses; as they by combination or contrariety serve to explain the simple process of thought and passion; and assist us in discriminating the intellectual differences among mankind. I here however, with the subject before us, notice a few instances of the vividness of perception, when uncontrolled or unmodified by other qualities.

* With broadly excursive perceptions, instances of all kinds may be found. For our present purpose we need not go far. Just before the demagogues, and the religious fanatics broke their shell in hatching the nothern rattle-snake and southern copper-head eggs of the United States Rebellion; the State of Maryland was disposed to leave the rattle-snake; but warned by Baltimore about to be destroyed; a vivid view of Property got the better of Patriotism, and the State remained quiet. Yet now when it sees its neighbor, with neither negroes, 'first family' residences, barns, orchards, and fences, and barely its idle tobacco fields, Maryland sits redeemed, with the slavery vision still before it, bright as an angel's of the sun, and excluding all these objects of despair, through the vividness, of a perception that outshines the very naturally related image of a country in ruins, and its negroes all absconding and Free.

Persons of limited knowledge, restricted to their interest in a single subject, are said to be of 'one idea.' It would be some advancement towards a precise nomenclature to identify this case with a large class of effects, by showing, that the limitation or narrowness arises from the excessive and excluding power of the vivid quality. The ambitious in worldly pursuits, and in religious fervor, are limited, from each having respectively, one vivid and excluding perception of their objects of vanity, and delusion, of hope and of fear; with the excursive and the elective quality restricted to the narrow field of his selfish purposes. Vivid, joined with actionary perceptions, make or may make a desperate villain, a courageous soldier, and partizan officer; but a very bad general: and though many such have been successful, it has been more by accident than by wide survey and its efficient application: nor do their power and fortune always continue; their minds being deprived of the assistance of other moderating qualities, and blinded by the vividness of their solitary image or type. It was therefore, well figured of Moses, as he conducted an Exodus of rebellious and unruly slaves; that he followed a cloud by day, and a pillar of fire by night. The Hebrew leader, like every other adventurous and enthusiastic Patriot was a vividist; but having left his pursuers in the Red Sea; and with no expected danger from without, his circumscribed purpose was to contend with the stubborn, or 'stiff-necked,' ignorance, and idolatry of a rabble broke loose from their tasks. With this concentrated design, and with the distant star-light brightness of a prospective seat of empire, it was not unpoetically said of his vivid view of his resolute marches, that he was under the advancing protection of a cloud, which obscured every daily obstructive object around him, and under the nightly guidance of that pillar of fire, which in leading him on, and overruling his perception of danger, pictured the brightness of his ambitious vision. Bonaparte on the Bridge of Arcole, was under the influence of his vivid perception, and saw nothing except the picture of his necessity. There was neither the combinations of what is called 'Genius,' nor the reflecting energy of wiser courage, in the headlong blindness of this act; so calculated to astonish those who do not think upon their own vivid, and actionary perception, and its extemporaneous ad-

ventures, so similar in miniature consequences, to this supposed, unparalleled display of valor. The dauntless, yet thoughtless leader had both the cloud around, and the pillar before him at his lucky moment. There is a like vividness before him who without a momentary thought of his own life, plunges into the stream to save the life of another: and that produces the thousand little untrumpeted incidents of private life. He who looks through the plain and simple process of the well proportioned and natural mind, can have no respect for the vivid, ruthless, and destructive instincts of a Conqueror; except, and then only for the moment, when an aggrieved and timid world may be obliged to resort to his protective assistance; for though his excursive and elective perceptions, may not extend beyond the circuit of his own selfish schemes; yet the blazing vividness of his vanity and glory give an energy, though it may be blind, to its merely executive purposes. And what; apart from alleged providential chastening, and impious belief of some wicked instruments of human misery, being the corrective 'scourge of God;' what has any Conqueror ever achieved, which would not long before, have been accomplished, without suffering, and with greater benefit, by that ordained and regular use of the mind, which the Almighty Commander of the Heavens and the Earth, has deputed his Laws of Nature, physically to perform. A Conqueror, constituted as his unbalanced mind generally is, of excluding-vivid and actionary perceptions, should be the appointed Chief of Police, for catching thieves, and murderers, not the personator of both.

Bright, and useful as vividness may be for its own limited purposes, it generally blinds the way to broad scientific discovery: for this requires a diffused and steady, rather than a close and flaring light. The productive observer makes a modified and careful use of this vivid lamp of the mind; applying it like the dark lantern, to show what is all around his object, and not to either display or to dazzle himself.

The mischief of vividness has a familiar exemplification in that rule of the Lawyer; to know 'nothing but his Client.' The rule of the Excursive, and the Elective mind, which searches for the just relationships of all things, is to know the rights of all things. The thief knows nothing, except his plunder. The generality of

Lawyers, and all the thieves by adopting the rule, use alike their vivid and excluding perceptions, to protect their client; secure their plunder, and to wrong whom they may.

Vivid memorial perceptions, when not a part of delirium and dreams, are generally accompanied by the agreeable quality; and this may be the cause, why they assume the Durable; and thus lead to the vice of obstinacy. When therefore the foolish woman says, she is self-willed because she choses to be so; we can furnish her with the true, but not an apologetic motive; it is a selfish, and by a law of animal nature, an agreeable quality of her perception.

In the prevalence of ignorance throughout the world; except with every man in the knowledge of his own special pursuit; vivid perceptions both primary and memorial, are almost constantly before the mind: for in the instinctive state of ignorance, in all ranks, they are necessary for the support, well-being, and continuation of the human as well as of any other animal; since, when the mind cannot roam broadly and far, by means of the Excursive perceptions, it should see sharply and brightly, within its restricted focus. If children and the ignorant, and others with sub-animal characters, had not vivid perceptions, they would have no stimulus towards their wants: for education has always consisted in teaching what the mind *does*, not what it *is*; and thus having no clear and proper use of its working-plan; they are in the condition of the French soldiers and their Leader on the Bridge, and have need of the instinctive vivid-attraction, to blindly support them under their necessary or notional wants.

Vividness in children and in the ignorant, may through indefinite and erroneous verbal signs, often lead to folly and to vice. But the sub-animals, happily for themselves, being destitute of speech; for language is a cause of vividness in memorial perceptions; this quality can never lead to error or abuse, beyond the ordination of nature for all their purposes.

The best protection against the vice of vividness, must come from the cultivation of the excursive, and the elective qualities. This is to be accomplished by an increase of knowledge, which diffuses the excess of light over the many and the various images and types of all the senses. Education applies the maxim; ‘Di-

vide and conquer,' to rout this otherwise overpowering enemy of natural order, unchangeable precision and truth, from the human mind.

There are three conditions, under which perceptions assume the vivid quality, with apparently some difference in their effects, from those under which we have thus far considered them. These are the vividness of Dreams, of Delirium, and of the self-absorbing state of Extacy. But we defer the consideration of these subjects to a future section, where we may show those conditions to be modified phenomena, under the usual law of connected and unconnected perceptions in the waking state.

The last division of the several degrees of brightness or force of perception, in the order we have described them, is the Faint, or Weak, or Obscure. This condition like that of all the other qualities, is the result of either a peculiar organization of the senses and the brain; or of that habitual exercise of the mind on vivid and excluding perceptions, which renders all others faint or indistinguishable. Faint perceptions are either of things, or of their verbal signs. Faint perception of things is exemplified by the senses and the brain scarcely noticing the particulars of an aggregate before them. Faint perception of verbal signs is exemplified in those persons, upon whose ear the words of a long discourse or conversation, if not personally interesting to them, make so slight an impression; they do not properly distinguish twenty words, nor remember a single phrase of the whole discourse. It is remarkable also in servants, and even in their superiors in dress and station, who when plainly requested to hand you a penknife, unheedingly bring you a wafer.

The faint like the vivid, though not in the same degree, are liable to fall into error, and from error, lead on to every vice of the mind. One is dazzled by the pillar of fire; the other confounded through the cloud of mist. The faint, like the vivid can make no important classification, nor discovery. Its view of a subject is too indefinite; and having indefinite primary and memorial perceptions, whether mixed or unmixed, its joint and conclusive must be limited and inexact: just as the too-vivid, from being restricted in their scope, necessarily have limited comparisons, and erroneous conclusions, and therefore make no

broad-spreading development of nature or of art. Faint perceptions do not certainly imply a perversion, or an imbecility of mind; and when not thrown into convulsive action, by events that raise a vivid perception among them, they do not necessarily lead to fatuity. So long as a mind of this character pursues its appropriate, though humble course, it may guide its possessor to the performance of his own limited duties. It is only when, by the conceit of vanity, assisted by the ignorance of a general suffrage, it pushes itself into some superintending duty of Church or State; from a Bishop's to a Beadle's; from the office of Presidency, or Legislative Representation, down to the inefficiency of a raked-up City-Mayor or Councilman; that the folly and mischief of a perverted and incompetent use of faint perceptions become conspicuous. In such cases, the vanity or insolence, so usual with a common mind, above its place, raises some of its faint perceptions into temporary brightness; and thus his vivid, ill assorted with his customary faint, serves only to expose his incapacity, destroy his humble mental sufficiency, and his former unobtrusive contentment. For we will endeavor hereafter to show that a proper assemblage of duly adapted qualities, in their respective degrees, constitutes the completeness of the humble, and restricted, no less than that of the broad and universally productive mind. The varied qualities of perception may be so proportionally mingled, as to insure, in widely different minds, a perfect fulfilment of their respective final purposes. And to this we may add that the history of the functions of the senses and the brain, in the descending degrees of intelligence among the sub-animals, will upon the principles of our analysis and classification, develop a like varying gradation, in the number, extent, and quality of perceptions, and their vocal, and muscular signs, in accommodated perfection, down to the lowest degrees of Zoophyte-sensation; which itself seems to be a fragment of the percipient mind.

The Third division of vivid perceptions, is that of the intermediate or Neutral degree. This like the two former, may be the effect, either of a peculiar organization, which instinctively takes-on this gradation of light, in the images and types of the senses and the brain; or of that education which shows the

medium quality of perception, to be, in its effective application, equally free from the dazzling, and limited agency of the vivid, and from the inefficient impression of the faint.

We have endeavored to show, that the faint does still afford the mind sufficient power for self-direction in thinking, and for the physical necessities of the mere animal-man; though it cannot assume the range and collected strength, of a full-provided intellect; and that the vivid, though limiting the perceptive survey, is not without the means for occasionally assisting, a more extended and higher exertion of the mind. But the neutral is the appropriate degree of brightness, for the efficacious use of all the perceptions; being free from the cloud of the faint, and screened from the excluding force of the vivid; they are prepared to extend themselves widely by the excursive quality; to chose by the elective; to compare the joint without obscurity or excess of light; and between these excesses, to decide by unerring conclusion. Looking upon the mind as a physical function of perception, and not as a spiritual agency; let us consider it in pursuit of knowledge, through the two first described degrees. Setting out with the vivid, and attracted by some brilliant or memorial seen before it, with all surrounding star-light of perception extinguished, it sees only what lies within the circuit of its own brightness. Again, with the faint, the mind observes wider and further, yet too obscurely for one perception to enlighten another, and thus to allow an exact conclusion upon them.

It has been common to represent observative inquiry, usually called Philosophy, as calm and deliberate, or what we would call neutral, in the tempered light of her images and types. And though she may occasionally receive the assistance of a concentrated light, she does generally, and most efficaciously accomplish her true and lasting works by the neutral: for perceptions and their relationships through this intermediate degree, are distinct enough for a wide and accurate survey; and not so bright as to overshine each other; nor so faint as to be confused among themselves.

It is then through the neutral character of perceptions, with some of them raised into brightness, for special and concentrated observation, that the great products of intellect are derived; whether

in science, or in rare and exalted works of esthetic art; for these last being directed by the same principles of observation and reflection that produce the original works of science, are only another form of representing the truth of nature, by a memorial picture, described in the forceful and elegant terms of an exact or a figurative language. When these works of scientific or esthetic combination have been framed in the mind, it is the rising and flight of these excursive perceptions, and their well-directed descent upon the actionary quality, that produces speech, writing, passionate muscular signs, and physical handling in every fine and mechanical art, worked-out from the plans of the senses and the brain.

This view of the vivid and the neutral quality may explain and substantiate the following remark, in the *Novum Organum*, at the close of the subject of 'Idols of the Den.' 'Whoever studies the nature of things, should be suspicious of what powerfully strikes, and delays, (*say vividly lays-hold-on*) the mind; and use the greatest caution, to preserve his understanding pure and equable' (*say neutral, but clear in the brightness of its perceptions.*)

Having thus far described the use of the three degrees of vividness or force of perceptions; we will endeavor to exemplify their application. Let there be two inquirers into the forms of Government. One, on extending his excursive perceptions over the subject, is so vividly impressed by the simplicity of Will, the effective energy, the imperial splendor, and the self-confidence of a Despotism, that he does not perceive the dangerous mutability of its simple construction, the ruthless injustice of its jealous power, the ruinous waste of its imposing ostentation, the intensity of its egotism, and the wild delusions of its proud self-reliance, with their probable train of disastrous consequences, equally faded amid the brightness of his memorial assumption. The other in his excursive flight over a Democracy, vividly perceives the metaphysical picture of the equality of mankind; has a certain confused notion of liberty, impracticable to those who know, that freedom and subjection work under the same compromising master; and relies on the omnipotence of a majority, of which he assumes himself to be a *conscious part*. Thus vividly occupied,

he perceives not the real character of the High and the Low, the Wise and the Foolish, the Rich and the Poor, of Liberty without a thought or act of her own, of the hand of every idle knave in the public treasury, and of the always inter-changing majority, whose purpose and will are kept in unity only by the bond of madness, or of gain. Nor does he see the consequences of all this delusion; hid, as they are in the other case, by a like memorial vividness.

On the other hand, let the excursive survey be through the neutral medium of perceptions. As far as they extend, all are so similar in clearness though distinct in kind, that none are found to overrule the rest; the joint and conclusive are justly and successfully applied; the simplicity of Will in one case, is compared with the heterogeneous Will, without the possibility of its useful action in the other; the ruthless power, and the self-confident, but responsible individuality of Despotism, compared with the imbecility of justice, and the boast of infallibility by the *im-punishable* knaves of a Democratic oligarchy. These conditions, and their evil consequences, the neutral observer broadly and clearly perceives, in all their personality, and its vivid delusions; for personality is always selfishly vivid; being kept down, he comes to the conclusion; that as long as the masses, and the so-called better minority of mankind continue to use their perceptions without comprehending their simple and wise design, or knowing the method of their actionary application; they can neither in their Democratic sovereignty *well-govern* themselves, nor *be governed* well by absolute Despotic authority. Any thing like a tolerable, not to say a happy state of the million, is not to be looked-for, through the present limited and indefinite knowledge of the working plan of the mind, and the contradictory manner of using it. Thus illustrating the thought of Plato; that the world will never be governed well, till Statesmen are Philosophers, or Philosophers are Statesmen. That is, not a metaphysical philosopher, looking-out for what is not to be found, nor a natural philosopher, looking for what is not worth finding; but until Rulers are without ambitious, avaricious, and selfish perceptions; no one, now standing on the brink of despair, can take-upon him to say, will ever come to pass.

When we consider the subject of perceptions as here set forth; that the brightness of the vivid, and the obscurity of the faint, are equally insufficient for the discovery of truth, and for its practical use and extension; we perceive, how the directive notice to Phaeton, that he would go safest, between the Blazing Zenith, and the Clouded Earth, might be changed and figuratively applied to the extreme degrees of perceptions; you will observe more distinctly, compare more variously, and conclude more accurately in the neutral clearness of the middle course of inquiry.

We have thus far, seen the relationships of vividness or force only to the four constituents of the mind; the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive. But as the verbal sign is the fifth essential constituent; vividness must have an equal influence in weakening the power of language by either of its extremes, or of enforcing it by the clearness of its medium degree. Since however, all the various qualities make equal use of the verbal signs; and their effect on it may be more comprehensively perceived, when they are classed together, than when separately considered under the head of each quality; I shall defer their classified history, till we have finished that of the Qualities; and now go on in the order of our synopsis, with the Quickness and Slowness of perceptions.



SECTION XII.

Of the Quickness and Slowness in Quality.

WE call a Quick perception, that suddenness with which the senses and the brain of certain persons receive the images and types of things, when compared with the senses and the brain of others, which receive them more slowly. In the former case the *start* of the perception is instantaneous; in the latter, you appear to measure its rise.

The quick and slow exercise of perception extends to all the five constituents of the mind. It is perhaps more remarkable in the primary and conclusive: for we have no means of knowing directly, how quickly or slowly the memorial arise and the joint are compared. These actions are to be inferred only from the time of the two former. Quickness, by being mistaken for some important qualities; has been suffered to play; for it is often no more than to play; the part of extended and useful exercises of the mind. Under its influence, all the five forms of perception are apt to be unsteady: for the rapidity with which they catch the impression of things, is rapidly transferred to other succeeding things; and thus quick perceptions act like the vivid, by excluding every image, and type, except that which momentarily occupies them.

Persons of quick perceptions, when these are not connected with higher qualities, which they may be, are rarely reliable characters; for being, if I may say it, hungry after things, they eagerly seize a new bait, the moment it presents itself; and hence on moral points, a vice will often take an agreeable hold of perception, as readily as a virtue. The mind of merely rapid perceptions, has in this 'motly' world, its proper place; and when nothing better serves, may be entertaining, at least, if not useful. One of the appropriate applications of this quality is to the purposes of honest and discriminating satire, to catch the striking impression of folly and vice. It shines too, or rather *darts*, as a wit, with its quiver of assailing or retortive points, of quips, and quirks, and obtrusive puns. All communities have both male and female minds of this sort, on the dinner stipend of a plate and glass, to sit at their tables, for the amusement of guests of dull and slow perceptions, who are unable to converse with each other.

Slowness, the other extreme in the time of perception, is never found with the higher, and more productive qualities: but it may be connected with some of the limited, in the composition of what has been called a well-balanced, and as far as its power extends, a moderately useful mind. Slow perception, when contrasted with the *Evanescent*, is generally Durable; and being commonly neutral in force, is, as an example of Mutative influence, out-

ruled by the vivid, as well as by the quick. The slow may not displace the faint, nor the faint the slow; yet when both together, they produce nothing. The slow is frequently found with a limited flight of the Excursive; and is not incompatible with the slowly elective, in collecting images and types homogeneous with itself. This affords the opportunity for making a useful comparison with the joint; and often a deliberate conclusion. Persons with the slow quality, may on common affairs, be assistant in grave councils; especially to temper and moderate the too rapid, in those who have not the mutative, or controlling qualities to restrain them. On the mutative principle, the slow might be adapted to overrule the vivid. But the vivid is in most cases of excess, the quality of the frivolous and of the insane, and to be controlled, must be so, by compulsory means, or by a number of slow perceptions, accumulated from various subjects of observation and knowledge. We may illustrate the process for correcting excesses in the time of perceptions, by the case of a mind, too rapid in its primary constituent, and with the evanescent, of which the rapid generally partakes. A mind of this character, will skip in its excursions, from one perception to another, and thus prevent the deliberate comparison, especially necessary in ordinary persons, for a just conclusion. To restrain this rapidity, the simple cause of the evil must be known, as we have endeavored to explain it, by analysis and classification; and thereupon to task the mind with a course of exercises on new and different subjects; which can accomplish their purposes, only by means of the slow; that a habit in this exercise may, if the case is curable, have a useful influence upon it.

To change or overrule the rapid by enlarging the number of other perceptions; the attention should be drawn off to varied subjects of observation; for as quickness is encouraged by habit, and the ease of exercise on familiar knowledge; so new and sometimes difficult tasks tend to counteract that habit, by the slowness of time necessary for their accomplishment.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to render the extremely slow available by mutative correction, than the too rapid; which having within itself, at least an excitability, affords the means of change to some actionary perception: for this excitability is alto-

gether wanting in the slow. Just as it is easier to direct and turn a spirited horse to your wishes, than to make a lazy animal mend his habitual pace. And thus we find the extremely slow, is for any enlarged and useful purpose, generally a hopeless case.

Persons of slow perceptions are very rarely of considerate Justice, or nice and elevated Honor: for justice and honor require a wide and ready comparison. Yet in the common affairs of life, when no broad principle is involved, and where both memorial and joint perceptions are familiar to them, the judgment of slow minds is easy and often correct. But it cannot compass subjects that are unusual, and which therefore call for an excursion into new and related perceptions, to insure a just decision.

Although the quality of Quick, and its reverse, does not hold an important place, either for good or for evil among the intellectual functions; still for the accomplishment of the highest purposes of which the temporal agency of perception is capable; the moderate or medium between the quick and the slow, like the neutral degree in force or brightness, is required to insure the most effective result of its application to science and to life. Quickness of perception touches and then flies-off from the primary and memorial materials of thought and truth: slowness suffers these materials of the excursive and elective quality to fade and escape, before it can hasten time to use them.

Perhaps the Geometer and the Arithmetician, if not of the highest caste of mind, to discover new relationships in magnitude and number; effect all their purposes by the slower degrees of this temporal quality. And we may say the same of minds of ordinary power, on all the conventional subjects of common business, or of legal, moral, medical, and religious instruction.

Quickness of perception, as above remarked, is one cause of instability of character; for through the same readiness with which it catches-up one image or type that may lead it aright, it catches-up another that may lead it to wrong. Whoever has this quality, united with a wild excursive flight, much vividness, and a dull elective choice, can never be kept to one purpose. The vivid makes him self-willed; the excursive and quick make him conceited and changeable. You will in vain, endeavor to alter the present determination of such a man, and much more a

woman, except by personal compulsion, or more hopefully by a flash of interest or vanity: and yet, the next day or hour, by a quick mutation to another perception, with which his memorial excursion, and his elective choice furnish him, his purpose will suddenly change itself. This in women, and in men like women, is called caprice. It is the result of an involuntary action of the mind, under the rapid assisted by the vivid quality of perception. Thus we see, how the intermingling of qualities, and their mutative influence on each other, opens to view the simple explanation of some of the innumerable shades of human character.

In regarding this character, we are not to consider the thousand influences from motives of interest, ambition, jealousy, envy, ill-humor, patriotism, and the World's Religion; which with all their cross-purposes, and confusion, may have conventionally produced exaggerated or false opinions of both the virtues and vices of men: but rejecting the wide and confounding effects of all these motives, we should look to the few five constituents of the mind, with their qualities; which by drawing aside the old metaphysical curtain of conceits, and personalities, set the plan and working of the natural intellect before us.



SECTION XIII.

Of the Excursive Quality of Perceptions.

WE have learned that the primary, memorial, and verbal perceptions furnish the mind with all the materials for its subsequent use. These materials are available in a search for those images and types, which the purpose of the investigation then in hand may require. This search, whether through the primary, the memorial, or the verbal constituents, we have called, the Excursive Quality of perception.

If any one quality, of all those which are necessary for the

highest agency of the mind, could be placed first in the order of efficacy, we would be disposed to assign that place to the excursive, when assisted by the elective; which will be considered in the next section. We have endeavored to show those who have the intelligence to observe their own minds, or who examine the intellectual process in others, that the amount of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception with their relationships and their verbal signs, is coequal with the amount of knowledge; and that knowledge is only another term for the aggregate of the perceptions of things, and their relationships. We may therefore say as a consequence that the amount of knowledge is greatest in those who reach after, acquire, and properly use the greatest number of perceptions. This reach after perceptions is effected by the excursive quality: and as this quality is a wide-spreading cause of every kind and degree of knowledge, it may be understood; from its fulness, with the useful and delightful application of it; why we should rank the excursive quality so high.

We are all familiar with the phrase 'running the mind over a subject,' whether for the recollection of a word, or an event, or for the cause of a particular phenomenon, or for the establishment of a principle in science, by the orderly classification of facts. Let any one, in the daily exercise of the simple process of verbal recollection, or in the more extended researches of science, look into his own mind; he will perceive the method to be the same in all these cases. For the mind is a physical, and should be an orderly aggregate, of images and types of things which are produced by the general laws of Nature; and observation of the physical mind will show that the process by which a child tries to recollect, when and where it lost a key; and that by which Newton tried to find the key to an explanation of the circulation of the planets, and of the colors of the rainbow, is conducted by the same law, and a similar method in the train of perceptions: the difference being only in the extent, of the reach, and the practical benefit of the discovery; just as the law of gravity is the same in its agency on a feather and on the world; the process, in each case, consisting of an involuntary train of perceptions, which variously draws together, the images and types of things, really *related in nature*; till by joining, separating, com-

paring, rejecting, and concluding, the purposes of both searches are accomplished. In each case, the mind *runs over* or *along* or *through* the primary perceptions it has, the memorial it may have collected; and uses the joint, and conclusive, according as they are necessary in one case for finding the key of the cabinet, and in the other, for the discovery of a key to the science of the stars. This running the mind over a subject; or running among perceptions, whether mixed or unmixed, for joint comparison and conclusive results, or as we call it the excursive quality; is a principal agent in the method of scientific discovery, mechanical invention, and in the old term 'imaginative,' or as our Outline classes it, primary and memorial originality.

We will endeavor to illustrate this description of the process of the excursive quality, in developing the truth of nature. Before the general law of the tides was known; suppose it to have been the subject of inquiry. A person of limited primary and memorial perceptions, with a restricted excursive power, and therefore incapable of a wide survey of things, having heard, and read, all that had been said and thought on the subject by Phœnecian captains, by Nearchus, Hanno, De Gama, and Columbus; and then adding some perceptions, true or false, of his own; makes-up a theory of connected but unsatisfactory notions, on the ebb and flowing of streams. Afterwards comes the observative philosopher, with clear and broad excursive perceptions from reading or other source; who selecting from known facts, tested by himself, not from pictures of things, supposed by others; adds his gathered representations of things and their relationships, unknown before. The scientific observer, being through his excursive habits, thus well acquainted with the facts of the case, and with the method of nature, *sends forth* his perceptions, or rather, his involuntary perceptions, by some cause, *are sent-forth* to gether-up the phenomena of the tides; as they are related to themselves; to the double power of attraction in the earth and the moon; to the mobility of water; to the peculiar tidal variations of rivers and seas, in all parts of the earth; to the resistance of gulfs, and inlets: the relationships of the succession of tides to the powers and motions of the heavenly bodies: **and from the abundance of these relationships, combining by his joint, and deciding by his conclusive perceptions,**



raises from this connected train of observations; not by that abused old term, 'reasoning,' but by classification; a demonstrative system of the subjection of the phenomena of the ebb and flow of the sea to the law of lunar influence.

Again, suppose a person of limited excursive perception; to say nothing of a limitation from metaphysical notions; intending to give a history of the human mind; which, as Nature by her laws of matter made it, is similar in the principles of its constituency, to those of all other animal minds. Accustomed to be led by authority, as he must be who cannot go alone, he would first inquire, what others think and say on the subject. This is a just and timely step, if he knows which way to direct it, and how far to go. But alas! he turns towards Plato's spiritual mysticism; and to Aristotle's more earthly, yet equally useless system, which pretending to set out from the elementary ground of its *Sensible Species*, passes-over without an intermediate thought on the constituency of the mind, to the narrow process of its syllogism. Then coming down to Locke, Condillac, and Stewart; and entering into disputes with them all; tries to reconcile them not to nature, as ascertained by the senses, but to each other. And he calls this a history of the human mind, which is only a detail of the opinions of others, on some of its more obvious phenomena disjointed and confused by human delusion. Then let an observer with broad and excursive perceptions undertake to analyse and arrange its working powers. He has heard of the cloudy gatherings of the metaphysicians, and of teachers and school mistresses who should themselves be taught; advertising about 'mental culture' and 'intellectual training;' of biographers making a large book out of the 'genius and profundity' of their popular hero; and of the gigantic powers of statesmen, and financiers: has read too the opinion of the few, who observe closer than the mass, yet not close enough to nature. From this limited field of barren weeds, and entangled thickets of thought, his excursive perception takes flight over the cultivated region of his own knowledge, and observation, and over the faithful record of glimpses, and broken lights of nature, in descriptions of the mind by others; and assisted by the elective quality, adopts all that has been truly seen before; freed from the halucination of

spirit, for there is no spirit; free from authority, for he knows none but the facts; and free from a thousand notions, for nature has only herself to be observed. With all this hindrance removed, he has an accurate memorial collection of the mental things that have come before his own senses, or that he has received through the accurate senses of others. These he assorts by joint perception; sees their resemblances; concludes on their agreement; arranges them into classes; and thereby discovering the working plan of the mind, may by its verbal signs, clearly describe it to those who are willing to learn. This is no more a picture for the occasion, than that of the illustration of the manner of discovery of the law of the tides: for the Reader sees here an exemplification of the method in which this history of the mind was slowly chronicled, however imperfectly, from the perceptible course of nature.

I have endeavored to show by these illustrations that the excursive quality properly exercised, is essential to all the great works of science and art; and being the guardian of knowledge, as well as the guide to it, acts an important part in keeping mankind from relapsing into savagism; which with the mass-majority would be inevitable; for it is the mind that directs the voice and the hand to civilization; it is also essential to the common purposes of life; and thus in various degrees to the man of business, the unconventional statesman, the philosopher, and the unmystified minister of a holy Religion. As then this quality is employed to a varied degree, in different cases, it may be a question; in what manner it should be applied, to fulfil the highest purposes of the mind. If so extensively, as to require a rapid flight of perceptions, their evanescence prevents the exercise of strict comparison and of just conclusion. If the circuit is limited, and the comparison slow, there is not material enough, nor a prompt use of it, for sufficient joint, and for ready conclusive perceptions. This difference between the broad, and the limited excursion, pervades every process of the mind, from the greatest to the least. For the simplicity of the system of nature, gives a unity to the laws of perception, however varied in the importance of their effects. And as the principle of muscular action is the same in the humming bird and in the eagle; so the method of the mind, as

we learn from the respective identity in the modes of action by the several constituents, is the same in each of its various subjects. Sophistry, or a limited and perverted use of these constituents by the worldly gangs of thinkers, has allotted a different method to the investigations, or rather opinions, of Theology, Law, Morals, and Medicine; as if in the one, and self-accordant system, it must take up, like the subdividing Phrenology, the Multiform, and Irreconcilable. Under our view of the mind, even the mathematical process, peculiar as it is considered, in the schools, who never look broadly, closely, and surely at the same time, is similar as far as it goes, in measuring the relationships of quantity, to the method in a train of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, for considering the material, formal, and final causes, in the simple design and manufacture of a thimble. The only difference in the use of the mind on all the various subjects of inquiry, is that Arithmetic and Geometry have as far as scientific record informs us, always employed the proper and orderly method of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception, with their precise verbal signs; and hence with their precise applications, have been called exact or demonstrative sciences.

On all other subjects, doctrines, systems, authorities, faiths, and creeds of schools, call them what we will, the civilized and the savage, the learned and the ignorant, have made, and still continue to make a confused, disorderly, perverted or false use of the all-sufficient, and wonder-working five constituents of the mind.

I will endeavor to exemplify the limited, and the broad application of the excursive quality, in common affairs, by the cases of two old women, and of two physicians whether old or young. Suppose the first woman to be a grandmother, not so old however as to have lost her mind, if she ever had one. She has one darling grandson; and the care of bringing him up, is to occupy the vacancy of her thought, by something worse than vacancy. He is with her all day; lies on a crib at her bedside, as she dreams of plans for her dear Willie's amusement. She finds him increasing in stature, but does not thereupon extend her excursive steps; it cannot be called flight; to the time when he is to be a man, and

to do something else than blow his whistle, eat sugar plums, or plague his grandmother's parrot into disturbing the neighbors. She humors him in every thing, without the excursive perception that he will find when she is gone, no world of grandmothers to humor him. She allures him into a caprice to eat every thing, and then gives him every thing to eat; without the foresighted perception, of his being hereafter the dyspeptic slave of a succession of advising friends, if he should find them; or of his greatest enemies, regular, or irregular medical quacks. She takes his part against every man, woman, and child in the house, and even his tormented kitten, without one excursive bye-thought of the consequences of his overbearing temper, on which every body may take part against him: nor does she get so far from the center of her vivid perception, as to reach the very natural anticipation, that if he should ever be corrected into common sense, he may wish his grandmother near him, 'to bite off her ear,' for her early, and killing kindness.

Our second instance is a person of sense and accomplishment whom we must call a Lady, if vanity, dress, and the popular assumption of equality, have left to that name any dignity and refinement. Equally with the first she is a grandmother; for with intelligence, and education, the more mature the better. Take the opposite of all the vulgarity of mind in the woman we have just described; for to be weak and foolish, is to be vulgar; and it will be a negative picture of our second illustration. I need not go into a detail of comparing with that contracted intellect, her wide excursive circuit into every department of educational care, which cannot concentrate itself on a single child, merely because it resembles herself, and is destined to be the belle of a court: but spreading the fulness of her primary and memorial, with the exactness of her joint and conclusive perceptions, over the equal claimants of a whole family, on her present and prospective watchfulness and instruction.

For our proposed exemplification of the excursive quality among Physicians, we will set aside the Homeopath, who makes you suffer the 'same misery' that your disease inflicts, the Hydropath, who makes you suffer by cold water, and the Thompson-path, who leads you by many 'preparations' even to the valley of

death; whose empirical success is the sharpest satire ever made by the profession on itself, I say setting these aside, we will take an Allo-path, or one who makes you suffer in some *other way*; a *Regular* physician sent out from a College, armed with the weapons of thinking-confusion; and a diploma-authority to use them; an authority so much the stronger, from its having discarded the authority of nature, which might otherwise have taken its place, and have taught him to observe disease as it really is. Let us suppose a graduate of this school, to become one of its Professors; and that from a habitual concentration of his perceptions on the means of obtaining the Chair, and of keeping it, by assiduous court to managers, regents, or trustees; and with an eye to popularity with his ignorant pupils, he has limited or paralysed the excursive power of his mind; if indeed, a mind so vividly intent on advancing itself, ever has excursive perceptions on any other subject. Whenever this eminent professor is called upon to prescribe; for it is hardly thought necessary for a professor to practice; he finds the patient with a head-ache, and prescribes arnica, and valerian; hears he has had a chill, and immediately sends for quinine; sees what he calls a rhumatic swelling, and gives guaiacum; an inflamed toe, and gives gout-powder, and 'eau medicinal;' finds that general and uncertain compound of changeable symptoms, neuralgia, and prescribes a farrago of cures; thinks there is an ailment of the stomach, and gives cod-liver in the form of Lamp oil refined; and finally is called to a teasing cough, for which he prescribes nothing; and waits a few days, for the cough to grow worse, that he may make his *Diagnosis*, by ascertaining, whether the symptom proceeds from the stomach, the liver or the lungs. We have here drawn the general picture of a narrow-minded practice; for though there is with a few, a sort of rote inquiry into common causes and effects, yet I give a sample of the mass of physicians.

We perceive in the preceding illustration, a total want of the excursive; with feeble or perverted joint, and conclusive perceptions. Instead of these busy, and productive exercises of the mind, we have a sort of tally of symptoms, with their invariable remedies for each, as mechanically directed and recorded, as the baker files the corresponding notches on the family scale, and on

his own, for making out his bill. Experience in the art has furnished ample materials, in primary and memorial perceptions, for a broad, excursive survey of facts and experiments necessary for a comparison of the relationships of disease, and of the effects of remedies, to suggest a *New order of Medicine*. There is no symptom, which to an acute and general observer, has not others with it, as preceding cause, or subsequent effect; and thereby filling the mind with pictures of relationships of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions. And yet among the countless number of physicians, with some high exceptions, all this enlarged view is narrowed down to the vain attempt, to make what is called a Nosological System out of the endless permutation of symptoms, which cannot be so classed as to allow a definite diagnosis, or to justify the use of remedies for the mere name of a disease assumed to be unchangeable, yet having a variable aggregate of symptoms.

Again let us take, in illustration, a physician of education, whom a general knowledge of nature and art, has brought to a wide excursive perception on most subjects of inquiry. This enlarges his mind beyond the narrow habit of viewing symptoms in an insulated manner. The great train of pathological functions, in pre and post succession is brought before him, and obscure and embarrassing as the subject may be, he closely employs his primary; cautiously excludes all questionable authority from the collections of his memorial; deliberately compares under all circumstances, numerous forms and degrees of the joint; and makes according to their relationships, his conclusive perceptions: fallible as they often may be from the obscurity of his unsettled art. For this is the only process of the mind in the accumulation of knowledge. In this class of observers; as far as the theoretic metaphysicians of the Grecian school would allow him to exercise his higher powers; was the great Hippocrates, or the medical masters who taught him to investigate nature. Of that same class too were the Galens, the Sydenhams, the Boerhaaves, and the Hunters. Nor let us forget after these the excursive mind of the Author of that original view of the phenomena of disease; the first in an eminent, and responsible public station, directly and systematical^{ly}— to attack the vague divisions of the

Methodic Nosology, as contrary to the truth and usefulness of strict observation: showing that from the same collection of symptoms, all the several diseases, though differently named, are variously formed; thus presenting the appearance of a Unity among most diseases, in the unity of most of their symptoms. Such a physician is to a certain degree master of the philosophy of the deviations from health. Whereas the physician of limited excursive perceptions, pinched closer by general ignorance, is reduced to the necessity of prescribing a single remedy for many varying symptoms under a single name. In truth, most practical physicians go to their art; like trade-apprentices going to learn their working, means of livelihood, which; raising the vivid hope and prospect of wealth, with ambition of place, or of being employed by the great or the fashionable; shuts out every exalting perception, and classes them among the million, who live only on the thoughts of themselves, and when they die, their works have been dead long before them.

From what has been said it appears; the excursive quality, under its medium degree, is essential to the highest exercise of the mind. The extremely limited and the extremely extended, are each an indication of its insufficiency: and without some counteracting, or compensating quality, on the occasions of their use, the former makes the 'dull,' and the latter the 'sprightly Fool.'

The excursive quality depends either on the organization of the senses and the brain; or on a gradual and continued education; and is best exercised with an abundant store of knowledge; for when assisted by a due amount of primary and memorial perceptions, with joint and conclusive upon the relationships of things; and by the precision of their verbal signs, the excursive quality is in a favorable condition for the increase, as well as for the production of knowledge.

When we observe existing scientific and literary works, together with those of religious, moral, and political instruction, we perceive varied degrees of the excursive quality in each. In Bacon; and there may have been, with uncultivated senses and brain, many of like capability in organization; we have the widest survey of all the departments of nature, of man, and of his arts;

and an application of perceptions, both joint and conclusive, for the discovery and extension of truth. Newton had perhaps a similar mind, with similar objects; the natural history of the Heavens, and of the phenomena of light: but with less excursive circuit through the varied things, actions, and laws of universal nature. In Newton the world mistakes his supposed wonderful power of distant vision, for an unlimited survey of endless images and types; and a vast amount of mathematical demonstration, for the general 'profundity' of his perceptions. In Shakspeare, we have an unbounded excursion through primary and memorial perceptions, representing truth under the guise of fiction, and therefore not unfrequently wild, perverted, and occasionally falsified by their vividness. In Milton a similar excursion, though not so universal; yet the fiction of truth, so to speak, well guarded from extravagance by a more moderate flight, a less vivid brightness of perception, and by greater precision in the verbal sign.

In the thousand schools of Theology of every age and country, the excursive quality, poor as it is, is always busy within its limited field; since that quality is restricted by the vividness of its perceptive hopes and fears, which excludes every perception that does not conform to them. Theology concentrates itself so closely upon its God, or its Gods, that it overlooks, and in cases of fanaticism it despises; if narrow-minded folly can despise; the great universe of works, by which its several Gods designed to reveal themselves to man.

The morals of the schools, and of their disciples, have been so bound up with religion, as to deprive them of the benefit of unembarrassed observation and experiment: and the mind has here fallen under the same condition of a limited excursive, and vivid quality of perception.

In the unruly schools of Government; if indeed they have ever pretended to teach any thing besides self-confidence, contention, and war; the same narrowness may be observed under a legislative, administrative, and justicial exercise of power; for on this subject, the mind is so limited by hopes and fears, to the circle of personal interest, and ambition, that the vividness of these vulgar passions excludes altogether the broader and more

useful perception of the wise, and effectual means for the true, and lasting agreement and happiness of man.

Perhaps the most remarkable difference in the works of intellect is produced by the excursive quality. Let us consider the great majority of those who have fulfilled, in their own way, the practical purpose of their lives; whether political, clerical, military, medical, literary or educational; in the mechanic and in the esthetic arts. We shall find they have faithfully performed the obligation of their trades, so to call them, by an *acquired* instinct of their duty, with an unchanging routine, like that by which the sub-animal exercises the *natural* instinct of its wants and passions. Yet with no excursive perception to encompass a wider relationship of things, for the enlargement of their minds, and the advancement of their respective arts; of which, with a clear understanding of the plan of their minds, and a just execution of it, they might, in a greater or less degree be capable. Looking beyond these narrow circles of conventional excursion, to the far-reaching discoveries of the universal principles of science; and to the Authors of those renowned fictions, with their materials gathered from the familiar primary images and types of things, combined by the joint, into an agreeable imitation of truth, if even without its unchangeable exactness: we will find them, whether Philosopher or Poet, using an identical power of the excursive quality; varied only by the character of its subject, and the degree of its actual employment. This is exemplified in those twin and 'Prerogative Instances,' Bacon and Shakspeare, who being by birth compatriot and cotemporary, we endeavor to show not merely by an admiring parallel, but by an analytic sketch of their productive powers; they were coequal in the exercise of the highest qualities of intellectual perception. Shakspeare, with broader education on subjects of exact knowledge, and a closer regard to the relationships of action, might have been a Bacon; and Bacon, with less exactness of research, but a closer regard to the mere *resemblance* of things, and with no obligation to the truths of science in his memorial pictures; yet in their use of verbal signs, each knowing alike, 'the weight and edge of words'; might have been a Shakspeare. For a broad excursion through memorial and joint perceptions, see Bacon's illuminat-

ing simile and metaphor, kindled on every field of nature and art, in that instructive Fable of the 'New Atlantis;' and those striking allegories which convert the poetical Mythology of the Ancients, into illustrations of the truth of his proposed system of real observation, and experiment. See also his 'Essay on Death;' where, in like manner with Shakspeare, he adopted the sententious, English phraseology of the Age, which had just then grown out of the unwasteful brevity of classic style and thought; and which in all except measure might pass for a poem. Nor can we here avoid supposing, that had Shakspeare met with this Essay, he might have turned it to some purpose of his own, as he did on occasions, the brief and expressive prose of Hall, Hollinshead and North.*

On the other side, we have from Shakspeare the parallel to a Baconian satire on the Scholastic Philosophy, in the Second Scene of the Second Act of *Hamlet*: where Polonius, in a 'logical' mingling of narrative and 'reasoning,' confounds; in like manner as the Medical Faculty often does the judge and jury on the signs of insanity; both the King and Queen, touching the madness of the Prince; with a grotesk affectation of rhetorical method, and art; and with words of studied trifling that confuses even itself. And again, in that scene of the Grave-diggers, so instructive to the wise; and amusing both to the vulgar and the wise; Shakspeare has put into the mouth of a conceited Clown, a humorous satire on the pedantic definitions of the Schoolmen; and the pretending but narrow purpose of Grecian Syllogism.

* I once remarked to a Scholar, well-read in parts of Shakspeare, and himself a minor poet; the resemblance in style of thought and language, between the excursive and other perceptive qualities, of these transcendant Thinkers: which he however, with the common conceit that a poet is not made up of thought and language, but rather of an inspired or 'unearthly' intelligence; was not disposed to admit. On a subsequent occasion, holding, apart, a volume of the Dramatist, I read to him, as from its page, the following written extract from Bacon.

'Death arrives graciously, only to such as sit in darkness; to despairful widows; pensive prisoners; and deposed Kings; to them whose spirit mutinies, and whose fortune runs-back: unto such, death comes as a redeemer, and the grave a place of retiredness, and rest.'

Then asking my friend, from what Play this poetical description, with its beautiful train of metaphors, was taken: he thought for a moment, and said; his memory did not serve him

I have spoken more particularly of the excursive quality, in memorial perceptions, and their verbal signs. I might further illustrate the claims of the Philosopher and of the exalted philosophical Poet, to an equality in the joint comparisons and conclusive exercise of the mind. All these were respectively used by them, for a different end. The one, to develop, and instruct; though he does not fail to delight all who are instructed: the other, only to combine, to picture, and delight; though he never fails to instruct those who are wisely and deeply delighted. The common mass of mankind *make themselves*, in any erroneous way, and of every unsettled fashion. Nature by her Laws directing observation, and with human rules for applying them, *makes* the higher intellect of all times and places, with a like degree of the like powerful and productive qualities of perception, and of the like power and precision in the language that represents them.

We have thus seen the effects of the excursive quality in the higher works of intellect. Perhaps the most obvious display of the lower degrees of this quality, appears under the limited education which the mass of the people receive in the trades and professions. A savage has, according to his knowledge, acquired through War and the Chase, a certain degree of excursive perception, which he uses with more or less benefit to himself, as the first Law of his Creation. But his reach of perception is so limited, that for ages, he scarcely perceives a relationship of the knowledge he possesses to any thing beyond himself and his immediate wants. This in outline is a picture of the intellectual character of the trades and professions in civilized life. In our view of the human mind; at least ninety-nine in a hundred of the Doctors, Lawyers, Parsons, Statesmen, Diplomats, Tailors, Shoemakers, and Workmen, down to the Money-maker and the Politician, never extend their perceptions, at least with any productive power beyond the narrow circle of knowledge they have been taught in the school of their trade. In the minds of all these persons collectively, there is a vast amount of true primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions; together with a much greater amount of the false. The true consists in the demonstrable and practical facts, embraced, and usefully applied within each of the particular trades and professions: the false, in the

habitual errors, unperceived by the trades, but produced by the vague and confounding purposes of the five constituents of the mind, carelessly attempting to enlarge the excursive flight under an ignorance of the true working plan of the percipient powers.

We had some years ago, in the United States, a very popular personage, whose history exemplifies the foregoing remarks. He was of Irish parentage; of limited education; and like too many of similar condition, in this country, as a stepping stone to growing ambition, *took to* the Study of Law: in the practice of which not making figure nor fortune, he was made a Militia Officer, and a Judge. With a bold, irritable, self-willed, and therefore a contrary and obstinate temper; united with a comparative ignorance, and with a sometimes-vain affability; always courted in dangerous men; he acquired influence over those around him; or rather, they found it convenient, to submit to his overbearing rule: though occasional resistance by some of his own associates, sometimes brought him to tavern fights, to cock-pit, and race-ground brawls, and more than once to lamentable duels. As far as his limited mind supported him, he was a man of self-confident energy, and prompt in execution. Though cautiously designed by Nature to be *thought-for* and directed, in all important and prospective affairs, not to *think-for*, and direct himself; being without the excursive knowledge, and the reflective foresight, so essential to insure prudence in deliberation. With this character, of various qualities, he carried-on with success, a war against Border-Indians; as this required some concentrated acuteness, but no compass of thought, beyond a care of savage stratagem, by forest, swamp and broken ground. He was also engaged in *civilized* warfare, and conducted with decisive and energetic actionary perception, the wider operation of the defense of an unfortified city, by temporary expedients, and raw militia-men against the veterans of European Fields, and conducted that defense to a successful, an important, and what men call a glorious end. The fortunate Hero was afterward raised to the Presidency; and then displayed the contracted circle of his excursive, and the humble quality of his other perceptions, in three very disastrous ways. He was elected as the Federal Constitution; under that sad necessity of government requires; by a *majority* over a minority. The former

were, perhaps for their own purposes, his friends; the latter with his selfish perception, and its jealousy, he called his enemies. His first actionary power, in petty contrast to the magnanimity to the 'mightiest Julius,' was to reward his friends, and punish his fallen enemies. This was done according to the old law of Pagan Conquerors; but a strange proceeding of our Model Asylum for the distressed of all the world; by removing from office, all incumbents, however qualified and faithful, whose experience would not be necessary to conceal incompetency, in the new order of things; and supplying their places by troops of his friends, 'fresh from the People.' To give a supposed pretext for this act, as well as to attempt to excuse the oddity of his election to the broad duties of the Presidency, he conceited, or his friends for him, that any one can, in accepting, fit himself at once for any office: where we again see the mill-horse circle of his excursive perceptions. He tried the experiment, but as with his little span of thought, he could never determine how his friends, with a self-education fulfilled their novitiates; he left his more intelligent successors to discover, that his example of introducing ignorance into office, for the purpose of making itself wise, has done more towards degrading the Republic, both at home and abroad, than that of any other single Demagogue who has fallen into power, since the foundation of the government.

Such is the common consequence of raising to high and supervising office, men who survey only the limited prospect of their own vanity, and conceit; whose narrow minds have barely the elbow-room, for the work of their own useful trades; yet who attempt to embrace, and to use the wide circuit of perceptions, required in the broad science of Government; and in the expanded purpose of every mechanical, and every elegant art; for which presumptuous, and narrow-minded ambition is totally unfit.

Is there no means of relief from this misfortune, whether organic, or educational, in those who want the widely roaming excursive quality? There is a remedy for this very popular disease of the mind; but as happens with some powerful, yet repulsive prescriptions for other epidemics; few will yield their prejudices to their cure: since nothing is so revolting to narrow-minded ignorance, as knowledge; the only means for their relief.

We have said; the terms knowledge, and excursive perception, with a further use of the joint and conclusive, are synonymous; each signifying images and types on the senses, and the brain, of the existences, the actions, and other relationships of things. An infant has no excursive perceptions; and no store of knowledge. As the former extend, the latter is increased by them: and they are thus always found in corresponding degrees co-existent with each other. We however learn by analysis; there is no difference between them, though called by a different name; and that by a reciprocity of cause and effect, perceptions increase knowledge, distinctly so called; as conversely, knowledge, distinctly so called, once gained, extends the excursion of perceptions: for it is with an enlargement of the mind, as with all other physical things, which enlarge their dimensions by homogeneous accretion. We say therefore; an increase of knowledge, by gathering the materials of perception, is the cure for the common weakness of limited excursion; as exercise after disease is the means for strengthening a debilitated body. Milton speaks of his darksome contemplations 'feeding on thoughts:' but thoughts are only primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perceptions; which when duly exercised, strengthen the mind, and encourage it to perceive still more. Milton's phrase is then, under our view, equivalent to that of thoughts feeding on thoughts, or perceptions living and increasing on other perceptions. And this is true of all thoughts or perceptions; as Shakspeare figures it of the actionary perception of the Queen's over-weening love; 'as if increase of appetite had grown by what it fed on.' And upon this we conclude that one of the remedies for the popular disease of narrow-minded ignorance, is a knowledge of the just use of the excursive quality, through an enlarged field of primary, and memorial, with a subsequent use of joint and conclusive perceptions; under the clear photographic delineation, if I may so speak, of the verbal sign.

But how is this progressive increase to be accomplished? Persons with a susceptible organization of the senses and the brain, go on instinctively step by step, in the advancement of self-made knowledge: as we suppose it to be exemplified in the traditional portrait of Mango Capac; if b ~~not~~ a partially educated stranger,

cast ashore among the Savage Peruvians: and although, with a natural aptitude on their part, he may have assisted their excursive perceptions into useful knowledge; yet such an instance is of rare occurrence, and its application to important purposes is scarcely to be found among a million of mankind. The general, more certain, and productive mode of improving the mind in its excursive quality, is;

First; exercising the senses in primary perception, not only by attending to things and their aggregates, which come before them, particularly those of hearing and sight; but by urging the senses, so to speak, in the pursuit of things, merely as individuals, not yet brought together by classification.

Second; by classifying all these individuals. This economises the management of the multitude of primary perceptions; and enables the memorial to embrace, and apply a greater amount of its perceptions, in all departments of the existences, the actions, and other relationships of things. These become the means for an extended excursive flight of the memorial images and types of nature and of art; and lead the attention involuntarily through that flight.

Third; this reach, not voluntary reach, of primary perceptions after individuals, and the classification of them, is the mother-of-pearl which produces every collected and precious string of the sciences. As science embraces every systematic arrangement of knowledge, from the highest to the most humble, and must contain within itself, the most comprehensive application of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions; we learn that a studious survey of the fulness, order, and precision of the sciences, offers one of the most effectual remedies for those who by the structure of the senses and brain, or by defect of education, are limited in the use of their excursive quality. But the sciences universally; and where should the rules of science not be the obligatory rule of thought; the sciences, we say, further afford the means for an indefinite extension of this quality in those who possess it by nature. It would then appear, that the character of all the constituents being given, perhaps the superiority in general power will always be with those whose minds are exercised in the regular classification, or science of the things of

nature. For it is as true, that the scientific or classifying mind, acting by a widely excursive quality, leads to further knowledge, until it reaches, on all subjects, the highest degree of intellectual civilization; as that the narrow limit of excursion, or the ignorance it tolerates, does negatively diminish itself; and finally descends to savagism, the sub-animal state of man.

If the possession of the excursive quality, and the proper use of its extensive flight, is one of the sources of the most commanding power of the mind; so reversely, the want of it, or the clipping of its wings, must doom the mind exclusively to a routine-use of the primary and memorial stores, accumulated by others. And although we by no means undervalue the compiling or humbler use of the mind; for it is an indispensable assistant to its original, and ruling or directive power; yet without the radical means for distinguishing between the Patrician and this Plebeian character of perception, their appropriate places are too often mistaken by the blind estimate of the world. Nor are we, with a narrow aristocracy, to look alone to a single class, favored by early education. That famed and towering Adansonia of the Ethiopian forest sometimes springs from the lowly shrubs and brambles around it: and the good fortune of mankind owes enough to the striving efforts of the humble and the indigent, for the enlargement of knowledge, to have taught us; not to choose our masters, by rank, or wealth, or favor, alone; but to *hunt* them out, wherever concealed, and where, from the want of patronage, they are obliged to employ their powers only for themselves. Still let him who is called a 'self-taught Genius' consider that he has had an ignorant Instructor, and that by properly availing himself of the abundance of perceptions, and the stores of practical science, accumulated by others, it is the task of his 'natural genius' to rectify their errors, and to assist in extending their partial success.

I speak alike to those who in every department of inquiry, whether humble or exalted, would aim to discover the final cause of Comets; who would sift out the incalculable notions, and their evil consequences, in all Religions; who would show, why mankind cannot be forcibly well-governed, yet are unable by any compact to well-govern themselves; who would devise an art of

too-much money-making, that would not contract the mind; or to contrive an iron-shoe, that should not cramp the hoof and tender sole of the horse.

We have spoken of three general characters in the excursive quality. The Wild and Rapid flight, which has no time for deliberate primary, and memorial gathering, or for joint comparison; nor composure for just conclusion. The Limited, which has few joint, and consequently few exact conclusive. And the Moderate, with sufficient compass and duration, for a full comparison by the joint, and a clear conclusion upon their relationships.

Of this moderate and productive character, there are various degrees of extent, dependent on the organization of the senses and the brain, on the cultivating exercise of their perceptions, or on the special subject over which the excursive flight is made. We have noticed the range of the higher Poet, and the Philosopher, gathering for exalted subjects, from the unbounded circuit of the relationships of things. The works of others both in Pretending science, and what common language calls creative 'Imagination,' but which on analysis, we call Fictitious Combinations of memorial perceptions, show a less excursive flight in descending gradation; till we come down to the narrow circle of a Newspaper novel; and to some Gimcrack invention, bearing a medal from the Awarding Committee of the 'World's great Fair' of emulative vanity, popular heart-burning, and scientific ostentation.

We will hereafter show more in detail, the effect of the various degrees of this quality in the different occupations, and intellectual pursuits of men. It is however merely remarked here, that whether from the organization of the senses, and the brain in women, or from the comparatively trifling education, which even the most favored receive; their power of excursive perception, scarcely excepting subjects referable to their own passions and purposes, seem to be more limited than in other different classes of the human mind.

Among the qualities of perception, we enumerated the agreeable and disagreeable; and stated; these qualities may be respectively united with the vivid. The like is true of the excursive quality. Its flight is over perceptions, sometimes agreeable, and sometimes

the reverse. I leave the interminable metaphysical question; why they are so, to the impalpable and shiftý winds; and not even to those who vainly seek to nourish their minds with such insubstantial diet: being contented to know, these are qualities of perception; and to avoid the disagreeable, without requiring a knowledge of its proximate cause. We avoid the disagreeably excursive, by encouraging involuntary perceptions, as far as this is possible, through the Mutative quality; which in the use of the mind, obliterates one perception, and substitutes another in its place.

Finally, we may see, under the combination of the agreeable with the excursive quality, the resources in minds of the humblest, as well as in those of the highest power; and though the degrees are by no means equal, yet by a wise accommodation of the mind, even to ignorance, the humble are happy in their degree, without the perception of its difference from that of minds, far beyond theirs, in the breadth and delicacy of enjoyment.



SECTION XIV.

Of the Elective Quality of Perceptions.

It is a characteristic function of the senses and the brain, that when two or more images or types of things or of their aggregates come before them, for primary, or are revived for memorial perception, either at the same time, or in immediate succession; they have apparently the power of selecting two or more of these perceptions from among others; of observing them particularly; and of noting their agreement or disagreement, as to their conditions, actions, reciprocal influences, or other relationships existing between them. I do not say we learn this by a process of what is called 'consciousness;' for it is the *general* power of perception **which gives us knowledge**, not only of what

we are said to be self-conscious, but what we perceive in the minds of others, through their works, or their own description of their thoughts.

This particular determination of joint perceptions to two or more images or types of things, either primary or memorial, mixed or unmixed, we call the exercise of an elective power; or the Elective Quality of perception. In ordinary language, an elective power signifies a *voluntary* power. In the present condition of the mind apart from some verbal convenience in the use of this term, when we are unfortunately brought near to its erroneous meaning; and though under the necessity of referring to a term universally employed as the verbal sign of a notional belief; I have yet no occasion in the purposes of this essay, for the phrase, voluntary power: since we have no more knowledge of this power existing in the animal mind, nor indeed any where in nature, than of a sensuous representation in images or types; of Spirit; Infinity; and of Substratal Matter. The phrases, voluntary action, and voluntary thought, applied to man, cannot denote a reality; and are therefore no more than an indefinite language, for the supposed function of an assumed elemental part of the mind, called the Will; derived from the interference of a metaphysical delirium, with the sane and simple physical phenomena of the brain: for without the intermeddling of this self-assuming, and autocratic entity, we should no more have the fiction of a voluntary power for the direction of thought, than for the working of a cotton-mill. Setting aside then the popular acceptance of the term voluntary, I can with all my means of observation, only perceive that the constituents of the mind are solely directed by causes or motives, over which they can have no control: the mind being left to the operation of the concealed organization, and the law of necessity in the senses and the brain. And a happy ordination it is. For if man by the mere *assumption* of a voluntary power over his thoughts, has in every age and nation, with the supposed unrestrained use of that Will, so crossed, confounded, perverted, or crazed, the beautiful system of involuntary action; what else could the great Almighty Cause, through, if I may 'say it unblamed,' his co-almighty hand-maid Nature, have done; had he designed to set the mind at variance

with itself; than to have given it a voluntary power? thereby to break its simple unity into the multiform confusion of self-willed folly, insanity, and crime: leaving no unwasted intellect, to try the wiser plan of involuntary motive and causations. The universe is directed by the necessary physical power of God and Nature. The mind of man is part of that universe. By an Elective Quality then, in the working process of the mind, we mean; that necessary law of perception, which directs its attention to those of its images and types, that represent the resemblances, differences, and other relationships of the things of nature and of art.

It is the part of the wise who explore the ways of nature; to perceive broadly, and to select conformably to the truth of her relationships. To those who by organization, or by cultivating the primary, memorial, and joint perceptions, possess the power of wide excursive flight over the images and types of things, it necessarily happens, that whatever resemblance or difference of things with their kinds, degrees, and actions, there may be in nature, they must all be found in imaged and typical representation, on the senses and the brain. But that representation is an involuntary function; and therefore to that sense, and brain which has a wide excursion over the relationships of things, those relationships, perceived as images and types, must be represented as they really exist between the things which produce them. And though by the dogmas of the School, relationships are not considered as subjects of sense; they are as truly physical images and types, as those of the things themselves: when therefore; for I must be allowed to vary the view of our subject, if not to repeat it; when a perception of the resemblance, or difference of things, or of any other relationship, comes-up in the senses and the brain; since they do *come-up*, without our Will; and are not *brought-up* by any wilful Spirit, they are the necessary function of choice, so to speak, of the organization of the senses and the brain, in representing the pattern of nature. Thus the Elective perception is an ultimate fact in the working plan of the human mind: nature herself having ordained the physical means of selection, for the progress and fulfilment of her purpose in the human mind. Or to use the style of the metaphysical Theolo-



gian; the selection is the necessary choice of that single Self-Will, the will of the Creating God, now an ultimate fact; to be only unquestionably revealed through the science of his Works.

We shall have occasion, to inquire further into this subject, in our section on the Involuntary character of perceptions. And if Metaphysics; which always revels in fictional argument, and seems to have abhorred, submitting its contentions to the decisive close of the 'yea or nay' of Christ's unarguing instruction; had not inflated the mind with its Spiritual *gas*, I would be saved the bad taste of further repetition, in showing, as I shall in a few words; more by reference to the frame of Nature, than to the human mind, which is one of the local actions of her universal Law. I will therefore endeavor, further to explain the subject of the physical Necessity of Elective perception, in another, perhaps a figurative manner.

The whole frame of nature has an unalterable destination; and we suppose we perceive its final causes in a few of its parts. To effect the purpose of this frame, nature has ordained relationships between all things, for the accomplishment of the reciprocal and successive actions, which we call, cause and effect: and as things, for their own time, steadfastly exist; and as actions in their course, succeed each other by an unchangeable order, there must be a fixed and regular adaptation of means to an end. But adaptation of means to an order of events, implies that the exact means are always applied. This is the wisely ordained necessity, or as we would figuratively call it, the *choice of nature* in directing her works: for the obvious wisdom of her choice of ways, is to us a wise exercise of her necessity. Now we have never heard from the lips of wisdom among men; nor has the Almighty been known to speak or to write it; that the same kind of necessity has not been ordained for the frame and working plan of the human mind. The metaphysical Theologians, who pretend to know more than others of their Jehovah, have certainly not been able to reveal to us, that the unity of his design has been broken, by counteracting in the animal mind, the operation of *his-only* wisely determined, and then unalterable Will, in the universe.

Of all the endless relationships of things, and of their endless

actions on each other, nature *chooses*, if we may so speak, those which fulfil the wisdom of her purposes, not those which would defeat it. The power of heat, to convert water into steam, is a relationship of cause and effect, or of a successive action between these two things. But nature *chooses* that degree of heat for the sun, which will raise only the vapor required for vegetable and animal life. This is her ground and manner of choice among the actions and relationships of things. The senses and the brain are capable of representing all the relationships of things; and it would seem; since I speak only from this seeming; that when the images, and types of these relationships are impressed on the senses and the brain, they are obliged, under the universal law of nature, to make a *necessary choice*, in effecting their purposes of science and art, similar to that which nature employs in her transcendent and continuous creations: for this power of effecting a choice, however derived or directed, perceptions do certainly possess. Things of nature have a necessary choice in producing all their actions and relationships: therefore the images and types of the mind, which are the true representations of those things, actions, and relationships, must convey with them a corresponding necessity of choice. This physical necessity of choice in the human mind, we figuratively call; the Elective Quality of perception.

I cannot explain why the senses and the brain have the involuntary power of perceiving those relationships which are necessary for its conclusive purposes: though the metaphysician might; with his positive assurance on unknown things, in some such manner, as I have proposed, merely for an analogical illustration. But without fiction, or dispute, the power of creative originality, from a facility in selecting images and types related to a subject of inquiry, does obviously exist, and is widely varied in different minds: some taking the lead in productive selection, by doing the greater part, and sometimes all for themselves; others through an imbecility of choice, requiring it to be done for them. Archimedes, Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Smith, Leibnitz, Newton, Montesquieu and Bentham; Shakspeare, some of his cotemporaries, Milton, Voltaire, and Rabelais; in the departments of both truth and fiction; with many others, stand at the

head of excursive and elective minds: the whole host, with a few exceptions, of modern professors, modern lecturers, public speakers, preachers, and compiling book-sellers, being at longer or shorter distances from the lower point of sub-animal intellect.

The higher Historians, the just and philosophical Satirist, the widely surveying Statesman, and the great Masters in the Esthetic Arts; give respectively, the useful results of extended excursive, and well-gathered elective perceptions. The minor and Scribbling Poets, the every-day Novelist, and Story-tellers, the Wits of their popular time, together with the Adepts at Repartee, the Humorist, and the Droll in personal ridicule, exhibit in their descending order, the gradual restriction, and degradation of the elective quality. But as the broad Genus always includes the narrow Species, it will be found; those having the full and elevated efficacy of this quality, have when required, the power of making its humbler application, for the general correction, in this case, both of persons and of things, that respectively call for rebuke or reformation.

We have shown the vivid, the quick and the excursive, to be qualities of perception; and that all others, not of contradictory character, may sometimes be combined with them. On this ground, the elective may be more or less vividly, rapidly, or excursively exercised. Some minds seize upon a relationship, in a moment; others more slowly make their choice. The former, from the vividness with which they are invited to their involuntary selection, rarely alter their first impression, and remain obstinate upon it, till this is supplanted by the mutative quality, through another vivid fit of choice, and its obstinacy. The latter, from a delay in the selection, become discouraged, and the design is abandoned. The elective power unaccompanied by the excesses of the vivid, the rapid and the excursive; gives the greatest accuracy and success to thought.

The elective quality, like all the rest derives its importance from the subject to which it is applied. In the dignity, permanency, and usefulness of the broader sciences, when the choice is made among productive relationships of action in cause and effect, with their precise verbal terms, its power is the most eminent. In the quick selection among words related by sound

alone, its character and usefulness are the most humble. And we might put in contrasted illustration of these two uses of elective perception; the instance of the mind of Adam Smith, and that of a Punster.

The elective perceptions being used on all subjects, they are to the sciences, in the discovery of useful truth; for the true is useful in all things; what Taste, another name for selection, is to the esthetic arts, in the production of grandeur, beauty and grace. Both alike choose from the unities and differences of relationships, measure the degrees of their mutual influence, observe the course of causations, and record the discoveries of what is respectively true, in the creations of nature, and beautiful in the works of art.

The elective quality, like the excursive, is exercised over the primary, and memorial perceptions, and like it, prepares the way for the joint. But here, to prevent misunderstanding, we must point out the difference between these two qualities, and the proper joint perception; the third constituent of the mind.

We said formerly; the joint brings, or joins together a few or many of the memorial images or types; mixed or unmixed; by their resemblances and other relationships, for the conclusive finally to decide upon. It then appears; both the excursive and the elective are assistant qualities to the function of the joint constituent: yet each of these conditions is different from the others. The excursive quality runs through the whole circuit of primary and memorial images and types. The elective passes-by the relationships of this panorama, not accordant with the subject in hand; and involuntarily receives those which contribute to its purpose. The joint constituent compares an indefinite number of images and types, either at the same time or in succession; and upon this comparison, the conclusive sets the seal of its final decision. The excursive and the elective, which are specific qualities of this generic constituent, are their preparative or assistant functions to the joint; as strictly speaking both the primary and memorial are: but for the simplicity and clearness of Division, I preferred arranging them as assistant forms or degrees of *qualities*, rather than to make them two leading constituent perceptions.

We will endeavor to give an example of the use of the elective

quality, and of its proper place in a course of inquiry. Let us suppose the process, in the explosion of gunpowder to be unknown, though the characters of the elementary agents in that process are supposed to be familiar to the inquirer. His primary perception of the explosion is, that it involves the phenomena of heat, light, abrupt sound, a perceptible shock to touch, the odor of sulphureous vapor, the production of carbonic gas, and a residuum of dampness and lamp black. With these and other primary perceptions, either directly of the phenomena, or indirectly through the writing or speech of others, the inquirer runs over his memorial circuit of images and types, by the excursive quality; perceives the relationship of degree, action, and causal succession, which these images and types bear to each other; perceives a similarity of the explosive noise, and of the sudden shock, to the sudden expansion of air; the light and heat, to the sudden flame of combustible gases; the moisture, to the dampness produced by burning a candle within a close vessel; the inflammability, and odor, to the ignition of saltpetre and sulphur; the black residue, to the presence of charcoal. In like manner, the excursion might be extended to numberless other phenomena, having more or less, their degrees of similarity, and their relationship of action. This extensive excursion we will suppose, has brought up the many relationships of resemblance, or of causation in the subject of inquiry. From this example I leave-out a supposition of the wider field of excursion, to be offered by the use of Experiment, in the process; since the mode of perception is the same in both Observation, and in Experiment; one being a perception of the simple working plan of Nature; the other a perception of the complicated purpose and contrivance of uncertain man.

With all these excursive perceptions, the elective quality surveys the agency that some of the phenomena might have in producing the effect; and neglecting those unrelated to the question, gathers by an involuntary choice, those that seem to include the causes of the explosion; and these being again narrowed down for close comparison by joint perception, the causation becomes so manifest to the inquirer, that he definitely concludes upon the real agencies in the case.

I have drawn this picture of a mode of inquiry into the undis

covered causes of nature, and the concealed processes of art, as a general view of the working plan of the mind in some of its researches. On every subject, the application of this clear and simple plan is similar; varied only by the greater or less compass of the excursive flight, the propriety of the elective gathering, the identity of the joint comparison, the readiness and accuracy of the conclusion, and by precision in the predication of the verbal sign, which describes the whole train of the inquiry. And this is the 'honest method' which allows no juggling sophism, with its kindred syllogism, or a still more confounding spiritualism to obtrude upon its simple sufficiency: a method by which every mind human and sub-animal, in their varied powers, comes by educated and material perception in the former case, and by what is instinctively done by pre-organization, in the other, to the two very different degrees of their respective shares of knowledge.



SECTION XV.

Of the Agreeable and Disagreeable Qualities of Perceptions.

THE qualities of perception we are now about to consider, are great controlling causes in the animal mind. We think and act from various occasional motives: but perhaps the most powerful and general influence over quiescent, and actionary perceptions is shown in our always indulging in those which are agreeable, and turning from their reverse. Nay, Casuists have gone so far into the metaphysics of this interminable case, as to maintain that in doing good, we are not disinterested; but directed by a real selfishness; and that the pleasure we thus give to others, is done, only to be reflected back upon ourselves. We have neither the disposition, nor the time, and certainly not the ability required to consider this question. It is sufficient in rejecting the *how* and the *why* of a more particular investigation, to resolve most if not

ll our motives for thinking and acting, into the general fact, hat what we pursue, is directly or indirectly agreeable to us; nd what we avoid is disagreeable. And as vivid perceptions, in heir exclusiveness are generally agreeable, it is another question or the metaphysician; which the physical Observer cannot answer; whether perceptions are agreeable because they are vivid; r vivid because they are agreeable. We will endeavor to set his subject in another, and perhaps a less disputable light.

It is known from universal experience, that we actively seek leasure, and actively avoid pain, without a knowledge of the roximate cause of these actionary perceptions; and that these tates insure the accomplishment of their purposes. These are he necessary instincts; the Reader keeping in mind our physiology of instinct; that direct man, in common with the sub-animal; and without which each would passively die, or be violently estroyed. Pleasure and pain being then qualities of perception, hey may accompany the use of the primary, the memorial, the joint, the conclusive, and of their verbal signs. Thus we may be leased with two separate sights, or two separate sounds, pleased ith the memory of them, with the joint comparison of them, ith the truth and usefulness of the conclusion drawn from them, nd with the language in which they are described.

The quality of pleasure, as well as of its reverse, is a physical ondition of the senses and the brain; and is to us an ultimate act, without a known cause; not requiring a notifying spirit to ell us we perceive it. We can be happy or otherwise, in our erceptions, without knowing wherefore we are so.

This quality of the agreeable and of the reverse, is itself positively a perception; and is experienced, as we have said, in all s five forms; more commonly in the images and types, of the rimary and memorial in the senses of sight and hearing; but most remarkably, in the primary of the other three; though in ll, it may sometimes amount to delight, or to intolerable pain. he state and purpose of these two qualities in the primary perceptions, are common to man and the sub-animal. In the latter owever, these qualities are limited to sensual pleasure, and pain; ith an earnest appetite for one, and an endeavor to avoid the ther. The former, together with the same sensual condition, has

through his language and education, the means of enjoyment, and the causes of suffering in an equal degree, under these respective qualities.

The agreeable and disagreeable may be respectively joined with the excursive, the elective, and with other qualities of perception: and all these may be severally more or less agreeable, or the reverse, according to the degree of quality and the form of the perception. Thus the intensely vivid is generally agreeable in the memorial of the religious fanatic, and in the revolutionary patriot, the stock, turf, and table gambler, the speculator in paper-credit, the proud, the vain, the headstrong; and the whole host of selfish characters, with their excursive and elective qualities contracted to the smallest circle. The widely excursive and elective are agreeable to the poet, and the analytic inquirer; the medium or neutral force to the broad discoverer, and inventor; the vividly primary, and memorial, and the wildly excursive to the lover; the properly vivid and excursive of the primary and memorial, in the perception of grandeur, beauty, and grace, are agreeable to the artist; and errors and deformities of taste therein, the cause of aversion, and even of pain. Primary perceptions in music and cultivated speech, are an abundant source of the agreeable; the false time and note in one, and false intonated expression, of vulgar elocution, in the other, are alike disagreeable to an observant and intelligent taste. Among the perceptions of Touch, we enumerated pain, as one of its forms. It is one of the out-post sentinels of our health and life; and may be when turned against ourselves, the severest of all afflictions: excepting, of course, that metaphysical and fanatical misery, presupposed, and called the horrors and torments of the Damned.

It would however, take us through the whole range of the senses, and through every subject of thought, in both the virtuous and villanous pursuits of men, to consider all the agreeably vivid memorial perceptions. The vivid and falsely conclusive hopes of the ambitious politician, for what we call hopes are merely vague and restless memorial perceptions in a future tense; the vivid primary and memorial of the pickpocket; and of the lazy sponger; are all severally agreeable to those who exercise them; the perceptions of the last, being at least not disagreeable, or they would

arouse him and be cast off. We leave further details on this subject, to the intelligence of the Reader; who, by understanding the manner of combining the agreeable and disagreeable with other perceptions, may; from the preceding exemplifications, and his own observation and experience; carry the combinations through all their possible cases.

To the senses and the brain, in their highest organization, and most extended degree of their functional improvement; the joint and conclusive perception of the true relationship of things, is a fruitful source of the agreeable: the perception of mental or practical error, is in a corresponding degree, the reverse. It is well then to contrast an exact perception of agreeable truth; in the images and types of the unchangeable things and relationships of nature; with the appalling falsehoods in those of the varying governments, religions and fashions, in the purposes of man. For error is never perceived so plainly as under the full light of its opposite, truth.

It is a happy ordination; to be applied with practical benefit; that wisdom and justice in those Masters who direct public affairs, should be delightful to the contemplation of an elevated intellect; and that the corruption and failure of Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Republics; with theft in office, and cabinet, with Legislative bribery for contracts, and Executive pardons; and the lower frauds of Banks, Railroads, and paper-credit corporations, should on the other hand, be so painfully abominable, to the upright Subject or Citizen who has been able to remain uncorrupted.

I have thus endeavored to describe the character and uses of the agreeable and disagreeable qualities of perception: and have said enough, to show where to place them, in the constituencies, and method of the mind; without pretending to carry into detail, the views briefly set forth in this Work. I have, most probably so short a time before me, and being altogether solitary and unassisted in this primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive manner of arranging the process of thought, and its corresponding nomenclature; that I presume to furnish only an outline of the wise; and simple because wise; system of human perception: which has been so vaguely or fictitiously described, and so spiritualized and con-

founded, till what was designed to be the *Camera lucida* of nature, and to contain within itself the clear representation of all things; is found to resemble nothing in the heavens above, the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth; and therefore so long unforbiddenly worshiped, by the Metaphysical Theologians; and at all times guarded as their *Ark of the Law*, which not even the hand of physical Observation must dare to touch.

The agreeable and disagreeable qualities of perception, when regarded under the simplifying analysis here presented, give a closer view of the important agency, that pleasure and pain exert over the constituents of the mind; and would show, that the proper degrees of these qualities have been joined with the exercise of perception, to prompt a useful and desirable result on the one hand; and to guard against any destructive interference with the mind and body on the other: for it is known, from the perversion of one of these qualities, in mania; injurious, and fatal lesions of the body are sometimes incurred, in the absence of a painful perception to protect it. It is no new remark; that we are induced by pleasure and by pain, respectively to seek and to avoid the various impressions which surround us: but we may now differently see an arrangement of these motives, with the constituent agents of the mind, under a simple and explanatory nomenclature. Instead therefore of confusing the causes of pleasure and pain with the numberless subdivisions, and individual variations of our purposes and acts, after the immemorial practice of the Schools; we lay them more intelligibly, and with more profit, to the roots of the few genera of perception; and leave others to make the specific application of the simple principles of the natural and unperverted mind, whenever it may be required.

We have pointed out five constituents of the mind; and have shown, that the verbal signs, though extending the range, and insuring the precision of their uses, do themselves subsequently become things for perception by the ear and the brain. It may then be inquired; are the agreeable and disagreeable, in like manner, connected with them? We do not say that among the ignorant, and unreflecting, in the higher and the lower classes of mankind, there is any pleasure in speech, except it may be connected with the means of gratifying their appetites and passions,

and the hopes of political and other ambition. But the pleasure derived from the verbal sign, in those enlightened by knowledge and taste, is a strong motive towards the cultivation of all its modes of propriety, elegance, and expression in poetry and prose; and whenever they may be required in Oratory, and on the Stage. Nor is it less true, that the disagreeable perception of error, both in written and in oral language, is to a critical discrimination, the motive, and leads to the means, for guarding against it. Thus we perceive the law of pleasure and of pain extends its influence to all the five constituents of the mind.

The agreeable and disagreeable being at first instinctive, and thus without a known and controllable cause, in the animal senses and the brain; it may be supposed their purpose cannot be enlarged, and more keenly exercised. If however, our explanation of the pre-arranged organization of instinct is correct, all our knowledge and pleasure begin in it. With the assistance of Language this same instinct puts-on the ample habit of education. This gives us what we call the Human Prerogative, and makes us, in pride and vanity assume to be, of all other begotten creations, the only earthly children of God.

The sub-animals, and nine-tenths of mankind have pleasure in nothing except their proper or their corrupted instincts. There is however a fund of enjoyment, beyond the necessary, and when wisely used, the delightful sensual perception. If we could admit the old distinction between intellectual and sensual, we might call the primary alone, sensual; and without assigning their special locality, the memorial, joint, and conclusive, intellectual. It is in the latter class of perceptions that, under the influence of education, a more abundant, permanent, less injurious, and equally with the sensual, an absorbing source of pleasure is to be found. But here the division is at fault; for sensual perceptions when modified can be so connected with the memorial; they may come to resemble the intellectual in their character and uses; and sometimes in the degree of their refinement. It appears then; the agreeable quality of perception, even in the sensual primary, is by restraining the excess of its vividness, usefully increased by cautious cultivation and exercise; and that without distinction, this quality is so applied to all the five constituents

of the mind, that with man, and some of the sub-animals, the greater the extension of knowledge, the more is the means of pleasure enlarged.



SECTION XVI.

Of the Quiescent and Actionary Quality of Perceptions.

As the terms quiet and quietude, have been metaphorically applied to a state of mind, free from 'emotion' and the apparent signs of passion, I call those perceptions Quiescent, which are reflected by images, and impressed by types, on the senses and the brain of the percipient; but which have, neither to the percipient himself, nor to others, any external sign in the muscles, nerves, voice, nor in the color or other condition of the skin; and constituting what is called silent thought. These quiescent perceptions may be primary, memorial, joint, or conclusive; under all the qualities, consistent with them; and among these, may be either agreeable or disagreeable to the percipient: but cannot be so, in a great degree, without producing their respective vocal or other obvious signs: since without these, all the other four forms of perception, even the primary, would be few and limited; thus reducing the human to the condition of the sub-animal mind. For though the latter has the like five constituents with our own; yet with their partial use of vocal and other signs, the extent and power of those perceptions are restricted to what they are. This quiescent quality, or silent thought, may yet be vivid, quick, excursive, elective, agreeable or disagreeable, or of any quality except the actionary: for the senses and the brain may still be perceiving, without employing an obvious sign.

I call Actionary perceptions, those which produce on the muscles, nerves, voice, or skin, actions or other perceptible phenomena obvious to the percipient himself, and to others.

This function of the quiescent, and of the actionary quality,

is not to be confounded with that of Passion, so-called by the metaphysician; which through a superficial and indefinite view, and a confusion of etymology, has been made to signify both an active and a passive state. Active, in the violent excitement of the body and mind; and passive, as if the mind were suffering from an internal or external infliction. The qualities we are now considering meet the mystical subject of 'passion,' by this application of the simple working plan of perception; that the quiescent quality may be vivid, which the Schools would call the *feeling* of passion; and the actionary, which they would call its obvious effects. We have nothing to say here, on the deep and subtle movements of the 'impassioned soul.' And require no transcendental 'wishing cap,' for making a spiritual mind, execute any and every vagary, at its pleasure. Without therefore departing from the simple ordination of Nature, and her great Cause, we resolve the supposed complicated phenomena of passion, into perception and its vividly quiescent, and its quick and apparent actionary qualities.

I make no physiological inquiry into the peculiar state of the senses and the brain under these two different qualities; nor into the metaphysical notion of a final cause, why they so differ. Physical observation teaches, that a difference does exist, as an ultimate fact, of an unknown causation: and we leave the Observer to watch subsequent effects, and their relationships to each other; thereby to discover details of the plan and practical uses of the mind in reference to all things. There is little to be remarked here on the quiescent quality; for as all perceptions not actionary, are in our view to be considered as quiescent, or silent, what is said generally of perceptions may be applied to them.

The actionary quality performs an important function in the mechanism of the human mind, and in its productive agency. The great Experimental method of acquiring knowledge is founded upon it. The quiescent may silently observe by the primary, be excursive through the memorial, compare and be elective under the joint, and decide by the conclusive. But all these silent perceptions can lead only to a possible or probable result, till made obvious by actionary language, or by other signs: and thus by a community of knowledge, and with connected thought, the sub-

ject of inquiry may be reduced to the condition of truth, or of falsehood by the conclusions of actionary experiment. It may thus be seen, that when the quiescent become actionary by signs, they become primary perceptions to the percipient himself as well as to others. For the verbal signs by which the quiescent are described, again produce primary types on the ear; for sound significant is as any other sound to that sense.

The actionary perceptions are more or less vivid; and with an action more or less quick. When too vivid, and contracted, they cannot be broadly excursive, wisely elective, nor profitably conclusive in the higher purposes of science, or of human affairs: and when too quick, they are restless, unimpressive and evanescent.

The endless list of Emperors, Kings, Presidents, Legislators, Executive agents of every kind, Professors of science, morals, and religion, together with those who exercise with success the mechanic arts; have severally their various degrees of the actionary quality. From this promiscuous mass, deprived of more than half its productive power, and confused in what it has, by ignorance of the intellectual means of exercising that power; you may select instances, by ages, as the Poets of the three Epochs have been selected; and that will give you Archimedes, Galileo, and Newton, whose records of nature and art, are by discerning and impartial time received as leading examples of actionary, no less than of other eminent qualities of perception. To what is this 'beggarly account' of the higher human intellect, and of its success to be ascribed? Although mankind, contrary to the Democratic delusion, are not born, nor do they live and die equal; yet why, under this condition of inequality, has the best education, intellectual, moral, religious, high school, and low school, so lamentably failed to correct that inequality, if indeed it has not served to perpetuate it? Certainly the wild sub-animals are almost undistinguishable from each other in the form and degree of their silent and actionary perceptions, as far as the latter can denote the former. They have, equally with the proud human intellect, its five essential constituents, under a similar but circumscribed application of all the characters and qualities of perception. And they do all this aright, without a knowledge of the working plan

of the mind; because nature is directing the work by the unembarrassed plan of their physical instincts: with a language accommodated to their purposes and powers. Add to which; they have no poets, metaphysicians, theologians, with other fictionists and wranglers, to darken and confound the exact yet limited signs, for their clear though limited thoughts. But however circumscribed the sub-animal mind may be, it is still, in the common phrase, well balanced; or in our language; the five perceptions are, in purpose, and use, duly proportioned to each other. We must then ask the profound metaphysical thinker, as he is called, why the human mind is almost universally common or corrupt; and so rarely exhibits a proportional correspondence to a sub-animal perfection, in its pre-ordained and natural powers? For the wild animal has no theories, nor errors, nor vices. The metaphysician can explain all this, by reference to the manner in which he has in great part contributed to it: he having so confused, and entangled the plain order of the mind, by baited spiritual and notional 'springs' and nets, as to leave ninety-nine and nine-tenths in a hundred of mankind, without the least perception of what their minds are made for; how they are constituted; and how the great mass of *uninstructed* teachers ought to *instruct* them.

On the other hand, with that only *self-knowledge*; the percipient's knowledge of his mind, and of the working plan of its five constituents; a comprehensive survey of the universe of things, creates a comprehensive wisdom; which by the use of abundant primary, excursive, and elective memorial, well-compared joint, and just conclusive perceptions, respectively speaks and performs, through an appropriate Actionary quality, words of precept, and works of usefulness, all-sufficient, all-provident, and distantly God-like in the practical purposes of man. But all this is a simple view of their own minds, which the million of philosophers, so-called, will be rarely prepared to comprehend; and therefore generally be disposed to reject.

In regarding the productive powers of quiescent and actionary perceptions, which are among the elements of a higher wisdom; we have abundant examples, in particular departments of science and art, in works that are justly held-up as triumphs of knowledge

and of skill. But these works are valued only by those who are designed to be the leading and directive Few; the unnamed multitude, along with nominal philosophers, following the shouting wonder, only because others follow and shout. Thus the success of a great achievement, is not a compliment to the choice of the world, but as an offering to the foremost discernment of the wise.

A workman who unites the vivid and the quick with other required qualities in due degree, and all in just proportion to each other, exerts his actionary power, shortly, easily, and well, and rarely spoils his work; for this reason. Suppose a Sculptor, at the moment his joint and conclusive perception direct his hand, that the rapid quality gives a quick and quiescent perception, of what the chisel should effect, and the actionary gives the stroke. But if, the moment before the blow of the mallet, something intervenes to change the quiescent purpose of the stroke, the rapid perception is aware that the intervening cause is to be obviated. Thereupon, a similar and mutative rapidity is to be thrown into the new actionary effort, to arrest or change the former effort, before the mallet reaches the chisel; and thus the wrong or excessive cut is prevented. It is reported of Michael Angelo, that when *roughing-out* a statue to the gauge-marks of its outline; bystanders would be alarmed, as he wildly scattered his *spawls*, lest the apparent carelessness of his chisel would mar or ruin his work. But the quick, and quiescent perception of the Artist, was safely directing the actionary hand. Such persons in emergent situations, generally prevent embarrassment, and escape a sudden danger. Battles by sea and land, siege-assaults, and the daily occurrences of life, present surprising instances of the quick and vivid, quiescent and actionary perception.

In a contrary case, when all the four forms of perception are slow, quiescent and faint, with the actionary weak; the person is scarcely to be trusted in sudden difficulty, without close watching by some one ready to take the emergency in hand. Such persons always spoil work; put locks out of order; injure tools; like women, cannot safely handle a watch; are liable to injury from cutting instruments, and machinery; and are indeed almost good for nothing, on occasions requiring smartness of hand or foot. I once had a faithful old coachman, a Black; who, if in driving, he

saw, or was warned of something to be avoided, was so sluggish in his quiescent perception, that figuratively, I fancied I saw the image of the object enter his eye; the nervous action, so to call it, slowly pass to his brain; and then trickle down his arm, into the hand that drew the rein. The circumstances of his case were different from those of the thunder-clap, from the flash of which, they say you are safe if you have time to hear the report. With him the danger arose from the sight of the obstruction, and the pull of the rein not coming together. In one instance he turned his horse to the left, though the carriage he was meeting, had previously turned to its right; and thus by his slow actionary movement, the shaft of our gig was broken-off in the concussion.

The phrase 'presence of mind,' in the old language of the Schools and Streets, we may suppose, refers indefinitely to something like this rapid quality of quiescent and actionary perception; we have here described under a detailed analysis, a definite arrangement, and a corresponding nomenclature.



SECTION XVII.

Of the Synchronous and Successive Qualities of Perceptions.

IN our synopsis of the qualities of perception, they are said to be either Synchronous, or successive; meaning that the senses and the brain can represent a number of things, either at the same moment; or that they are perceived singly, in succession. Each condition occurs under different circumstances of the several forms of perception, and under the different senses. As there are five forms of perception, including that of the verbal sign, and five senses, we may inquire how the distinction applies to each. It may be stated of the primary, that all the senses equally employ the successive quality. We may see one thing after another; hear one sound after another; and touch, taste,

and scent, a number of their respective subjects in succession. But the synchronous, as far as observation informs us, is not a function of all the senses, in primary perception.

If we are to be directed by the similitude of the mirror, which reflects at the same time, every thing brought before it, we must say that in the primary, two or more may be perceived together. When I referred to that old supposition of the analogy between the mind and the mirror, it was not under a belief in the identity of causation in all the facts of the two cases, but to illustrate our view that in the unity of nature, the physical act of reflection in the senses and the brain, is not altogether without its similarity to something else; and with an endeavor to turn the mind from its habitual delusion; that only some unearthly spirit can produce or direct the images and types of all the forms of perception. Without however attempting to draw proof or even probability from the instance of the mirror; it is not to be disputed, that in the primary perception of sight, there is a synchronous perception of many things. It is no objection, to say in this case; there is always but one brightest image on the field of vision, while other surrounding images are obscure: for the question here, is not upon the greater or less impression by two or more things, but of more than one being seen at all. It is undeniable however, that in any object, or aggregate of things, we have at the same time, an image of form and of color: and that we can perceive at once a greater number of images of individual things, when impressed by a sphere or other aggregate.

In the sense of sight then, we have both the synchronous and successive qualities in primary perception; the former, when an aggregate of things is before the eye. If the Reader will recur to what is said of the excluding power of a vivid perception, he will readily observe, that if a thing of sight should create an excessive vividness, it would destroy the synchronous function; for nothing would be seen but itself. And it is perhaps owing to the out-ruling of this synchronous, where it exists, and sometimes even of the successive function, that vividness so mars the purposes of wisdom in the human mind.

In the other senses, the existence of the synchronous quality is either not so easily ascertained; or it seems to be altogether

wanting. In the primary perception of hearing, it is questionable, whether we can receive two different impressions from sound, at the same time. There is no analogy, in this case, to the function of the eye: for the mechanism of the ear, in its manner of perception is entirely different from that of the surface of the retina; which like the mirror can reflect all the aggregates set before it. What we have yet learned of the physiology of the tympanum, is that if two different vibrations are excited upon it, they weaken or confuse each other; or the strong destroy the weak; not that they make two different and clear representations on the senses and the brain. For it is to be remarked; there are not distinct types or spots of sound on the tympanum; as there are different positions of distinct images on the retina; the same vibration extending over its whole surface at the same time.*

The primary impression in Melody, is successive; so must be that of its time; for time is only a succession of perceptions. What is the condition in Harmony? Is it, as with a single vivid image on the field of vision; that when one note is the most impressive, the rest are merely obscure, which would be as in sight, an instance of the synchronous? But when a discordant note breaks into the blended sounds of harmony, the effect of all the supposed synchronous perceptions ceases, and only that discord remains upon the ear. Thus it would appear; when the ear receives two or more distinct impressions, they must be successive.

Touch has an extensive surface for perception; and there may be on this surface, several impressions at the same time; one predominant, as we called it in the sense of sight, and the rest obscure. But the synchronous quality must as in sight and hearing, depend on the character of the impression; for one more forcible

* And yet, there is a fact in audible vibration, which the celebrated Rameau first perceived; and made it the foundation in nature, of the system of related notes in the diatonic scale of Music. The fact is this. In a single stroke of a loud and deep-toned bell, four sounds of different pitch are heard at the same moment by an attentive ear. The apparently sole, single, and principal sound. The octave to this principal. The twelfth, or octave to its fifth; and the seventeenth, or double octave to its third: thus showing that any apparently single sound, always combines within itself, however faintly perceived, its third, fifth, and octave. It would seem, from this fact; that in musical sound at least, the ear has its peculiar manner of perceiving more than one sound at the same time; or that these are instantly successive.

will destroy all weaker perceptions. Thus touch is synchronous under a moderate impression upon the fingers; of form, heat, or cold, and hardness, in a sphere; and of heat or cold, and fluidity, in water. We have scarcely the curiosity to inquire; whether in the senses of Taste, and Scent, perception is synchronous, or successive: nor would the determination of this point, have at present a practical application. It seems however to be in each case, principally if not always successive.

This subject of synchronous, and successive primary perception, with regard to the senses, very much resembles those in which the old metaphysical school is prone to indulge; thereby turning attention from the practical and useful investigation of the mind: and as all we yet know of this undetermined subject, does not serve the important purpose of this essay; we leave others to ascertain, how far it is necessary for a full knowledge of the working plan of the human intellect.

The memorial perceptions in the sense of sight, are both synchronous and successive; the latter of single things, the former, of their aggregates. In joint perceptions we are unable to decide, whether we compare perceptions present at the same time, or as they follow each other in rapid succession.

The conclusive being a single perception of relationship of existence or of action between things, it is not within observation to decide upon its synchronous or successive character; though it would seem that two or more conclusions, on two or more joint comparisons, must be successive.

We have thus far considered unmixed perceptions of the synchronous or successive quality; but there is a mixed form of primary with memorial, and the joint comparison of these, would seem to be successive; since we have at present no means for ascertaining; when a primary is occupied with one image or type, that the memorial can have a perception of another.

We leave this together with other similar topics of the present section, to broader, and more penetrating observers; hoping; they may not wastefully argue, nor warmly wrangle about it: for argument too often leads to intellectual ambition; this to personal contention; personal contention to selfishness; and this mars, or altogether defeats ^{the} enlarged and disinterested pur-

pose of discovery. And we should recollect, that Columbus found a New World, within the three days, he induced his companions to refrain from argument, and clamor, against his resolution to continue his voyage.

Of the relations of the synchronous and successive, to the other qualities of perception. Quickness does not counteract the former; and accords with the rapid transition of the latter. Vividness in one of several synchronous perceptions would exclude all the fainter, and thus prevent the use of the joint and conclusive. Yet it does not follow, that approximating degrees of vividness in images and types, may not be compared: for if we do not allow vividness, in some of its degrees, to be comparable, at the same time or in succession; we shall not be able to account for the vividly quiescent and vividly actionary of the joint and conclusive perceptions; narrow in circuit, and low in purpose as they may be; of sharp and ready wits, pouncing and clutching money-makers, retortive and dodging wranglers, sleek-worded knaves, and quick-fingered pickpockets. If these, by our assumption; think vividly, and perform rapidly, it must be by quick quiescent and actionary, but successive perceptions.

From the use of the excursive and the elective quality in high efforts of the mind, it appears; the process is successive: for it is not known, that the brain is able to represent at a moment, the vast amount of images and types, drawn from all the heavens, and all the earth, which would be necessary for making a broad, wise, and useful elective gathering: and we must suppose the mode of using these qualities, to be the same in more limited minds.

We do not perceive important, or practical relations of the quiescent and the actionary quality, to the synchronous and successive perceptions; except that the quick actionary, which are generally vivid, seem to require, the then indispensable service of the successive.

Finally, it may be remarked, on this subject of synchronous and successive perceptions; that as we have been less decided in describing them, than other of the qualities; it may be a consolation to our ignorance, that some of these doubtful questions, have as we yet view them, no very useful bearing on our attempt to explain the practical and simple method of the human mind.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the Single or the Few, and the Manifold Qualities of Perceptions.

I HERE speak of perception as single; in that case where the mind, having the ordained power to attend to more images or types than one, whether at the same moment, or in succession, is still confined to that one, or to few, by some functional deformity or disease; or by some other limiting, or excluding influence over perception. We have described the vivid quality, often existing as a solitary perception; the contracted excursive, as limited to a single image or type, if that indeed, can be called excursion; and the faint, which may present but one or a few to attention. This is the narrow state of perception, of which we are here to speak more in detail.

I have named this quality, or as it should rather be called condition, of singleness or limitation, as different from that of the individuals of a succession; although each of these does for a moment, singly exist. It is rarely however; the more continued singleness of which we here speak, occurs in a natural and proper use of the mind. It seems to proceed from a neglect to obviate the tendency of an impotent structure of the senses and the brain; or from a functional and fatal error in perception. For certainly if things and their relationships are not regarded jointly, either as synchronous, or successive, no conclusions can be drawn.

The most remarkable, though not the only instance of single perception is: First; that produced by an excess of the vivid quality: for it alone can obscure, or outshine the ordinary light of every other imaged or typical impression. And it may here be remarked; that considering the simple system of the mind, with its five constituents; their necessary dependence on each other; with the various influences of the several qualities; and knowing that all this beautiful arrangement with its admirable

effects, is at once destroyed by an excessive vividness in any one of its constituents; like the greater physical forces of nature overpowering the less; we may have some ground for belief, though not a proof, of an overruling power in what is distinctively called the intellectual, as well as in the material world. This vivid perception, from its essential character of singleness, is one of the most prevalent and disastrous vices of the mind. Second. In some, though rare instances, perception may be occupied on a single thing, without that thing having an excluding vividness. This occurs from an extreme weakness of the memorial wing, which does not allow an excursive flight, beyond the contracted circle of its debility: and where there is no excursion, there can be no election, no joint comparison, and no conclusion. If then the proper function of the senses and the brain consists in the due employment of the five constituents; we become madmen or idiots, when, through vividness or weakness, reduced to the use of a single subject of one or more of them. Thus through the actionary exercise of a single vivid perception in one case; and through the single perception of a feeble sense and brain, in the other, there is practically little difference between the state of mind in a simpleton, and in a maniac: for when the former happens to be an ordinary hereditary, or chosen Emperor, or King, or a universal-suffrage President; all being demagogues in their way; each of these imbeciles may be as ruinous to the State he blindly pretends to direct, as the unconfined madman to his family and his neighborhood.

To have manifold perceptions, whether synchronous or successive, is to have for subsequent use, one of the deepest and broadest resources for supplying the wants, and forming the strength and activity of the human intellect. On the contrary, to have a single-absorbing or a limited perception, must mar its provided powers, and reduce the unbounded functions of the senses and the brain, to that contracted condition, which we may suppose to be the quiescent and the actionary perception of an oyster; to draw-in salt water, and in some way or other to reproduce itself.

We know that the vividest quality of perception, whether in primary or in memorial representation, allows only one image or

type, before the sense and the brain. This is exemplified, as just stated, in the raging maniac, who never compares nor concludes; for this requires two perceptions. Hence his purpose cannot be changed, except by physical force in his actionary; and in his quiescent, by a mutative perception. But in this case, there is a single vivid, with no other to exert a mutative influence over it; and from this cause, his madness is, like a sub-animal's, often incurable. Under a disagreeable, or painful impression by an object of fear, a Runaway-horse is in this condition. He has a single perception of that object, raised to a vivid and actionary violence. No other thing affects his senses, nor creates a memorial image or type, to allow him to compare and conclude. In this insensibility to all impressions, except to that from the object of terror; he will break through an unseen hedge, or fence; dash himself to death against a wall, and thus be stopped by physical resistance alone. So under a wise necessity, should a dangerous, and otherwise uncontrollable, yet common madness in the human mind be visited; and so it is visited by the retributive God of nature, and the ruler of his own final causes. Still, when the mind is no longer directed by its natural rectitude and justice, but led by the thousand wicked devices of the love of self in money, and power, and worried by the endless conflicts of political, religious, moral, and medical sophistry; it is wisely ordained, that as its blind and perverted purposes bring on the deluge of misery, from intemperance, poverty, and crime, which destroys so large a part of mankind; it should yet allow an Ark of prudence, industry, and virtue, in a natural use of the intellect, for the preservation of the rest.

We have here been speaking of the single vividness, which produces the foolish madman; and of single feebleness, which produces a foolish idiocy; respectively the effect of the quality of the bright and of the feeble in perception, and of the restricted in excursive flight. There is a like outruling influence in other qualities, either singly or combined: for we have stated that the several qualities, when not incompatible, may be united with each other. The agreeable may by single influence exclude all the others; as it occurred in Paradise; the perceptive principle being equally illustrated, whether in truth or in allegory. It is recorded

of Eve; and we take her as the mother-example of her sex; that her single image of delight, at the verbal perception of the flattery of her tempter, outruled the happy reverence in the memorial perception of the command of her Maker.

From what has been said it appears; the quality of singleness of perception does not belong to the natural, regular, and practical character of the mind; and is found only in that concentrated state of single and vivid, but quiescent memorial perception, which we shall give as the analysis of what is called Extacy; and in the single, vivid, and actionary state of raging madness.

We have set the term Manifold, at the head of this section, only as the antithesis in definition to that of single or few; and have therefore nothing to add, on its use in the purposes of the mind; since it is only another word for the abundance of the excursive quality. We have shown; the manifold condition of the primary and memorial constituents is found in comprehensive and original thought; and produces, with other leading powers, all the exalted works of intellect. Shakspeare and Bacon had each a mind of super-manifold excursive, and choicely-elective perceptions. We would place Aristotle and Plato along with these; but we know not, and perhaps never shall know, how far they were respectively sagacious and eloquent compilers. Still we would gladly add the names of those whose works; all too, their own; have produced the successive epochs of intellectual advancement. But the benefit and splendor of these achievements have too frequently, by the prerogative of the 'reversion of strays,' been awarded to the sweeping claims of Imperial, Royal, and other Official glory. The Age of Pericles; of Augustus; of Louis the Fourteenth, that model to France, of National egotism; and of Elizabeth; to say nothing of the hypocritical Pontificates; rise up, on the pens of tributary eulogists, as the Patrons of Science, and Arts, and Arms; which through the absorbing vividness of a single-minded personality, they indifferently tolerated, but neither valued nor understood.

Our preceding remarks on the single and the manifold condition of perceptions, may seem to be a repetition of the subject of the abundant gathering of the excursive; and of the elective, and the limited concentration of the vivid. But there appeared to be

a sufficient difference in the use, if not in the character of these several conditions, to justify their separate division. The excursive can scarcely be said; agreeably to the meaning of the term; to make its flight after a single perception, though it passes through the manifold; nor is the elective ever employed on a solitary image or type. And though the vivid is concentrated on a single perception, or on two or more of similar degrees of brightness, yet it never embraces a field of numerous images and types in the manifold of the excursive. Besides, the terms single and manifold are convenient verbal signs, for a ready designation of the extremes, in the amount of images and types, severally of all the five perceptions.

SECTION XIX.

Of the Involuntary Quality of Perception.

OF all creation, why should the human mind; as the schools and the multitude after them, suppose; be the only thing that is not the result of a necessary course of causation? Let Nature herself answer this question by a brief yea or nay: for like the crucified Son of Mary, and very unlike his contentious followers, she never argues. But her works are her words. These tell us through the senses alone, all we know of her; never tell any thing but the truth; and when she does not disclose it at once, she begins to tell it by analogies, or as they are; the parables of related truths. I long since bound myself, how poor soever my means, to watch her; yet she has never shown me, in full, nor by analogy, the fact of a voluntary power. We are left therefore, to suppose; some groundless or false analogy may have led to the metaphysical notion, that the mind has the voluntary means of directing its silent and actionary perceptions: the question; *how* or *why* this comes to pass, being no more answerable, than that of the beginning of the world, and the end of it. Not intending to argue

this question; since it is as every subject should be, a subject for demonstration; we have only to vary some analogical views already given of perceptions, that by inference, they are altogether involuntary; just as nature, not intrusting them to a self-willing Spirit, has kept them under control of her own physical necessity.

In the section on the elective quality, where the subject incidentally came before us; we endeavored to explain a view of what we called, figuratively, the *choice*, but, essentially, the *necessity* of the power of nature in the human mind, as well as in the rest of creation; and we here resume the consideration of the involuntary character of perception.

Man is prone, either by an animal instinct, or by bad education, to regard, as peculiar to himself, what is every where a common law of existence. When he uses the words *choice*, and *voluntary*, he immediately, if he thinks at all, connects with them, his self determination on the agreeable, and the disagreeable, the right and the wrong: concluding; if he cannot resolve and act as he pleases, he must be classed with those who live by compulsive causes, and be, at least metaphysically, a slave: nor does he perceive, that by the compulsion of nature, as well as by social rule, he is *always* a submissive or a rebellious slave; and that nothing, not even the Royal Brow, can ever wear the long and vainly wished but nominal Cap of Liberty. If he throws-off his habit of domination, and discards that 'liberty-mad,' and prideful distinction without a difference, between the Bondman and his Master, the voting Freeman and an unvoting Woman; he will then find his law of free-willing choice, to be the same in his mind as in all other physical creations; exhibiting there, a necessity in causative means, for the accomplishment of every intelligent end. The law of perception in the mind is like that of *elective* affinity in chemical action, merely a special application of the universal and obligatory law of nature to an invisible agency. But when the metaphysical and spiritual theologian cannot, in his narrowness, perceive this wise and unerring necessity, or ordination of the *Will* of his Creator, which is a subject of physical scrutiny; and affects to undervalue or despise the 'reason' of his works, he conceits an immaterial-self-directing work of his own, and *creates* the word, *Will*.

The use of a voluntary power in any thing, would have been foolishly ordained, for effecting that which can by an omnipotent and steady necessity be rightly done without it. And what after all, is the need of a voluntary power in the human mind, supposed to be wisely directing its own capricious purposes; when nature is every where else, by her law of necessity, directing her other equally important purposes to their necessary ends. Nature, we know, admits no redundant work; and used this general simplicity, as we learn by Geological record, long before she applied it to the intellectual system of man. We are therefore obliged to conclude, from the unity and brevity of her ways, that having thus ordained a necessity for herself, and found that 'it was good,' she could not in wise consistency, have afterwards altered her plan, and ordained a voluntary power, when she came to create the later microcosm of the human mind. But see! as we incautiously travel through the subject, we have fallen into the hands of Argument, that specious Thief of intellectual usefulness and time.

By the term Involuntary perception, I mean that necessary action of the laws of nature in the mind, which like her other physical laws, directs as in chemical attraction, the *choice* of barytes, in uniting itself with sulphuric acid; to produce a compound, which may serve another purpose, in some new physical action: In like manner, and by the same obligatory law, not by spiritual choice, perceptions are brought together by their relationships, to fulfil a subsequent purpose of the mind; which to be uniform, consistent, and effective should *be necessarily* so, and not otherwise. To speak for myself, I cannot choose, and no supposable motive would compel me, to worship a God, or to give him thanks, who with his divided Unity, complex simplicity, and partial omnipresence of his goodness, wisdom, and power, must cease to be a God; when the gross irreverence of the metaphysical school divides his laws of matter from those of the human mind. Comparing the perception of the necessary operations of matter, with the lawless caprice of the voluntary choice, by which man is said to act for himself; the latter might seem to be, the left-handed work of an apprentice; and the former, the production of the right and finishing hand of a Master.

Let us then give up the self-delusion, whether from our pride and vanity, or from the authoritative pride and vanity of some ancient oversight or ignorance, which strangely dividing the Laws of the Universe; assigns to Nature the care of brute and lifeless matter, and of the living and *unspiritual* brute; while it endows man with the voluntary power of directing himself; and we shall with a wider prospect, behold the works of the Great Creator, as he made them, in the unity of one pervading design. Man too often divides into parts, what he cannot comprehend as a whole: and therefore assuming that the mind is different in entity, and in its laws, from the rest of nature, takes-away the only means of enabling him to understand himself.

The difference of opinion on the subject of the human mind, has set one on the side of physical necessity, another on the side of a self-directing spirit. But God from whom all things proceed, is a being for singleness of Adoration, not a subject for many-sided Opinion; and the unity of principle, in his works, is not to be any way divided; much less to be broken-asunder by so wide a separation, as that between the known laws of matter, and those ascribed to the notional assumption of a spiritual Mind. Being unwilling to enter into an endless argument on that old question, of the 'Liberty or Necessity of the Will,' which as altogether of metaphorical origin, cannot be positively answered, I have given a history of part of the works of God and Nature, and my opinion of the notions of men; having therein, endeavored to show an analogous working plan in the senses and the brain, and in the rest of physical Creation: or in different words, to class the intellect, that *apparently* 'solitary instance' of an aggregate of things, with other instances of a Universal Law. But as the decision of this question would be of little importance, in a description of the practical purposes of the mind, I shall in seeming accordance with the rest of nature, speak of every mental function as Involuntary.

The method of analogy here employed, is intended only to show, that the assumed *voluntary* power of the Will is not itself analogous to the law of physical necessity, in every other obvious work of God and Nature; and therefore not deducible from the rule of that work. Leaving then the inference open, that the

action of the Will, from an analogy of purpose, may be necessary and not free; I shall always be ready to use analogies, merely as a physical picture for what may be true; and never to support a belief, which is not founded directly on perception.

In a strictly observative history of the mind, we might have the word *Will* to signify purpose or intention, according to the Latin etymology, *in*, and *tendo*, to design, and tend-to; without implying, either a spontaneous, or a compulsory cause of that tendency. Still however, we regard this intention, or 'will,' as not self-ordered, but directed by some motive or cause, which excites, or compels the quiescent state of perception into the actionary: and we can look no further, than to the agreeable or disagreeable quality, which tends to, or from, any particular thing or action. Under this view of the term Will, we should no more inquire into the free, or the submissive character of its agency, than into that of rain being raised, or of raising itself in vapor to the clouds; or of its precipitating itself, or being precipitated by the force of gravity. In the ordained and natural use of the mind, all such idle discussions would be as unknown to the strict and practical inquirer, as a question on the ultimate shape of the atoms of water, to natural philosophy; to a holy, peaceful, and *Scientific* Religion, that of the real character of King Melchisedec, and of a supernatural power in the Witch of Endor. If the law of the mind had never been separated from the general law of nature, the stock-in-trade of the dealers in metaphysical spirit, which, for the present geological period at least, has produced so much disputatious speculation, would, on the subject of the 'Will,' never have found a single customer-disciple, and dupe.

Under our view, free-will must be self-will. When self-will is continued, it is obstinacy: and who but a fool of self-will would choose to be obstinate? We endeavored to show that obstinacy in perception is one of the results of a too vivid quality. Thus it would seem, that obstinacy, self-will, and the 'Will,' are other-names for a vivid perception: and as in our plain and comprehensive view of the mind, the qualities of perceptions, with all their results, are ultimate facts, that cannot be traced to any preceding cause; we rest at present in the conclusion, that the Will cannot, in one case at least, escape from the compulsory influence of

vividness; and that with all its pretensions to voluntary power, it is reduced to the mortifying condition of an Autocratic authority, not being able to govern, or even to help itself. Here then, we point out one vivid and physical motive, capable of determining some of our quiescent and actionary perceptions. In physical philosophy; an important branch of which, we consider perceptions to be; we need not look beyond what is true to the senses, and sufficient to explain a fact: and if God is consistent with Nature, we cannot find the Will without its vividness, or other compulsory motive on all its various subjects. We speak of our intentions and purposes; meaning, what we think, and what we would do; without an immediate reference to freedom or necessity: and it would be well; on which ever side of the question truth may be found; to employ for the word Will, with all its disputatious influence, some other term to denote what we *are to think and do*; to be used with less waste of time, and less ill-natured argument.

Finally, it may be remarked, that as the impenetrable obstinacy of the Spiritualist, which is not unlike the impenetrability of his abhorred matter, must from the inexorable law of his character, continue to believe in self-will; the Necessarian will in vain endeavor to turn the microcosm of his mind from its fixed perception: for as happened with the fruitless longing of Archimedes, he will find no fulcrum for his subversive power. Taught then by the failure of an easier project of lifting the great Globe itself; the consulted shade of the despondent Syracusian would perhaps agree with us, that in the spiritual mind, there can be no crevice for a penetrative wedge of physical proof to cleave-open the solid obstinacy of its 'Will;' nor any blaze of available argument from without, to overshine and mutate the vividness of his self-satis-

SECTION XX.

Of the Durable and Evanescent Quality of Perceptions.

THE terms durable and evanescent, here denoting qualities of perception, mean the measure of their respective times, either singly or in succession; and in either the true and natural, or in the erroneous and disordered state of the mind. We do not give, for we do not require the exact measure of this time. Passing over, therefore, what is not presently essential, in our practical view of the working plan of perception; we make only the above general distinctions; leaving others to assign their various degrees of duration to the particular occasions and purposes of their use. We may severally exemplify the extremes of these two qualities, by the evanescent perception of *one* thing, in hastily counting a numerical series: and by the durable and fixed perception of single images or types in a monomaniac. The term durable applies principally, if not entirely to cases of primary, of memorial, and of joint perceptions, both unmixed and mixed. There may be an image or type of a thing, for a longer or shorter time upon a sense; a memorial image or type may continue with a similar difference in duration: and a joint perception of two or more memorials may continue so much longer than other joint perceptions, as to justify its being called durable. And this distinction of time is applicable to verbal signs, which retain the images and types of what they represent, longer than when the perception has no audible sign.

The term Evanescent is applied to those momentary perceptions, whether primary, memorial, or verbal, which pass through the mind of those whose restless and changeful pursuit of the objects of their own idleness, serve for the instant to make them laugh or fret, agree or wrangle, in the perpetual succession of excitement and collapse: which yet with a pretension to intellect, sometimes produce those momentary results, called in the meta-

physical, and in the vulgar school, the sudden 'inspiration of genius.'

If we employ the word Temporal, as a genus, embracing the two species, evanescent, and durable, we may say; each of these temporal conditions is severally united with the vivid, the excursive, the elective, the agreeable, and disagreeable, the quiescent and the actionary qualities; all of which may be respectively, and variously different in their time. The quick are generally evanescent. The vivid present the most marked instance of the durable, in the primary and the memorial. The time of the vivid is indeed variable; for they remain only till they are outruled by what we call a mutative perception; and this may be short in the changeable and vivid caprices of a fool; or be continued to any indefinite extent, in an involuntary self-willed and incurable madman. The agreeable, and even the disagreeable, without rising to the absorbing brightness of the vivid, are next to them, in producing a durable perception. The other qualities variously give rise to the durable or the evanescent.

Such being the temporal character of the durable and the evanescent qualities; we may point out their particular use, in the working plan of the mind, both in its natural state, and when perverted or diseased. To have a durable primary perception of one or more things, renders that perception impressive and distinct, and prepares it to make the memorial clearer and more durable. The durable being thus distinct, they are more efficiently collective in their excursion, as well as more accurate in their election. I have regarded the evanescent, and the durable quality, whether primary or memorial, as temporal variations of images and types upon the senses and the brain. There are several conditions of this time; and one of them has an important agency in the broad system of perceptions. It was shown; the excursive quality by its extended flight, is a ruling cause of a comprehensive intellect: and as the excursive is exercised on the memorial, more than on the primary, in the same proportion that the things we have perceived, and hold in the memory, bear to those we presently perceive by the senses; so with the few present primary; as in experimental inquiry; the excursive survey is principally made over the memorial; the former primary

having now become memorial. But we have said, of the primary, some are lost; as in those who have not sagaciously observed, and whose perception has scarcely reached the memorial form. Such primary perceptions are evanescent. Again, all those which do memorially reach the brain, lie, as it seems, secretly couched there; and consequently are not always present as images and types; yet by some unknown function of the brain are sometimes brought up before it. In this case then, the reviving or returning memorial has a time that may be called its *secret duration*; which the evanescent of the primary has not. The time of the primary is measured by the time of the presence of the thing or aggregate before the sense. The time of the memorial is varied by the occasions of their use. They may disappear in concealment for a longer or shorter time; and may after being, in their various times, once or oftener upon the brain, be afterwards forever lost.

From what has been said, the Temporal qualities of perceptions may be arranged under four different conditions.

First; that of the evanescent primary: for these disappear when the thing or aggregate is removed, and thus never reach the memorial; consequently they can have no joint and conclusive, except what may be made from the unmixed primary, which are above those of the brute, only in having the verbal sign. This is the character of perception in the great mass of mankind, on all points except those of their own profession, trade, and other particular pursuit or passion; for in these, as soon as the primary perception is agreeable, from interest or habit, it begins to take on the memorial, the joint and the conclusive form. It is evanescent on every other subject.

Second; that of memorial perceptions which have come-up and been used, but are so lost to the brain, that like the evanescent primary they never return, without the renewed presence of the things which formerly produced them. These like the unmixed primary, serve only a limited purpose in the intellectual process. As long as they existed, they may have been either durable or evanescent.

Third; of concealed memorial perceptions. These have from primary, passed into memorial; and though presently disappear-

ing, are not permanently lost; since by a peculiar, but unknown causation; for the illustration of which, the analogy of the mirror altogether fail; they are by the assistance of the verbal sign, under a necessary law of the mind, involuntarily revived, through the relationships existing among them. These perceptions are durable even in concealment; and when revived, have either a longer or shorter time as the occasion may require.

Fourth; that of revived memorial perceptions. These when brought from concealment, continue, as just remarked, a longer or shorter time, as required for joint comparison, and final conclusion.

The two last named conditions especially afford the abundant means for a convenient and effective use of perception: and as nature, in her other physical works, has with an inimitable economy, nothing in hand which she does not then require; so with a like physical agency in the mind, she keeps all types and images out of view, when she has no occasion for their representing the existence, action, and relationships of things; yet still; as the unloosened winds, in Virgil's fable of the Cave of Æolus; ready to arise with the required visible, audible, and other sensuous effects of their power and purposes.

The revival of the third or durably concealed condition here described, is if I understand the term, called in common nomenclature, 'Recollection;' as distinguished from memory: the former implying an *effort* to recall a lost image or type; the latter being as it is supposed, a spontaneous rising of the memorial perception. By reducing the confusion and complexity of language, so prevalent in the School; to a plain description of the unity and simplicity of nature, we find no ground for this difference. For all perceptions as we maintain, come up involuntarily, or by what we called the law of instinctive or *necessary* choice, in the brain: and 'recollection' seems, under our view of the mind, to be a sudden necessary recognition of an image or type, with the type of its verbal sign, upon a wide excursive perception.

Here, we learn the effects of the durable and evanescent qualities on the five constituents: the revived in memorial, and in verbal perception being important agents in the intellectual pro-

cess. The more of these revivable, on the excursive, the broader will the field of the elective be, the more related the joint, and the more accurate the conclusive.

It has been shown, that words being physical sounds, produce primary types on the ear which subsequently pass as memorial, to the brain; in like manner as other physical things produce their respective images and types. Hence, all we have said of the four forms of perception applies to the verbal; and thus the durably concealed verbal, with its revival, is an important agent, in the working of the mind: for as language mainly serves to raise, if it is so, man above the sub-animal; so memorial perception of verbal signs, when wisely employed, contribute by their durability in concealment, and their capacity of revival, to form an acute and comprehensive intellectual character.

The evanescent quality is a negative or feeble agent among perceptions. For when the primary and memorial are momentary, the exercise of all the other constituents must be equally with them, circumscribed, and faint. But further, the evanescent when they rapidly succeed each other, may so *pervert* the mind to a habitual levity, that no sedate and accurate comparison and conclusion can be effected: or they may by their desultory changes *overturn* the regular order of perception, till by the restless crossing of its own purposes, it falls at last into idiocy or madness. I have said; the proper employment of the revived memorial, together with the use of other qualities, leads to the broad and powerful exercise of the mind. The evanescent, on the other hand, sometimes gives it a character of quickness, that may suit some tastes and purposes. Minds of this character though amusing to the wise with one view, and to the vulgar with another, generally become tiresome to both; and with all their efforts to arrest a downward world by 'keeping up its spirits,' could not if left to themselves, prevent mankind from reverting into savagism.

We must here add the evanescent to the list of those qualities, formerly ascribed to the intellect of the mere wit, the scribbling writer of measure and of prose, the flippant debater on worn-out subjects, the election-demagogue, the story-teller of every kind, and the inveterate punster. All these classes derive their readi-

ness and fluency from within the narrow circuit of their minds, and have their own satisfaction; from the vanity commonly connected with an evanescent perception.

The qualities described in the present section, differ from those of the quick and the slow: for these last refer to the ready or the hesitating manner in which perceptions of things are at first seized by the primary, and subsequently revived in the memorial; not to the time of their continuance, when once received by the senses, or conveyed to the brain.

SECTION XXI.

Of the Mutative Quality of Perceptions.

WE learned, in the tenth section, under the twelfth head of our synopsis of the Qualities, that perceptions have the involuntary power of supplanting, or of overruling each other; and we now proceed to describe, and exemplify the variable conditions of this interchangeable influence.

Perception being the physical result of a law of nature, to the antecedent cause of which we cannot yet penetrate; and being an involuntary process, it follows, that we possess no power to direct it. But the law of nature is exercised in us, under her mode of *necessary choice*, to a much wiser and more useful purpose, than when left to the human sovereignty of an independent 'Will;' which independent will being nowhere discoverable in the operations of physical Creation; has, by metaphysical Theology, been ascribed to a figment of its own, and called the result of a spiritual mind. Perceptions being then under the law of physical necessity, we must refer to a like necessity for regulating and directing them to their proper end. Between the actions of these several perceptions, a due proportion is necessary; as well as a

provision against both a deficiency, and an excess in their respective functions. This proportion is to be maintained, and this provision to be supplied, by the interchangeable influence, which each, as the case requires, necessarily, and with a wise final causation, has severally over the others; and which we have called the Mutative quality, or the changing influence of perceptions.

These remarks, together with the preceding illustrations of the mutative power of the qualities, open an important subject for practical consideration. We have shown how three of these qualities, the vivid, and the faint, with the manifold, may mutually affect each other. There is a like reciprocal influence among them all. And hereupon lies an extended field for observation of their efficacy and value, in the productions of the human intellect.

By this reciprocal agency, or mutative power, we mean more particularly, that all the qualities of perception, as they severally exert their influence, may change, modify, or altogether displace each other. And as these assistant, or counteracting causes are constantly occurring in the mind; it becomes an important purpose, to observe and collect the unassorted facts in the case; though under the peculiar view of the subject here presented, we have few, if any rules upon it. It has been shown, how the vivid, the excursive, and the manifold, correctively alter each other. In like manner, the evanescent may modify, or change, or displace the more durable; the durable, the evanescent; the quick may help the slow; and the slow restrain the quick, when they exceed their purpose; the agreeable may temper, or destroy the disagreeable; and reversely the latter may outrule the former; the elective which necessarily seeks the homogeneous, may displace the heterogeneous; and in some odd and crooked minds, the latter perversely confuse, or overrule what would be the elective order of the former; the quiescent may repress the actionary; the actionary excite the quiescent; and the actionary change each other; the true may happily supplant the false, and unfortunately, much oftener, the false overpower the true. And generally, to state our proposition, there is scarcely one quality which may not, as causes and occasions occur, be master in its turn, over each of the others; or as the vivid often is, over them all. This varied reciprocity of overbearing and submission among per-



ceptions, is altogether independent of what is called *our will*; but is wisely under the *directive choice*, as we metaphorically call it, of a necessary law, too often, alas, perverted in the human brain.

We are all familiar with the term 'ruling passion.' Now, obvious passion, as we have learned, is only the actionary quality of a perception, which produces the audibly vocal, or the visibly nervous and muscular effects upon the body. The ruling passion is then no more than the ruling *perception*, either quiescent or actionary: and as a ruling passion, when it varies in the same person at different times, may be founded on different subjects, and may sometimes give-way to other passions, or in turn displace them; so vivid actionary perceptions; another name for the external signs of 'thought and feeling' may with their mutative power, at one time rule the mind; and in turn be overruled by the single or combined influence of other perceptions. We here speak of one quality displacing another, as if they were material things; for being only images and types, we regard them as the result of organization alone. And this may shock the common notions of those unaccustomed to observe and think; as well as of spiritualists, who very culpably never *observing*, do unfortunately only *think*. This organization sometimes produces a quality so vivid as to obscure or altogether hide fainter perceptions. And again, fainter perceptions can effect by numbers, what they cannot singly: for many, figuratively speaking, coming around or across a vivid one, sometimes shade or entirely eclipse it. These two cases of single vividness, obscuring many faint perceptions, and of many faint overruling one vivid, we know from observation; and these may exemplify our view of what is called a mutative power exercised among the physical qualities of perception.

It would not be difficult to illustrate the effect of this mutative quality, First, in those weak and light-minded characters, commonly termed desultory, whimsical, and inconstant. The life of changeable hopes and conduct; such persons lead, is dependent on the mutative, and reciprocal influence of their unsteady perceptions on each other. This mutative process is the same in a Second class of characters of a so-called higher position. These scarcely differ except in rank from the former; yet in the powers

and opportunities for good and for evil, they are far before them. These latter characters are found on the throne, in presidential and ministerial chairs, in state councils, and senates, in war and the church, in bank and rail-road corporations, and at the ballot box of popular opinions. The two classes differ from each principally in this: the vividly selfish and mutative perceptions of the First are exercised to their own delusion and failure; of the Second to the corruption, and final ruin of every thing in church, state, finance, morals, and law, that the finger of their transitory glory has been able to touch. One character wears-out the patience of his family and friends, by wasteful and troublesome versatility; the other, blinded by his vivid ambition, and deluding others by its pretensions to greatness, breaks-down an Empire or a bank; and only to leave an example for following ages with the like vividness of avarice or pride, to emulate and if possible to surpass.

There are then, two modes in which the mutative power is exercised: the General, and the Partial. In the general, the changes extend over all subjects of human purpose and desire. This is remarkable in children, who fly through the whole round of their restless perceptions, in their actionary efforts to be amused, whether in their harmless or their mischievous propensities. I say, harmless, if indeed the thought, that children are only to be variously amused, does not often create in them, a habit of the mutative quality, and thus an incurable disease of the mind: hence the same versatility occurs in those who continue to be grown children, in their variable fashion of dress; an affected novelty of words in literature, in the style of music; and last and lowest, a changeable fashion of the appetite, through the 'Artistic' inventions and discoveries of a French-Cook.

The Partial application of the mutative principle is observable in persons of a different mind, or of more education than those who try every thing, and then try all over again. This character is limited to that eternal plague of mankind, the ambitious busy-body, in any pursuit; who vividly, for his time, seizes on whatever may *directly* assist his purpose, but who seldom has the excursive flight, or the elective resource to answer his ends: and it is a wise ordination of nature that where the final cause is an evil intention,

there should be no effective power nor proper means, successfully to accomplish it.

Of the General mode of mutation, I here give the example of a humble individual, who beginning in nothing, ends after a life of mutative actionary perceptions, in worse than the nothing with which he began. From its grotesk character, this illustration might be assigned to a note; yet it belongs strictly to the text.

It is the case of a Boy, in whom the quiescent perception of his menial condition being so disagreeable, that it was displaced by the agreeable one; so common under a credit, and work-aborring system; of being a young gentleman. Happening, in biting the edge of a piece of bread and butter, to gnaw-out something like a profile of his master's nose and chin; and this being the wonder of the kitchen, a new perception, representing the art of painting, comes before him; and this excluding all others, he takes to chalking figures on the wall, draws the maids' faces; and soon acquiring that vividly excluding perception which makes the painter's memorial eye; begins to beg, borrow, and save, to enable him to be vain and indolent enough to be an Artist. Some Scone-painter takes him in hand. But ambition once begun, there is no end to the number and succession of its mutative perceptions. The dazzle of the Actor's foot-lights, and of the dress-circle eclipses the color and gold-leaf of the Painter; and 'Dick the apprentice' has now before him, one blazing perception of Theatric Glory. It is a law of sympathy between human minds, that a vivid or fanatical perception in one, is by the vividness or force of its particular verbal, and generally of an actionary sign, easily communicated to another; together with its vanity, exclusiveness, and delusion. On his first appearance, the touching effect of the bright perception he has of his own 'genius,' voice, and gesture; sympathetically touches Lady Mary's daughter, with a sudden and intense idolatry to the idol of himself. Immediately a vivid perception of Rank and Title becomes his 'Pillar of fire.' He now however has the vividly disagreeable perception of his want of some sort of education for the necessities of *high-life*. He borrows from a friend having an eye to good company and remuneration; and employs

tutors. Lady Mary discovers what is going on, and takes her daughter abroad. But he has learned enough to create in him a bright perceptive hope; so rare with the stage; of being an *educated* Player; and vividly foresees himself, the Garrick of the Green-Room. He joins a literary Club. Here he finds each member so vividly and exclusively occupied with his own Works and reputation, that nobody has a perception of his. The brightness of his literary hopes fading, he goes, with some strolling Thespians, to San Francisco. Here after a calculating view of the chances of justice from the Committee of Vigilance, and of hopes from the Rogues, he has a vivid perception of Military Glory; is made; taught or untaught; Colonel of a Gang of Filibusters, and under view of Presidential and Cabinet Authority, winking at adventures, makes his way to Nicaragua. Finding his enemies more than ready for him, he is quite satisfied to run away: and getting back to the Country of Universal but not Special Justice, and the proffered Asylum of too many vagabonds, he is feasted in its great Trading Metropolis, for his Invading Benevolence, his honor, and his unflinching Bravery. His preparatory term has not yet elapsed, but by an accommodated fraud in the Office, he is naturalized; and from his capacity for change, he is made the leader of the odd-end of a popular party. He has now a vivid perception of Political Place, and is burning to become one of the 'Honourables' of the Country; but is told, there is in the high-road to Legislative and Official power, a narrow necessity, through which he must squeeze; he therefore buys a small green bag, and enters a Lawyer's office, where by minding the door, and taking messages, he gets law enough in return, to serve his young ambition. With a nice adaptation of the Part to the Man, he is made Overseer of the Poor; with the bright Star of the Presidency in the distance, and a vivid hope of an alteration of that Article in the Constitution against Foreigners.

In this vision however, he is reminded of his friends in the literary Club: and finds with all his political joinings of heart and hand, every man for himself, and no chance for him that is not. He now has a very disagreeable perception of Democracy; and turning with agreeable hopes to Science, takes part in a

scheme for a 'patent Pump.' But he soon has a disagreeable perception that the *Head-Business-Man* keeps him at work, and keeps all the profits himself. He is now in the usual way, overcome to mono-madness, by the American vision of Paper Credit; and is sent by a 'Board of knowing Financiers,' with *knowing* arguments, for enabling 'Honorable' Legislators to sophisticate the Morals of Bribery, and then to Charter that double-barrelled instrument, a Bank-and-Rail-Road, with the privilege of a single and a deadly aim. For his services, he is made President; since the more unfit, the easier managed; while between the Directors *minding* their own business, and *overlooking* the President's, some Nobody gets the Funds, the public and the stockholders are swindled; and from the great numbers interested in the fraud, nobody is punished of course. And now he is brightly ambitious to serve the Country of his adoption. His Excellency the Executive, for some important consideration, nominates him for a Place: and there positively is discrimination and honor enough in the Senate, to reject him by a Majority of *one*. Being out of funds, notwithstanding the Bank and Rail-road, he asks assistance of his political *friends*, who thus to get rid of him, obtain 'bed and board' for him at a Fashionable Watering Place, as 'Beau Nash' of the season, Letter Writer to the House, and Annoyer to the decent portion of the guests by introducing any and every body to them. Here in a vividness of his need, which mutates the perceptive fear of detection and punishment, he takes to himself a two-dollar counterfeit note, with a Lady's worthless ring; and is sent to the Penitentiary; after escaping the law for Filibusters, Bank-swindling, and other trifling offences, against a Public, sympathizing with the Missionaries of Freedom, Anti-slavery, and the artful Rascalities of Credit Capital. But a fellow convict, more righteous than the Law, in a quarrel, from a too bright and covetous perception of his tobacco, fulfilled the negligent duty of Justice, by choking him in prison: yet the still tender-hearted and commiserating Public buried him at its own expense.

I have, with the momentary perception of Lady Mary's daughter, omitted all the inconstant mutations of our gallant among the 'fifty fair damsels' he may have jilted, if indeed no more:

for I wished to leave out of this illustrative sketch, what might give it the character of a skeleton love-story, to be verbosely fleshed-out into a popular novel, or a magazine-tale of the day. This is not an over-drawn picture. The like may be found in every age and country; but perhaps more abundantly in our own; where the greater, and a very bad portion of its so-called liberty, consists in the restless Anglo-Saxonism of every one as he pleases, changing his pursuit, and striding on paper and ambitious stilts over the industry of his neighbor, employs the wasteful rivalry of a fictitious credit to ruin himself; and then looks to the abundant Americanism of Public Office, to support him in his own incapacity for it. There are cases like the above example, of the vividly mutative and actionary quality of perceptions; persons whom education has not tended to help the mind towards its natural order and purpose, who can never be controled from without, except; and not always then; under the mutative compulsion of the whipping post, the pillory, the stocks, incarceration, an elephant-taming starvation, or the hopeless submission of white or negro slavery. Even in these cases the vividly actionary perception of their personal disposition; induces them, in overruling the fainter perception of detection and punishment, to resist or rebel in one case, and to break jail, or their necks in another.

The Partial mode of mutative perception is exemplified in those who are regarded as the leading, but who are too often the driving characters of the world. These with a certain degree of conventional education, have a *glimpse* of the steady, equalized, and productive course of the true and natural use of the mind; and are therefore less liable to fall into the extreme mutability of the womanly caprices of the former. Still the mutations, as far as they occur, are no less vivid in the quiescent; nor are the actionary less obtrusive and overbearing; yet the effects of this changeable intellect, are more extended and more disastrous. Nine-tenths of the world's *great men*, in the executive duties of Church and State, belong to this class. It is under this mutative influence, that the Ecclesiastic, the Soldier, and the Demagogue 'of fortune;' from the obscurity in which they had better have remained; rise by what is called 'Force of character.' This force of character consists in the excluding vividness of the quiescent,

and the force of the actionary quality, which in the General influence of mutation, produce the insensibility, the presumption, and folly of the vagabond: but which in the Partial, with no more wisdom, produce, under the name of 'daring ambition,' the equally thoughtless adventurers of an unbalanced and a reckless mind: with this difference only; that the 'Man of Mark' is more mischievous than the man without the Mark. Thus the practical consequences of the vivid mutability of these two classes of characters, differ only in degree. Friends are laid under contribution to pay the debts and funeral expenses of one; and the public are taxed, for palaces, pensions, statues, and triumphal arches, due from a 'loyal people' to the destructive capacity of the other.

As I have explained the operation of the law of the vivid and mutatory perception; I need scarcely choose for illustration of the Partial Mode, from that crowd of characters, at the present, and of other times, from which the intelligent Reader may himself select and measure by that law. I will however, take an instance so recently before the world, that most of its superficial, though not analytical details are in every-day memorial type before us.

The last conspicuous 'Scourge of God,' whose ambitious purpose was to make his name known to his own age and to posterity; and according with that purpose, here personally referred to; was an illustration of this partial mode of the mutative quality. This man; if the nation, once under his tyrannic control, is now free enough to think him no more than a man; changed his perceptions of the means of glory, as he advanced step by step, from a humble military servant of the people, to the mastership of an Imperial Autocrat. These perceptions were vividly quiescent, and impulsively actionary. But whatever their mutation, they always presented the same dazzling picture of himself, within their bounded circle: and allowing no excursion nor election beyond the halo of that selfish light. Nor with all his changes, was the circuit of his perceptions more extended at one period of his life than at another; the mutations being still into a brighter and brighter picture of himself. He had, judging by its effects, the same organization of senses and brain, exercised in the same un-

alterable working plan. This was lighted up in his childhood, for an excluding vividness, in whatever occupied him. In that light it continued through life; and as that light went-out, a muttering delirium still proclaimed his self-glorifying position, at the head of his army and of the world.

His ever-present perception was the image or type of his ambition. He saw it as they pictured him on the Alps; in his battles; and at his coronation; he heard it in the echoed report of his victories, and the hailing shouts of the people; felt it as he set his seal to the mandate of his authority, and in his sexual hope of continuing his dynasty; tasted it at banquets to his honor; and inhaled it in the priestly incense of *te deums* to his glory. He was vividly but not broadly a thinker: yet throwing occasionally sparks of that light beyond the limited field of his selfishness, they would sometimes shine upon an insulated, and to him a useless truth; at moments too, there appeared spots of generosity on the disk of his ambition; which served by striking contrast to draw more eyes to its brightness; and sycophancy reported these accidents of intellect, as the mercies of an all-powerful and an all-seeing mind. Having only self-conceited glimpses of things, beyond the epitome of his ambitious knowledge, he did not regard, for he did not fully comprehend, a more excursive flight; and elective comparison. He permitted some side-scenes, and by-play in the sciences and arts, for the influence they might have in attracting the world to the dramatic light of his *starring* character. Yet he changed with time, his enacted tragedies. He changed the past of his worldly religion; changed the past of his politics; and changed the design of his conquests; each of his mutations taking on its piercing vividness, and its impulsive action, and fatal habit. But there is always a last scene; and the dark curtain closes on the Actor. It was humorously said, that he bowled at the Nine Pins of Kings and Emperors. The humming-top of the child would furnish a stricter figure: for the whirling impetus of his ambition being exhausted, this gigantic and world-exciting toy, with all its resounding glory, reeled, and fell at last into quietude before its time. It is reported of this same man, when in the height of his power, that he then said; 'he felt himself great enough to be just;' betraying a characteristic,

a vivid, and therefore limited perception of that universal and godlike virtue, as if it were the offspring of his own concentrated ambition.

As it occurs in all-pervading minds of Rank and Power; with vivid perceptions, announced by vivid and expressive language, this man excited the vivid sympathy of those around him, to regard his mind as he himself memorially perceived it; and to ascribe to that mind excursive and elective perceptions on many subjects, perhaps far beyond its power. For he saw himself only in a pictured vividness, which excluded every thing except his ambitious purposes. Thus it appeared to himself to be a full and consistent mind; for it harmonized throughout, with its own vivid selfishness. As then the greatest to himself, so alone worthy to be regarded as the greatest by others. For thus, one of his Generals, and a favorite, sympathizing with the vivid perceptions of his chief, did regard it: pronouncing it to be; one of the most capacious, (*broadly primary and memorial*) the most extended, (*widely excursive*) the most profound, (*excursive, suppose downward*) and the most productive, (*effectively and universally actionary*) that ever existed!!

A writer who undertakes to describe the mind of another, should have a mind of broad observation and reflection, capable of encompassing his subject; or at least, should know the powers of the working plan of the senses and the brain, as a fortress should be described by an Engineer, not by a Novelist who may say any thing. Of the above transcendent, but general, and indefinite character, it must be remarked, that the mind of every idolater, is from its vivid concentration, necessarily limited; and that the Favorite General lived within the speciality of a French Camp; and of a Parisian circle, in extatic Beatitude at the grandeur of the Empire and the Man; and pronounced that eulogy, after the reverses of military glory had left the Imperial possessor of that paragon of mind, like our impoverished Filibuster, to be controlled by some better balanced intellect in the Warder of their respective prisons.

This last 'Scourge of God,' with a self-relying confidence, was born among conventional minds, was obliged to live for conventional minds, and to receive his fame from that mediocrity of

mind which can perceive and act only in convention. But his conventionalism had a quicker and more vivid quiescent, and a more energetic actionary perception, than all the conventional drones who surrounded him: and like Luther, and Paine, had power to shake habitual and drowsy conformity; and when aroused, to be the Leader of revolution or reform. There must have been, we know not how many, in France, when the corruption, and vices, and wealth of Church and State were overthrown, able, on the emergency, to compose the passions, and curb the heterogeneous, and impracticable assumptions of plebeian sovereignty and ignorance. When man undertakes to govern himself, as he calls it, this control, sooner or later becomes necessary: and the Corrective Scourge surpassed all his competitors for this fated and righteous command; by him so happily applied to bridle an ignorant, wild, and self-destructive Liberty. The natural Qualities of his perceptions enabled him to take this preparatory step. He could restrain the national mind, but he could not direct it; for his Nature ordained no mutative power to change his own ambitious purpose; and ignorance was as ambitious as himself. He tyrannically sought to make men think and act as he pleased; but could not conceive the great originality of teaching them to think and act for themselves; though he had the power to patronize some '*National Institute*,' for that unheard of enterprise. Governed by the strong centripetal force of ambition, it was the reverse, both of his purpose and his power, to throw an enlarging and encompassing thought upon the age; and France reverted back again to France, unaltered France, still like himself changefully ambitious, when he left it. While he lived he did much for his country, that was compatible with doing more for himself.

In the description here given, change the name of the Adventurer, and the principles merely illustrated in him will apply to every sword-in-hand Ambition-Hunter; from the earliest Nimrod; down to the last detestable troubler of the earth.

I have thus, some may say, ventured to solve one of the World's Enigma-Intellects, by comparing it with what seems to be the ordained and wisely working process of the natural, truth-finding, and right-directing human mind. I here offer the

result as it appears; being equally unsworn, as I think, to the formula and the man.

Between the extreme examples here given of the general and the partial influence of the mutative quality, there are many conditions and degrees of its use, throughout the varied characters of the mind. The principle here illustrated may be applied by the Reader, if he thinks the subject deserves it.



SECTION XXII.

Of the Qualities of Conformity and Independence in Perception.

By Conformity in the mind, we mean a temporary agreement upon mere Opinion; either through ignorance or authoritative error; so common under the theoretic views of knowledge, and from the relations of every kind, between man and man. Opposed to this, there is an enduring Independence upon what we learn by cultivated primary perception: and this is received, except by metaphysical sophists, as the only and sufficient test of truth. But the term conformity has, by its use in theology, politics, morals, and medicine; subjects of leading human interest; been so often applied to agreement in vague and changeable notions, that it has to a strictly observative intellect, become the designation of party adherence to temporary sectarian, and scholastic creeds; and as such we employ it here.

The quality of Conformity, which we set in contrast with that of Independence of perception, somewhat resembles the instinct that brings together the innumerable individuals of sub-animal species under unchangeable laws. This uniformity of instinct in the different species, is the ordination of Nature, for their peaceful intercommunion, practical self-government, and protection. And so it remains. The ignorance of the human mind, as it

slowly advances from a state of sub-animal perception, in childhood, and the earliest savagism, would seem to require a similar uniformity in thought, for the protection and assistance of that incompetent ignorance. In this early weakness of the mind, we perceive a cause of the then allowable and useful conformity. The natural progress of the mind, from this weakness, is to an accumulative knowledge, which should enable it to assist and protect itself. This would be the independent course, under the working plan originally ordained by nature. But as knowledge is enlarged, some causes, yet unknown, pervert that plan; and the mind becoming confused and incapable of wisely taking care of itself, is obliged to seek the social protection of a community of thought, something like the conformity of sub-animal instinct; though not so safe and efficacious. The conforming instinct of the sub-animal gives a unity of design, with an unchanging course to all its purposes. The conformities of men are variously classed by their opinions, their follies, errors, and vices; each severally conjoined in their obstinacy, as long as the bond exists. The sub-animal clearly knows his natural instincts, and unerringly applies without authoritative example, his quiescent and actionary perceptions. Man, with his pretensions to a higher knowledge, obtained through metaphysical delusion; and too often limited and unintelligible; is obliged to seek the assistance of a partizan and majorative authority, which he thinks he understands, to direct him; and in government, morals, religion, and medicine, betrays his doubts on what he has bound himself to believe, and would rely-on, by quarreling with all conformities except his own.

We thus trace conformity, with all its consequences, to a timorous ignorance; one of the poisonous roots of the folly and error of every quiescent and actionary perception: and it will be found, universally, that uninstructed, feeble, narrow, and thoughtless minds, in their various degrees, are altogether supported and led by the tie of conformity; yet vainly conceiting, it is by their own brave enterprise of thought. Whereas minds of enlarged knowledge, comprehensive excursion, and joint comparison, follow their own sagacious observation, and *intellectual experiment*; for there is in the brain, a kind of experimental search after truth, by the

collections of the memorial, and trial by the joint, as well as in the senses by primary perception.

It is worthy of remark; that man so self-sufficient, and self-directed, as he thinks, in his physical purposes and acts, should so readily yield the freedom of his mind to mischievous opinions. It must however, be observed; that the physical functions, as commonly distinguished from the intellectual, are still under the ordained Law of Nature, and therefore justly fulfilled in all their purposes: but the original working plan of the mind, has by some early and unknown causation, been in most men, perverted or entirely broken-up, and removed beyond their own corrective control. The intention of Nature if it may be analogically inferred, seems to be; that the mind should be a perfect self-sufficiency; should be able properly to employ its primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, with their verbal signs; and by the assistance of other minds of like natural character, to observe, listen, and read; and from its gathered materials, to think as it is called, for itself. This independence is to be exercised, not in the pride of mere disagreement, but with an earnest and defensive love of truth; altogether regardless of the forbidding authority of the pen and tongue of man; of church, and state, and schools; of the revered tyranny of wealth and rank, and of the thoughtless influence of the popular voice; with the precious powers of perception, fixed on the works of God and Nature, and nothing but their works. Yet with the original means for *observing* the truth and purpose of all these works, it would seem, from the Story of Eden; for even the parable serves; that metaphysical persuasion, then and there; as it is said, cut short the life and purity of man; and must with its proofless and accursed 'Logic,' have sown those intellectual thorns, and thistles, and tares, which still respectively pierce the quietude, thwart the fruitful industry, and mar the dignity of his intended happy and his hopeful mind.

And so it is; that through the limited, imperfect, or erroneous exercise of the senses and the brain, the insufficiency of means to direct the man, becomes, by experience of his failures, vaguely apparent to himself; and he is forced to ask assistance from the minds of others, which upon further experience, he finds to be no

better than his own. This assistance is received through the senses of hearing and sight by a verbal or a written sign; so that the verbal or fifth constituent of the mind; which has been shown to give extension, durability, precision, and force, in the proper exercise of the other four; becomes when perverted to the representation of their abuses, the proximate cause of conformity, with all its narrowness, weakness, and error.

I have noted excessive vividness as a positive, and very general vice or disease of perception. The vice of conformity is no less prevalent, and scarcely less fatal to the cause of truth. It is both positive and negative in its influence on the mind: positive, in the power of error, when supported by the popular repetition of itself; and negative, from the blindness which always comes over gregarious *opinions*, and prevents the mind receiving that light of independence which; alas for the prospects of mankind; is too often found to proceed with greater clearness and utility only from the Few.

I will endeavor to exemplify the manner in which nine-tenths of mankind upon most subjects, are by imbecility, or the necessities of interest, and ambition, forced into conformity; and the greater part of the other tenth, drawn towards it. Let us suppose a man of common capacity and education, and any woman, with or without education; for I here speak of women, because they seem privileged to employ no other than their vivid perceptions of their own concerns and hopes. Let the individual be informed of some important event; or set an object of usefulness or taste; an agricultural implement, a picture, or a statue; before him, for joint and conclusive perception. We allow this person to be, in common phrase, intelligent, and well-informed, whether King, minister, lawyer, parson, doctor, or man of business; one whose conservative pride of character is, never to differ from the *world*: and though he is sure to differ from individuals who *think* for themselves; yet he is always ready to submissively regard what he has been taught to consider the conventional influence of distinguished, that is popular minds. Having brought himself under the rule of others, he now hesitates to give an opinion, till he has the support of leading authorities. For being unwilling to confess ignorance, through some conceit in his quiescent

perception; this is not of so vivid a degree, nor is it so well founded, as to produce an actionary verbal sign; and thus he is not prepared to defend his decision should it be questioned. He therefore waits for the *words* of authority, that he may give them as his own, even though he may not understand them. This is one of the modes of submission to individual authority, in which there is neither intellectual benefit nor credit; and which extended to a submission more or less general, is with no reliable meaning, but with a vividly excluding perception, called Conformity. It then becomes a fatal epidemic of belief, under the varied names, of party, sect, persuasion, hetero and orthodoxy, sworn-brotherhood, free or rather slave masonry, school of philosophy, medicine, or theology, patriotism, and fashion: all which forms of disease, though variously changing their seats and symptoms, proceed from the same afflictive cause; a use of the confused and contradictory dogmas and terms of metaphysical inquiry, instead of the orderly system of the five obvious physical constituents of the mind.

The Nonconformist; for I here adopt the term applied by the Sectary, as a reproach to those who do not believe his fictions; forms his conclusions in a different manner. When told of the important event, or on viewing the implement, the picture, or the statue, and having, by the right use of his perceptions, learned the difference between those two opposite states of mind; knowledge and ignorance; which as the world tries it, is a hard thing to learn; he determines in a moment, that he has either a limited or an extended knowledge of the facts of the event, the principles of the implement, or the esthetic rules of the picture, and the statue. With these undisputed facts, principles, and rules, his own cautious perceptions, assisted by a like cautious perception in others, enable him, confidently to decide upon them. If then we may use the word in a strict and favorable sense, he does conform, not to avowing opinion; but to knowledge, ascertained by the orderly use of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions. This is the real and enduring agreement which nature invites a just and independent observation to hold with her existences, actions, and their unnumbered relationships; so different from the unsteady conformity which sectaries demand of a mind per-

verted and enslaved, beyond every means and hope of freedom. We do not say; arithmeticians, geometers, and practical mechanics, in their own several arts, respectively *conform* among themselves; for they all *observe*, with a real identity of the images and types of things, not a conventional conformity with the opinions of men. The agreement of those who are to be educated under a knowledge of the proper working plan of the mind, will always be both sure and productive. The perpetually changing conformity under the fictional delusion, though it is always distasteful and unsatisfactory to those who would avoid contention, has produced only one wide agreement to dispute. With what havoc has not the vain and versatile notions in Church and State, invaded the friendship, family quiet, and every natural right of human life; upon any departure from their temporary but tyrannical conformities: which havoc we are taught, is decreed for holy purposes, by what is called the beneficent providence of God: but which is produced by that Almighty and general law of Nature, ordained from the beginning, that when man transgresses the particular physical law of his mind, he must suffer the necessary physical punishment. And what ties of friendship, delightful and lasting content, and endless progress are not, through unproud science, derived from the steadfast powers of a beneficent Nature, who never varies from the ordination of her own beneficent Almighty.

To be a nonconformist to mass-majorities of every kind, in government, religion, and even in the flimsy changes of universal fashion, is to prepare for the Bastile, the Stake, and for the Pointing Finger of the fellowship of gibbering Fools. We may thus perceive the evils of the world's conformity; and by comparing them with the benefits of that agreement with itself, for which nature has prepared the mirror of the mind; but which man with the restraints of his sectarian yoke, has never yet accomplished. Where the rule of conformity prevails; and where does it not prevail; the progress of knowledge is delayed, if not altogether arrested; for few are able to alter the current opinion, and still fewer are willing to incur the penalty of nonconformity with it. On the other hand, by the unharnessed exercise of the five constituents, the same principles of agreement in what we *know*, become the principles of fellowship in progressive additions to

knowledge: and as it occurs in the observative and experimental sciences, the penalty falls upon the stubborn objector; who from some previous conformity, will not change to an agreement with the newness of truth.

We have learned that the qualities of perception may be united: and there appears to be a union of the agreeable with the conformable in unobservant and unreflective minds; which may be the reason, why persons of this character are unwilling to forsake the conforming flock. We see an illustration of this, in the use of the verbal sign, which is so immediately connected with thought; since we seek and enjoy the company not only of those who perceive like ourselves, but of those who merely speak the same language. Lovers are in part, delighted with each other, as long as they generally are, by exchanging the same or similar words of reciprocal passion. And further, there is perhaps in the timid weakness of conformity, a reliance on the influence, and mutual support of *like-thinking* numbers, which may be agreeable, and encouraging to the despondence of mental imbecility, as well as to that concentrated selfishness, the love of power, and even to the vain and fictitious memorial perception of it. It was a sharp reproach from Christ to the Jews, in their narrow notions of a Theocracy, and it applies to every sectarian mass; that they loved darkness rather than light. And his courageous adherence to the principle of nonconformity with that darkness; in which he stands-out a bright example to most of his thought-bound and puny followers; brought him at last to the Cross: and to that cross, even they who rely on his Millennial coming, would take him a second time if he were to correct the back-sliding of their metaphysical and distorted Faith; and reprove their canonical conformities to the revolting corruptions of his Gospel simplicity.

It is this love of conformity among enthusiasts, and bigots; who catechise others, but never themselves, which makes the difference of their minds from those of observing, reflective, and independent reformers; whose nonconformity begins with a searching inquiry into their own, and into every original mind. Am I not right in this high estimate of the principle of a disinterested and critical nonconformity? For the broad and exalted mind has

to apply, and to exercise it in the cause of progressive truth. Those who are unchangeably satisfied in sectarian opinions, resemble the lover, who never questions the merits of his mistress: and thus the identity of feeling in the lovers, and of opinion, in the whole flock of conformists, respectively prevents all equally, from seeing the beam, or the mote where they do not expect to find it. And although it is true; the eye cannot see itself, the eye of the right and independent mind does always know itself, as well as reflect every thing else. But the pupil of both the eye, and of the mind, contracted by the vividness of conformity, lets in barely his own sectarian spark of faith, with neither length nor breadth nor other intellectual extension.

It was stated above, that perhaps reason might be found for conformity, in the pleasure it affords a weak and thoughtless mind; and we adduced an instance of our pleasure from a conformity in language. But to show how a departure from the only source of conclusive knowledge, in the joint and orderly use of the five mental constituents, will lead to confusion, and absurdity, let us consider the fashionable fact of the Italian Opera in England and America: for here a vivid conformity makes the unmusical and untaught pretender affect to feel, and under that affectation, to take intense delight in the unmeaning mannerism of the mere agilities of the *Florid song*; through a language he imperfectly hears, and does not in the least part understand. It is true, the display of self, and dress, and the vivid perception of being within the fashionable Circle, is with many, their only interest in this exciting pastime; but in assigning this reason, we only change one kind of conformity for another.

Of the many mental perversions; that produced by the union of vividness with conformity, is among the most purblind and the worst. This produced severally the political and religious atrocities by the Jacobins of France, and the Inquisitorial Bigots of Spain; one employed in teaching the freedom-rights of man; the other in fiercely compelling Christian duties to the Church and to its misrepresented God. And let it be remembered, that it was conformity alone in the mass, without the vividness of the chief Fiends, and Priests, which led the country, and age to submit. There are no bounds to the power of this vicious Despot of

the mind; the Quality of Conformity, in perceptions. But perhaps the intelligent Reader may think I have said more than necessary, to enable him to extend the principle over the whole field of its application.

I have taken only a passing notice of the Independent quality, being satisfied to contrast it with its opposite; Conformity: for surely, he who does not like independence, will be found in the ranks of conformity; and any one, in whom we miss the wavering opinion, the reference to popular authority, and the fear of claiming his own 'soul,' till others allow him the pittance; he will necessarily belong to the former class.

Let me add a word more, on the subject of this section. There has always been a banishing proscription, and sometimes an exterminating war, upon the independent use of the mind. He who exercises this independence on government is called an agitating Revolutionist. He who applies it to reform an absurd or corrupt religion, is abhorrently styled a Freethinker. These titles are just and complimentary. For the mind that remains uncorrupted, has in its natural freedom and its love of truth, the purpose and often the power to reform, revolutionize or overthrow the conventional errors and vices of constitutions and creeds. To think freely, or independently, is not to think with an ignorant self-will, on the limited subject of our interest; it is to apply the laws of perception to every thing that comes before it; to the phenomena of nature; to the works; and to the opinions of men. That application has produced every known truth, and when unobstructed, will correct every possible error. To think freely, or independently, is strictly to follow the natural course of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception. This we have endeavored to show, is the law of the senses and the brain, in representing the necessary existences, the actions, and other relationships of nature, which are ordained by her Almighty Ruler. But that ordination may be transgressed, and perverted, by ignorance, pride, self-interest, and ambition, to an overbearing conformity. The cause of humanity has therefore, been wisely embraced in that ordination, by a provisional regard to the protective and regenerative labors of the Free; or independent; thinkers. To oppose the exercise of freethinking on any subject of inquiry, is to

oppose the command of an inseparable God and Nature; that the mind should freely observe and think: for the great Creative cause directs the mind to perceive what it may, and the vivid to proclaim it; as he made the free and unlimited wind, to 'blow where it listeth,' and that we should 'hear the sound thereof.'

I was *once*, and only once, in this age of patriotic tongue-serving, called upon to give a public lecture. This, for many reasons, I declined. Among the *conditions* of speech, *all* subjects were *free* to choice, except those of Politics and Religion. And considering the advanced state of our intelligence, by public schools, and telegraphic velocity, the restraint was a proper police caution, to prevent confusion, riot, and possible blood-shed. But certainly, it showed a savage infancy, in knowledge of the purpose of the mind; that on two of the most important subjects of human thought and happiness, there should be a necessity for 'keeping the peace,' by preventing the progress of intellectual civilization, in thus fencing off the least approach of Independence, towards the sacred confines of Conformity.

The People of a Republic, by a kind of habit of not understanding what they say; are always boasting of their metaphysical term Liberty, and annoying other communities, by endeavoring to *force* its litigious and impracticable notions of independence upon them; forgetting that liberty, whatever that may mean, like charity with the selfish class, should begin in the home of their own mind and conduct; for they might then learn, from their personal experience, how the benefits of liberty and independence, might with less indelicate, and obtrusive ostentation, be extended to others. The motto to the arms, of one of the States of the Union, is '*Virtue, Liberty, and Independence.*' Its wise and honorable Legislators may explain its American meaning. We the People do not understand it; and have not yet seen its practical application.

SECTION XXIII.

Of the Qualities of Truth and Falsehood in Perceptions.

TRUTH, or the true quality of perception, consists in a faithful representation of the things of nature and of art, and of their relationships, on the mirror of the senses, and the brain. The term truth is then applicable to the exactness of that representation: and as a correspondence of the images and types of things in the mind of the percipient, with those of others, is the only subject to which we refer in using the term; so all exercises of the mind, by which we are said to arrive at truth, whether syllogistic, mathematical, or figurative, are to be considered equally vain or false, if they do not directly, or indirectly include the proof of this exact representation. This universal proposition should have been the simple answer to Pilate's confounding question; when impatient at the farrago of Greek, Jewish, Egyptian, Persian, and Christian Opinions, he asked, 'what is truth;' and well knowing; this question could not be answered at once and fairly by the disputants, he went on with the trial.

We altogether reject here, the ever variable inferences, or proofs as 'strong as holy writ,' and other terms in the sophistry of the vulgar tongue; so contrary to the simple and decisive Yea, or Nay, upon the truth of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions. Let us illustrate our own meaning, by what is told, figuratively, we must suppose, of the forbidden fruit in Paradise. Under the simplicity of the command; the brief Yea of assent, or the Nay of refusal, on the offer of the apple, would have been clear and conclusive. But when the tempting metaphysical 'Reasoner' came, the agreeable and vivid primary and memorial beauty of the fruit; the false joint comparison between knowledge and ignorance; the conclusive palliation of the sin of disobedience; all enforced by flattering the woman into a bewildering conceit, she consented; and met the fate of that confusing thought which attends the changing vividness of vanity and am-

bition. One would be disposed to think; the Egyptian Priest, by whom Moses was educated, may have had an anticipative view of the system, and the working plan of the mind, that we have endeavored to describe from nature; and may have furnished the great Lawgiver, with the parable of Eden, to warn-him against admitting the 'devilish' artifices of the 'reasoning faculty' into the popular oratory of a commonwealth, and into the diplomacies about a throne. If so, and had he given the plain verbal sign, of his hieroglyphic picture; he would, at least, have deprived me of much absorbing, retired, and delightful occupation, in thus attempting to supply his omission.

The design of nature, if we may interpret her, in ordaining the true and regular use of the five forms of perception; is, that through an equality in the just exercise of those constituents, all minds should be alike in perception. And the inevitable result, if not the design of scholastic *tempters* in all the ways of common 'reasoning,' as it is called, is to make not only individuals, but masses of mankind differ from one another, in their perceptions of things; and by that difference, to divide the strength of a general equality, and thus to give the crafty few a power over the divided and weakened multitude.

It is obvious, on a view of the division of the mind into its constituents; there is no place for argument, in the common meaning of the term. There are indeed, series of predications, both affirmative and negative, composed of all the forms of perception, and directly terminating in a decision. But as we represent the mind, its proper and productive purpose is, naturally to observe; contrivingly to experiment on that observation; jointly to compare; conclusively to decide; and verbally, without two forensic sides, to declare the result. The process called argument, should only by a kind of analogy, be carried-on in the joint perceptions of the percipient. Common 'Logical' argument, as the conventional means of conclusion, is one of the perversions of the five constituents, and is part of the intellectual method of the lawyer, the *discussing* legislator, and the polemic theologian.

This is the view our natural system of the mind takes of truth; a term referable only to its perceptions; and employed only to distinguish real things, from a false or defective description of

them; and never required, in surveying the realities of things, except to contradistinguish their misrepresentation on the mirror of the senses and the brain.

Throughout the preceding systematic account of perceptions, they have been regarded only as the *true* images and types of the existences, actions, and other relationships of things; in their primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive forms. We will now consider the misrepresentation of nature, by the false character of perceptions.

Every thing is true in nature. That is, every thing corresponds to its design. Nature like her Almighty, cannot even conceive an imperfection or a falsehood; except it is suggested by that outlaw of Creation, a disorderly human mind. Thus every true existence and action can be no other than it is. But it is different with human perceptions; and there are few of us in whom the mind is not, in a greater or less degree, questionably fictional, or manifestly false. Look wherever the mind has been used, whether on earthly or what are called heavenly things; on governments, the affections, rights, duties, and the common business of men; and say what a mere mite of truth, with its wisdom and justice there has been, to permit; for it is man by his mind, not God permits; the miseries of life; and to allow the mind to be so overwhelmed with despair, of happiness in this world, as to produce a compensatory hope of happiness hereafter. But God and his Nature have always had a few witnesses of their design to give happiness here on earth; and we may find one of its means, in a true knowledge, classification, and appropriate use of the five simple constituents of the mind; for the use of the mind is a cause of happiness or misery, accordingly as its perceptions are false or true.

Falsity may arise from various causes, both organic and functional. We know, there are deformities in parts of the body, which limit or destroy their actions: and by analogy there may be defects in the organization of the senses and the brain. The form or manner of the defective or diseased organization of the senses is in part known; but that of the perceptive brain is altogether hidden. The common phraseology, hardening and softening of the brain, with other terms of morbid anatomy, have no assignable con-

nection with the known and special errors of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions. Inasmuch then, as we are ignorant of the proximate succession of cause and effect in the brain; the errors of the mind, except from obvious lesion, born-idiocy or disease, can be apparently ascribed, only to an education, and exercise, contrary to the exact and regular course, in which nature has directed the orderly use of the five constituents, under their properly adapted qualities. Defective organization, which however we cannot especially discern; and deviations from propriety and precision, in the use of the five forms of perception, and consequently of their several qualities, thus produce the errors and limitations of the mind in its purpose of representing the realities of things. In the use of the five forms of perception, and of their verbal signs, the errors are of several different characters.

First. The 'primary may be in a measure neglected, and the unmixed memorial too generally employed in their place. This was the manner of the Grecian philosophers; and it is still continued by their slovenly imitator, the modern Transcendentalist, but without their system and eloquence. It is still the manner of the common theorist and dreamer in what ought to be physical science; of the countless inventors of foolish notions in medicine; and of impious doctrines in religion; there being no difference in the kind of falsity and mischief among them all. This substitution of unmixed memorial for the mixed, may answer the purpose of Poetry and Oratory addressed to the mass, both within and without a House of Lords or of an *Honorable Congress*; and of the memorial visions of the power and glory of thrones, whether aristocratic or ministerial: but it can bear no part in that process of primary perception which constitutes observation and experience; and is totally unfit to direct the world, in forming a steady and *unturbulent* government; a broad minded, unambitious, and unvulgarized religion; the civilizing advancement of science; and the industrial detail of a useful and a happy life.

Second. The memorial may be neglected, for the unmixed primary: as exemplified in the sub-animal, and in the human mind not far from idiocy. We are however to remember; although primary perceptions may be unmixed in particular cases;

there is scarcely a mind, whether sub-animal or human, without the general condition of mixed perceptions. The exclusive use of the unmixed primary is a copious source of limitation and error; for the round of perception is a great system, all the parts of which are necessary, and alike assistant to each other, in the discovery and application of truth, through every department of science and of life.


There is here a source of error before alluded to. The mixed memorial, we have stated is the great working means of the important process of experiment; when at the same time the primary perception is strictly fixed on the object or aggregate, and the relationships of its components; the memorial is furnishing its related images and types to those of the primary object; thus affording the broadest circuit of excursive comparison. If however the memorial is unmixed, its accuracy depends on this condition. When all the memorial are known to be derived directly from the primary of the individual and responsible percipient; the unmixed memorial may still be the faithful representative of nature. But if some of the memorial proceed directly from the primary of the responsible percipient, and the rest are derived from the reported primary of others, by hearsay, or writing, or any ancient tradition; these being merely images and types of authority, may be doubtful, or confused, or false; and thus pervert the whole working plan of the mind. The question then of the truth or error of unmixed memorial perception, must be determined by the fact of its directly-primary, or its authoritative character.

Third. The joint comparison, as we have just learned, may be made of either mixed or unmixed perceptions: and a restriction of the comparison to the primary or to the memorial, is therefore a cause of limitation or error. We have the unmixed *primary* in the joint perceptions of children, not yet arrived at the clear memorial age; and in those of the thoughtless, and ignorant of every age and station; who not having the memorial resources of knowledge, have as it would seem, their mind with its profits and enjoyments only in the senses. We find the error, and even the absurdity of a joint comparison of unmixed *memorial*, in the quiescent perception, without actionary speech, in dreams, delirium,

and madness; when there are no primary; or, as in the last two cases, when the primary are banished by the vividness of the memorial. The unmixed memorial, being prone to a wild and disorderly combination, do not often present the images and types of things according to their real relationships; and therefore do not allow a just joint comparison.

Fourth. A fourth source of error in the use of perception lies in the conclusive being formed altogether of limited feeble and unmixed primary, or of unmixed memorial. For if the joint, when formed in this way, are liable to be limited or false, the conclusive, which are only the perception of the agreement or other relationship by the joint, must necessarily partake of their imperfect or erroneous character. There are however conditions of mind, in which the joint may be made as conclusions drawn solely from unmixed primary perceptions, suitable to the character of such a mind. This is the process in the sub-animal; for being deprived of the assistance of a full memorial knowledge, and of a thought-making, and thought-directing language, it produces a narrow, though a keen perception of the agreement, or its reverse, in the relationship of things. In the human mind, it produces what Lord Bacon calls a 'sharp genius.' Its view is lynx-eyed, and concentrated to the few relationships of the things before it; but it is then insensible to every other primary, as well as to memorial perception. A person with this character of unmixed primary perception may be conveniently employed, as an observative and experimental spy upon nature, by those whose perceptions embrace both a wider expanse and a closer gathering of things; but who have not the time to collect all their details.

Fifth. The want of truth, propriety, and precision, in the verbal sign; our fifth constituent of the mind; is an abundant source of false and imperfect perception. And although not greater than that of the other four; yet from the perpetual use of these signs by the intelligent few, in necessary intercourse with the multitude, who have little accuracy of thought, and still less of language; the few are obliged to take a practical part in the inaccuracy of that language; and by a very natural result of evil communications, are brought into conformity with the abuse of words, and with the other errors of perception which that abuse



produces. This falsity of language is well exemplified in the attempts to designate human character. In our country at least, where the rude civilization of the Anglo-Saxon is fast mingling with the vivid perception of the Ignorant; the word 'Great,' an ambitious Americanism; applied with vulgar wonder, as well to a common President, as to an uncommon Pumpkin, has led to endless misrepresentations, in primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception. I could point out by name, many an ignorant demagogue, of *great* popular reputation; with the sycophant and knave, clearly expressed in countenance, manner, and intonation, whom 'we the people,' given up to conformity, unite in a corrupt application of the term, and call the ephemeral noise-maker, Great. It is the same with the verbal distinctions of virtue and vice; when tithes of anise and cumin, much of the leaven of the Pharisee's alms before men, and high place in the Synagogue, make the 'Good:' yet those who are endowed by God and Nature with scope and keenness of intelligence, to look upon and through the endless forms of worldly hypocrisy, *are not*; but by a wide conformity, *are called* the *Bad*.

This is an account of falsities, arising from the inappropriate and irregular exercise of the five generic constituents. We called these generic; because they are the divisional heads, to which the several specific qualities, with all their particular modifications are to be referred. Thus the quality of vividness or Force, in its degrees of vivid, faint, and neutral, is applicable, equally to each of the five. The excursive, and the elective apply severally to the primary and the memorial. The quick and the slow, the involuntary, the agreeable, the mutative, and the true and the false, of which we here speak, are severally qualities of them all. We called the constituents, the Five Genera, and the eighteen or more Qualities, the Species of perception. It is the use of the degrees and modifications of these qualities, as we have endeavored to show, which produces the multiplied practical effects of good and evil in human thought and action. And as we have assigned a manner to the exercise of the Qualities, under the natural and perfect working plan of the mind; we will briefly consider the errors and imperfections, resulting from their improper use: and

First. Of vividness. The false and imperfect in this quality, are its excess, and its faintness: since neither of these degrees gives the true character of things, and their relationships, for an exact use of the mind.

Second. The misapplication of the quality of time, is a cause of falsity in perception. The time may be too quick or too slow: the former degree does not allow a due impression of the primary, and a proper revival of the memorial; the latter prevents a full gathering for the joint, by allowing some of the justly related perceptions to pass-away.

Third. An imperfect representation of things by the Excursive quality, proceeds from its being too extensive or erratic, or too circumscribed. Both these extremes lead to error: the former by grasping at too much, confuses or drops what may be necessary for proper election; the latter by furnishing few perceptions, does not allow a manifold joint comparison, and therefore, not a just conclusion.

Fourth. Falsity in the elective quality is the effect of a weakness or confusion of *choice*, from the interference of some other quality: as of the quick and vivid which exclude the fulness; and of the feeble, which takes the place of the proper force of perception; and thereby prevent a wide and clear comparison for a strict conclusion.

Fifth. Error in the actionary quality is directly connected with faults in vividness: for the actionary are generally led astray by the vividness which may efface other perceptions, and thus produce a blinding concentration. In the quiescent, the false and imperfect may mislead the percipient, but not others to whom they are unknown.

Sixth. The durable quality gives rise to falsity, by a continuation that excludes the due variety of perceptions, necessary for a sufficient joint comparison, and a true conclusion. Error in the evanescent occurs, from there not being time to make a true primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception.

Seventh. An unjustified or false conformity, by its very character, implies a falsity in one or more of the other qualities: for no mind governed by the natural, and therefore proper use of the five constituents, can join itself with parties, or sectaries, who

have no principle of thought, except that of never forgetting, to agree in *thinking with* one another. But as the multitude, under the present misunderstanding, and misuse of the mind, cannot be uniform in wisdom, or even in what is very oddly called, 'common sense;' so conformity with a limited or a larger class, must always fill the mind with falsehood or perversion of every kind. To conform in perception with the weaker class, is to play a false and shuffling part with our duty to a wise and beautiful ordination of the five constituents of the mind.

Eighth. Error in the Mutative quality occurs in those cases in which the change, instead of correcting the excess or defect of a quality, rather increases the evil, by adding to the excess in one case, and taking away, even from the deficiency in the other. Thus for the purpose of correcting a concentrated and vivid quality, suppose the mutation should be directed to a broad and varied excursion under a moderate or neutral vividness, and yet by some perverse and interfering cause it should be made to a rapid perception, there would then be a false purpose of mutation; since the rapid flight equally with the vividness would destroy the clear and proportional use of the constituents; and the mutative quality would not effect the design of its controlling power.

Ninth. The agreeable, and the disagreeable qualities are common causes of the falsity of perception. Ninety-nine-hundredths of mankind usually take knowledge into their minds, as they supply their appetites with food; just as it happens to be agreeable; without the least regard to its being nutritious or healthful, or to a perceptive foresight of its being subsequently agreeable or the reverse. And as it happens in disease, that taste is no criterion of the propriety of diet; so an agreeable or disagreeable truth should never be the test of its adaptation to the wants of the mind. Children begin life with an animal instinct, prone to only agreeable perceptions; and foolish parents cultivate this instinct into the obstinate selfishness, of their doing nothing that does not amuse them: and when occasional submission to the disagreeable is required, try to force it by the mutative and agreeable perception of a reward. From these faults of animal instinct, uncorrected by education, the tendencies of pleasure, and the requisi-

tion of a reward, unfortunately accompany them through life: the common reward becomes the prevailing motive to action; and when this is absent, the disagreeable perception is rejected, and the mind's duty to itself slighted and forgotten. Under this view, we must perceive that through defective education, what is called agreeable error will be approved, and truth then disagreeable, rejected. Herein lies a source of unnumbered species of falsity and deception; for many of these are adopted only because they are acceptable.

All the errors thus described, proceed from a defective condition, or a misuse of the five constituents; and from the excessive or deficient influence of their several qualities. There is, we know, a pleasure, in the due exercise of the muscular frame, and in the proper use of the animal senses. It is equally true, that when the mind shall be broadly analysed, and comprehended, and perceptions employed according to their natural working plan; the practical application of that plan will be as agreeable to the self-percipient mind, as the view of an autumn landscape to the eye, and the notes of an unaffected instrumental and vocal melody to the ear of taste.

Tenth. There is a world of falsity in the Habit of perception: for since the mind, in ignorance of itself, has attempted, and failed, to properly execute the wise ordination of its purposes; it has necessarily happened that the influence of the habit of error has far exceeded that of the habit of truth. An evil habit not only continues the error which the misuse of other qualities has produced; it further, in weak and narrow minds, confirms its particular vice beyond all means of mutative correction. In its vicious use, habit is analogous to the evil of conformity: for habit is a conformity of the mind to itself; and conformity is the habit of the mind's agreement with the minds of others.

Eleventh. The term Foresight, by which we designate a quality of perception, has always been employed with the meaning of sagacity. But there may be a foresight of cunning, and of ignorance, as of wisdom: though the foresight of the two former is always both purblind and narrow; for a fool may have foresight, such as it is, through the broken and distorted images and types of his perception. Foresight is a quiescent exercise of the pri-

nary and memorial; mixed and unmixed; the joint, and conclusive constituents, with their merely *thoughtive* verbal signs, as distinguished from their oral and *passionative* utterance: and, as these are properly or improperly used, so will be the wisdom or the folly of the foresight. Foresight may therefore be an abundant source of error; though this is usually called *want* of foresight; but means the want of wise and useful foresight. I say nothing of the false foresight of individuals, by which they bring on themselves mischief back upon themselves; and we leave them to bear the punishment, that from their culpable ignorance, and their stoning the real prophets of the mind, they so richly deserve. But I must speak a word of those who would throw upon others, the effects of their own mischief and obstinacy; and who will neither be taught, nor will they teach themselves. Consider what is called the combined and accumulated foresight of every past and present government; and of every past and present ministration of the holy purposes of religion. Have they once agreed among themselves, on a single perception of their wavering foresight. The man who first thought of, and made a Nail, had a true foresight of its purpose; and ages upon ages have confirmed it, without one word of contention. Empires present only a series of revolving changes; and religions will 'delight to bark and bite,' as long as they endure. The difference of these opposite cases does not consist in the former being the work of the hand; and the two latter, respectively of the mind and the 'soul;' for this is all a metaphysical, not a natural distinction. Every quiescent perception is the work of the mind alone; and every actionary one, the inseparable agencies of the mind and the muscle.

Twelfth. The quality of selfishness is so well known a cause of falsity in perception, that the Reader has, by the assistance of our history of the mind, only to *think-through* the details of its agency, to perceive the fatal effects of the vicious concentration of perception on itself.

Thirteenth. We enumerated in the synopsis, and shall consider in the next section the Exaggerative quality. This refers to those cases of flimsy or chaotic minds which have been classed as nervous disease. Its title implies; it cannot assist truth, and its caricatures furnish every form of materials for error. We

leave it therefore to the smaller poets and story-tellers who consider the accuracy of truth as no better than the stupidity of prose: and metaphysics has distortion enough in its own representations not to call for any other kind of falsehood.

I say nothing of the synchronous, and the successive qualities; of the involuntary; the single and the manifold; the quiescent and the actionary; since truth and falsehood are not, as far as I perceive, predicable to any important purpose, of their influence: and yet, I leave it for future observation and arrangement, to give them their proper character and place.

Such is our view of the causes of truth and error in the process of perception. And to this classification, corrected, varied or amplified, as it may be, both the simple rule of truth, and the endless confusion of falsehood may be referred. All the fictions of writers in poetry and prose, agreeable as they may be, are no more than a compilation from mingled records of varied true and false representations of the character, manners, opinions, and actions of man; and of the common relationships of things. To speak in the plain words of our system; writers of fiction are the exaggerators, and falsifiers of perception, under the incurable delusion that they are the chief, if not the exclusive possessors of the 'Soul of Genius,' to enjoy and direct the art of the Beautiful and the Sublime. The common sort of these writers, exaggerate and falsify both in their descriptions of events, and of facts and notions; which Shakspeare so finely satirizes in this class; for he could not apply it to the clear and demonstrable perceptions of his own; where he represents the Poet, in a refinement of phrensy, rolling his eye after the things of heaven and earth, and trying to give a local habitation and a name to transcendental nonentities which no where exist, and should therefore have no verbal sign. The Higher Poet falsifies in the events and composition of his story; a point on which the Great Dramatist was ready to borrow, and cared not to create; though in the perception of his incidents, and reflections, he is generally the faithful observer and recorder of the truth of things, and of the life, character, motives, and manners of men; with the illustration of that truth, by the analogy of known truths, in the utmost propriety, precision, force, and beauty of the verbal sign. Nor does he ever describe broadly

and closely, without representing more clearly than a merely critical biographer can, the working plan of his own explanatory intellect. Among the thousand apologies for the errors and follies of men, there is this for the falsity of common fictional writing; that every one knows it to be false; just as the world is persuaded to bear the gruff and vulgar manners of an Anglo-Saxon Commodore, because every body knows his character.

From these various sources proceed all those perversions of truth, which are known under their numerous generic, and still more numerous specific terms, in the relations of perception and of language between man and man; from the doctrines of the philosopher, the physician and the priest, down, or up; for we scarcely know their relative localities; to the savage habit of falsehood, so common in our boastful civilization.

Let us consider for a moment, the mode of falsehood, or what among the ancients, was called the High or First Philosophy. It may have been, according to its etymology, a blindly ambitious 'love of wisdom;' but it was not the means for discovering that truth of nature, which constitutes the supremacy of universal wisdom. Think of the applausive cenotaphs, for all is hollow within them, which have for ages after ages, been raised over the spiritual fictions of Egyptian, Jewish, Assyrian, and Grecian doctrines; then look in vain to find within those doctrines, the truths which their proud vanity had foolishly intended to embalm: for you discover neither the substance, nor the grateful odor there. No, but they have broken that high commandment, which forbids the conceits of the mind, and of its verbal signs, to take the name of Almighty Nature in vain: and we learn, by the confusion, mischief, and failure of the impious pretensions of fiction; they have not been held guiltless before the retributive justice of mocked and offended truth.

What might we not show of the endless systems of religion, with all their false, and vividly actionary perception, on what is impiously assumed to be the will of Almighty God to man. But presumed on fairer grounds, not to be that will, from its never having been, in part or altogether undisturbed; from its being always reciprocally denied among its various votaries; from its never having been reduced to one uniform and universal belief;

and from not taking its *words* from that oldest of sacred Testaments, the *works* of God.

Nor can we suffer the physical sciences; though but lately rescued from the anarchy of fiction; to escape the reproach, of still, in some cases, leading the mind from its original design to represent the realities of nature.

There are few pleas, to save from utter condemnation, the whole tissue of varied absurdity and falsehood, in the metaphysical Faculty of the Healing Art. From its first recording master Hippocrates; who by his good will at least endeavored to found his rules on nature, is perhaps among the best of all his followers; they have generally had one continued occupation, in blowing empty bubbles of fictional systems, to be burst, and then blown again by their successors. Nor am I the single satirist on this ignorance of the natural and orderly rule of perception, in the medical department of conjectural knowledge: since the world, with a kind of instinct of its false pretensions, has drawn from it, a term to designate the so-called Quackery, in all other boasting and deceptive promises of success.

And oh ye superior powers; of Nature I mean; what shall we say of all the delusions and falsehood of Governments, from which man has vainly endeavored to choose a scheme of Law and Happiness? He has experimented on all the materials embraced by human 'reason' and passion, and on the swayful motives of punishment and reward, both here and hereafter; but for effecting his purpose even indifferently, he has failed on all its points; in trying to govern; in submitting to be governed; and last of all, in going upon the forlorn-hope of trying to govern himself.

I might thus go through every department of quiescent, and actionary perception, and show therein, how falsity and truth are confusedly mingled together, from an ignorance of the character and elementary intellectual sources of each.

The system of perceptions here offered, teaches us to look for truth in the orderly representations of the five constituents of the mind, with the employment of their qualities, all well-balanced in their exercise; not only as a true observation of the analogies of things would suggest, but as experience in the successful application of these qualities would di

On the other hand our sys

tem with equal importance shows; that the roots of all the numberless, and wide-spreading imperfections, delusions and falsities in the human mind, proceed from the misapplication of the five constituents, and from the defects and misuse of their qualities; teaching us thus to lay the educational means of prevention to the very origin of the evil.

Under the old metaphysical Dynasty, and it has been a usurped control over the mind; but too much occupied in holding its power, to understand its proper duty; we were never taught, by a general rule, to know the difference between error and truth; every one having a test of his own. In this state, without a common measure, in the proper working of the five constituents, which is every where the same, the world has done little else than dispute on all important subjects of life; thus choking up the way to truth with words. Nor will the difference between truth and error, in government, morals, religion, medicine, and in more than half the business of man, be clearly assignable, until it is known in what elementary points that difference consists.

In the old, indefinite nomenclature, we are told of sensations, perceptions, ideas, memory, imagination, association, judgment, reasoning, moral and other faculties, operations, conscience, the will, and for a long time innate ideas, self-evident propositions, fluent and infinite quantities, infinite time, motion, and space, intuition, genius and inspiration; with numberless other terms of processes employed in the mind; which not even the metaphysician; who is said to use them so profoundly; can as we believe, perceive them in clearness of relation to each other. And certainly they never have been able to reduce to a rudimental method, with its appropriate nomenclature, the few and simple elementary constituents of the mind.

Although our analysis, like every inquiry, must end at last, in ultimate facts; yet within the limit of that analysis, the mind shows a few simple constituents mutually connected, and working to a common and consistent purpose. And should the system founded on that analysis, be hereafter allowed to happily rule, as the center of the revolving sciences; for the natural mind was ordained to be their balancing and illuminating center; the light they would receive would be clearer and more steady. And

again, its survey of the whole circuit of knowledge may enable it to point out in every department, as it has in Arithmetic, and Geometry, the productive, and radical causes of truth; and thereby, to teach, in the present state of our minds, that essential preparation for every inquiry; the true causes and effects of destructive error.



SECTION XXIV.

Of the Exaggerative Quality of Perception.

WE have shown that all the constituents may be varied to the bright and the faint, the quick and the slow. These conditions may be the attendant on ignorance, and lead to folly, imbecility, or vice. The exaggerative quality though an actionary trouble to others, is a quiescent misery to itself. The quick and the vivid qualities of perception are applied in their medium degrees, to the acquisition of knowledge in science and the arts; and in their excess to a perversion of the interest and passion of men. But the vivid and the quick are, in their excess, the great agents of exaggerated perception, and being, like every other vital function, involuntary, seem to come over the whole system of the senses and the brain; certainly for no purpose of knowledge; and for no very serviceable passion. The common term for this state of body and mind is nervousness; which every one is ready to charge upon a restless and complaining self-tormentor, without having any other meaning in the word, than that it denotes something restless and tormenting. Nor have physicians, even with all their descriptive verbosity, been able to make the vulgar understand, what they cannot themselves define: and we will not suppose they would make so much use of the term, to merely mystify unanswerable questions by their patients, if they could explain the mad functions of nervousness. But physicians in this

case, as with many other of their medical pretensions, are contented to change the name of a disease, when they cannot escape the charge of ignorance of its natural causes. It would fill a volume, to set down all the changeable and local names that have, through time, been applied to the varying nomenclature of this single and unaltered disease. Under the besotted rule of the earlier metaphysician, and medico-theologian, patients who were not altogether mad, were supposed 'to have' a nervous devil, that played all the fantastic whims, and troublesome vagaries of a self-afflictive harlequin spirit in the senses and the brain. Within my single medical recollection, it has pleased the dissatisfied *Nosology* of the Faculty, to run the name of the nervous temperament through the variations of spleen, green sickness, hysteric passion, vapors, and dyspepsia. The present name; which will last, while it lasts; is neuralgia. This signifies in Greek; which the Doctors like to quote; a pain in the nerves; and this, any thing else they choose to call it; thus coming back to the simple English, of Nervous Disease. And now, every ailment that ignorance wants an intelligible name for, some master of a similar ignorance satisfies credulity, that the word Neuralgia is the 'open sesame' of the Arabian tale, to the cause of every nervous symptom. But professional nosology apart, we will try how our analysis of the working plan of the senses and the brain will apply to the working plan of the nervous temperament.

We will begin by changing its vague and useless nomenclature of an indefinable disease, to that of a classification of the constituents and qualities of the mind. The analysis of the effects of this disease shows that it employs the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive constituents, and many of their qualities, in every mode and variety of perversion. In the primary constituent it perceives things with their actions, so vividly, quickly, transiently, selfishly, and withal involuntary, that it has only an excluding and magnified brightness, or a limited and false perception of the truth of nature. In the memorial, these delusions are more varied and exaggerated, under a like perversion of constituent and quality. In the joint constituent, this mental nervousness is perverted both by physical constitution and by quality, beyond all the means of regular and just comparison of things. This

produces the disorderly and unrelated perceptions of what may be distinguished as a 'nervous,' confused, and fantastic mind. With these perverted primary, memorial, and unrelated joint materials, there can be no just conclusive constituent, and from this arises the indecision of a 'nervous' mind. Nor is the fifth constituent uninfluenced by the nervousness of the other four, and the excess of their qualities. Hence the incoherencies, the mutterings, the mingled laugh and cry, and screams of a nervous or hysteric patient.

The Qualities of Vividness, of the rapidly Evanescent, and the Mutative, are the principal causes of the chaos of perception in the nervous temperament, or as we would like to call it, the Restless mind. But there are other qualities that contribute to the perversion of the constituents of the 'nervous' and restless mind. The most zealous advocate of the freedom of the will, must admit that in this state, the whole working plan of the mind is Involuntary, for it seems not to be directed by any self-willed purpose. The Elective quality too is paralyzed, or seems for every thing, and for nothing long. The Disagreeable is in most cases, the ruling quality of its complaints. The qualities of Independence and Conformity are altogether unknown in the chaos of the nervous mind: and it is so much under the rule of a Mutative transition, as not to know the difference between falsehood and truth. And what can that mind know of Foresight or Habit, which has not a steady constituent or quality? It is difficult to say what influence Selfishness has over the Restless mind. As it is *Immutative* by others, it might seem to be altogether absorbed in self. But selfishness is a vivid and *persevering* quality, and apparently not consistent with the changeable character of the vagary mind. We will show how the volatile and indefinable symptoms of nervousness; which physicians consider as 'seated solely in the nerves;' may be arranged under the *perverted* constituents and qualities; though still describable parts of the mind.

The symptoms or rather phenomena of the exaggerative or nervous disease are seated in the mind, and in the several senses; and may magnify any or all the perverted primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perceptions. When the senses and the brain are in the exercise of an ordained, full, and exact state

of knowledge and usefulness, there is always a steady harmony of the mind within itself, and a correspondent similarity, with that of others. When that ordination is perverted; not only do all minds differ, but each individual differs from itself. And though a perversion of mind must have preceded any 'Fall' of man; yet Nature designed it should previously see, hear, touch, taste, and scent alike in all; as we presume it began, and know; it still exists in all sub-animals. But as the human muddled and make-shift senses now perceive; to one the moon appears; no larger than a shilling; to another, the full size of a paper drum, for the flying leap of a Circus horse. By one the unexpected shutting of a door is scarcely heard; another is startled at it as by a clap of thunder. Play your finger over the side of a ticklish child, it will laugh and shake itself almost into convulsions; another asks to be delighted by being gently rubbed on the sole of its foot. The first taste of salted olives is repugnant to many; yet a dandy who outlaws both sense and taste, will eat them at a fashionable table, and declares they are *enchanting*, because Miss Dandy-she, at his side, says they are *so nice*. One person faints at the odor of assafoetida, another takes it on his beef-steak. The Doctors try to get over these perversions by a word, and call them idiosyncrasies; with syllables enough to cover up a heap of plain thought. But they are no less perversions of the natural images and types of the senses, than the endless differences in parliaments, religious councils, and medical schools are perversions of the sane and productive use of the brain.

After this survey of the symptoms of the exaggerative power of the nervous temperament, and of its misplaced classification, we are ready to account for its nosological position among what are theoretically called the diseases of the body. Physicians, in disputing about diagnosis and names, have so superficially analysed the symptoms of bodily disease; and so entirely neglected the *poor intellect*; they could certainly not perceive that the restless mind is not to be classed among their contentious technicalities. They might then well ask themselves; where they should place this nondescript? and receive no answer. For as they know not the character, and subdivisions of the mind, they could find no place within it, to class its relationships; and therefore

kept it where it did not properly belong; among indefinable metaphysical words. For how could physicians arrange any thing respectively in the order of either body or mind, with a notional pathology, and with the muddled materials of 'memory, imagination, reason, judgment, the moral faculty, consciousness and the sense of Deity?' And all this, further confused by an unintelligible spirituality; since these have been severally the subjects of contention, not of inquiry, among both the medical and metaphysical Doctors, who have alike wasted their ambitious definition and arrangement on things beyond what is discoverable in nature.

This then is the condition, and classification of the restless or the exaggerative mind. We do not pretend to know what is the particular cause of this state in the organization of the senses and the brain. Its cure is more assignable. It is as we have said, a perversion of the vivid, quick, evanescent, and mutative qualities, in the various constituents. If we run through the table of the whole twenty-one things of the senses, it will be found in the history of the nervous or restless mind, there is scarcely a perception which in its various cases is not magnified or perverted in a greater or less degree, beyond the obvious, described, and measurable condition of the healthy and ordinary mind. Thus a pale pink color, a little out of place is said to be as red as blood; a grey spot on a napkin is as black as ink; a room with a single Gas-light is as dark as pitch, an insignificant President made out of insignificant votes, is declared to be the greatest man in the world; an army of one hundred thousand, is reported like the host of Xerxes as a million. A melancholy patient grows impatient with time, and declares; the bell-ringing in the neighborhood will never cease; and children are told, not to whisper; it hurts papa's neuralgic leg. Sister Mary, who had an excruciating headache and a dreadful lumbago all day, by a nervous mutation goes to a ball at night and dances till sunrise. A fidgety hypochondriac, traveling in the midst of July, muffled up tight with a silk handkerchief, complains that the draught of air is frozen as in the middle of winter, orders all the hotel-sash to be closed; though it might suffocate half the rest of the table; to keep him from catching the 'Throat disease.' I once had a patient, who magnified a slight 'catch' in respiration; from some



defect in the capsular ligament of a rib; into an unalterable perception that his rib was broken: and a nervous woman, under her exaggerated touch, declared to me; she could *feel* the *odor* of the painting of her house, at the very ends of her fingers; and she no doubt thought so. There is no end to the exaggeration of tastes. To some the least tartness is as sour as vinegar, and any astringent as bitter as gall. There are some so susceptible to good or bad odors, that a hay-field brings on a catarrh; and others who can scent a cockroach that has run over a towel three days before. Among these are the tender sensibilities, that would 'die of a rose in aromatic pain.' Rhetoricians, who like lawyers and doctors, defending any thing by a term, call this hyperbole; but its real name is false perception.

Whoever would read of these nervous, or rather mental whimsies, may refer to the description of the 'Cave of Spleen,' at the beginning of the Fourth Canto of Pope's *Rape of the Lock*. There he will find its Queen in the midst of *vapors* tossing forever on her restless couch; Pain at her side and Megrim at her head; attended by ill temper and affectation, with phantoms, spectres, and unnumbered bodies on every side changed by Spleen; maids by the power of fancy turn into unstopped bottles; men to prospective mothers, to teapots, and to pipkins.

The prevention and cure for all these perversions, as for all diseases of the mind, are as we shall show hereafter, to be drawn not from the apothecary, but from itself; which rejecting the notional or metaphysical method of its working plan, and enlarging its circuit of adjusting and productive knowledge; proves that false and imbecile delusions are utterly inconsistent with the sane and useful purpose of the senses and the brain.

The Reader will here perceive; I have taken the vague classification of the 'odds and ends' of the 'nervous' temperament, from the indefinable causation and terms of the theoretic and obscure pathology of physicians, and arranged the unassignable particulars of this chaotic subject, under the clear, and orderly analysis of the five constituents and the qualities of the mind. Under this view, he will perhaps be able to compare the various symptoms of the nervous temperament, he has observed or read of, with the principles of the mind and its working plan as taught

in this work: thus changing the confusion of a so-called bodily disease, into the describable order of a classified intellect; yet there, in its proper place, perverted to an infirmity more assignable indeed, but not less distracting than the error it has corrected.



SECTION XXV.

Of the Mixed and Unmixed Qualities of Perception.

I HAVE called the mixed and unmixed perceptions, qualities, because they produce, when joining or separating the two first constituents, respectively a useful or a contrary effect, in the working plan of the mind.

In the seventeenth section, we stated probable grounds for belief, that in most if not all of the senses, the process of perception is successive; the images of sight alone perhaps affording an instance of the synchronous. It was there, also said, that the memorials of sight are both synchronous and successive. But all the primary types of the other senses being successive, the exercise of joint and conclusive perceptions upon them alone, would be both slow and embarrassing: and we thus see an admirable convenience and facility in the provision of a memorial constituent of thought; in which the succession is readily performed. Yet these separate functions are necessary to each other. For though the memorial, at immediate command, are more numerous than the primary, at immediate command; the latter give a more exact representation of things, in their forms, brightness, and degrees; and are necessary to correct the errors, and to determine the uncertainties of the memorial. It is therefore the mixed use of these two constituents which makes the mirror of the senses and the brain the most comprehensive and the clearest picture of things. It is from this principle of mixed perception, that the

great products of the Experimental philosophy have been, and must continue to be derived. The system of investigation in this Work, being by the orderly course of perception in the representation of the existences and actions of nature; differs widely from the sophistic method of what the ancients called the First or High, or metaphysical philosophy; and of all the religious doctrines founded upon it: for these derived their working plan, in greater part, from the unmixed memorial; and therefore quite consistently, threaten with the inquisitorial dungeon, and flames, the least intrusion of primary perception into their memorial 'Castles in the air.' Thus unmixed primary are a cause of limitation, in the excursive and elective quality; and the unmixed memorial the cause of all the fiction in science and theology, which have so long misled and disgraced the human mind.*

We will exemplify the different uses of the two different qualities. Suppose an inventor, devising under quiescent perception, a mode of employing steam for propelling a boat. He had formerly a primary perception of the power and movement of an engine; and of the power and movement of oars. With this *unmixed* memorial, he brings the images of the two several powers and movements together, makes a *joint* comparison of their conditions and actions and other relationships between them; and then *concludes*, or has a *foresighted* perception that the power of steam might be applied to the oar. This conclusion was formed through three of the constituents; the unmixed memorial, the unmixed joint, and the quiescent, or mere cerebral type of the

* In the sixth section, it was shown, that significant verbal signs act on the ear, and significant written symbols of these verbal signs act on the eye, in like manner, with the common physical things of nature on hearing and sight.

It was also shown, that the application of the verbal sign to quiescent and faint perceptions; like the *mordant* in fixing the colors of the Dyer; make the images and types on both the senses and the brain more forcible, durable, and distinct. I am therefore disposed to ask; if the unmixed memorial, in minds enlarged by knowledge, exercised upon the five constituents, may by a memorial vividness of what we would call the verbal images and types, in a measure supply the want of the mixed, by giving in a degree, to the memorial the effective character of a primary perception: thereby endowing the contemplations of the natural philosopher, with a more exact and productive joint comparison, and conclusion, than is attainable through the scumbled and misty images and types of the metaphysical theorist.

verbal sign; for we have shown that the verbal sign may come back to the brain as a silent perception. The inventor next converts his whole train and order of quiescent into actionary perceptions, and makes a steam-worked oar.

With the memorial perception of the frame and action of this construction; he happens to *see* the common picture of the Car of Neptune, with its wheels rolling through the waves. By a joint comparison of these two *mixed* perceptions, he has a foresight, that instead of the oar, the wheel, with a board attached transversely and projecting as a radius from the circumference, might be worked by steam. Thus the paddle was designed, and the propulsion of the boat in this way effected. The method of invention here exemplified, is either by synchronous; if such there are; or by successive primary and memorial perception; constituting what we have called mixed perception.

And in this manner we might illustrate an invention of the stern paddle or screw, from a joint comparison of mixed primary and memorial images and types of the power and action of a Wind-mill, with those of the irrigating screw of Archimedes. This is the plain and co-operating process, by which the ground is laid for great and useful discoveries, and for the extension of a broad, and beneficial knowledge, with the influence of its honest and honorable power.

From the preceding account, we learn what an important agency the mixed and unmixed perceptions exert in the inventive method of the mind: and further, how their influence may, accordingly as it is used productively or otherwise, affect the joint and conclusive constituents; and that without the mixed condition, an extended and exact intellectual result cannot be obtained.*

* It is, as above stated, from the use of the joint, and the conclusive perception, exclusively on the *unmixed* memorial, that what is called the metaphysical, and purely ideal *Contemplation* of the Grecian School, and of the Theologian of all time, is derived. But a *mixing* of the primary perception with the memorial, furnishes, in that primary, a physical element, for a corrective system, of demonstrative observation and experiment: showing by the light of our analysis, a simple sketch of the whole purpose, of the observative and experimental method of the *Novum Organum*. And had not the penetrating mind of Bacon, which saw so far into the *working plan of Science*, been driven by a Conformity

As this use of the mixed primary and memorial perceptions and of their several qualities, through the joint and conclusive constituents, is the natural and therefore the true method of the mind, it must have been employed, though rarely, in every civilized age. We do not know where nor when, the exactness began in geometry, and arithmetic, which have set to so many other departments of thought, a marked, yet overlooked, if not a rejected example. For when the mind shall be hereafter understood, it will be perceived; there is but one exact method of using it, on all the views and hopes of life, and in the happy acquisition of agreeable and useful knowledge.

Besides the Discoverers, whose truths were collected by Euclid, we have among the Ancients, a rare instance of strict and natural method in Archimedes; for we hear of no High Philosophy in him; nor of any attempt to find the proportion of the diameter to the circumference, and to sink and burn the Roman fleet, by locking up his mind in spiritual contemplation. Thus with all the unmixed memorial; metaphysical, and therefore false use of the mind, there is occasionally found in the Grecian School, some enduring testimony to the natural and productive method of developing mathematical and mechanical truth.

It sometimes happens however, that the use of unmixed perceptions, whether exclusively primary, or exclusively memorial, are the only means for making a joint and conclusive perception. In the former case they are principally employed by what are called 'Gim-crack' inventors, though by no means a useless class. Chemists too by a like unmixed primary process, often very usefully tease little aggregates of Nature, with their minute analysis: not having, or employing the power of excursive memorial, along with their primary perceptions. On the other hand, with an abundance of the memorial, without the primary; to correct the vividness of the excursive quality; the joint are less exact in their

with the belief of a spiritual entity in the brain; it would from its fine analytic tendencies, have shown by a sagacious physical inquiry, that the most effectual *Organ*, instrument, or means for advancing knowledge, is by a knowledge of the *working plan of the mind* itself, and thus, by looking deeply into perception, and developing its simple physical history, it would at least have saved all subsequent writers much of their wasted time, and useless occupation of thought and pen.

comparisons, and consequently the conclusive less clear and decided.

I have given an eminent personal example, from the Ancients, of well mixed use of perceptions, in the geometric, arithmetic, and mechanical truth of Archimedes. The same Ancients afford systems upon systems, in government, theogeny, cosmogeny, and natural philosophy, formed nearly altogether of joint and conclusive perceptions, from unmixed memorial, and too often from those of false authority alone. I need not specify those disjointed notions which so infected the Grecian schools, from the earliest period, down to Plato the great Mystagogue, who by the self-delusion of his unmixed memorials, and so-called, but misused, eloquence of their verbal signs, ambitiously carried off the palm from his dreaming Peers; which, on due rectification of himself, by well-mixed primary and memorial constituents, he should have been satisfied to renounce. Then came the Sophists; if indeed all the schools were not more or less so; who with the wranglers of Alexandria, and the early Fathers of the Syllogistic Church, were on this subject only Corollaries from those two impracticable human Theorems, Aristotle and Plato.

Fictionizing on unmixed memorial perceptions, was with the Greeks, and is with some modern metaphysicians, so much a cherished indulgence; that the stirring and industrious application of the senses to the investigation of the physical sciences, was regarded as a laborious and menial occupation; with so much vulgar perception in its character, as to be adapted to the condition and capacity of those who were their artizans, teachers of the useful and practical arts, and their working slaves. So it is with the modern Transcendentalist, whose 'soul' being in his eye, and his eye on the 'procreations of his soul,' wastes his memorial images and types on the Good, the Beautiful, and the Perfect; without drawing-in the assistance of his primary perception, to give an intelligent form to his beautiful; a practical and measurable usefulness to his good; and any other describable notion of his perfect, than what he borrows from that passage, already quoted from Shakspeare, when speaking of the fine madness, and the rolling eye of a phrenzied poet.

It would be in vain, to affect blindness before the vast amount

of folly, misery, and crime, which has arisen from that old subject, the strict meaning of the co-relative terms, truth, and error. One supposes truth to be what is agreeable to himself, or to his selfish perception; another defines it under this more popular form; that it is what is agreeable to the majority. And hence the thousand conformities to the various notions in government and religion: one party believing the authority of truth to be held by the plain sense of the poor and the ignorant; another that it belongs to the rich collegiate Peer. One sectary, sword in hand promulgates his notion of truth; another with the sword concealed by the Olive-branch of peace; a third would show the form and light of truth, in the Cross and at the Stake; a fourth, rejecting every external and diffusive test, mistakes for truth, a conceited inward spark, which any gusty passion may blow into a disastrous conflagration among mankind. But even the false light of all these assumptive kinds of truth, has served only to make metaphysical darkness visible. Nor has any one yet appeared, who, roused by the warning voice of all these failures, has made a radical search into the physical mind; which alone can decide the great question to the satisfaction and usefulness of all. For the purpose of the mind being to represent, exactly, the realities of things, its untarnished mirror alone must reflect their truthful images and types.

Truth, says Saurin, in one of his sermons; adopting an old definition; is the agreement of our ideas of things, with their real existence: and then goes on to exemplify his definition by sectarian doctrines. Our system in like manner, defines truth to be an agreement of the perceptions of things with their realities, as recognized by universal consent, on no authority except that of the cultivated senses and the brain: and then refers to the use of the five constituents, under their several qualities, as the ultimate and only proof. To this proof, as we have shown, the qualities of mixed primary and memorial perception are an essential contribution.

And here we appeal to the great results of the modern System of Observative and experimental science, for an exemplification, by innumerable truths, of the productive power of the merely instructive exercise of the natural but unperceived working plan of

the mind; the ways and means and constituency of which, the illustrious Founder of that System unfortunately did not, as the crowning glory of his great revolutionary purpose, turn his encompassing and searching intellect, analytically to discover, to define, to classify, to name, and to describe.

In a future part of this work, I will revert to this subject of the mixed and unmixed qualities; and there endeavor to give a further analysis of the manner in which the physical, and the metaphysical process of the mind severally employ them; to produce the useful truth of one, and the mischievous fictions of the other.



SECTION XXVI.

Of the Quality of Foresight in Perception.

WE have heretofore spoken of perceptions, as representing only present things and their relationships, in the primary form of images and types; passed primary, in their memorial images and types; and joint comparisons, and conclusive decisions upon unmixed primary, and unmixed memorial, and mixed primary and memorial perceptions. By these modes alone, knowledge; or as so much fiction is often thus called; is *true* knowledge obtained: yet truth being a just perception of things, can be affirmed of only what is present or what is past. But the unsatisfied human mind, perhaps by instinct, and certainly by the habit of conjecture and hope, desires to know what is to come. For gratifying this desire, by means to satisfy it; there soon appeared imposters, or false prophets, as Christ so justly calls those who pretend to predict the future and unknown. This looking to prophecy for a revelation of futurity, has given it the right hand of power in all the various systems of religion; and brought up those swarms of oracular shrines, schools of divining priests, magi, soothsayers,

gypsies, and other fortune-tellers, prognosticating physicians, lottery brokers, and advertising promissory quacks of every sort.

All this prophesying, whether in self-delusion, or with a crafty intent on wealth or power, is perhaps only the perversion of a tendency in nature to direct us by an orderly use of the unchangeable laws of the mind, to that knowledge of the future which may contribute to our happiness, or be necessary for our safety. This knowledge is to be obtained by the same proper use of the five constituents, which gives us a knowledge of the past and the present.

It would seem that nature intended to withhold those purposes from the mind, which might lead to the injury of itself, and other functions of the body; and to confer those which are wisely useful, and safely agreeable; that while regarding the useful and the agreeable, dependence on past and present perceptions, she had provided the proper means for a perceptive prediction of what is to come.

The art of foretelling truly, consists in the application of the general laws of nature, to herself, and to the processes of art; for obtaining a knowledge of what will come to pass again, from what has actually passed before: since the laws and rules of nature being the same yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow; observation of the rules of yesterday and to-day must, with equal certainty, give us the rule of what will happen to-morrow; making just prediction only another term for stating, what is *to be* physically known by what is already physically known; and is neither a special miracle, nor a supernatural act of intellect; for the true, the well-meaning, and the knavish prediction, must all respectively proceed from previous knowledge properly used, or artfully perverted. To avoid, if possible, connecting the subject of this section with the more serious self-delusions, as well as with the open knavery of prediction; which is only a vulgar conformity with the meaning and claims of the former, we use the term Foresight of perception, or Perceptive foresight, to signify the knowledge we may have of the future, from a proper exercise of perception on the past. This can be done, only through present primary perception; past primary, or memorial, mixed, or unmixed; excursively, and electively surveyed; accurately and widely compared by the joint;

and a just conclusion made from that comparison; thereby to discover the law, principle, or rule, by which the actions of nature, and of art are universally and at all times inevitably performed; and thus at all times, and universally applied to the future. True foresight then proceeds from exact, and extensive knowledge. False foresight, or common prophecy and fortune-telling, from ignorance, and a limitation of mind, with a real or feigned attempt to blind itself to these defects, by the delusions of fanaticism, or the impudent pretensions of a less insane imposture. Just foresight is the consequence, and even the accompaniment of full and accurate knowledge; for to such a condition of the mind, the future, so to speak, is the present in the past.

The only subjects of human observation, in which the relationships of things have been so precisely and extensively perceived, as to furnish a system of laws for foreseeing future relationships, are Geometry, Arithmetic, and Chemistry; with Natural philosophy, and Physiology to a certain degree: for these sciences are in the condition, to allow in a measure, a true foresight of perception. The laws of the relationships of things, on each of these subjects, has been widely ascertained; and that safe and happy state of knowledge has, with them, come to pass, in which irrelevant perceptions are not allowed, or do not necessarily come up to interfere with the regular and destined use of the mind. This interference is prevented by an exact primary perception, and by that strict election from a wide excursion among the memorial, which rejects from comparison every image or type that does not lead directly or indirectly to the efficacy of the joint and the conclusive. To avoid contention, and to give the most exact, productive, and predictive power, the rule of these sciences should be the rule of every quiescent and actionary perception. To this ordained productive and predictive end, the progress of knowledge; whatever a present age is apt to think of its rapid progress; has been tending, and slowly, *very slowly* creeping, from the rudest state of savage ignorance. And it is remarkable of ignorance, that the less it knows of what it might know, the more it desires to know that which then, to itself, cannot be known. Hence a principal cause of that creeping pace. Hence the earnest desire to know the origin and destiny of man, and the

event of all his purposes and actions. Hence too, Crafty Rulers, with their military, civil and priestly ministers; at an early age, formed into a system, the means for gratifying this curiosity. With a preparatory influence of ages after ages, on the hopeful credulity of mankind; the Jews adopting the Theosophy of the Egyptian College, established a pure Theocracy, with its single-revealing and directive Oracle, in their ever-present and ever-special-ruling Jehovah. The Greek and Roman religion was multiformly Oracular; and from the inspired and tipsy Priestess of Delphi, down to the Dryad of the hollow oak, found endless ways and voices to answer the passionate purposes of individuals, and of the crafty designs of the State. Nations and their Hierarchies have long ago, through a slow improvement in the better class of minds, abandoned the established, wealthy, and popular Oracles: and now for reasons of Sovereignty, employ Diplomatic whispers from a corner; new promises and hopes from ever-changing Cabinets; and insinuating fictions, put forth from the columns of some trading and servile Press: leaving the future personal wants and hopes of the People, to the limited though not less honorable horoscopes of the daily advertising Astrologers in the journals of a 'moral, religious, and highly enlightened community.'*

I have considered truthful foresight as requiring the broadest survey of past and present perceptions of the relationships of things; and have represented the fortune-telling of speculators, as the lowest and most despicable attempt at prophetic imposition. There is however, no perfect foresight: and even in geometry and arithmetic there are still some unknown relationships of magnitude and number, on which the prediction must in part be

* But the influence of the Theosophic and Oracular system of the Jewish Dispensation is still upon us. And it is a foresight, founded on the law of folly in the fanatical mind, together with a primary perception of things as they now exist; that if our Country should effect her threat of separation, and then fulfil the so-called purpose of providence, in her 'manifest destiny' of a political Millennium, so much is profitable cant, and hypocrisy on the increase, though 'Fasts' and 'Thanksgiving' among a 'God-fearing people,' that one section of the divided Empire would be quite ready to establish a Theocratic constitution, with a Leviticus of rules, on righteous dealing in Bank-paper, and trading credit, to the North-east of the Susquehanna.

founded, and which may alter the conditions of the known: so prediction, or predication on the future, in other of the demonstrative sciences, cannot be altogether certain. But we do not belong to the school of that committee of the American Congress, who because they could not arrange a system of weights and measures mathematically perfect; imperfect as they are in their own acts; reported their difficulty and recommended, Nothing.

There is in every art, with its facts, joined into system, the means of foresight to a greater or less degree; and which, in minds with acquired knowledge, and a just exercise of the five constituents, is generally sufficient for those arts in the leading purposes of life: more I was about to say; than man with his indolence and waste of mind, his perverted passions, and his vices, seems to deserve.

Although we are far from admitting the full extent of the Law-maxim, that 'every man is always to be believed in his own art,' except within those simple cases, which require only a few primary, memorial, and joint perceptions: yet without a certain amount of practical observation, and of systematic rule, as the ground of present decision, and of foresight; no art can be safely conducted, nor justly criticised. It is in the sciences, arts, and trades, that foresight takes the names of Discovery and Invention; though the mental method is the same in every use of quiescent and actionary thought. And it will be found, that with the greatest extent of general knowledge of the sciences, arts, and trades, and of the facts of practical life, there will be the most discriminating conclusion and the truest foresight. For with a latitude of paraphrase on the vulgar saying, that he who tries all arts, will succeed at none; we may, with less familiarity, affirm, that Jack at *the principles* of all trades will be good at directing and foreseeing in any: constituting a kind of masterly superintendence of perception. Without knowledge then, and its arrangement into rules, all the words of prophecy must be as idle as the girls' building 'castles' of matrimony 'in the air;' or otherwise they must be written after the event; as the predictions to Eneas, of the glories of the Roman Empire, with its military Aristocracy, from the adulating pen of Virgil; when their incendiary torches were fast burning to their extinction.

Let us consider the mischief and vice produced by this vague and busy exercise of perception on what is to come, without its broad and necessary foundation on a knowledge of nature, and art, and life. Read of the states-man, falsely predicting, from his Charter of Rights and the Frame of his Constitution, which no states-man of another nation relies on or respects. Read too, aye, 'infinitely' read, of the Priests of every time, quarrelling-on to persecution, misery, fire, and blood, for the truth as they severally call it, of what each differently thinks is to come hereafter. Listen to parliaments; to all sorts of societies; to women and the rest of the untaught ignorant. In all these we find something of the present, a trifle of the past; for the greater part of what they think and say, is on the future. Read how the silly Newspapers are flattering the thoughtless into thoughtful conceits of their 'manifest destiny:' and exciting Baby-America into impudence, on the future glories of their experimental republic, which their management is to place hereafter among the stars. Look into the ruinous foresight of the speculator after wealth and votes; and analyse his mind by our system. You will find him under a concentrated and vivid perception of something to come, that by an excess of brightness, prevents his knowing or seeing distinctly what he himself is in pursuit of; and in almost every instance, doing nothing for himself, yet sufficient wrong to others, to let him, under the epidemic contagion of his vices, go *unlynched* by justice, and unhung by the equally vicious imbecility of the Law.

In considering the folly and mischief of actionary foresighted perception; it is necessary to keep in view the influence of other qualities in assisting to falsify or encourage vulgar prediction. The same want of knowledge and system that leads to erroneous foresight, prevents the changing or restraining power of mutative perception. Hence among women, children, and the different ranks of the ignorant; the vivid, the rapid, and the limited exursive qualities, together with that of conformity in error with the majority, which are prevalent vices in these three classes, are to be regarded as qualities attendant on the pertinacity of vulgar prognostics; and thus add to the folly, mischief, and crime of fanatical prophecy. The wise make their foresight a necessary

process of their wisdom. Women predict upon vanity and hope. Children and the vulgar draw their expectations from the fortune-tellers: and the impious, and unimprisoned fanatic, profanely from his God.

After all that has been said, on what is to be observed in primary, collected in memorial, and compared in joint perception; it would appear to be plainly conclusive, that the mind which has the fullest command over past, present, and future perception, will be the most extended and exact, not only in its present, but in its predictive purposes: thus showing that with knowledge systematized into principles, the working plan of the mind becomes so simplified, and its means so economized, that the past does its service for the present, and both unite their perceptive services for the future.



SECTION XXVII.

Of the Quality of Habit in Perception.

THE Grecian Schools of philosophy are remarkable, for having employed themselves chiefly on subjects of no practical application; which among a people, self-wise in individual as well as in national conceit, would consequently give rise to contention. By thinking analytically, to excess, on theoretic trifles, they so disputed themselves into fictional differences, that between refinements and wrangling, they have left to those who with a blind reliance sought a definite meaning in their prolixity, very little either intelligible, or useful, or true.

We learn however; they did recognize, without assigning its place in the constituency of the mind, a condition they called Habit, by which they meant something superinduced, or brought upon a subject or other thing; and possessed, held, or worn, as they illustrated it, like clothes for habiting the body. Thus with many persons, the palate is repugnant to the taste of a salt-olive;

but when that taste is repeated from some compulsory cause, or from whim, or a resolution to bear it, and does in time overcome the repugnance; the taste is said to be agreeably reconciled to itself, by a habit superinduced; and thus as it were, *clothing* the original repugnant state of the palate. The Ancients, without comprehensively perceiving the application of this process of superinduction, to the great purpose of physical *Experiment*, did fully recognize the influence of habit on the mind; and more especially its effect in moral, as distinguished from physical education: insisting on the practical importance of confirming the virtuous, and of changing, by proper means, the vicious disposition, at the earliest period of impressionable life.*

The history of our system of perception and of its five varied forms, with their qualities, has we trust, satisfied the Reader; that the mind has one short and similar mode of exercise, on every subject; that in the due order and agency of its primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, assisted by their verbal signs; all nature and art is open only to this one method of inquiry; thus forming one identical and productive working plan of thought. We therefore find in the elementary parts of this system, no ground for distinction between the mode of scientific, and of moral inquiry and education: for referring to our former illustration, each consists respectively, in the application, of the same five constituent thumb and four fingers of the mind, to two varied conditions of things and their relationships; as we would exemplify it, in the use of those constituents, for designing and constructing a bridge; and for their similar use, in the investigation and practice of the moral duties of men to each other.

* If we consider the superinducing or mutative power of Habit, we perceive one of the innumerable instances of a difference in terms, imposing on the reflective as well as the thoughtless mind, the semblance of a difference in things. Habit and Chemical Agency! in what are they alike? Observe the actions and other relationships of the two cases. Habit, as our system shows, is one perception, under the influence of *time*, displacing or changing another: and Chemical Agency is one thing altering another by attaching itself to, or changing, or covering another. In like manner, all the functional changes in animal and vegetable physiology, together with alterations in mineral composition, and disintegration, are when viewed without the prejudice of words, severally cases of states and conditions superinduced upon other states and conditions, under the universal Law of relationships in all physical things.

We do not admit then, those distinctions in the old method of the school; that the scientific, jurisprudential, theologic, and medical mind, with that of the mechanic, the artist, and the man of business; each works with its own special instruments, in its contracted, and as they make it, a separate chamber of the brain. We must however, from our view of perceptive unity; except the metaphysical mind, which, though obtruding its visions among all the others, is yet a dreaming confusion by itself; and not to be grasped by the five perceptions of our intellectual hand. We are therefore obliged to consider habit as a purely physical function, clearly obvious in its effects; and no more than what we called the mutative quality, or the means of superinducing a new condition of things, equally applicable to the changes produced by physical experiment, as to those which are called the moral influences of education. But until we learn to spell and pronounce by the new a, b, c, of the mind, we may and perhaps must employ these distinctions between moral and physical, as the 'common law' of speech; for the ordained and natural mind rejects as a 'statute,' that language, which from its vague attempt to discriminate, none of us very clearly understand and apply. We perceive then; the influence of habit is an important agent in perception; and have included it under the list of qualities.

Habit as we regard it, is a quality of perception, that changes, by its continuance, the character of another perception to which it is applied: and thus to define it properly, it is a peculiar form of the mutative quality. We call the mutative, that quality of a perception which changes or overrules another quality; but without stating the particular means of this influence. For we know not the essential proximate cause of the vivid displacing the faint; nor of the manifold obscuring the vivid. We learn however, from the definition of habit, that it effects its change by repetition, and time.

Changes among perceptions are sometimes effected both through agreeable and disagreeable qualities. This however is not the cause of a change by habit: for it is habit that makes a perception agreeable, not always an agreeable perception that makes a habit: since if a perception is agreeable, habit is not required to make it so. Still habit may be employed to change an agreeable

perception which is injurious to body or mind. Thus an intensely vivid perception may bring on a strongly disagreeable one, to displace the agreeable; and afterwards, by habit this disagreeable one may become agreeable. But we leave others to pursue the inquiry, how, and to what degree, habit is influenced by the other qualities; having here suggested the subject, and briefly exemplified the manner of its mutative agency.

By our view of the qualities, and of their reciprocal influence on each other, we may perceive how habit, which is a very general form of the mutative, may be employed for the purpose of education in all good things, by its means of governing and improving the mind.



SECTION XXVIII.

Of the Quality of Selfishness in Perceptions.

SELFISHNESS as a so-called moral evil, and as a common subject of reproach from man to man; has, in the indefinite application of its term, so much of the vague meaning of the terms of other qualities of perception; that whoever is in an ill humor with his neighbor, for not granting what he asks, charges him with this illiberal fault, without perceiving; it is his own selfishness that makes the charge. Let us try if our analytic and elementary view of the mind will enable us to describe the effects of this quality, with more precision and practical usefulness.


With a very few excepted facts in sub-animal history; all instincts, perceptions, and habits are selfish. This, when it does not transgress its purpose, by injuring itself or others, is the wise ordination of nature for the preservation of the individual, and for the continued existence of the species. In this useful condition of selfishness, the sub-animal continues unchangeable, through every succeeding generation, as long as the species endures. The

individual and uncultivated human mind, for every purpose of its own improvement, and the advancement of the mind of the species, is scarcely removed from the condition of the higher sub-animal, in its personal selfishness, as well as in its intellectual capacity; and with rare exceptions, continues in the humble and uncultivated condition of its class. I say this in uninvincible truth: for where persons of this class will not be ruled and protected by their intellectual superiors, this selfishness is their only sentinel and defense. Language, which is one of the effective means of cultivation, does not by itself lessen the evil; but through 'evil communications,' sometimes increases it. It is when the first four constituents, together with the adjusting and impressive assistance of the verbal sign, have by accurate primary, broad, memorial, comparative joint, and strictly conclusive excursives; expanded and multiplied the perceptions of things, with their classified relationships; that the mind by the mutative influence of knowledge, is extended beyond the contracted instinct of thinking only personally of itself. As an illustration, we take the case of a necessitous individual ignorant of every thing but his own business; a day-laborer, for instance, or a merchant, given up to work, or to traffic, and with difficulty supporting himself and his family. Is he not, and should he not be, himself the absorbing subject of his own thought? He has perhaps lived under a moral system, that tells him to be charitable, by halving with the poor his own last necessary mite: and that he should love, not only his spiteful neighbor, but even his life-seeking enemy, as himself: and though by a kind of half-conformity to his maxim he unmeaningly applies it to others, yet should the righteous and protective selfishness of his poverty and ignorance reflect on that impracticable requisition; he would thank his God and Nature for the gift of this economy of selfishness; so necessary in his unprotected condition: would reserve the little he earns, to enable him to be just, when he should be; and thus, by an example of industry and prudence, to do away with the preaching of this indefinite obligation, and to lessen if not to eradicate all avoidable poverty, by inducing every one to provide for himself.

In a case like the above, selfishness has the efficacy of a virtue; and is as useful against intrusions on some of the rights and

necessities of the mind as the protective though painful sensibility in the skin, for warning and defense against abrasion, and thorns. Nor can I here, in the excursiveness of perception and in the election of similar relationships, avoid a joint comparison between the condition and necessities of present poverty and ignorance; and that of former Baronial Europe. The Baron was generally ignorant, and often quite poor enough to break-in and steal, and murder, for assisting his slender means of livelihood and defense; being protected in that selfish ignorance, by the gloomy selfishness of his Castle on the hill, with the furze and brambles, up to its very foundation. All was waste beyond; and his commanding prospect, only the means for watching a coming enemy; or espying a laden vessel to rob. That Castle too, without a window to show around, the goodly things of Nature; but shutting out the all-teaching light of heaven; and as his own senses, closed to every humanizing perception. Such are the parallel instances of the laborer and the merchant, secluded within unconscious ignorance; and the Baron shutting his ruder ignorance up behind the loop-holes of his Castle. But the Trader becoming independent of subsistent labor, begins to think less of his necessities; and though he does not turn his attention to his mind; yet still with the perception of self, reflected in his son, he sends him to college: and the Baron, by the industry of his retainers, and their improvement in knowledge and civility which follow industry, is relieved from the necessity of thieving, and of defending himself against reprisals; fills up his moat, removes his barbican, and enlarging his loop-holes to windows, looks out on cultivation and taste, and by the mutative influence of knowledge and thought, reversing the direction of his self-ward senses, lets in the prospect of a thousand things he never looked upon, or thought of before.

We here perceive in man, the first departure from the instructive and required selfishness of his sub-animal class: and when the instinctive animal wants are supplied, the wants of intellect begin. In this second stage of perception, the selfish necessities and cares are not altogether lost: for with the growth of personal pride and ambition, fostered by ten thousand gazing eyes; and tongues to speak their admiration, the selfish habit still con-



tinues; yet under the name of greatness and glory, vividly concentrated to the most intense degree.

I have thus made two divisions in the subject of the selfishness of perceptions; and here contrast with them, a third condition of the mind, in which selfish perceptions, as far as possible under our present imperfect and disorderly state, are among the yet limited Few, restrained or overruled by the mutative quality, in the forms of various and systematic knowledge. For it will be found that fulness and variety of classified knowledge have the same overpowering effect on selfish perceptions, as we have endeavored to show the broadly excursive have on the single-vivid. And indeed these two influences are nearly identical in character; since systematic knowledge is made by broad excursion; and selfishness is always a singly vivid quality.

To class these three stages of perception, among mankind; four-fifths in savage and civilized life are of the first or sub-animal class, of necessary selfishness: of the one remaining fifth, who go through the mockery of Fire-side, Public-school, and College education, a greater part belong to the second or ambitious class of selfishness. Both these present themselves in so many different ways; there cannot be great error in the proportions we have given. The petty and sometimes more serious personal disturbance of the world by the first class; with the devastations over empires by the second, must teach us what reactions may arise from the poor and ignorant, and what disastrous effects from the ambitious class.

It is difficult to tell the limited amount of the third class; for though they see through and through the world; we of the world do not see them as we pass them by. These wherever they are, have, in the greatest degree possible, escaped from the control of selfish perceptions, by the mutative influence of a wide, classified, and exact cultivation of the mind. The Prophets of old; since Nestor was respected by the Poet, who thought he so deserved to be; were stoned for knowing a little more than their times, and might be counted on the ten fingers: those of later days, have been so few as to escape by hiding themselves, and successfully lying quiet.

Of the two former classes, the first or ignorant, is quarrelsome

and annoying. The second or ambitious, is obtrusive, and it is impossible to avoid the noise of their trumpets, and the mischief of their restless turmoils. The third class, when happily set beyond the necessary selfishness of the first; and withdrawing themselves from amid the flare and clamor of the second; are enabled, by observation and contemplation of the things and principles of disinterested nature, to fly from the centralizing selfishness of individuality, to the unbounded circuit of universal perception. For briefly to vary the language, yet to take the meaning of a philosophic poet; who that from the alpine height of mental observation surveys the wide horizon of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception, can once draw-in his eye to center on himself.

Happily for a check on the selfishness of the first class, their working employment withdraws them from their otherwise necessary concentration on themselves. And thus it would appear that, of the first and third condition of the mind, the one is joined to mechanical labor; the other to an extended, accurate, and useful system of knowledge, to alleviate, each in its respective manner and degree, the lot of an excessive, though natural selfishness. But the contracted self-occupation of the ambitious class has no mutative means for reducing or outruling the absorbing vividness of its perception, except through a fear of punishment for its vices, or a mortified pride at the want of success. What fanatic in Glory was it; called ambition, 'the brilliant infirmity of superior minds'? Young aspirants intent on doing good to themselves, by doing mischief to others, think much of this sentence. Our view of the mind reads it, as a rhetorical compound of antiphrase, irony, and enigma.

From what has been said, it appears, that selfishness of perception is a quality which, under the present unprotective condition of government, religion, and morals, is to the individual among the poor and ignorant, a guide, and defense; but sometimes excessive and injurious, both to the body and the mind; generally incurable, except by mutative force in the ambitious; and utterly inconsistent with the broader and more productive powers of perception. Lord Bacon remarks, with his wise reasons for it, that no one who has in view the higher works of

intellect, should on the risk of distraction, ever marry. And yet I must think, that had he taken a sagacious view along the path we have accidentally fallen into, he would have both perceived and declared, that he who desires to accomplish thoughtful and broadly useful works; besides abjuring matrimony and children, and turning away from kings, and their unworthy sycophants; should neither court nor admit selfish actionary perceptions to the 'bed and board' of his intellect.

As the purpose of this essay is to present a new and elementary method of the mind; and thereupon an instructive system for its direction; I regard the selfish quality of perception, only as it affects the more important use of the five constituents: and with the preceding remarks on the moral bearing of this quality, I describe it to be, in the present disorderly, and limited state of the mind, a necessary condition of poverty and ignorance, undefended by knowledge or wealth: but a fatal obstruction to the progress of intellect, in the broad and elevated course of its destination. And certainly the whole school of metaphysical Artists, in selfish adherence to its own notions of spirituality, has portrayed the mind, in likeness to the redundancies, defects, and contortions of a Hindoo Idol: whereas a strict physical representation after nature, of that same mind will, figuratively, give it the God-like character and noble stature of the Apollo Belvidere.

Let me illustrate what is said above. This Country has for fifty years past been under the direction, nominally of the People: but by a natural turn of Universal Suffrage, really under the control of a sub-animal brood of narrow-minded and selfish politicians, who exercising their 'loafing' ambition on the ignorant wealthy as well as the poor, have exhibited that state of comparative imbecility, to which the vivid and egotistical quality always leads; for it does not appear, that among the innumerable boastful and so-called, great, smart, original, profound, and extraordinary statesmen, any one has suggested a principle, on the subject of their Republican Government, unknown to the world, and the common learning of its Founders: nor introduced one alteration of theory or practice that has not tended to weaken its feeble power, and to corrupt its imbecile administration.

In the practical uses of the mind, the selfish and the vivid quality are closely related, but not reciprocally; for though the selfish are often intensively vivid, the vivid are not always selfish. They are both fatal vices of the intellect, yet each may be mutative of the other. The selfish may bring in another ruling light; and the intensively vivid may change one form of selfishness for another.

I have gone no further into the analysis of the selfish quality, than to describe its character and effects: and though we have hinted at its final cause, for the protection of sub-animal *rights*, and the *rights* of the sub-animal portion of the human intellect; we have no knowledge of its proximate cause, in the functions of the senses and the brain. Nor is it probable, if we should discover it, that a remedy could be therein applied. The only means of relief or cure for this, as for all diseased or vicious qualities, is that of the mutative power; and education alone must point out the mode of its application.

In the twenty-second section, we endeavored to show, that the Quality of Conformity; exercised under a blind agreement in mere *opinion*; though a vice to the ordained, and natural working plan of the mind; is yet in its perverted application, a saving virtue to feeble and restricted intellects. These without perceiving the real cause of their deficiency, and thereupon seeking the educative means for relief, endeavor, continually, to hide their weakness within the protection of a gathered flock for mutual assistance, as timid as themselves; but which putting on a 'compelled' confidence, gives every individual the conceited strength of a sworn brotherhood for defensive argument, and for offensive attack.

Selfishness then affords the like protection to the defenseless poor and the ignorant, that Conformity offers to imperfect, weak, and defenseless thought.

This concludes the enumeration and the description of all the qualities which appear to constitute, accordingly as they are severally employed, the productive powers, or the fatal vices of the mind. I have not observed so minutely nor reflected so extensively, as to enable me to say; other conditions of perception may not be properly classed among those we have named. A

long familiarity with the working plan, as here described, may perhaps enable those who come after us, to perceive other functions like those qualities; or at least to define and arrange with more accuracy and fulness, those we have enumerated.



SECTION XXIX.

Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Qualities of Perception.

WE have considered the eighteen qualities of the first four constituents, with their reciprocal effects among themselves; but not with their special relations to the Fifth or the verbal sign; and though occasionally referring to the connection between them; have not formally described their influence on each other. We are now, according to a proposal at the close of the eleventh Section, about to point out this influence, in orderly succession, under the several heads of the qualities.

The verbal or vocal signs, as shown in the second section, are formed either instinctively, or by convention; and, afterwards as proper physical things, reflected-back through the ear to the brain; producing there, quiescent or silent perceptions or types of themselves; in like manner as images and types are produced on the senses and the brain by common external things. The primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive constituents are therefore, through the ear, in like manner affected by the conventional verbal sign, as they are, by what we Contradistinguish as natural things, which speak, we may say, to the several senses. Hence we learn, that the Fifth constituent, or the verbal sign; on the same principle which makes the essential functions of the other four; bears a large and important part, in contributing to the purposes of the several powers of perception; and thus to the powers of the human

mind. There is however this difference in effect, and in degree, between a perception of the common things of nature; and the perception of verbal signs.

The first four constituents have their perceptions of *unthinking* things, so to call them, or of things only individually significant; and the primary, the memorial, and joint are to do the *work of thinking upon* or of going-through all the images and types, necessary to make out their relationships, and to conclude upon them; thereby producing the useful, the agreeable, and truthful forms of thought.

In this case of the verbal sign, which already has a meaning, it does not come upon the ear and the brain, as an *unthinking* thing, but as a thing significant, or so to speak, *thoughtful* of its purpose; on which the mind is not obliged, as in the former case, carefully and often tediously, to exercise the comparisons and conclusions that constitute the instructive process of thought: for the mind is *told* by the significant word what it has to learn; not to *work-it-out* from a comparison of as-yet *unsignificant* things.

To illustrate the difference in effect, between these two cases: Let us suppose a primary perception of the Rainbow, under different positions of the sun in the morning, and the evening, with the negative fact of its never appearing at mid-day; and the various degrees of its color and elevation. Then considering these circumstances memorially, suppose an excursive memorial flight over passed primary perception of the analysis of light, the order of colors in the spectrum, the difference in refraction between air and water; with an elective choice, a joint comparison, and a conclusion among all the relationships of these perceptions. And suppose, this orderly method should furnish a full and accurate explanation of this reflective and refractive phenomenon. This discovery has been accomplished only by successive, patient, and arduous inquiry.

Let us further suppose, the proper verbal sign of all these perceptions, merely for the sake of the illustration, to have been individually known, before they pass through the ear into the brain. It is clear; these verbal signs can in a moment, communicate to the quiescent mind, without the delay of collecting the facts, arranging the comparisons, and conclusions, of that fulness of

knowledge, which even with a combination of industrious intellects, it would have required, perhaps years to gather, to systematize, and to describe. Thus we learn that language, by the reaction we have spoken of, comes to the brain with its knowledge; unretarded by a second primary perception, memorial excursion, joint comparison, and cautious conclusion. Hence verbal perception, though the last named, in our method, is far from being the least in the constituency of the mind. In its usefulness, it is more than a short-hand assistant; more than a preparatory and convenient Logarithm; it is a picture of that wonder, and to the uninstructed, almost-miracle of thought, the analytic, and resolving power of the higher algebra; for without the great ordination of Nature, which said, Let there be light in the verbal signs, the great problem of the human mind would be insolvable; and its conditions unchangeably classed with those of the brute.

From what has been said, we learn, that verbal perceptions are of all others, the most acceptable, to the senses, and to the brain. The first four, when silently and obscurely used without actionary language, are to be exercised under a tedious task; since the natural things that produce their silent images and types, must be first represented as primary, then become memorial, then comparisons, elections, and finally, conclusions: and all this, to be properly done, requires an effort which few minds, without compulsion and even with it, are able or willing to undertake. But when with verbal signs, either silent or actionary, to constitute them significant; types have been already applied; the primary, memorial, excursive, elective, and joint perceptions have been already used in acquiring knowledge, and, as it were, thrown aside, for a conclusion, certified and recorded in language; they present the whole significant picture of that language to the senses and the brain; and require only their easy recognition and acceptance of it. We find then the most effective character of the mind, and the most abundant means for acquiring knowledge, are derived from verbal signs, representing the most effective qualities of perceptions; just as the highest character of actionary wisdom is the result of the most effective use of the qualities themselves.

In the sixth section we endeavored to explain, and here again

refer-to, the subject of the purpose whether silent or audible, of language, when properly and precisely constructed for the representation of thought. But in the present confused and careless condition of the human tongue, even with due watchfulness over its errors, it is often a false, and dangerous reporter.

It has been stated, that the power of the Generic constituents is manifested by their Specific qualities. We will endeavor to show, that under the unity of purpose in the mind, the verbal signs derive their usefulness, force, precision, and elegance, from the qualities they represent. We go on then with an account of the relationships of the verbal sign to the qualities of perception.



ARTICLE I. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Quality of Vividness or Force.*

We endeavored to show, that the quality of vividness in its extreme degrees is a vice of perception. And since the verbal sign, as a physical thing, does impress the senses and the brain, in like manner as the things of nature, in the production of the first four constituents; it is a like vice in the verbal sign, when it makes so strong, or so weak an impression as to obscure, or pervert by misrepresentation, the meaning they are intended to convey. Thus the fanatic, with his vivid and delusive perception, of things having at the same time, too vivid a perception of the language of his delusion, is by this double light, blinded to the common perception of natural things, that might rectify his error. This vivid condition of language, along with the vivid perception of things, though less connected than in the fanatic; occurs in the madman; whom the vivid primary and memorial, with the vivid verbal perception lead to a like delusion and its dangerous consequences. Yet one is shut up within the cell of an Asylum: the other may be followed in life, with admiration, by thousands; and afterwards Sainted to answer the blind or unworthy prayers of his votaries. Verbose speakers on common subjects, often have the vivid perception of the verbal sign to a degree, that confuses their meaning; without altogether destroy-



ing it. Thoughtful subjects require few words, and a medium degree of force.

A feebleness in the verbal sign has the same faint effect upon the senses and the brain. The ignorant on all subjects except that of their own particular trade or profession; all thoughtless idlers, of fashion and rank; all merely literary scribes, called writers, who cultivate a style for common thoughts; every demagogue with his single selfish perception of popularity; all, up, or down, as it may be, to the King and Queen, with their sole perception of vanity and pride; have a very faint perception of verbal description or phrase, which is foreign to their knowledge and thinking. With those whom good breeding does not induce to give ear, even ordinary speech frequently passes unheard; as the hammer of a clock, to one who does not listen for the hour. The most intelligent listeners, in a serious and useful purpose, are persons of observation and knowledge; for these enable the eye and the ear to take-in every thing that comes before them. Nay, the senses of a broad and keen observer appear to have an involuntary tendency to knowledge. For in a kind of reciprocity between things and perception, it would seem; the senses and the brain are not more in search of knowledge, than by its own elective affinity, knowledge seeks the senses and the brain. There is however this difference between the effect of brightness in the verbal and in the other perceptions. When the latter are too faint, very few of the relationships of things being perceived, and those obscurely, the percipient will be poor in knowledge. But the verbal sign has, through its appropriate use, been already assigned to the meaning of the first four perceptions; and the representation of the relationships of things by their signs, is capable of making a stronger and more immediate impression on the brain, than is usually effected by the things of nature, in passing more deliberately through the silent process of picturing that meaning: for though language is necessary to extend the scope of human thought, beyond that of the sub-animal, it prepares for the extension, by brightening the faint and quiescent perceptions of the former.

To recapitulate; we learn, that too vivid a verbal sign blinds perception to the meaning it should convey, exaggerates its pur-

pose, and deforms the elegance of language: that the faint though more available, and impressive than the yet quiescent and unsignified perceptions; still it has not sufficient force to render them the definite representative of thought.

The medium brightness of the verbal sign is one of the means for rendering language clear and impressive.



ARTICLE II. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Qualities of Quick and Slow.*

What was said of the influence of these qualities on the first four constituents, applies equally to the verbal: recollecting however, that the latter conveys a collected and concluded meaning to the ear and the brain; thus making the first four more efficient in their purposes, when combined with the language of that concluded meaning; than when they have not gone through the whole perceptive process of the mind, for reaching that conclusion.

Quickness of perception in language, makes an unhesitating speaker; and with a natural and cultivated ear, gives a free command over the rythmus of poetry and prose; makes an apt punster; a good guesser of riddles and conundrums; and a ready rhymers. A slow perception of the verbal sign makes a deliberate, and often a hesitating speaker; would make a poor improvisator; a flat punster; and a wit by preparation. A medium between the excess of quick and slow in verbal perception; as in a neutral brightness, marks the proper degree of this quality for a thoughtful, dignified, and elegant command of language.

As the verbal sign conveys a knowledge of the relationship of things, by a short-hand, of perception, without going through the full mental process to obtain it; there should be a cultivation of the ways and means for communicating it to others. This cultivation is referred to the departments of Grammar, Rhetoric, and the old school Logic. With few exceptions the mass of mankind have faint perceptions of language. Here and there, an uneducated individual, with vivid and quick perceptions, makes a just metaphor, and a sententious maxim on the subject of his own particular business; but rarely perhaps, on a subject beyond it.

ARTICLE III. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Excursive Quality.*

We have defined the verbal sign to be the artificial, or conventional representative of the other four several constituents. And as the images and types of the memorial are the principal materials of the excursive quality; it follows that the excursive flight may be exercised on the quiescent verbal sign in combination with the memorial constituent; and thus contribute to the clearness and precision of the memorial range of the mind. We have no knowledge of the agency of the excursive quality in the sub-animal, with his limited vocal, and other physical signs: but we know that the actionary perception of language gives a wider-circuit to excursion; and certainly, it is in great part, if not altogether the cause of memorial accuracy and duration. Without here intending to jest in a metaphor, it would be only making our excursive flight over the *malaria* of metaphysics, to inquire; what is the mode of the verbal agency which enlarges excursive perception: for of this we know no more, than that the memorial and the verbal excursions are made together; and are to be classed among ultimate facts, without a perceptible proximate cause.

From a use of the excursive flight, under the quiescent verbal sign, without the elective comparison for insuring its purity, propriety, and precision; we have that endless fluency of speech, which in popular and talkative governments, enchants the ignorant mass, who know not the clear meaning nor perceive the dangerous application of one-half they hear; and are not aware that every talking stump and Legislative demagogue is intent on turning patriotism into party, and substituting interest for sense. This case of fluent and wild excursion over common-places in speech soon makes its way into writing; for without extended education in a country, and a high character of criticism founded upon it; popular schools and colleges soon lead to a popular relish for verbosity; with the inevitable consequence, that the wider this humble kind of education prevails, the less the general benefit, and the less the patronage of the 'saving grace' of knowledge in the comprehensively practical intellect: for the broader the

survey of the mind, the more accurate and practical the conclusion. And certainly the narrowness of popular pretension has never yet been able to accomplish any thing usefully, or well, except to destroy itself.

The proper use of excursiveness in language, when held from wildness, yet free to rove with the rein on its neck, gives that docility to the tongue and pen, which is ready to turn, to the right or the left, for an abundant gathering, and to pause for selection.



ARTICLE IV. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Elective Quality.*

The first four constituents and the verbal sign are so assistant to each other, that it is difficult to draw a separating line between their uses. For in the mind which employs signs; as even that of the sub-animal does more or less; to perceive, is unavoidably to combine with perception the memorial of its sign: and to have the memorial of a sign, is to have at the same time the perception it represents. To be elective in the use of the constituents, is therefore to be elective in verbal signs. The elective in language is the source of much of the precision and power of thought: and from the close connection between thought and sign; the like may be said of the influence of the accuracy of thought on the precision of language.

Among the discriminative rules of rhetoric are those of Purity, Propriety, and Precision. These indeed refer more especially to language; but as verbal signs are useless except with a *thoughtive* or a *passionative* meaning; to write and to speak, purely, properly, and with precision, is in like manner so to perceive. It is the elective quality of perception, connected with its word, which practically fulfils those important rules of style, in the beautiful union of intellect and speech. The elective function is the means of collecting; by the *involuntary choice* of nature, of which we formerly spoke; those pure, precise, and proper words that denote an intended perception and no other. The higher writers in

poetry and prose, together with the author on science whose observation extends beyond the limit of his interest, and his fame, are all distinguished by the bright, and finished touches of their works. In this view of the elective quality and the verbal sign, the latter is supposed to be of neutral force, and the excursive to be made, not like the irregular and hasty flight of the swallow, which dodges and feeds from every passing swarm; but with that deliberate, yet compassing wing of the eagle, ready to stoop to the well-watched subject of its choice.

When the verbal sign is joined to a confused election, a feeble force and limited excursion, the character of both language and thought is appropriate to, or rather produces, those dull and flimsy writers who accommodate themselves, like the self-degraded demagogue, on other subjects, to an ignorant and imbecile popularity. And let it be remembered, that when here and elsewhere we speak of popularity, we include, the common undigested, and blind conforming opinions, and notions, as well of the mass of Aristocracy and Wealth, as of the low and sneaking mass of Politicians. Again, should the verbal sign be combined with an elective quality of the first degree of vividness, and a wild excursive flight; language and its attendant meaning, would be active indeed though wasteful and unsatisfactory; producing a style without accurate delineation, accumulated perceptions without order, and altogether that promiscuous gathering of words, which having neither the dignified demeanor of prose, nor the majestic excitement of poetry is too much like what has been called, the one running madly into the other.



ARTICLE V. *Of the Relations of the Verbal Sign to the Agreeable and Disagreeable Qualities.*

The verbal sign has a broad and intimate relation to the agreeable quality.

We say nothing here of the effects of language, in extending the power of perception, and in giving a clearness to its pictures; which so remarkably distinguish the human from the sub-

animal mind: though this power and clearness, by their multiplied means for the advancement of knowledge, produce a large portion of the enjoyment of the intelligent part of mankind. Leaving then a more detailed account of this subject to future inquirers, we shall briefly notice the connection of the agreeable with language, as applied to the department of Philosophy, both with a view to usefulness and taste.

Philosophy, through all its various branches, is an abundant source of the agreeable, to the intelligent mind. Etymology, with all its roots, offsets, and engraftings; its combinations, interchangings, and substitutions; its ethnological connections with the origin or affiliation of nations, their arts, governments, manners, and religion, contribute the means of useful knowledge, as well as of a varied intellectual enjoyment. Old 'Logic,' as it used to be taught, through the endless divisional nomenclature of syllogism, was once the deep interest and delight of philosophic wranglers; and constituted the learned and quibbling enjoyment of quarreling sophists, in one age; and in another, stirred up the acrimonious broils of Theologians, who founded their ambitious pleasure on the hopes of victory, in their verbal disputes.

Rhetoric, by its chief divisions; Poetry and Eloquence, with their sources of the agreeable, in the endless means of the position, force, and rythmus of words, affords a never-failing variety of agreeable perceptions. One should not speak for other Readers of Shakspeare; yet, of all his excursive gathering, and elective choice, we have the highest primary and memorial gratification, in the originality, force, variety, and unexpected fulness of his *thought-packed* metaphor; the precise description and *photographic* picturing of his phraseology; and in the precision of his verbal, following the unbounded excursive flight of his memorial perception: for much of that truthful delineation of character, and of that heartfelt delicacy of sentiment, is set in striking relief, by the finishing touches of the firm and graceful pencil of his language. Shakspeare is called; from Milton downward; the Poet-child of Nature. And he is so: not only because he describes those common things of nature and life, which most of the world have perceived; and therefore recognize at once, as its own revived images and types; but because he describes them in terms,

which nature has ordained for the fulness and power of the verbal sign, and that no child of hers has perhaps so satisfactorily reached. There are few who widely estimate all the several merits of this great master. The number of those who perceive the beauty and sublimity of his generic descriptions, and the wisdom of his reflections, on subjects familiar to them, far exceeds that of the admirers of his language. The former, wanting perhaps the natural instinct, or not having been taught, the *art*, of the verbal sign, do not perceive the full force and beauty of his peculiar use of it.

I add to the preceding account of the sources of the agreeable in the verbal sign, that of Elocution; with the hope, and partly with the expectation, that if ever the practice, I cannot call it the Art of Reading, should be extended beyond its present condition of corrupted instinct, and then founded on a scientific analysis of the voice; it may be classed with the Esthetic Arts; and thus become, to the educated votary, a refined, and reflective enjoyment of the *thoughtive* and passionate uses of the verbal sign. Then shall we no more have the Histrionic art exemplified by the *uncut* tongues of vain, conceited, and restless Youth, too eager and ambitious, to acknowledge or even to know, the necessity of education and time for doing any thing well. Then too a theatric audience, having something to interest them besides the tinsel, dress, and strut of the Player, and finding a just and beautiful system, which in every particular, adapts the verbal sign to thought and passion; will make it a source of intelligent reflections as well as of agreeable sound to the ear. But when will that enlightened age of Elocution come? Never perhaps, until we have some clear analytic method of the mind, to enable us to comprehend an analytic method of the voice, which was designed to go hand-in-hand with its use.

I have said nothing of the relation of the verbal sign to the disagreeable quality of perception: nor is it necessary; since whatever is the reverse of the agreeable, in the uses of speech, is to be considered disagreeable, without a special designation.

The most disagreeable infliction upon the intelligent and educated ear, whether by the verbal sign or by the mechanical sound, is that of useless Noise. But mental sensibility is not yet civil-

ized enough, to take up this subject; since nine-tenths of the world, like the brute, are too vividly occupied with their own self-contracted concerns, to perceive its annoyance and distractions.



ARTICLE VI. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Quiescent and Actionary Qualities.*

It was shown formerly; there is a silent or quiescent perception of the verbal sign of conventional language, and of the relationships of its words to each other; as well as of a quiescent perception of the images and types of natural things, and of their relationships. There is we now say, a necessary and close connection between this quiescent perception of the verbal sign, and of the other quiescent perception of things: for this quiescent memorial of words is a *mordant*, as we called it, to fix, and thus to accumulate images and types for just comparison, and for conclusive perceptions, which are, as yet, neither visibly acted nor audibly heard. But the actionary quality is the agent that embodies the quiescent perception into the external signs of gesture and speech; and is therefore always the coadjutor, often the director and controller of thought. The vividness of a quiescent perception is, by some wise but unknown causation, urged into the actionary quality: still that quality when once excited into speech, accompanies, and assists in directing the effects it has contributed to produce. This is obvious in what is called 'Passion,' under two conditions of the mind. In the first; among the intelligent and educated, where its actionary course is restrained by the *reactionary* control of the world. In the second; with the irresponsible and therefore uncontrollable actionary purpose of a self-willed woman. The former may be quiescently fierce; yet being prudently resolute, the language of his temper, though strongly emphatic, still keeps within the influence of the reactionary language of the temper of others. Whereas the wild and vivid passion of obstinate ignorance, especially among women, being beyond the orderly restraint of just perceptions, with their precise and habitual signs, are controllable by physical force alone. Such



passions, wanting the rule which definite language, combined with definite perception imposes on the intelligent and educated mind, have the like relation to it, that the whirlwind has to the right-onward gale: for this seems to have a purpose in its line; but may in a degree, be opposed or counteracted: the other, seeming to have no design in its turbulent sweep, leaves disasters in its path, that could not have been foreseen and prevented; and have not yet been strictly accounted for, by the general laws of nature, in the air.

These are the differences, ascribable in part to the influence of language, in the actionary functions of the ignorant, and in those of an enlightened intellect. The enlightened, energetic, and orderly perception is governed, in a great degree, by an energetic, precise, and orderly language. The ignorant, and disorderly perception, is under the influence of a wild, indefinite, and self-confusing use of its proper verbal sign.

In dreams, delirium, and madness, this reciprocally assistant or controlling influence between language and thought is strangely disturbed; and that orderly disposition of the memorial, which is essential to the collection of properly related joint, and accurately conclusive perception, is confounded or altogether lost. The actionary, in its verbal or other muscular sign, which is so necessary for assorting and correcting the wandering of *waking* thoughts, very rarely occurs in dreams; and when it does, waking, in most cases, immediately follows. We will hereafter inquire, how far the absence of this actionary quality is connected with the disjointed phenomena of dreaming: when the analogy will be shown, between these and the silent or quiescent memorial perception, in its waking yet still wandering state.

The world's opinion, which in the present state of the mind, is too often on the wrong side of the question; regards the act of speaking to one-self, as denoting at least an oddity, if not something more irregular, in the mind that directs it. This use of the actionary perception in speech, is received by the mass of the high-born no less than the low, as an indication of insanity, because they do not consider the value of precision in thought and language, either in themselves or in others; nor would they much regard it if they did. When however, the frame and working

plan of the mind, shall be understood by the Few, and the knowledge of them, *beat*-into the comprehension of the many, who will not receive it in the gentler way; it will be found, that he whose quiescent perceptions are prone to take on this actionary form of self-dialogue, throws-off many of his otherwise wandering, unrelated, or *insane* memorial perceptions, that disturb the just exercise of the joint and the conclusive; and thereby contributes essentially to the precision of the combined employment of his language and perception. If then we are here right, we must give a varied turn to that old sentence against talking fools. The Ancients had a saying that 'he is a wise man who speaks sparingly.' This in its generality may apply to the metaphysician, who not having much to be wise upon, might by wrapping himself-up in silence, perhaps appear to be so. But an observative and practical philosophy would set it down, that the man would be wiser, who, to fix his own thoughts would with a perceptive purpose, talk much to himself; and to enlarge them extensively talk freely in exchange with others.



ARTICLE VII. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Synchronous and Successive Qualities.*

In the seventeenth section, we considered, without being able to resolve the question in all cases; whether the several perceptions by the several senses and the brain, are synchronous or successive; or whether to the percipient, more than one image or type, or relationship is present at the same time, or whether these perceptions are successive; and whether joint comparisons are made from synchronous or successive images and types. And although this might be a subject to occupy metaphysicians in ill-natured dispute; we find it of no present importance in our development of the practical purposes and acts of the mind. There being then no purpose in the above questions, we make no inquiry into the relations of the synchronous and successive, to the other qualities: for the quality of brightness, of excursion, elec-



tion, quick and slow, the agreeable and its reverse, with the quiescent and actionary perception, would not be affected by the synchronous or successive; nor would the latter qualities be affected by the former. But we are not prepared to say, how far if at all, the synchronous and successive, and the verbal sign may mutually affect each other.

Leaving to future time, the further inquiry, and final decision on this subject; I will only suggest a point for investigation. There is, as we have said, a quiescent state of verbal signs, as well as of the other perceptions of the images and types of natural things. I would then ask; may the verbal sign have an effect in holding the successive image or type on the memorial for such a time, and in such a manner, as to enable the successive to perform the part of the synchronous? And as a consequence; is the obscurity of these memorial signs, in dreams, one cause of their confusion, and oddity? For the apparent synchronism of perception not being then effectively kept up by the verbal sign, there is a more rapid succession of unrelated images and types; and therefore a greater irregularity, than in the actionary verbal perception of the waking state.


I beg the Reader to take these as suggestive queries; and to make them the subject of further observation, not of criticism and argument; for this will be more likely to obstruct, than to assist the progress of knowledge.



ARTICLE VIII. *Of the Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Single or the Few and the Manifold Qualities.*

In the eighteenth section we described the few or the single, and the manifold quality, to be in the former case, the limitation of the mind, through vividness or other cause, to one or more images or types; with the exclusion of all others: and in the latter, the abundant command of a succession of memorial images and types for a wide elective choice. I have been disposed to consider these two forms of perception, as conditions of the two



qualities of vividness and excursion. And I am not aware of their having further relationships to the verbal sign, than was stated under the head of those qualities severally in the eleventh and thirteenth sections. When there is a single faint, or a vivid perception, the verbal sign will be either weak, or absorbingly emphatic. When neutral, the sign will be suited to its clearness. If the excursive images and types are manifold, and unconnected, the sign will want precision, when applied to joint comparison, and to conclusion.



ARTICLE IX. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Involuntary Quality.*

When the term involuntary was employed in our synopsis of the qualities, it was more in momentary conformity to the language of metaphysics, which assumes the notion of an independent Will, than with reference to a true and practical view of the case.

The word involuntary, as we have endeavored to show, is purely a theoretic term. Had not the metaphysical Theologian, for some fictional purpose, raised the delusion of a self-directing will, we would never, in deciding against its existence, have supposed such a case as, *no-will*, for its contrary. We would have only looked upon the working plan and action of the mind as part of the great scheme of causations, that God and his Nature, hand in hand, have in the necessary course of design and execution, prepared on a similar principle, for all things and their relationships; and would then no more have thought of a voluntary power in the mind, than of a voluntary agency in two stems of vegetable growth; one of which should *will* to form a citron, and another a peach. If such is the nonentity in this supposed condition, it cannot as we perceive, have a functional relation to the verbal sign, which is intended to represent a real physical perception.



ARTICLE X. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Durable and
Evanescent Qualities.*

In the twentieth section, we stated some of the circumstances under which perceptions are what we call durable, and otherwise evanescent.

The Primary are evanescent, when the things that produce them pass rapidly before the senses; though the perception may be revived by their reappearance. The Memorial are evanescent, when they are once excited, and never afterwards: again, when they are excited, vanish, and are afterwards momentarily revived.

Primary perceptions are Durable, when the things that produce them are continued for a time before the senses. The Memorial are durable when they appear, and continue for a time. They are also what I have called, durable in Concealment, when they remain unperceived for a longer or shorter time; but rise again involuntarily, if required in joint comparison and in conclusion. Having, when thus concealed, the capacity of revival, they endure for days, months, years; or for a whole life.

The verbal sign is the emphatic assistant of all the first four constituents: and in application to the subject of the present section, we find; the evanescent primary and memorial images are rendered more distinct, for their moment, by being connected with their verbal sign. For here a perception of the thing or object of nature, accompanied with its verbal sign, makes a double impression: and thus has seemingly, a double imaged, or typical hold of the senses and the brain. What I have called the durable primary and memorial perceptions are, by the like assistance of the verbal sign, not only made clearer, but are more readily retained for their allotted time. And again; the revivable-Concealed have their functional importance, from a similar double influence of the verbal sign.

We have recorded our grounds for the belief, that all perception is involuntary or necessary, whether unavoidably produced in the primary, or in the memorial: and we endeavored to explain the principle of their revival ~~at the~~ ^{by the} excursive and elective calls;

by considering them as a picture on the senses and the brain, of things and their relationships, which exist in nature; or to paraphrase this description; that things have their necessary actions, and relationships in nature; and when the images and types of these things are pictured on the senses and the brain; there seems to be an instinct, to picture by what we called the *necessary* elective choice, those relationships between images and types, that exist between things themselves. I here design to speak cautiously, that others may not take implicitly this explanation as an authority: still this seems to be the manner in which excursion and election necessarily collect relationships, and lead to the intellectual result of joint comparison and final conclusion. Thus by the conditions and laws of the mind, things arise in perception, as they exist, act, and are related to each other in nature. Therefore without the aid of Spirit, to work-out the problem; perceptions by representing in all things, nature as she is, constitutes the natural and productive mind; and the verbal sign announces this in knowledge to others, and echoes it back to ourselves.

We may now perceive, that the power of reviving clearly, of comparing strictly, and concluding justly, depends in a great degree, on the grasping and illuminating power of the verbal sign: and we are encouraged to this view, by observing, that the sub-animal, which is most limited in vocal and muscular signs of perception, is often most limited in the process of revival, comparison, and conclusion.

What I here say, refers to durably-concealed perceptions in the higher purposes of knowledge in every department of science and taste: but it applies also to common occasions of verbal recollection; with this difference however between the cases. The revival of the scientific perceptions, being founded on a memorial representation of the existence and relationships of natural things; the elective perception is, when assisted by the verbal sign, more disposed to follow the course of that natural relationship. Common recollections are more immediately connected with the conventionalities of life, and being therefore not always founded on a perception of the relationships of nature, but on the accidents of human affairs; are thus more dependent on the assistance of

words, than on the instinctively elective choice. And hence, we are apt to grope long and in vain for the image or type, of the thing, till we have caught the perception of its verbal sign.



ARTICLE XI. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Mixed and Unmixed Qualities.*

It has been shown, that the process of the mind, in its joint comparisons and conclusions, is conducted by the use of the primary perceptions alone; or the memorial alone. Thus we may compare and conclude between the memorial, without the presence of the primary; and between the primary, without the presence of the memorial. These are called unmixed. Again; comparisons and conclusions are made directly between the primary and the memorial: or a present primary perception of a thing of nature and its relationships, may be compared with the memorial of another thing and its relationships, of the same sense: and this is a mixed perception. Thus in Rubens' *Descent from the Cross*, we may memorially compare its composition, drawing, and coloring, with similar points, in the same subject, treated by Volterra. When the pictures are compared under primary-unmixed perceptions, they allow a precise comparison of point to point. Still discrimination is limited; for only what is at the moment perceived, can be compared. The memorial-unmixed, by its extended excursions, presents numberless images and types for comparison; but they are not so clear nor so steady as the primary, and not always so true; hence the comparison and the conclusion, as far as they go, are not generally, so just and exact; and are moreover liable to run into artistic fiction, and into poetic extravagance. The mixed primary and memorial, having the brightness and precision of the former, with the abundance of the latter, are more efficient in every extended purpose of the mind; and; if in the instance before us, we may use the expression; the comparison will be more *science-like*, definite, and satisfactory.

We have been considering the effect of the first four constit-

uents. As the fifth or verbal sign may be mixed or unmixed; that is, comparisons and conclusions may be drawn altogether from primary; or altogether from memorial perception of words, with their meaning; or else from a mixed auricular and memorial perception of them; it follows that the verbal sign is as necessary for giving the highest power to the mind, in the present instance of mixed and unmixed joint comparison, as in that of the several other qualities.



ARTICLE XII. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Mutative Quality.*

We have described the mutative quality to consist in that necessary power and action, by which one perception, when either primary or memorial, changes the form, varies the quality, or altogether effaces an image or type, and its influence on the senses and the brain. It is an important agent in the working plan of the mind, and consequently in all the practical purposes of man.

It has been shown, how the verbal sign influences the vividness or force of perception; and as vividness is the principal means by which mutation is effected, we may perceive how this important quality is essentially connected with the verbal sign. We know; the powerful influence of language in moulding the mind to any state of perception, whether in truth or error: and that a single verbal sign, as that of the name of Boodh, Jupiter, Odin, or Mahomet, has been able by its vividness, to shut out from the senses and the brain, those images and types of truth which are so palpable to the neutral and moderate degrees of perception. It is under this influence of names, that good as well as evil is effected by their mutative power. The vividness of the name of Jesus, and of Paul, on their enthusiastic followers, far outshone the waning light of the Pagan Mythology; threw the Hierarchy of Moses into darkness; and brought its votaries to contempt and persecution.

Observe the effect of the *name* of an epidemic disease, on nine-

tenths of the world. Like that of the Grave, 'Men shiver when 'tis named:' and when the vivid selfishness from the word becomes mutative of the perception of the ways and means of cure; of duty and kindness to relatives and friends; the whole mind is filled with one confusing, vivid, and blinding image of headlong self-preservation. I once knew a Navy officer, of that valorous character called a 'Fire-Eater,' who hurried from a town, on hearing of a case of Yellow-Fever being in one of its remote corners. Here a vivid memorial foresight of death, with all the horrors of the word, overruled his habit of steady resolution before other forms of danger from batteries and boarding-pikes. The vivid and selfish perception of the word Yellow-fever, in the former case, was mutative of the now less vivid type of the verbal sign of vanity and glory in the latter.*

It is by the mutative quality, under the influence of its verbal sign, when perceptions are yet mutable; for I speak not of the incurable vices of the mind; that education is to be conducted, morals to be preserved, government to be purified; religion to be revived, or reformed to the condition of plain and comprehensible knowledge; and then, after the manner of science, to be employed in gathering the Will of God from the facts and laws of nature, to render it a uniform, peaceful, and unversatile blessing to mankind. The mind was created in fulfilment of the ordination of Nature, that itself like all-things should be right and good; and though it has been ignorantly brought to depravity, it can no more be said, without impious contradiction, to be 'prone to evil as the sparks fly upwards,' than that the rooted mountains, self-winged can rise through the air. Yet as long as man has been foolish and wicked in his moral, political, and religious ways, have

* Some writer in a British Review, or some speaker in Parliament having, perhaps properly at the time, revived the obsolete term, *unmistakable*, it quickly caught the limited and confused, though vivid perception of American Editors or reporters; and in many instances displaced every other term for demonstrated truth. I lately read in News-paper phraseology, of the *unmistakable greatness* of an Arch-intriguer for the Presidency; and we hear of another admired Demagogue, who, from the habit of looking two different ways at the same time, is said to have an *unmistakable squint*. Here, to vulgar perception, the usual vividness of a slang-language outshone by mutation, the just precision of appropriate and useful terms for two 'unmistakable' knaves.

deadly arrows, javelins, and the fiery ball, been projected against gravitation, in some warlike form of that folly and wickedness, by cupidity and ambition, for the glory or the misery of mankind.



ARTICLE XIII. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Qualities of Truth and Falsehood.*

Into what department of the mind shall we look and not find that its fifth constituent, as we call the verbal sign, has its influence on the other four, and their qualities? The relation of language to some of the qualities is however nearer and apparently more important; particularly to that of Truth and Falsehood; its precision adding to the clearness of the quality, in one case, and its obscurity adding to confusion and error in the other.

It is well known, that those who have not been educated on the subject of the fifth constituent, and are not accustomed to apply clear language to accurate thought, are often unable to give true actionary character even to true quiescent perception: the speech or writing in this case, being only a faint representation of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive constituent. This is generally the case with the mass of men, and is nearly universal with women. In the common affairs of life, a habit in every day perceptions, often makes the beginning of a sentence convey, if I may so speak, all the rest both of the language and the meaning. And thus we may say, 'a word to the mass.' For those subjects however, on which the Few are raised above the Many, not by Inspiration but by Physical knowledge, the utmost precision of thought is required; and error in the verbal sign may produce much intellectual confusion, with its consequent practical evil.

In the twenty-third section, under the fifth head of the effect of the verbal sign, on the perception of truth and error, we endeavored to show, how it corrupts the discrimination of the greater part of mankind, particularly in its misrepresentations of human character. The perverted influence of language often making fools and knaves pass for the wise and the good; and the wise

and the good, as no better than fools or knaves. The influence of a mere name not only creates false representations of *men*, by holding up the popular reputations of patriots so-called, politicians, and marketable writers of fiction, who often leave nothing behind them, except debts to be paid by their country or friends. But further, the error of the verbal sign extends its influence to the names of *things*. A *great* man in England, not long ago, with the effect, if not the design, to overrule the moral feeling against debt; when the glory of Royal and Warlike extravagance, Pensions on lazy rank, and a desire to leave monuments of his Administration, made borrowing necessary; used the captivating yet ruinous phrase, that national debt is a National Blessing: and King, Council, Lords temporal and Spiritual, Jew-financier, with secretaries and clerks of the Revenue, all by the vivid vision of this overruling phrase, along with the bright phantom of a 'Sinking Fund,' brought on, from excess of promising light, the hopeless darkness of an irredeemable debt. There was a time in London when no woman of rank or fashion had a primary perception of the word Bond-street, without a memorial perception, which leaping-over all joint comparison, fell into a foolish conclusion, that every thing in their way, selected elsewhere, could be neither good, useful, nor decent. And without there being rank or fashion in these cases, and only purse-pride-folly; the same is now true of Chesnut-street, and of Broad-way, in the two imitative Cities of the United States. This is a form of falsehood in perception, produced by the vivid overruling of the verbal sign. And without going into particular exemplification; observe the clearness of verbal description, the precision of nomenclature, and the well ordered arrangement, by which language combines to make the true and luminous sciences, of geometry, arithmetic, natural philosophy, chemistry, and even of technical terms in the mechanical arts.

I have thus pointed out the general scope of this subject, and leave its detailed consideration to others: for it would be an endless task, to name the various occasions on which the verbal signs, by their impropriety or obscurity, may lead to perversion or falsehood of perception. I intend this work to be an outline of what may or should be done by others: and not having myself time to

carry it out, I must be satisfied to stand at this, the beginning of the road, and point the way; without giving further directions, perhaps to embarrass the inquirer and prevent his observing for himself. Since if he has the ordinary instinct of excursive, elective, and foresighted perception, he may pass on, and gather up all the useful knowledge he may require, of the working process of the mind.



ARTICLE XIV. *Relations of the Exaggerative Quality to the Verbal Sign.*

We have shown; the exaggerative quality outstrips the sober pace of perceptive truth; and as the purpose of the verbal sign, here considered, is to represent things as they are, we leave this quality to the science of advertizing empirics, small poets without heads, politicians without veracity, and ambitious candidates for greatness, whose hyperbole bursts in its expansion.



ARTICLE XV. *Relations of the Verbal Sign to the Qualities of Independence and Conformity.*

The qualities of independence and conformity are respectively subject to the influence of the verbal sign; which produces in the former, the free quiescent, and the fearless actionary use of the true and orderly functions of perception; and in the latter, the universality of its despotism, in creating and continuing their disorderly errors. As then the proper application of the verbal sign gives breadth, order, and independence to perception, and thus essentially distinguishes man from the sub-animal; so a deviation from that order by the great mass of mankind, makes the striking difference between those who speak without thinking; and those rare individuals, who with a knowledge of the place and purpose of the intellectual constituents, observe, think, and speak, with a

true and practical use of the first four constituents with a proper application of their verbal signs.

In the new view of this subject, under the present analysis, and classification, it is not easy to decide, what proportion of the misuse of language, compared with that of the other four constituents, contributes to the vice of conformity. If this view should be hereafter embraced by broad and discriminating observers, the subject may be further investigated with success. It may seem strange that words which were invented, to assist in the management of the other four constituents, should after a long connection with them, exclusively take their place. Yet it does appear, that with a large majority of the world, words are used not only on the common occasions of life, which seem scarcely to require a directive meaning; but also on those important subjects that require the deliberate and careful use of both meaning and sign. A convincing instance of this, is found in every religion, where rituals, and other verbal and conventional services, are repeated by both Priest and People, with no other understanding of the words than that vaguely suggesting a duty to God. It is said, some of the formal phrases employed in the old Roman Sacrifices were traditional words from the Etruscan, or from some other lost language: and to these the multitude ignorantly bowed-down and responded; in like manner as they piously heard the trumpet-summons to the altar, and respectfully obeyed it. Following this parrot-prayer and praise, in the celebration of their masses, the Papist-descendant of the Pagan Roman, still traditionally employs the Latin phraseology; to which the ignorantly pious attach no other meaning, than that it is the obligatory language of their worship. Nor is the Protestant, through all his contentious divisions, free from this senseless use of verbal signs, under the interested league, and unthinking language of Conformity. How few men, women, and children, even though hearing and speaking their native tongue, are aware, more than the Roman with his Tuscan, and the Papist with his Latin jargon, that in their united responses, and their universal Amen, there is any other purpose in the words they utter, than thereby to do what the Church, their God at second hand, has from time immemorial required them to do.

These are some of the modes, in which verbal signs contribute to religious Conformity; but they are alike influential in every other department of human perception especially in politics, medicine, law, and fashion. For, how many, under all the voting-forms of government, ever think the word Party, means any thing besides an organized conformity, for giving profitable places or ambitious power to themselves? Who among physicians, at the sudden sound of the word plague, yellow-fever, or cholera, has any other thought than that of conformity with all around him in one general verbal panic, which deprives him, in like manner as it does the flying populace, of common discretion, and of the sensible use of his experience, in comparing the symptoms of disease; in quieting the fears, and saving the lives of his neighbors? What lawyer in the routine of his practice, has ever had that *unlawyer-like* perception, of quiescent, and actionary independence, as to rise above his technical forms and terms; and thoroughly to simplify the principles of jurisprudence into clearer sense, shorter time, and into undisputed usefulness? And where, in the name of the great Juggernaut-Idol of conformity, have the prostrate-votaries before the Car of Fashion, under every empty thought and thoughtless emptiness, done any thing, in all its conforming changes, except by the name or the word of authority, or the authority of a word or a name?

It is one of Shakspeare's reflective sarcasms, when sketching, in Polonius, the true character of a foolish but educated courtier, to make Hamlet answer him, that he was reading, 'words, words, words,' since from the unthinking conformity of the old Chamberlain, to every senseless thing around him, the Poet knew his mind would readily conform itself to mere words, without looking to their meaning.

These remarks are here offered as the opening of an analytic view of the boundless subject of human error, long known to observers, and deeply deplored; but perhaps here arranged under more traceable forms, for future management and correction.



ARTICLE XVI. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Quality of Foresight.*

In the twenty-sixth section, it was shown that the term Foresight means only a particular application of general principles, derived from the exercise of primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perceptions, for the accumulation of further knowledge, by the same working plan of the mind, which in geometry, arithmetic, and natural philosophy, slowly and cautiously derives the unknown relationships of things, from a use of the mental constituents and qualities on the known. By this comparison of the brightness of knowledge with the obscurity of ignorance, we may on any other subject of inquiry, though not with equal certainty, obtain a foresight of that course of things which has not actually transpired; but which lies within the anticipative power of the human mind; ready to be developed, whenever that power shall wisely operate.

Since then, the means of foresight in perception are the same as the means of past and present knowledge; the relation of the foresight of perceptions and of their qualities, must be the same to the verbal signs, as those of past and present are to the verbal signs. We may therefore, for further reflection on this subject, refer to what is said under the several heads of this section. For as vividness, quickness, excursion, election, mixed and unmixed, with all the other named qualities, are variously employed to discover the laws which direct present and past events in science and life; so are they to be applied for the discovery of future existences and events, under those laws; consequently with this condition, they must have the same relation to the verbal sign.



ARTICLE XVII. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Quality of Habit.*

We have shown, how most of the qualities of the first four constituents are related to the fifth. Thus the perception of the

verbal sign may be severally, vivid or faint, quick or slow, excursive, durable, true or false, or mutative. It may further and with greater influence over the mind, take on a form of mutation under the condition of habit. Nine-tenths of mankind, and nearly the other tenth, are the unfortunate victims of Conformity, from the habitual influence of terms. Is not the world tied into a great brotherhood by the verbal binding-cords of riches and fame? a child learns to play with the strings before he even thinks how he is to be tied with them, and from their effects in after life, the man has rarely been able to unloose the straight-laced habit of conformity from around his mind.

It is not my purpose, to inquire into the essential and proximate cause of habit; or why a single generic verbal sign when embracing many particulars of the other perceptions, should so shut up these particulars within the summary of a term, as to obscure the memorial of these details; and thus induce us to take the word for no more than the sign of some limited, vivid, agreeable, and selfish perception of our own immediate interest. But alas! with too many of us, it is so.

Considering the actionary perception of mankind on Government, and Religion, as respectively under the terms, Monarchy, with its subjects; a Republic, with its Voters; a Christian; Mormon; and Mahometan; each with the special key of Heaven; what purblind King or ambitious Demagogue, ever thinks of population, manufactures, agriculture, and commerce, except as the power to be aggressive for territory, or for glory, to his name? And on religion, read for how many ages, those two short words, the Crescent and the Cross, kept in implacable conflict, ferocious army after army, each on its respective side doing the opposing wills of Allah, and Jehovah. And instead of promises fulfilled, of a new order for the human mind, with peace on earth, and good-will to men; to find two sets of military and praying fanatics, under different signs of one individual God, fighting against each other for their own metaphysics, for plunder, and for renown. This is a common, but a melancholy instance of the habit of verbal signs, on whatever rank of the ignorant and vulgar and wicked intellect. Two religions, each claiming to have been sent from Heaven; yet producing deadly rancor among the adoring children of the same adorable Allah-Jehovah.

If there is something wrong in all this, it may be that men do not perceive the true and natural working plan of their own minds; and instead of searching into the little Scriptural volume of the Brain; this Pandect of God and Nature; have consulted only the *Dreaming-Book* of the metaphysical schools. Other departments of what passes for knowledge, will show the connection of habit with the verbal sign. The names of Plato and Aristotle were, by habitual authority, kept-up in the schools of Europe for more than a thousand years, under the spirituality of the Faith of one, and the Syllogistic wrangling of the other. Hippocrates and Galen, by the authoritative habit of their names alone, were able to out-voice the quiet words of observation, and to overshadow the faithful pictures of nature. An eminent Professor of the medical school of Bologna, on being told of the discovery of the valvular stops in the veins, which prevent the flow of blood *from* the heart, maintained by Galen, declared with true magisterial pride and ignorant obstinacy; he would rather believe, the human veins had undergone a change since the time of Galen, than admit his great Master's account of the Circulation to be erroneous. What was in this *name* of Galen? Much less than in his *sense*. One was a source of progressive knowledge; the other the foundation of the habits of an unalterable school. From the habitual mode of appointing medical and theological Professors, by some empty *name* gravely or flippantly acquired; it is not improbable, that, if in these days, there should be offered a physiological description of the intellectual process of the senses and the brain; teachers, with a crowd of boys on their benches, might not be wanting, who would prefer dying under the extreme unction of faith in a spiritual mind, rather than admit the explanation of a simple instrument of Thought, that might be plainly laid on the palm of every man's hand, and illustrated in its five divisions, by the analogy of his four fingers and his thumb.

I must not pass unnoticed the influence of habit on what are called 'household words.' This is of two kinds: that common to the whole family of man; and that of a more restricted conventionality. The first are habits of thought, formed on general and often mistaken views of justice and of life, which pass into maxims: such as the duty of *filial love to unkind and brutal*

parents: and the early requisition; to look-up to, and honor an imbecile or dishonorable King; and a corrupt and good-for-nothing Country; and *after these*, to place yourself, who may be an intelligent, truthful, just, and industrious citizen. Again to desecrate the purpose of Prayer, by making a child run-over some habitual words, with no other thought than that of getting ready, with his bare and shivering limbs to jump into bed. Those who would train up a child in the way he should go, ought to be very sure which is the righteous way; or it may be well for the child himself to depart from it. But second. The evil influence of some words and maxims is limited to classes and countries. There is an old practical saying, not always true, which yet the common people repeat without thought; 'Early to bed, and early to rise,' with its promised rewards, is one of many habitual errors; at first suggested by some shepherd, or plowman, from his not being able to watch or to labor in the dark. But it is not true of the mariner, nor the student; one of whom earns his subsistence by waking half the night; and the other acquires his wisdom, with less annoyance, in some of the quiet hours of the sleeping world.*

And in like manner, numberless maxims, true in one country and rank of life, are by habit traditionally continued with awkwardness, or with error and mischief, when families change their place or condition.



ARTICLE XVIII. *Relation of the Verbal Sign to the Quality of Selfishness.*

From an analytic survey of the mind, we have presumed to suggest, what appears to be the ordination of nature, for present-

* The drinking majority of Christendom quote Paul's advice to his brother Timothy, to 'take wine for his stomach's sake;' without thinking, that his frequent dyspeptic infirmities, alluded-to, may have been prescribed-for, upon the homeopathic principle, that the cause of the disease must be made the cause of cure. Somebody who had become childish from a long physical, and immoral habit of indulging 'too much,' thought to comfort the debility of Age, by imparting his experience that 'wine is the milk of declining years.'

ing a broad and faithful microcosmic picture of things and their relationships. But we have learned, that the *camera lucida* of the brain, with its five forms of representation, has been metaphysically changed to a *camera obscura*; in which Nature finds her own true image only in parts; and these parts always confused and often deformed. When perception assumes the selfish quality, this partial and deformed function of the mind is presented in one of its most concentrated forms. It can be readily understood that any of the first four perceptions may be selfish in being restricted particularly and exclusively to the personal or other interests of the percipient himself. It does not however, at once appear, how the *verbal* perception can be said to be selfish in its relation to this restrictive quality. It has been shown that the verbal type is the perception of a significant sound, and therefore like the perception of any other physical thing, with the meaning or purpose of nature in its action and other relationships: consequently the percipient may regard the meaning of that verbal sign, as referring only to himself; thereby showing a relation as we have said, between the quality of selfishness and the verbal sign.

I have endeavored to explain in former sections, and in the present, the manner in which the misuse of the first four perceptions, and their qualities, together with the misapplication of the verbal sign, obscures the mental representation of truth. Among the causes of this desecration of the mind, none exceeds that of the quality of selfishness: and we have here, only to point out its connection with the verbal sign. There may be a quiescent selfish as well as an actionary selfish perception: and language is one of the actionary forms of making that quiescent known to others. When therefore the quiescent is restricted to the personality and the interests of the Percipient, the verbal sign that denotes them, must represent that selfishness to others. And as the quality thus affects or overrules the verbal sign; so conversely the verbal sign may influence or overrule the selfish quality. In the first case; an excessive selfishness may overrule the influence of the most forcible verbal sign to correct it. This overruling power is illustrated in the sub-animal and the madman. You may force your Voice in vain to separate two fighting dogs, or to stop

a runaway-horse: and in vain try to laugh, persuade, and threaten, out of his selfish avarice, the insane claimant of an imaginary estate; or a self-righteous fanatic out of his impudent assumption that he has been accepted of God. It is a similar waste of words, to caution a selfish speculator in Atlantic-Cable stock; or to implore him not to raise in himself the extacy of a fool, when he hopes his visionary scheme of profit is to be realized. In the second case; moderate degrees of selfishness may be influenced or overruled by the language of advice, shaming reproof or condemnation. A word; under the vividness of habit, may be so agreeable as to give it the impressive effect of a selfish verbal sign; and thus on occasions, by a mutative power overrule the selfishness of any of the first four constituents, under any of their qualities.

We have throughout this section, had various examples of the language of fanaticism, avarice, or ambition, influencing or overruling, severally by vividness and habit, the first four perceptions; as the superior mutative power of the several cases direct. And with this outline of the subject, we leave the intelligent Observers of future time, to pursue, in detail and order, that which we ourselves have not the ability, either in quiescent thought, or action-ary words of description to accomplish.

This finishes an outlined account of the qualities of perception, and their relations to the verbal sign: a division of our subject, embracing a view of the practical application of the method of the human mind; and as we have given a short summary at the close of the other divisions; we subjoin to this, for the assistance of any hesitation in the juvenile and older Reader, the following brief recapitulation. They will understand by it, that the eighteen qualities, above explained and illustrated, are different forms, conditions, and degrees, respectively of the first four constituents, employed in the productions of the various works of intellect. They are therefore to regard these constituents as appearing under some one or more of the qualities; the constituents being the genera, and the qualities the species of perception.

The Primary may be vivid or faint, quick or slow, single or manifold, synchronous or successive; agreeable or disagreeable; true or false or exaggerative. The Memorial, in addition to these

qualities of the primary, may be excursive, quiescent, or actionary; mutative, exaggerative, habitual, and selfish. The Joint, vivid or faint, quick or slow, excursive, elective, agreeable, or the reverse, quiescent or actionary, mixed or unmixed, exaggerative, true or false. The Conclusive, vivid or faint, quick or slow, mixed or unmixed, independent or conforming, exaggerative, true or false, mutative, habitual, or selfish: all these perceptions and their qualities being alike Involuntary; and all alike silent or Quiescent; or otherwise Actionary, in an audible or visible sign: the audible or verbal being the common and conventional means of communication with others: the relation of these signs to the several qualities, being that of reciprocal influence; the quality when applicable, giving its character to the sign; and the sign representing the character of the quality.

I will endeavor to illustrate the manner in which the various powers of perception are applied in the practical purposes of the mind.

While writing the present division of our work; there is an event, exciting much interest in millions of the Western world: and so variously exercising all the perceptive resources of the mind, as to offer plain examples of the use of the constituents, and their qualities. I refer to the Progress through this Country; in the present October, eighteen hundred and sixty; of an Imperial Prince of an ancient and mighty Throne. The Event and its Eminent Personality thus widely employ the generic constituents, and their various specific qualities.

The Primary of Sight is earnestly exercised on the personal appearance of the Prince: for this is the eager interest of the million.

The Memorial images of this sense are innumerable on all that has been seen and told of him.

The Joint is exercised under every kind of comparison of his social, moral, and intellectual character.

The Conclusive are incalculable, on what the Prince can do, ought to do, and will do.

In the exercise of the Qualities, the inquiries and regards of the intelligent Few are; whether his primary and memorial perceptions of what he sees and hears in his progress, are vivid or feeble, quick or slow:

What power of Excursion and Election he has in the chrysalis state of his mind; for he is yet too young for extensive flight and accurate choice.

The universal perception of his character and bearing is agreeable; and we would hope; he finds nothing disagreeable in the well-meant attentions he receives.

Though youth may at present, limit his perceptions, we may hope the Manifold quality will be applied for every true and useful purpose of his future exalted life.

May every mutative influence on his mental character, be only a transition to a higher excellence.

Though under the inevitable lot of Kings, he can scarcely be allowed to exercise the hazardous quality of Independence; may he never Conform to the not unfrequent infirmities and vices of Royalty.

May the resplendent quality of Truth be the precious jewel of his Crown, and direct the beaming justice of his Sceptre.

He alone knows, or might know, his own silent or Quiescent mind. His actionary in all we see; while becoming his prospect of Monarchy; is still acceptable and grateful to those who have seceded from that Rule.

May his present perception of the right and the true, lead him to the preventive Foresight of evil and of error. And finally: May a Habit of perceiving what is disinterested and wise, enable him to discriminate and to escape those subservient snares of courtier and official selfishness, which already begins to way-lay his preparatory path towards the Throne.

With regard to the influence of the verbal sign over the qualities; still continuing the train of prospective perceptions, we have supposed him to excite; let us hope, that with an even and a wary justice, he will turn-away from all the jealousies of 'Sacrificial Whisperings in his ear.'

As the sufficiency of his Position should place him above the vulgar necessity, and the reach of flattery; may he wisely listen to the well-weighed cautions of his Counselor, and learn to bear with reflective self-examination, the temperate words of Blame.

May he avoid equally, the over-hasty tongue of the Fluent, and the Significant silence of the wordless Fool.

And may he always remember the maxim of an Ancient Instructor of a Royal Pupil; 'to Think wisely with the Few, and to Speak the Simple Language of the Many.'

Such is the manner, in which a physical analysis would direct the exercise of present and of foresighted perception, under all its qualities, in a full, clear, intelligible, and practical working plan of the human intellect.

I have now concluded a descriptive outline of what appears to be the whole frame and action of the mind; ordained for the representation of all things, and their relationships; from its earliest primary, through all its other four constituent perceptions, to the arrangement of their images and types, into a system of principles, for directing the support, protection, and happiness of the human Animal. And although these five physical constituents, and their qualities, in their proper exercises, are the mind, the whole mind and nothing but the mind; they occasionally appear under the condition of a broken, defective, and perverted order of that natural train of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception, which constitutes the connected functions of productive thought.

The disorderly and unproductive conditions of thought, are those of Dreaming, Absence of mind, Reverie, Extacy, Trance, Visions, fanatical Beatitude, and Insanity: and we proceed to describe their several irregularities, by showing their peculiar deviations from the true, and useful working plan, ordained by the Almighty Duality of God and Nature in the system of the Human Intellect.



SECTION XXX.

*The Disorderly and Unproductive Condition of the Mind.*ARTICLE I. *Of the State of Perception in Dreams.*

DREAMING is the accompaniment of sleep; and may be generically distinguished by two of the qualities of perception. The Quiescent or Silent, which is known only to the Percipient; and the Actionary; perceptible by the senses of Others, either in vocal or in locomotive effort.

The subject of dreaming is one of the metaphysical mysteries; and has therefore been confused by fictitious theories, and often misrepresented by fictitious facts; for dreams being a disorder of perception, can be explained only by the rules of its disorder. And since the Metaphysician has never yet fully ascertained those rules, he has thus admitted both fictitious notions and facts into his descriptions, without the comparative means for distinguishing falsehood from truth.

It is through ignorance of the natural and productive working-plan of the mind, that the method of dreaming; which is only an irregular application of that plan; has not been properly investigated, and understood. It is then a knowledge of the directive principles of the five perceptions, and their qualities, that must enable us to describe the occasional dreaming, as well as the more common waking deviations from them. We are not yet sufficiently familiar with the close and extended bearing of these principles, to apply them for the satisfactory explanation of many phenomena in both the productive and the unproductive exercise of the mind, respectively in science, and art, in dreaming, and insanity. If therefore, we shall not be able to refer all these irregular phenomena to the laws of ordained and natural perception; we believe they may be so far explained under these laws, that future observers may raise; on the foundation, proposed in this Work; the broad rules of thought, and their apparent exceptions, into one self-connected and systematic agency of the senses, and the brain.

On the subject of these irregularities, in the natural order and use of the five perceptions and their qualities, I shall endeavor to apply the rules of that natural order, to explain the irregularities; and beyond this, to direct inquiry, by suggestive questions, which may be altogether set aside, or be answered by others, to the satisfaction of truth, and themselves.

Of sleep, in which dreams occur; whether remotely brought on by natural or by artificial means; we know not the proximate cause: for we disregard the several physiological guesses on this subject. We know that we go to sleep, and therein have certain forms of quiescent, and irregular perception. But sleep is a physical condition of the senses and the brain, and may therefore have an influence on the physical perceptions of a dream. Thus sleep produces or accompanies more vivid memorial images and types, than occur in the waking state; and an approximation to that sleep, in a kind of dozing, attends the vivid concentration, in absence of mind, reverie, and all other apparently irregular delusions of perception. I have *heard* of persons who declare; they never dream. May their minds be of such indefinite perception, that they do not clearly distinguish between a sleeping and a waking thought; on the same principle, that children are supposed to tell their dreams as actual events; as persons of disordered minds, sometimes obstinately declare, they have not slept, when it is known they have; and as on some passed memorial, we may be uncertain whether the images and types had occurred in waking or in sleep.

The representations of things and their relationships in dreams have always been regarded as different from those of waking, by being irreducible to clear relationship between perceptions. And so they apparently are, when compared with a regular train in the actionary forms of speech, and writing. Still the waking mind, when strictly observed, presents a like memorial field, of apparently unconnected images and types. For we have shown, that the excursive flight after a joint comparison and conclusion, is over primary and memorial images and types, both related and unrelated: the elective gathering those related; and rejecting those unrelated to the perceptive purpose and train. But all the memorial images and types passing through the waking mind,

except those the joint and conclusive perceptions have drawn into a connected train, resemble more or less, the incoherence of a dream. For an illustration of the particular working plan by which related memorial images and types, from a multitude that are apparently unrelated and therefore incoherent; let us follow the waking flight of an excursive perception. Children put as a riddle; What is that, which goes up green and comes down red? In guessing it, let us consider how many images and types pass through the mind with no immediate and obvious relationship to each other; though there must be some hidden attraction that brings them together: for every train of perception being involuntary, images and types could not be brought together, except by some necessary tie; and as they do come together by *obvious* relationship, in so many cases, we can suppose no other cause than that of a natural relationship, when the tie is hidden. Strictly speaking then, as the things of this united and interwoven universe must have some tie of relationship; the mental images and types being the representatives of these things must have some tie of relationship, or they could not arise together. But as we do not perceive the tie in all cases; we speak of them as *unrelated*. Thus we have both the manifest and the hidden relationships; the latter appearing to be incoherent. Often however, the tie consists in the relations only of the verbal sign. There are numberless things, or their images and types; apparently related in no other way; that by the terms of the riddle; go and come, up and down, green and red; even though no one of them may separately represent the whole condition of the case. In solving this riddle therefore, the memorial excursion is carried over a field of images and types with no obvious connection, except that of words. Thus a rocket goes *up*; and a fire-ball comes *down*; the Romans saw Hanibal go *up*, and come *down* St. Bernard; children cried-out to Elijah, Go-*up* thou bald-head, and the wrath of God came-*down* upon them; the fire of Vesuvius does not go up *green* but it comes-*down* red; an egg goes *up* white and comes *down* broken and yellow; the Turkish flag goes up *green*, and the English comes down *red*; the young American greenhorn goes-*up* on the people's shoulders, and; pardon the playful jest; comes *down* well-read on the subject of popular

instability. In this way after the memorial flight over these and other direct and indirect relationships between images and types, brought together by the several words; the Guesser comes to the conclusion, that a water-melon is thrown up green, and comes down broken into fragments of red.

We have given this homely illustration, to show that from the simple and childish exercise of the excursive and elective perception, to even the most extended and productive investigation of nature; there is one and the same principle in the working plan of the mind: that of selecting from a memorial field of images and types those which coherently lead to a conclusion; and to reject those which seem to be incoherent with the train leading to that conclusion, and no less incoherent among themselves.

Such, in guessing a riddle, and in the discoveries of science, is the excursive flight over both related and unrelated images and types in the appointed use of the waking mind. In the preceding example, we have; with exception of the connected train, and true description of the going-up green, and coming-down red of the melon; a succession of images and types, with no related tie, except that of the verbal signs of goes, comes, up, down, green, and red. What other connection have the images and types, in the several cases; of the going-up of the rocket; of Hanibal; of a bald-head; an egg; the fire of Vesuvius; an American demagogue, or a melon? and of the coming down of a fire-ball; of a broken egg; the wrath of God; of Hanibal; American popularity; or the Turkish flag, with the rind; and that of the British, with the core of a melon? And yet from the rapid succession of object and person and place; each with its secondary or more remote connections; we have the rockets of Vauxhall, shooting above the Turkish flag in the suburbs of Constantinople; a popular mass-meeting, at the same time in the crater of Vesuvius, and on the side of St. Bernard; Hanibal running *up* the green flag at Navarino; with bald-head Elijah, and La Fayette hauling *down* a red one at Yorktown; young England and young America eating water-melons to make themselves *fluent*, and breakfasting on raw eggs to make them *long-winded* orators.

These incoherencies of a wild excursion closely resemble, and might have been the wanderings of a dream. Yet they were as

we have just written them, the natural and common condition of a greater part of the images and types of waking thought. But it appears; the waking mind, among so many motly and unrelated memorials, is still in pursuit of the train of related joint, and just conclusive perception; that the green melon goes up, and is broken into red by a fall. And though it perceives the incoherent, it has no self-delusion that these incoherent images and types are primary perceptions of real external things. Whereas the dreaming mind having no purpose or train in its memorial images and types, believes them all, both related and unrelated, to be the primary representations of real things. This view narrows the distinction between the waking and the dreaming mind; but still leaves a difference in the self-delusion of the latter.

With regard to this difference, we ask; why does not the Sleeping Mind pursue a purpose and connected train to a conclusion? and why has not the waking like the dreaming mind, a vivid perception of its unrelated memorial images and types, as if they were primary? The resolution of these questions may assist us, as far as it goes, in an analytic history of Dreams.

On the subject of the first question; why the dreaming mind has no continued train of strictly joint and conclusive perceptions; we must recall a remark in the fourth section; that the relative state, condition, action, connection, and influence of every kind and degree, between things in nature, called Relationships, are in the waking state physically represented along with the images and types of those things. Now, a connected, just, and necessary election and conclusion is vividly made from these images and types *only*, which are strictly *related* to each other: the unrelated being if at all, subjects only of a passing notice, have the faint or feeble quality of perception, and do not make the like vivid impression as the purposed and connected train: consequently the incoherency is not noticed in the waking mind. But in sleep; from some unknown cause; *all* the memorial images and types are equally vivid, whether *related or not*. Upon this ultimate fact, we may then inquire; if this vividness does not, by equalizing all, prevent the elective quality from gathering those which are related from those which are not: thereby interfering with, or altogether overruling the purpose and means of a con-

nected train and conclusion: for it is known, that only a few, and those limited and habitual conclusions, ever occur in dreams.*

In the twenty-ninth section, under the head of the relation of the quiescent and actionary quality to the verbal sign; I asked whether the absence of the actionary sight or speech, from dreams, might not be one of the causes of their incoherence. For it has been shown, that the verbal sign has the power of grasping, as it were, and holding-up the perception to clearer notice: and as the tie between related images and types must be assisted by the greater clearness of their verbal sign; it becomes an additional question; whether the effect of the absence of actionary verbal signs from dreams, may not be joined with the influence of the equal vividness of the whole memorial field, in preventing the related train from taking place; and thus be an assistant cause of the incoherence. But we have further shown, that the verbal sign is the *mordant* of perception, and serves to fix its images and types, as well when the sign is *quiescent* or only thought-of, as when actionary in speech and writing. The quiescent verbal sign then becomes an assistant if not the essential means of the connected train in joint comparison and conclusion. In this our attempt to ascertain the laws of dreaming, we may then ask; whether the quiescent sign is as impressive, or has so strong a hold on perception in sleep as in waking; and if not, whether this, with the other named causes, may not tend to prevent the connected train; and thus to throw the whole memorial field into incoherence. And yet, whatever may be the peculiar connection of the quiescent-audible sign, so to call it, with the memorial image and type; it is certain, that when we dream of reading, which is rare indeed, the visible sign must accompany the memorial image and type.

If the preceding view of the first question is correct; the an-

* While engaged on this very subject, I dreamed of being at school; and when called up to the *Black-board* on a Proposition of Geometric proportion; I hesitated, and stated, I was not prepared upon it; but remarked; it is very *Whole* and easy. Then demonstrate it, said the Tutor. Though the diagram *egg* confused, I still had a particular, rather than an abstract perception of the *The* proposition; yet from a kind of *Night-mare*, upon my joint and might I the perceptions, I could not move a the train of comparisons to

swer to the second; or why the unrelated images and types of the waking mind are not imposed upon it, as the vivid representation of external things; may be inferred from the facts and principles, stated under the first. For if the dream has no connected train, and its images and types are believed to be realities, because all the memorial perceptions are *equally* vivid; and the quiescent verbal sign, is not sufficiently impressive to allow a connected train; the waking memorials, on the other side, are not believed to be realities, because we *distinguish* the necessary and connected train, which consists of clear and true relationships, with their waking verbal sign, from those memorial images and types which are faint and incoherent. But we leave these two, perhaps unanswered, questions for future inquiry; with whatever light these pages may throw upon them.

Having offered these few suggestions on the most general and remarkable difference between the dreaming and the waking mind: namely, the incoherence, and the equal vividness of the entire memorial field, together with the absence of the connected train, in the first case; and the faint color of the unrelated images and types, in the last, when contrasted with the vividness of its connected train; we pass-on to the detail of some other differences between them. And

First. In dreams there is no primary perception. All is memorial. An impression of external things on the senses, or the perception of internal pain, arouzes sleep, and the dream passes away.

Second. Though there are no primary perceptions in dreams, the images and types that have been derived from them are all represented in the Memorial. These memorial images and types are severally exercised under the condition of most of the eighteen qualities. They are all, as we have said, of an equally impressive brightness or force, and believed to be equally related and real: but this brightness is not so clear as in the waking primary. They are of an invariable medium between quick and slow. They are wildly excursive; are agreeable or disagreeable; quiescent or actionary. They are successive; rapidly mutative; are manifold; and remarkably evanescent; represent some things truly; and others, under exaggerative, confused, false, and pre-

tending but impossible relationships. The other qualities are either absent, or obscure. There is no independence, nor conformity: no mixed perception: no habit, except in incoherency, and perhaps where a just but limited comparison and conclusion occasionally finds its way into sleep, from the customary thoughts of the waking mind. With only a confused and limited elective choice, there can be no foresight; and with no primary perception, no personal identity to the percipient; for as personal identity is not derived from the memorial; there can be, if any, only a low degree of animal selfishness in dreams.

Third. Joint perceptions being exercised upon an equal brightness of the related and the unrelated images and types, do not allow the election for a connected train, and therefore are confused, incoherent, or false. Dreams furnish occasionally, a just and original metaphor; a striking but more generally, an exaggerated, or unrelated epithet; a strain of vocal melody; a line of blank-verse; and a couplet of rhyme. But joint comparison, if made at all, being gathered from unrelated images and types, is too much broken and confused, to contribute more than a momentary coherency. Dreaming is therefore an unproductive function of the mind.

The subject of joint perception in the sleeping brain, leads to the remark; that dreams, as far as obvious, do not employ what are called 'abstract ideas.' For the memorial images and types being incoherent, there can be no proper joint comparison; no classification; and therefore no abstractive election of a single image or type. The process of abstraction, as explained in the seventh section, is no more than the application of a single term to designate a unity of many resembling things, taken or abstracted in perception, from different aggregates of dissimilar things. This power of abstract perception; for it is a form of perception, assisted by the verbal sign; is one of the master-instruments of knowledge in the waking mind: which if exercised in dreams, would so correct their incoherence, and render them productive of truth, and **usefulness**; that men might go to sleep and be wise; instead of dreaming the mind into absurdity. And if we may so ill-define democracy; it is by this all-grouping power, that God has given us a language to assist Omnis-

science, perceive the universe, in all its classified resemblances, by the brief, but comprehensive means of instantaneous abstractions.

Fourth. Conclusive perceptions are exercised to a limited degree, on rare occasions, in dreams; and only on those common combinations, that are the daily habit of the waking mind. Persons of observation and reflection, who may overflow with original thoughts in waking; and who on their subjects of inquiry, are constantly adding to the systems of science and art, never as we learn, derive conclusive knowledge from the essential confusion and falsehood of dreams. There is a story told of Rousseau's *Dream*. But he wakenly dreamed on so many other subjects, and so affected paradox, that he may have conceived he differed from other musicians, by dreaming instead of writing his compositions. Of all the Fine Arts, music has least occasion for, and employs least, the broad, discriminating, and productive powers of the intellect; we should not then be surprised, if some of its professors should not always be able to distinguish between their sleeping and their waking perceptions. I cannot presume to say, how it is with musicians who think of nothing except the combination of notes: nor how far this limitation may have contracted the field of excursion in their own art. But if I may state my personal experience, in having heard as much melody and harmony; learned and thought as much on their principles and practice; and in its own private and careless way, composed without recording, as much as common Amateurs; I have very rarely dreamed of a strain of music; and that perhaps, not worthy of particular notice.*

There are many ambitious persons, in science and art, who are yet so indolent, that if there were any useful joint comparisons and conclusions in dreams; they would be apt to go to sleep,

* The memory of man runneth not to the time, when the agreeable successions of melody, with all their permutations, were unknown: and we can now no more hear an original 'phrase of melody,' than an original thought or epithet, from the millions upon millions of modern extemporary prayers. An abundant memorial store of songs in one case and of set-words of hope and fear, praise and gratitude in the other; renders the two acts, after a little practical experience, almost a habit of the voice; and deludes many a Composer, and Worshipper, into the belief that he is offering something of his own, which belong to the ear, and to the tongue of another.

to accomplish their purposes of inquiry. And may we not on this point, naturally ask; if the Metaphysician has not from his own dreams, derived his visionary descriptions of the human mind.

Fifth. On the subject of the fifth mental constituent; we cannot assign the degree of influence the verbal sign has over the dreaming perceptions: yet we know the dream consists almost exclusively of quiescent or silent memorial images and types; excepting the few occasions for using the actionary quality. This actionary quality is either vocal, as in speech and cries, or muscular, as in acts of locomotion.

As this Work whenever it has departed from scholastic views, and is positive in its records; professes to have been derived from personal observation by the Author, on his own mind, and on that of others, together with their collected and recorded facts; he has yet very little to offer, from these sources, on the actionary state of dreams. For of 'Sleep-talking' and 'Sleep-walking,' he has witnessed only the slightest incipient efforts. He has heard cries and exclamations from sleepers; and has seen persons, when roused, rise and for a few moments, step unconsciously, and talk incoherently. Beyond this, he has no personal knowledge; having never before the present time, been a particular inquirer on this subject; and having never been professionally consulted on a case of sleep-walking, either as a strange, or a dangerous deviation from the common quiescent habit of sleep. Nor am I to regard the many stories of extraordinary feats of agility, and strength, and of intellectual power, surpassing the waking ability of the dreamer. I remember the school-story of a boy, who without knowing how to swim, would walk in his sleep to a neighboring creek, and there sport in water beyond his depth; and who, on being called to from the bank, awoke and sunk: and have read of a collegian, who being wearied into sleep, over the difficulties of his Latin Exercise, arose in the morning, and found it finished by his own hand. These are, to my slender faith in hear-say testimony, examples of the many reported cases of actionary *sleep*; I cannot say of *dreams*; since the marvelous transactions are not remembered by the sleeper, and therefore to be considered as *received by him*. But I leave this subject, with

its questionable facts, for future investigation by the light of the foregoing history of the mind: rejecting from the inquiry the marketable experience of opium-eaters, mesmerized simpletons, and transcendental chloroform 'geniuses;' all of whom being apt to think and talk and write, under different forms of be-muddled senses and brain, belong rather to the class of idle, though not always harmless insanity; than of dreams.

In any case however, the *quiescent* quality of dreams in an innocent perception: and even of the *actionary* dangers, fatalities, and unaccountable affairs, it deserves to be more strictly inquired into, whether some of the reported accidents, of sleep-walking out of windows, were not waking falls, through careless leaning, or reaching in opening or closing the shutters? and whether young ladies who rise when the house is quiet, steal-down stairs, and are found, in a long white dress, wandering near the arbor, are not wide awake to the rustling steps of a lover?

There are stories told under the old metaphysical system; and what *stories* has it not told; of important secrets, and strange developments being drawn from sleepers, by conversations held with them. These to me at least, are worthy of no credit: for they violate the laws we have ascribed to the dreaming mind. No impression on the dreamer's ear can draw his unrelated memorial images and types into the connection of a conversational train, without rousing him: for incoherence being the essential character of a dream, the exercise of joint and conclusive perceptions dispels both the dreaming and the sleep: as it happens, when the joint and conclusive perceptions lead us to dream we are dreaming, we at once awake; or perhaps we do not come to the joint comparison and conclusion that we are dreaming, until we are in the act of waking.

I have shown; there is a quiescent type of the verbal sign proper to every memorial perception having a name: but whether the sleeping brain has a perception of the meaning of any word which may fall on the ear, is not known. Though I have read or heard, that a whisper to a sleeper has produced an interesting dream on the subject of the whisper. If this is true, we must believe; from the rapid mutations of dreaming perception; that

the subject was not unmingled with others; and that its train did not long continue.

It was suggested by a question; that one of the causes of the incoherence of dreams might be the absence of the actionary verbal sign: implying; if the dreamer were to speak connectedly, it would render his perceptions coherent, and awake him. I found this view on my own occasional experience. I have been through life a frequent dreamer; not metaphysically, I must aver. Within the last few years, I have occasionally dreamed of speaking in a connected and fluent train, and always privately, in an explanatory and didactic manner. After a few connected and significant sentences, I awake, but so gradually, that for some moments, while *half* perceiving the waking state, I still continue to address the listeners, whom I believe to be before me; even to the last moment of this semi-delusion and the supposed company has disappeared. Whether I do really speak aloud with the actionary sign, before I awake, I know not. Yet from the unbroken connection of the dreaming train with that of the waking language, I would be disposed to infer that by some peculiar process, the quiescent language joins the quiescent thought, and this gives a train or waking order to the dream; the strange effect of which may arouse the sleeper.

We have ascribed the evanescent and the durable qualities to dreams. The greater number of my dreams have passed away from memorial record. Generally, they are retained only a short time; and after a night's sleep, and another dream, they are in part, or altogether lost. The details of some of my dreams have durably remained from earliest childhood, but they are few.

When dreams are not recollected, it has been assumed that the memory is asleep: and a separate sleep of one or others of what are called the 'faculties and operations' is supposed to account for the incoherence of dreams. Thus if we dream that an individual is, at the same time, another man and himself; for this is not uncommon; the 'judgment' is asleep. If one dreams he is dead, and still has a dreaming perception of living; as it has occurred with me; his 'consciousness' is asleep. If of committing a crime, his 'moral faculty' is asleep; and if of a luke-warm faith, his 'sense of Deity.' In all this the absurdity is not perceived

by the metaphysician; who believing in the greatest of all absurdities; the notion of a spiritual mind; is apt to overlook its many absurd and notional consequences. For in our entire ignorance of the proximate cause of sleep; if one part of the mind is supposed to be in that condition, we have no probable ground for assuming that the rest is not so. Suppose the memory to be asleep, how can we recollect other perceptions of the dream? Suppose the 'judgment' to be asleep, that judgment being only a perception of the relationships of things; those relationships being lost to the mind, there can be no mind at all; or the whole mind is asleep. And it is the same with the other 'operations;' for they are all employed on relationships; thus one part or function of the mind being asleep, the whole mind is; and the theory of partial sleep is both puzzling and absurd: there is then, no dream.

The groundless notion of trying to account for the incoherency of dreams by supposing a sleep in one or other of the metaphysical 'faculties and operations,' is only part of the confusion, mist, and error of the old chaotic history of the mind. Our present article would explain the incoherence, by the obvious laws of dreams. We have said they make no classification by genus and species: hence they have no joint comparison, and no conclusion. How then can any and all the images and types of dreams be otherwise than unrelated? In the early and desultory *Notes* preparatory to this Work, I recorded a dream, which is copied into the Appendix. I thought I was with a friend, while feeding his pigeons. I picked up one. It changed to a cat, with three yellow stripes along its back. My friend said it was a present from the Bishop of Sodor and Man. I know nothing of the involuntary cause of the cat taking the place of the pigeon; nor of the type of the Bishop's title coming up with the image of a striped cat. But neither image nor type appeared incongruous to my dreaming perceptions. They were all *equally* vivid. When the cat appeared, the pigeon was gone; and even if dreams could compare, there was no pigeon to compare with the cat. The title of the Bishop seemed not out of place, for there was nothing to compare it with, and show the oddity of its intrusion. The two cases would be no more incongruous than when awake, to see the

picture of a cat suddenly thrust before that of a pigeon: nor to jest in the illustration, unexpectedly in a steamer, to read the title of the Bishop, marked on a box from my friend, acknowledging the present of the harlequin-cat, with his kind regards, and six brace of canvas-back ducks.

It has been my experience, that in dreaming of deceased persons, they always appear as living; and never but transiently and obscurely, with the memorial of their death, even though I may have witnessed it. This is to be no further explained, than by classing it under a general law of the waking mind. For in waking we almost universally refer to the living appearances and the acts of the deceased individual; and a perception of the term death rarely or ever comes-up. To this, add; the word death is a negative term, and signifies only an absence of the state and actions of life: it consequently presents itself with only the images and types of that life, which it is intended negatively to designate. In dreams we never ascribe the condition of death to the individual, till we are in the act of waking: just as we never dream we are dreaming, till the dream is passing away; for then upon joint comparison, the conclusive perception that it is a dream dispels the incoherent illusion.

And further, the word Death is an abstract term, not applied to a particular loss of life, but denoting a classification of a like condition perceived at the cessation of the phenomena of life, in the endless aggregates of animal and vegetable organization: which classification not being an abstraction and a function of the dreaming mind, the quiescent word death does not create the quiescent perception of any particular death. Hence, a perception of the individuality of death not being within the experience of a living being; it can have occurred only to Lazarus, and to the son of the Shunamite, to dream of deceased persons, as if they are actually dead: for, to them the negative and abstract term *death* might have represented the positive memorials, if it could be, of that condition. Does the sub-animal ignorance of the effect of death, and of its application to them, arise from the want of a sufficient language to form an abstractive nomenclature? The sub-animal has a *particular* perception of what is inimical to its life. Does its ignorance of death proceed from its having no 'abstract ideas'?

If it were a question, whether dreams of persons of habitually an exact use of the five constituents are more related than usual, in their images and types; it must appear by our view of the involuntary incoherence, and of the laws of dreaming perception, that no cultivation of the waking mind would in any way rectify the confusion; and that in the cerebral function of sleep and dreams, Sir Isaac Newton and his servant would not, except in their subjects, differ from each other. Nor does it appear, from the causes and the phenomena of dreams, that with an identical Newtonian intellect throughout the waking world, there would not be one identical dreaming incoherency: for by the working plan of every mind, all elective choice and conclusion is drawn from both related and unrelated images and types; and in dreams these are equally vivid and attractive.

It is another question, to which however no answer can be given; whether dreams are a natural ordination of the mind? And if the waking perceptions were always exercised by their regular, and productive working plan, we should dream at all? Still as Theologians tell us; the forbidden taste of an apple brought physical death upon us; it may be a question, whether the habitual eating of the indigestible fruit of the God-forbidden and poisonous tree of metaphysical thinking does not increase, with its vaporous fumes, the incoherencies of the dreaming mind. But we leave these questions to be answered, when our connected history of the working plan of the senses and the brain shall be able to root out the vile weed from the fair garden of the human mind. For though dreams appear at present, to be a useless, yet innocent exercise of perception; we cannot presume to say, there may not be some appointed cause for their beneficial occurrence.

This closes an imperfect view of the subject of dreams; drawn by the light of the facts, classification, and nomenclature of the preceding history of the five constituents: and we leave future observers, to receive its truth, rectify its errors, and amplify its suggestions, by a clearer light from a further investigation of the working plan both of the dreaming and of the waking mind.

ARTICLE II. *The State of Perception in Night-mare.*

There is a slight effort towards an actionary condition of perception in dreams, called Night-mare; in which the quiescent quality is attended with a limited effort of the voice or of the limbs, with an inability to accomplish it: though the dreamer has a perception of a restricted and half-paralysed cry and motion. The perceptions have generally if not always, the disagreeable quality: nor in my experience have these efforts of personal action and of voice happened under any agreeable form. The dreamer has sometimes an oppressed respiration; and the Poets, who are not very fastidious about the whole truth, always crouch their 'Hag' close upon his breast: but like Gulliver he is held fast from head to foot.

The delusion of the dreamer places him in some great difficulty on some dangerous height, from which he has no means of escape or descent; and yet he never dreams of final injury or of falling; or he is endeavoring in vain to attack offenders, to escape from pursuit, or to call for assistance. If he should be cut in-two by his pursuer; like Milton's warring Angels, or his Lapland Witches, he does not feel it. If he begins to fall from a height, he never reaches the ground. All this is by a law of perception; for though he is familiar with the words, falling from a height, and cutting in-two; having never in the cases we have supposed suffered from either, he can have no memorial perception, of what has not been primary with him. But the dreaming brain has only memorials: he cannot therefore have a dreaming type of pain, either from the wound or the fall.

It is not known, whether the hampered effort of voice and action, and the oppressed respiration, when it occurs; which seem to have the effect of a primary perception in hearing and touch; may rouse the sleeper. But from these, or other causes, he is generally awakened by the bodily distresses of the Night-mare. Nor can it be said; its less impressive forms do not without waking, resolve themselves into sleep or common dreams.

The perceptive qualities of night-mare are; the incoherently excursive. . . . memorial, the quiescent, the slightly actionary,

the disagreeable, the mutative, and perhaps a faint primary perception of touch, in the anxiety, or bodily pain that produced the state of suffering.

What is here said on this function of the dreaming brain, is drawn solely from personal experience, arranged under our view of the general laws of mind: and we leave the experience of others, to apply those laws, for further investigation, if it should be desirable or necessary, on this rather curious than important subject.

There are some other conditions of the mind, which in classification should be placed between the harmless wandering of quiescent and actionary Dreaming, and the perilous and multiform aberrations of Insanity. These have been called; Absence of Mind, Reverie, Extacy, Trance, Visions, and Beatitude: each holding a graduated relation as here named, from dreams in one degree, to madness in the other. They consist severally, and nearly without exception, of quiescent perceptions. The author has nothing to say on these subjects from his own experience; having never, as informed, and as he recollects, been found in absence of mind, beyond common forgetfulness; nor in deep reverie, nor unconscious extacy, and barely-breathing trance: nor in the last two conditions; except indeed this Book may be like many of the past metaphysical Visions of the mind; and the author himself in a fictional state of Beatitude about its truth.

From the best information on the first four, there is little known of the laws that govern their phenomena: and on the last two, the Theological delusions that lead to them must prevent a reliance on any of their 'golden legends' of angels and saints. There remains then only the application of our systematic view of the five constituents, and their qualities, to assist our observations; and by the light of the working plan of the ordained and natural mind, to show us those perverted forms of thought that seem to be aberrations from it. And First,

ARTICLE III. *The State of Perception in Absence of Mind.*

I have never heard a description of the state of the senses and the brain, of those in whom Absence is a habit; except to show that the primary perceptions are torpid, and the other four, very limited and feeble. High powers of the mind, productively employed, are on the track of every thing, and therefore absent to nothing which the senses and the memory may contribute to their purposes.

Absence of mind occurs both when the body is at rest, and in action: for one may be absent while sitting in his chair; and in walking against a half-closed door. Notwithstanding this difference, the perceptions are all quiescent, till a sudden impulse on the senses, or on the brain restores the *presence*, so to call it, of the mind. The condition of perception in this state, as far as may be learned from an approximation to it, in the reflective and contemplative mind, is altogether memorial: and in quality quiescent; not very excursive, nor manifold, nor quick; never mixed; partially and slowly elective and conclusive; agreeable, according to the subject, which is often selfish; generally of 'Castle-building' improbability, and therefore apt to be incoherent; is rarely employed in a broad survey; and never leads to science. This state, though occasional and evanescent; yet through habitual frequency, its quiescent incoherence is sometimes changed to actionary insanity.

Among the instances of human affectation; and no other animal is so affected; there are, occasionally, persons so foolish as to think; absence of mind is an indication of 'profound thought' and deliberate wisdom; and with artifice enough to make other foolish persons believe it, and honor it accordingly. A character of this class, at a sitting of the American Philosophical Society, was once as an experiment on his affected absence, asked a question of business. No notice was taken of it: and the question was not repeated. After some minutes of 'brown study,' he said to the interrogator, with a full recollection of the question; did you not ask, what the committee had done? No, said the interrogator, I did not speak: and the other was cunning enough not to main-

tain he did. This 'profound philosopher' was afterwards made President of the Society.



ARTICLE IV. *The State of Perception in Reverie.*

Reverie appears to be a condition of the mind, under a like use of perception, and its qualities, as in that of absence of mind. Nor is it obvious, why they are differently named, except, to accord with the redundant and indefinite character of the metaphysical nomenclature; or with a proper discrimination, to designate a greater vividness of memorial images and types in reverie; and consequently a less perceptibility to impression on the senses. If the difference lies in this greater intensity, reverie is less apt than absence of mind, to be assumed as an affected vanity. We may play the fool of seeming to be secluded in important forgetfulness under the latter; in reverie the mind is more seriously and closely shut up within itself.



ARTICLE V. *The State of Perception in Extacy.*

Extacy, if different from the two states of mind just described, it is only in its greater degree of absorbing vividness: but in kind, it is similar under the use of perception and its qualities.



ARTICLE VI. *The State of Perception in Trance.*

This state of mind; if we may rely on the few credible accounts of it; is dreaming in a sleep so profound, as apparently to destroy for the time, the perception of all the senses, and the power of what is called voluntary, and involuntary muscular motion: the brain alone performing its memorial functions, under a quiescent incoherency of perception and its qualities. From this apparent death of the body; it is assumed; the spiritual mind deserts the brain, to wander after supernatural perceptions; or metaphysi-

cally taking its flight to heaven, profanely returns with its fictional scraps of the Omniscience and the Will of God.



ARTICLE VII. *The State of Perception in Religious Visions.*

A vision, although of the same character as dreaming, reverie, and extacy, has received a distinctive name, under the Theologic notion that it is one of the means for conveying the Divine Will to mankind. It has all the perceptive irregularity of these other states: but to give it a more authoritative influence over the weak-minded, its communications have been usually made through the wonderfully dead-and-alive oracle of a Trance.



ARTICLE VIII. *The State of Perception in Religious Beatitude.*

The metaphysical or notional state of Beatitude is produced in a religious enthusiast, by a restriction of his memorial images and types, exclusively to the subject of his own prospective happiness in contemplating the attributes of God; thereby to assume an arrogant sympathy with his Perfections; and thus become worthy of sitting through eternal life, at the right hand of Grace and Glory. This is the Theological delusion: showing that the scheme of Beatitude is a fanatic's dream of Selfishness; not of ministering angels passing and repassing on missions of universal Favor from Heaven to Mankind: but of his self-rapt egotism, churlish and all alone, ascending the visionary ladder of its hopes.

We have said, the selfish quality forms no obvious part of the common dream. It is the same with reverie and extacy; but selfish conceit is always joined with an affected absence of mind. For the high prize of Beatitude, the fanatic tries to concentrate his selfish soul to that state of vivid benevolence, which regards the fall of a sparrow; by intensely regarding nothing but his own ascending blessedness.

We have thus noticed some of the errors and mis-
and retained uses of the term "deviation" in the
conventional names. Above all, we have seen how
irregularities, by comparing them with the
proper employment of the term, have led to the
servers to measure the deviation from the mean
unnumbered deviation from the mean, and in the
the sciences, all the phenomena of the world are
age: and then say, "the deviation from the mean
the absurdities, and the errors of the world are
believed too, with a large number of people, who
dreaming, visionary, and the world is the world
described.

[illegible]

Somebody has been quite liberal enough to place the observation might be taken as authority, for the sake of the mad, that all madmen are in some way or other mad. By the way, if the affected powers of the ordained and profane mad, we are enabled to bring insanity, as well as dreams, and other things, into all the perversions and errors of the waking mind, to a comparison with the sane and regular working plan of the five continents; and thereby determine, how far the greater part of the political, religious, moral, and medical opinions of the *weeely thinking* world are amenable to the charge of being more or less under the influence of an unproductive, and a troublesome, or calamitous insanity.

Without the important purpose of illustrating the laws of the natural mind, by contrasting them with their worldly perversion; the aberrations described in this section might be considered subjects only of the Opium-eating, and transcendental poet and

novelist, for the entertainment of readers who inhale the besotting extravagance of a wild and purely fictional memorial.

The deviations from the regular exercise of perception, described in this section, as unproductive of applicable knowledge, are yet harmless in their effects; except when employed by knavish dreamers and visionary fanatics, to impose upon superstitious credulity. The Insane perversions now to be considered, though equally unproductive, often bring personal suffering and disaster on the patient; with trouble and danger to those exposed to his unruly folly and resentment.



SECTION XXXI.

The Disorderly Perceptions of Insanity.

INSANITY, from the oddity of its language, and its acts, and the importance of its consequences, has always been a subject of idle curiosity, of serious reflection, and of care. This interest has been traditionally fostered by the belief derived from Theological Ages; that it is either an inscrutable, and special visitation of Providence; or the effect of a Spiritual Devil taking *possession* of the Spiritual mind. In Conjuring times it was ascribed to Witch-craft. And although it is at last medically regarded as a disease of the Brain; yet fictional physiologists and pathologists cannot give up the notion, of there being a fair-spread and immaterial something, enveloping or lining every molecular cell of the brain, which somehow makes them think; it is the loosening and displacement of this immaterial envelope or lining which somehow makes it incoherently mad.

This Work defines Insanity to be in its most general sense; a perversion of the ordained and physical laws of the five perceptions and of their eminent qualities. For if perception and its verbal signs are material functions, a perversion of those func-

tions can be no other than material. Nay the very subject of insanity affords the strongest support to the probability of the material process of the mind: since only a metaphysical notion would pretend to show that the pure, everlasting, and indivisible spirit, unchangeable, except for its heavenly beatitude, or its eternal misery, can take on the disorganized, and degraded condition of insanity.

According to our definition, Insanity or madness is classed as an irregular, and unproductive exercise of the ordained and productive system of the five perceptions and their qualities. For there can be only vague divisions of that irregularity, unless measured by the original classification from which it is a sad departure. We must then endeavor, to limit and arrange its innumerably combined, and heterogeneous images and types, by showing their mode of deviation from the orderly use of the five constituents, under the influence of their various qualities.

Things to be understood must be classified; and we are aware of no other means for clearly describing insanity than by referring its phenomena to the laws of the genera, species, and varieties of perception in the regular and productive mind. Insanity adds no new and disturbing element to the related images and types of a productive train of thought; it acts its peculiar part, only by unnumbered and disorderly permutations of the qualities of the five perceptions, under all their forms and degrees. But the natural and *un*-spiritual laws of the mind having never been so strictly investigated, as to make even an approach towards a uniformity in the knowledge of its working plan; every one in his ignorance, thinks it to be just what he pleases; and having no rule of choice, pleases himself by thinking his own view is the best: the theological fanatic's, from its appropriate egotism, being the best of all.

Insanity is to general science, and to the personality of life, a subject of interest, only as it may be prevented, or cured: and it can in no way be so, effectually, as by a knowledge of the working-plan of the ordained and natural mind. Nor if curable, can it be, except empirically, otherwise than with reference to the law and order of those perceptions which are perverted.

To reduce the innumerable forms, degrees, and combinations of

insane perceptions, to simple and manageable divisions, for a clearer knowledge of the means of prevention and cure; we will class them with reference to the five constituents and their qualities.

The images and types of insanity are of the same incoherent character as those which, in a survey of the memorial field, are excluded from a strictly connected train. The insane incoherence is however believed to be real; which is not so, with the equally unrelated images and types, rejected from a connected and productive train. Waking, Dreaming, and insanity, resemble each other in being both alike delusive to the percipient. There is not one perversion of the images and types of insanity, that may not be assigned to one, or to a combination of more than one of the following heads of the sane constituents and their qualities.

First. There is a perversion of the laws of true perception in the senses. Our perceptions of things are or should be admitted as truths, only as they are directly seen, heard, touched, tasted, and scented, by the majority of mankind: for the senses, when not confused by notions, always sanely represent the real existences of things. Whereas persons under insanity, as in a dream, mistake their friends, or suppose them to be other persons; or suppose one place to be another at the same time; or mistake the purposes and use of things; and sometimes are insensible to pain, and every impression, except to the vivid memorial images and types of their delusion. This for our present purpose of nomenclature may be called Primary perversion.

Second. There is a perversion, by which the unrelated memorial images and types, as in dreams, are so vivid as to delude the madman with a belief of their truth. The principal perceptive materials for every subject, being the memorial images and types, received through the senses; they may represent all the delusions, both of persons and things, ascribed to the primary. This may be called Memorial insanity.

Third. There is a perversion of joint comparison; in which the madman perceives without distinction, an equal vividness between all the memorial images, and types; and being thus unable to select the related from the unrelated, cannot furnish the required premises for a sane and final conclusion. We may call this, a

perversion of the joint constituent, or otherwise, Uncomparing insanity.


Fourth. There is a perversion of the conclusive constituent, arising from antecedent perversions in the primary, memorial, and joint perceptions. This may be called Inferential insanity.

Fifth. There is a perversion of the verbal sign; in which its actionary use is sometimes so rapid, as to lose its precision; so misapplied as to be incoherent; so muttered as to be inarticulate; and sometimes so vociferated as to end in huskiness, and exhaustion. This may be called Verbal insanity.

From the imperfect and irregular exercise of the joint and verbal perceptions by insanity, there can be no precise and extended comparison of primary and memorial images and types, and no nomenclature of them. Without comparison and nomenclature, there can be no classification; consequently, as we have said of dreaming, no abstract ideas, or in the language of this Work, no abstractive perception. And although the abstract terms of sanity may, from habit, be used in some simple cases by the madman, they are yet without a classified usefulness, and are never applied to productive predication.

These are our views of insanity in the five constituents: for as they embrace every form of the sane and productive exercise of the mind; so they must embrace the forms of every insane and unproductive deviation from it. But each of the generic constituents may assume various specific powers, for all the practical purposes of the intellect. These powers we called, Qualities; and as species, they are subject to the perversions of their governing genera. Hence we may have an insanity of nearly every quality. The following species of insanity with their manifold degrees, varieties, and combinations, will include all their noticeable and important forms.

First. The vividness of perceptions. This quality may prevent the sane and productive use of the mind, by affecting the images and types of all the five constituents. Thus an overbearing vividness in the primary, the memorial, and the verbal perceptions may bring-on an insane perversion of the joint, and conclusive; or may altogether obscure them: for a concentrated brightness on **any** sense, or on the memorial field prevents comparison; and



a mind steadily fixed on a single vivid image or type, has the extreme unproductiveness of idiocy. Insanity may also proceed from too faint a primary and memorial perception; as this may in like manner prevent comparison and conclusion. Persons of common, unoccupied, and feeble mind, as age advances, sometimes fall into this passive state of insanity.

Second. The quality of quick and slow. Insanity may proceed from an excess in each of these qualities. For as excessive vividness perverts or limits the mind; so, too rapid a course of images and types prevents a joint comparison and conclusion, and turns the regular train of perception to insanity. Persons who show this character of mind by unusually rapid speech, in what is called *cluttering*; and by a jerking gesture, as it occurs in a moderate case of *chorea* or St. Vitus' dance; not unfrequently from untoward exciting causes, pass into the same form of insanity. On the other hand, extreme slowness in perception may lead to a perversion of the regular and productive use of the mind. A tardy movement over the primary and memorial field is often unable to gather a sufficiency of related perceptions, for just comparison and conclusion. Persons of this character, without much change of habit, sometimes as age advances, subside into a half-insane listlessness, or into a stupid idiocy.

Third. The excursive quality. As the medium and proper extent of this quality furnishes the field of images and types, for the sane and productive working plan of thought; it will be found that a wild extent of its range, by preventing a strict discrimination of the relationships of things, and a consequent just comparison, and conclusion; furnishes the perverted and abundant materials, for the unrelated images and types of insanity. It is in the boundless field of these images and types, that the mad-animal man tosses and tears the fair picture of things; destroying every relationship between its parts; and leaving some bright, unconnected, and useless shreds of perception. Insanity in all the other qualities derives its unrelated joint perceptions from the heterogeneous and changing pictures of an insane excursion. Nay it might be a question, suggested by the unity of cause and consequence, in our ~~common~~ working plan, that if accurate memorials of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~presented~~ ^{presented} vs presented with their proper

relationships; whether there would be insanity in the subsequent exercise of joint, conclusive, and verbal perception. After this view of the excursive quality, we here give only a single example of *its* perversion: since every case occurring in the other qualities, may, in a greater or less degree, be referred to its important influence.

We have shown, that every case of insanity must be assigned to one of the divisions of the five genera of constituents, however the qualities may diversify the specific forms, degrees, and varieties of these several constituents. Hence if we have rightly described the whole mind, there can be no other insanity than that of primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perception. When therefore, a rapid succession of numberless and unrelated images and types pass over the mind, with no apparent primary perception; not even of the uttered words; and no attempt to employ the joint and conclusive; it is a case of wild memorial flight, and an example of excursive insanity. Insanity may also arise from too limited an excursion. For this by not furnishing sufficient images and types for a wide comparison; the conclusion may be erroneous: and every error, of every kind, must, by the uniform working of the mind, be considered as a perversion of productive thought, and therefore as a limited insanity: its highest degree in raving madness, being an error in every thing.

Fourth. The elective quality. This depends, in a measure, on the excursive: and I have already asked; whether, if the memorial are presented in their true relationships, the joint and conclusive would not justly follow as an involuntary function. I have heard or read, that a madman may reason justly from false 'premises,' or as we call them false primary and memorial images and types. That puzzles me. For a sane mind cannot make truth out of falsehood; neither is there the new alchemy in a mad-one, to do it. The proposition is founded on a sophistical use of the term *justly*; meaning by it, something like an accordance of a false conclusion with false premises; and not a conclusion absolutely *just*.

I have not yet looked so broadly and so closely into the working of the mind as to say, that true primary and memorial perceptions will necessarily produce a just elective choice: for since

the elective is a different function from the primary and the memorial; it does not appear why the first might not be perverted, when the last two are not. It is on this account, I have above submitted this point of relationship, as a question to others.

Fifth. The agreeable and disagreeable quality. These characters of perception may, in each form, take on a perversion of their useful purposes. The sane exercise of the agreeable quality, within its proper limits, is a beneficial function. Beyond this, it may be the cause of insanity. Joy not unfrequently produces hysteric delirium in women, with sometimes more durable perversions. The disagreeable quality is a protection of the regular mind, against excess; as pain is a warning against bodily injury. The disagreeable, like its opposite, is a frequent cause of hysteria; and sometimes of permanent forms of insanity. I knew an opium-taker who finally destroyed herself; but who would still continue the miseries of her life, under the use of the distracting drug; declared to me; she felt what she conceived to be the *torments of the damned*: a means of measuring her suffering taught her by the metaphysical theologian; whose delight in his own kind of delusion is a continued delirium.

In describing insanity, I class under its generic divisions; hysteria, and some diseases of the Methodic Nosology, not recognized as diseases of the mind. Having never had much regard to medical Diagnosis, and its everlasting disputes; I endeavor to record the conditions of things which assignably differ or agree in nature, and class them accordingly. In our definition of insanity, I embrace every perversion of the mind, from raving madness, to the cases of furious argument between political, medical, and religious sectaries, who justly charge each other with having lost their minds.

Sixth. The quiescent and actionary quality. Quiescent insanity is exemplified in the obstinate taciturnity, of greater or less duration, sometimes maintained by the patient: though in this case, we do not know the special form of the silent mental perception. It is generally innocent: but like every other form of insanity, very troublesome to interested friends. A taciturn habit if it is not insupportable, limits the mind, and as age advances, if not by its through stupidity, to the

imbecility of the idiot. If the Romans had a saying; that he is a wise man who speaks sparingly; or who signifies much in a little; it was only a local maxim; framed in derisive contempt at the nothing-in-much verbosity of the demagogue at the Capitol and the *Comitia*; of the mass-meetings of *Mons-Sacer*, and the *Campus Martius*; and of the wrangling sophists of the Bath-Exhedra. The metaphysical School of Pythagoras in ancient Italy, it is said, imposed a term of silence on its Novices; that they might not question their master's transcendental discourses: as it sometimes happens in modern days, when a plain-minded child puts a very puzzling query to a Sunday-school catechist, and is frowningly answered by a, hush! Never to doubt and never to question, as the conservatives of profitable and ambitious error teach; is never to cast out the 'busy devil' of falsehood, nor to be wise unto salvation by truth. We are not therefore to be surprised, that the quiescent Pythagorians were considered, at least, delirious; nor that the prudent Rulers of Magna Grecia thought it necessary to banish a school of believers in the Transmigration of 'Souls,' brought up by silently ruminating on a system of metaphysical absurdity.

Actionary insanity is remarkable, from its highest degree being the most dangerous both to the patient and to others. Its moderate cases appear in muttering, in rapidity of speech, singing, vociferating to hoarseness and loss of voice, and in walking to muscular exhaustion. Sometimes it appears in the irregular and aimless motions of *Chorea*. In Epilepsy it is accompanied by general convulsions of amazing strength: and again, as in raging madness, it requires the control of the *waistcoat*.

Seventh. The single and the manifold quality. Insanity on a single subject of perception, and its immediate relationships, is in medical nomenclature called monomania. It is so well known, and has so many innocent oddities of fancy, as to be a matter of fictional exaggeration by the novelist, and by writers who know that to the mass of mankind craziness is a much more interesting subject than clear-headed honesty. Still between the earnest perceptions of a single and harmless whim; those of a distracted fanaticism on any subject, and the application of the mind to a pursuit of the greatest general utility, it is impossible to draw a

line of distinction. The zealous individual who pursues a purpose, which his neighbors do not, and will not comprehend, is called a monomaniac. But with all we have endeavored to unfold in this work; it appears to be necessary; the whole frame of the mind should be understood, to explain the working plan of what are called its insulated parts: and the time may come, when he who measures the purpose of another, only by his own ignorance, will pass for the greater monomaniac of the two. It is to the steady and undisturbed perseverance of this supposed insanity, which is however a wide and productive looking into what is unseen by others; that the boasting Caucasian Race is perhaps indebted for its rise from savagism, and its partial escape in a few cases, from the mental slavery of implicit Conformity. We need not go through the whole genealogy of progressive knowledge, from the time of the Egyptian Trismigistus, only stopping at the first Printer, who was believed 'to have a Devil,' down to the crazy discoverer of the long-hidden half of the Earth; we will select a single striking instance of what the imbecility of the idle calls the monomania of hard work, and of self-devotion to its purpose. The following is part of an inscription on a monument to *Yeu*, who four thousand years ago was called by the Emperor of China, to drain the waters of a destructive inundation. 'The Emperor intimated his orders to me. Joy lent me wings for their execution. For a long time I forgot that I had a home; taking my only repose among the rugged hills; exposed to all the inclemencies of the air. Continued solicitude so altered me, that I was hardly to be recognized. But occupied only with my task, I counted neither hours nor days; but constantly striving in my purpose, I at last happily accomplished it.'

The people of ancient Abdera thought Democritus insane, because he devoted himself to the study of the cause and cure of insanity. Hippocrates, it is said, when called to prescribe for his supposed malady, pronounced him; certainly with no great compliment; to be the wisest man in the city.

From a knowledge of the human mind, as ordained by Nature, and as universally perverted by ignorance and metaphysical influence, we infer the condition of Chinese and Greek popular opinion, back to an immemorial period, to have been the same,

that the American popular opinion is now. And we may suppose, from the reputed craziness of purpose, that Yeu must have found it difficult to collect laborers; and Democritus, without being well watched, to hire a garret, for conducting his 'analysis' of the human intellect. But Yeu worked for a sagacious Prince, and Democritus for Omniscient Nature. The one became the prince of Engineers; the other has been immortalized by the judgment of the Prince of Physicians.

It is difficult however, to draw the line of distinction between the mental disease of monomania, and that, ascribed by the Ignorant and Narrow-minded to the occupations of their future benefactors. For it is to be remembered, that the mind is divided, not by *subjects*, nor so far as we know, by *localities*, in the brain; but by its five perceptions; and that the same function of perception is performed equally on all things, and their aggregates or objects. Our analysis gives us this view of the working plan of the intellect; that with the same breadth of knowledge, its exercises ought to be equally strict and proportionally productive on every subject; and that when it is monomaniac on one, it cannot be very far from an imperfect, limited, and erroneous condition on others; except on a subject of daily routine, for which little more than a habitual train of perception is required.

This last remark would seem to imply; there is no ground for the distinctions of single and manifold insanity. For every mind having its own character, either from nature, or education; if it is insane on one subject, the like character of perception should exercise itself with a like perversion on all. And we observe, that a monomaniac mind; except upon subjects of habitual thought, or on a temporary mutation of its absorbing vividness; is no more productive, though it may be more fantastic, on one subject than on another: since it is unable to think wisely on its peculiar subject, from too vivid a quality of perception; and on others, from its obscured and overruled perceptions being too faint. This imperfect view is suggested by the unity in exercising the five several perceptions: and we leave others to deny or support its accuracy, by altogether extinguishing, or by brightening and extending the spark of light, we have been able, in our limited time, briefly to throw upon it.

Eighth. The involuntary quality. The diseased, like the healthy functions of the mind; of which they are only a variation; must by the rule of their necessity, be involuntary. And perhaps future observers may consider it a perverted exercise of the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perception; when a 'Free-Willer' so far disbelieves in the Creator's ordination of a necessary succession of the events of Nature, as to assume, he has a quiescent or actionary will of his own, without its efficient, physical, and directive cause.

Ninth. The evanescent and the durable quality. Evanescent insanity appears in the various forms of delirium from all its causes; hysteria; chorea; epilepsy, the exaggerative quality and intoxication. Febrile delirium does not necessarily produce a durable effect on the mind; nor does it create the habit for its return. The other evanescent states, if frequently repeated, weaken, and sometimes destroy the orderly and useful powers of the intellect.*

Durable insanity, as in born-idiocy, continues through life; and whenever it may first come on, its period varies from that of temporary delirium, through the times of curable to incurable perversion.

Tenth. The true and the false quality. Insanity rarely so affects the whole of the five constituents, as to prevent their representing truly some of the images and types of things. We see this in what are called the harmless insane, who roam at large; and who commonly have true primary and memorial perceptions on ordinary things; with sufficiently correct joint, conclusive, and verbal, to serve the habitual purposes of life: but who; whenever by any cause, excited beyond the routine of the

* Intoxication is a form of madness so well known by its causes, its effects, and by its epidemic prevalence throughout this country at least, in the street staggerer, and the wife-killer of the lower class, and the more degraded, but '*Honorable and Eminent*' Drunkard of our public Councils, and Offices; that it is almost hopeless to look for its cure, except from its own disgust at itself: since, if the mind is so idle and weak as to take to it; it is afterwards so incorrigible, as experience shows, that public shame, incarceration, and the whipping-post are of no avail; and nothing except death in an Alms-house can induce the Sot to lay-aside his liquor, and then only by laying down his life; showing; it is the *mania à misericordiâ*, or insane pity, which allows him even that.

senses and the brain: *fall into a total perversion*, and its outrageous consequences, and *lose their identity* with their constituents. For falsehood *is* a total perversion of truth: it is an insane perversion of the true images and their relationships.

Eleventh. The *exaggerated quality*. This occurs occasionally in man; and under all its various aspects seems much like an epidemic among women. It is a total and inverted perception; and is *erased* from the mind by the influence of being otherwise called *neurasthenia*, *hypochondria*, *melancholia*, or *perament*. It sometimes wears out the mind, and leads to *insanity* or *madness*.

Twelfth. The *mixed and mingled quality*. Almost every one of all the forms of insanity, from *delirium* to *mania*, may be said to have no primary perception. All the various qualities of memorial images and types, and of their combinations, and of moderate forms of perversion have a mixture of the primary and memorial. What influence they have on the character of insanity we leave others to ascertain.

Thirteenth. The *mutative quality*. *Delirious* insanity, from durable insanity, is the *mutative* in all its various ways. It changes its subject; its degree; and its form, from the *delirious* to the *actionary*, and the reverse; from the *agitated* to the *quiet*; *namely* from the *taciturn* to the *loquacious*. *Insanity* frequently changes the character of its *perversion*, as *regular* perception is productively changed through all its various qualities, by the influence of further knowledge upon it. It is upon this *mutative* character of insanity, that important means are provided for its relief or cure.

Fourteenth. The *independent quality*. If *independence* consists in a difference on points of opinion from the rest of the world, insanity which has its own peculiar notions, is always under the influence of the independent quality. An independent use of regular perception, or the power of seeing through the mist of opinion, has by that misty opinion been considered a symptom of insanity: since to differ from the several conformities of mankind is defined by every Polonius of the higher and the lower masses, 'to be nothing else but mad.' There never was a Decla-

ration of Independence, political, religious, mental, moral, medical, or mechanical, either by an individual or a state, that has not been obliged to carry the '*fœnum in cornu*'; or 'hay on the horn'; the old Roman warning to beware of a mad bull; and that has not fallen under the imputation of imprudence, or folly, or madness. St. Paul was mad, before Festus, with too much learning, in his independent defense. And Fitch, with the first Steamboat on the Delaware, was positively mad with too much ingenuity, before the Philosophical professors, and practical mechanics of Philadelphia; who were negatively mad, with too little.

Fifteenth. The selfish quality. In the twenty-eighth section, it was remarked, that selfishness is the natural quality of a limited perception; necessary to the self-protection of the ignorant and the needy; and that the only means for lessening its continued influence on the mind, as individuals rise above the condition of ignorance and poverty, is by a general cultivation of the perceptions of things and their relationships: for the more general and numerous they are, the more readily are they mutative of selfishness. We have endeavored to show that insanity in all its forms, is only a perversion of the regular uses of perception. When therefore selfishness occurs under insanity, it is subject to the same laws of mutation. Accordingly, the more mutative the insanity; or the wider the excursion among perverted images and types, and their relationships, the less will the mind be disposed or able to dwell exclusively on itself: and this is selfishness. When on the contrary, the excursion is not extended through the great field of varied images and types; the mind is disposed either directly or indirectly to turn to some single subject; which is the next neighbor to personal self. Thus the slavery-fanatic attempts to cover his selfishness with the flimsy, and notional perception, of what he calls principle, or conscience, or his duty to God. The mechanical, or the mathematical fanatic who cannot respectively invent a Perpetual Motion; or Square the Circle, may take a wider survey of the relationship of things, that may seem to draw him from himself; yet his disappointment affects indirectly his vanity; which is always a selfish perception; and the mortification of failure can rest no where but on personal self. What is called melancholy consists of the *v*, and of the disagreeable qualities,

and this last refers exclusively to self. The Hypochondriac who perceives only his own disease, has a selfishness of primary, memorial, joint, conclusive, and verbal perceptions, and is therefore insane upon them all. There being then few, if any, mutative perceptions for the cure of a hypochondriac, and a monomaniac; what is to turn the latter from madly thinking himself a king? and the former from conceiting he has a mouse under his skin, because one ran up his sleeve, and he could not think where else it could be. Some medical book or lecturer gives a *story*; that a patient thought he had a snake in his heart. His physician, while bleeding him from the arm, slipped, by sleight of hand, a little eel into the basin; exclaiming, there it is! And the story *goes on* to say, the man was cured of his halucination. If any thing like this did occur, the patient and the doctor may have played juggling tricks on each other; but under the laws of the healthy and of the diseased mind, that sudden mutation did no more occur, than that a '*Natural Bone-Setter*' instantly restored a joint which had been out of place for twenty years. Yet the dupes to Medicine, as well Physician as Patient, believe many such miracles.

The remaining qualities; of wise conformity, foresight, and habit, are rarely found under insanity. For it is only the regular working plan of the mind that properly employs them. When perceptions are perverted, there can be no conformity to a joint and conclusive order of images and types. When there is no order of perception, there can be no regular succession to produce a habit in their repetition. And where there is no habit of past and conclusive perception, there can be no foresight of that which is to come.

We have shown how the phenomena of insanity, in their leading divisions, are to be measured by the leading division of the ordained and productive mind. But as the productive mind, in all its purposes and applications, employs its five constituents and their qualities, under every consistent combination of the forms and degrees of perception; so insanity, in its analogous though perverted use of the same constituents and qualities, shows every consistent combination of the forms and degrees of its perverted images and types. Thus taking the productive ex-

ercise of the senses and the brain, on any subject of knowledge; it may have the primary with the memorial; the joint and conclusive acting on the primary and memorial; and all these in their various qualities, connected with the verbal sign; exhibiting incalculable modes of combination. In like manner, take a case of manifold insanity. There may be a mixed perversion of primary and memorial; a perverted action of the joint and conclusive; together with their qualities, of vivid, quick, durable, evanescent, agreeable, disagreeable, mutative, quiescent, or actionary, in innumerable modes of permutation.

But we may take another view of the relation of sanity to insanity; or of the productive to the unproductive mind. By the productive, we mean its ordained power, for perceiving and classifying truth; for widely foreseeing its consequences; and practically applying them, to all the purposes of science and of art. By the unproductive mind, we mean; that perversion of its power, which perceives no new things; classes none that are known; and practically applies only those which for the common purposes and acts of life, seem to be unavoidably habitual. Of the great mass of minds, bred up to hearing, reading, and *acting* fictions, how few discover truth, or are even willing to receive it; and how few classify the things of their own particular pursuit; foresee the new relationships of those things; or are productive; which every mind was ordained to be? Compare this majoritive state of the proud and conceited intellect of man, with the unproductive intellect of the technically-called insane, and say, if Shakspeare, in seeing through the mind; commonly called the 'heart' of man; was not right, when in meaning to remark, that the world, in its majoritive sense, is mad, applied it, as one of his passing satires, to the people of England alone: and it is only our comment on the discrimination of the Poet, to add from an analysis of the mind, why, and in what manner it is so.

We have endeavored to show, what should be the exercise of the five constituents and their qualities, for acquiring a knowledge of things and their relationships; and for the application of that knowledge to the extension of truth, to the administration of the rights of persons, and of the *rights* of philosophical, mechanical, and esthetic things. Let us compare the administered opinions

of the world with this constitutional, legislative, and practical system of the five-fold perceptive and productive intellect.

Consider the forms of Government, as they should employ the primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions. We find the exercise of the primary, on the analogies by which God and Nature so wisely govern the Universe, altogether overlooked in their application to the Laws of Man; the memorial, with its resources in the images and types of history, neglected; the joint comparison of their abundance, made in every different manner, and in every different age and nation, according to any and every theoretic caprice; the conclusive following the fictional character of the comparisons; and a confusion in the verbal sign, which cannot be true in representing an error. Then, for the qualities of perception; we find them too vivid or too faint, too quick or too slow, too wild in excursion, too undetermined in election, and almost universally selfish. With all this, and more might be added, there should be, and there is so little established truth among the Beau-idealities of statesmen, and so much confusion among the people, that it is not surprising; Shakspeare the great observer of Kings, Counselors, and People, should have set so many of his countrymen on the other side of sanity. Consider further that every government is divided into two or more parties, variously opposed to each other. Surely this is no wisdom of man, but a wrong use of the mind. For Truth, like the Word of Christ, cannot be divided, though the Schools in one case, and the Church in the other, have multiplied the difference between Paul and Apollos, into more than a thousand-fold. Swift, or somebody, defined Party; to be the madness of the many, for the benefit of the few. He would, with a little more philosophy, and a little less party in himself, have said; it is the madness of all, each for his own individual selfishness: since their hating and wronging one another makes no difference in their insanity. Consider again, how the mind has, in all ages, been exercised on Religion. Whatever may have been the primary perception of spoken words, or of written or other signs on which it was originally founded; they are all passed away; and Theology giving itself up to the figmental combination of memorial images and types alone, and to false conclusions founded upon them; has sub-

stituted, for the simple and God-adoring religion of Science, a farrago of disputatious notions, and an unintelligible 'rhapsody of words.' Consider further the Esthetic Arts. These too are to be investigated, and enjoyed through the use of the five perceptions and their qualities. They then become a science governed by principles of the agreeable and disagreeable qualities, which direct a conformity, or at least an undisputing similarity of Taste. Look to the world, on this subject. With few exceptions, every Artist, and Critic is directed by a branch of self-interest, called *Feeling*; and attempts to draw a principle, from what is especially agreeable or disagreeable to himself. But as each decides by his own personality, each may or must be different. There can then be no classification of esthetic perception; and consequently, as in government, and religion, there will be doubt, error, unnecessary difference, and dispute.

On all these divisions of human knowledge, this looks like the imperfect, and perverted use of perception which is medically called madness: at least, it is apt to lead to contention; and this to ill temper and unproductive argument; which for all useful purposes, is no better than madness.

Consider again, Geometry, Arithmetic, and the Natural Sciences; you find there, the true and ordained use of the five perceptions, in their regular order; and leading without contention, to one general consent, upon unchangeable truth. They bear no resemblance to insanity: and until government, religion, and the Esthetic arts are subjected to the strict and productive laws of perception, their precepts will continue to present the same intellectual confusion, and their practical application the same contradictions which have spread so much bad taste, unhappiness, and crime through every age and nation.

From this survey, we may learn, that between the state of intellect, as generally exercised throughout the world, and that of Hospital-insanity, no discriminating line can be drawn; and that 'great wit' and profundity on *one* subject, may not only be neighbor to madness on another; but very close to it even on that one. For an individual, with a detailed knowledge on one subject, may on it, sanely use his five perceptions, though not always in the most productive manner. Whereas, if he has no knowledge on

another, his memorial being founded only on a careless authority, will often be confused or false; and the joint, with the conclusive being founded on false or confused memorials, will have the irregular character of madness. In like manner, partial knowledge on one subject may exercise limited 'wit' on what it knows, but if the 'wit' is attempted on other parts of that same subject, it may find itself close beside insanity.

Young, or somebody, wrote; that 'an undevout Astronomer is mad.' We subscribe to its truth; and add, that a pretending Natural Philosopher, who has not a reverential perception of the great and the minute works of God and Nature, must already have *lost his* perception; together with the use of the telescope for one, and of the microscope for the other. But we cannot avoid having a foresight, that if the five-fold constituents of the mind, here set-forth, shall ever be received, and then strictly exercised, it will appear; there must have been great confusion, or obliquity in the mind of him who could be at the same time an Astronomer and a Church Theologian.

Two important views to be taken of the subject of insanity, are First, that of its general classification with the divisions of the five productive constituents, and their qualities. Second, the perversion of these constituents to the irregularities of Disease. We have considered the first head, in the preceding part of this section; and shall on the second here offer a few remarks.

As we have not pretended to give a detailed account of the innumerable permutations of the constituents, with their qualities, which form the healthy and productive exercises of the mind; so we do not intend to state the innumerable forms of the same constituents, with their qualities, in the unproductive irregularities of Insanity. This must be left to a future age; when the outline of the frame of the mind, and its working plan, here laid down, are adopted and have become familiar to the philosophic and thinking observer.

We have founded the general pathology of insanity, on the divisions of the five constituents, and their qualities. For all its symptoms; however variously connected among themselves, and with bodily diseases, by the nosological arrangement; can be severally assigned to some one of these divisions: showing that

the working plan of the diseased, is only a variation from that of the healthy mind. And as the various exercises of the healthy and productive perceptions may be influenced by bodily causes; so may the perverted perceptions of insanity. This leads to a brief view of the means of cure.

When a case is presented for treatment, let all the old nosological terms be rejected; refer the various symptoms to the proper divisions of the natural working plan; inquire what bodily causes may indirectly; and what peculiar agency of the perceptions may directly have produced the perversion. It is not the purpose of this Work, to go into the detail of the medical treatment of insanity. Enough was said in the several sections on the qualities of perception, and on the means for supplanting them, to show, that the principal *Indication*, or what the case requires; after removing bodily causes and their effects; is to overrule the perverted, by the greater force and influence of another sane and Mutative quality; either by some vivid, quick, excursive or strong actionary impression. This we have shown, is the mode of correcting the errors, and semi-insanity, in much of the so-called 'plain sense' of the conventional world. And when the system of this Work is attentively read, studied, and 'laid to heart,' it will appear to be the only means of reaching the troublesome follies, the vices, and crimes of the common mind; and the absurd and extravagant perversions of insanity.

This error, or insanity, or whatever it may be called, of the 'common' or 'plain sense' of the world is no where more remarkable, than among the family, and friends of an acknowledged lunatic. It is a belief, founded on correct observation; that in the present muddled state of persons and things, the treatment of insanity is more successful when the patient is removed from former associates; or rather from those who when called upon to advise in the case, particularly of a daughter, are apt to become as crazy as herself. We pass over the many advantages of this method of separation; to remark on one of the greatest evils of the reverse. It is an odd halucination of the world; to regard insanity as a greater misfortune to a family than drunkenness, gaming, cheating creditors, theft or forgery. When a young lady of a family becomes insane; a scene ensues of consternation

at home, and of exaggerated gossiping abroad; till with wringing of hands, the intrusive condolence of friends, and the distractions at what jealous ill-nature is saying; the brains of all around the lunatic are as crazy as her own. If the patient is married, there is the contradictory counsels and quackings of two equally distracted families. Each wants his own family physician, and nurse. One thinks the patient should see visitors, to divert her mind; but at the same time, to report her odd sayings, and doings over the whole town. Another recommends her being sent to an Asylum. This produces a terrible uproar; the mother *gets mad* outright, and declares *her* daughter shall never go to a Mad-house. The families mutually 'secede;' and like all foolish *seceders*, forget their purposes in recrimination. A skulking news-reporter gets hold of some ludicrous phrase or event; and while the physician is bothered and thwarted, and the bewildered patient still more confounded; the neighboring villagers crowd to the Post Office, and the Telegraph, to hear something of the 'crazy case.' Before the families have done contra-deliberating and quarreling on whether the patient shall go to the Hospital, the Poor Thing, in the absence of her nurse, throws herself from a third-story window. It would require only a single intelligent Inquest-Commissioner, to pronounce; the families, friends, and idle gossips, to be, with the addition of great silliness, as mad as the patient. Let us hope, that the time may come, when the curious inquirer, on receiving our definition and history of insanity, will after the manner of Moliere's pupil in Rhetoric, open his eyes and exclaim, Why! I have in many things been mad all the days of my life.

The treatment of the Insane is said to have been 'revolutionized' during the present century: but this seems to have touched only a few points of the circumference of perverted perceptions; and not to have turned-round the nave of the great guiding wheel. The personal comforts of the Asylum have been widely increased; and the social kindness to its inmates, softened to all that is desirable. But the *fashion* of the practice of medicine has so changed since I left the weather-cock business, that I cannot say how they now drug the Insane: we will however suppose, for the sake of conformity; it is with quinine, morphia, and cod-liver oil.

The principal design, in what they call 'moral treatment,' to allure, and direct the wayward intellect; or in our language to mutate the perverted perceptions; has been a well-meant groping after a purpose, without a full knowledge of the ways and means to effect it. According to the capacity or disposition of the patient, amusement and instruction have been offered, to divert his thoughts, and overrule his errors. But erroneous thoughts are at the time, the mind itself, or the functions of the senses and the brain: and who can know how to convey to the mind, to draw from it, or in any way to change it, except he knows all the parts of that mind, with the manner in which it receives and communicates thought, and the ways and means of its changes. With the old metaphysician, his system of 'sensation, memory, reasoning, association, and judgment,' conveys no manageable knowledge, and certainly not enough, to prevent his falling himself into some of its notional forms.

From our analysis, I have sometimes supposed, that as convalescents are severally collected to see experiments in Chemistry, and hear explanations in Natural philosophy; whether it might not be the most useful, and curative instruction, to teach certain patients of moderate and partial derangement, the natural philosophy of the senses and the brain, and the working plan of their own mind. A subject so entirely new might perhaps have a mutative influence, by convincing them; they are not bewitched, nor worried by some metaphysical Devil. But why should I propose this? For two or three hundred years perhaps, this Work will not be able to persuade the reputed sound, and exalted mind of the world, to examine its own vaunted perfection; how could it expect to turn the minds of the Insane to look inward upon Insanity?

The preceding outline, on the diseases of the mind, suggests another view than that of the professional purpose of cure. It unfolds the more important subject of Prevention.

Enough has been said, to satisfy the independent inquirer, that the fanatical, and even the majoritive use of the mind, has to a greater or less extent the essential character of dreaming and of insanity; and that the extreme degrees of the latter are but an extension of the **perversion** of the so-called regular exercise of

perception, to the quiescent and actionary folly and error of common life. As we consider the irregular action of the five perceptions, constituting insanity, to be of like character with the wrong use of those perceptions in government, religion, and indeed on every subject of science, and of life; it must be perceived, that the removal of the causes and habit of error and delusion in the latter, would be the preparatory means for curing the former. The difficulty of cure may therefore in a great measure be saved by the foresight of prevention. This prevention is to be effected, by keeping the mind to its habit of ordained regularity, and by teaching the distinction between the myriad insinuating forms of fiction, and the single form of truth, as founded on the orderly use of the five perceptions: for fiction in all its forms confounds the primary, leads to the wildness of the memorial, the inaccuracy of the joint and conclusive perceptions, and the falsehood of the verbal sign. From this fictional use of the mind, comes pride, vanity, ambition, avarice, the party and sectarian contentions of governments, and religions; for all these consist in greater part of notions, having no corresponding things in nature. But fiction, disturbing the balanced and orderly use of the constituents, prepares the mind for the exciting causes of acknowledged insanity. Thus the conceited and ambitious Stripling from College, misled by mischievous schemes of Glory, from Plutarch's deluding *Lives*, resolving to be 'Cæsar or Nobody;' the avaricious Speculator emulating the finger of Midas, to turn his fictional paper credit into gold; the faded Belle, as a devoted Nun, reconciled to penance and seclusion, that she may receive thereafter, the flattering admiration of the worldly Saints; are all predisposed, on the final reverse of hope, severally to sink into indolence and moping melancholy; or within the cells of an Asylum, to assume for a Crown, a ring of his twisted garters; to put on long paper ears; and to make a hand-mirror of her plate, to reflect the picture of a beautiful Beatitude. The ordained and simple purpose of the mind, will, with a few exceptions through bodily or other causes, always take-on, by irresistible necessity, its productive exercise. For without interference from bad education; begun by Fairy tales, Ghost stories, Parental ignorance of every thing except the tricks of life, and vulgar absurdities, which

confuse the difference between truth and falsehood; there would be no more danger of Insanity, than of dislocating a joint, or breaking a limb in walking by day-light, along an even floor. But when the perversions of theoretic Philosophy, fanatical Religion, and nine-tenths of the poetical representations of 'feeling' and of life, have entangled the five perceptions; and when circus-riders, rope-dancers, and tumblers, strain-aside the body to every condition of balance, and contortion of muscularity; there is always a preparation for insanity in one case, and a risk of life and limb in the other.

From a strict consideration of the working plan of the mind, described in this Essay, we would maintain, that were Education to be conducted, away from the idle amusement of fiction, which has always prevailed; and thus to be given to the mind anew, by first understanding its structure; what it has to do; and then to acquire the habit of exercising it according to the indication of that structure, with the just succession, and balanced action of the five constituents; there would be few cases of insanity. For independently of the mind being less subject to its ordinary causes, it would be better fortified against their influence when they might occur. There is a universal balance in the works of nature, and among the several parts of her apparent divisions. A knowledge of the means for adjusting the balance among the five Great Powers of Perception, which would do much towards the millennium of 'peace and good-will to men;' would save a world of treasure, misery, and blood, incurred by trying to poise that unsteady see-saw between the jealous powers of ambitious nations. But Kings, Pontiffs, and Demagogues will never lay-down their official pride, and personal selfishness, to look into, and exercise that working-plan of the mind, which Almighty and Adjusting Providence, from whom as hypocrisy serves, they claim to derive their power; wisely ordained to direct them.

It may assist in a degree, to illustrate the efficacy of a broad and precise cultivation of the constituents; in preventing insanity; that persons of temperate life, with a command of mind which education creates, can always, when prudence requires, as I have observed, govern their perceptions, words, and actions, under accidental inebri more certainly, than one who is habitually

muddled by intoxication: the latter having so often broken the natural order, and obscured the clearness of the five constituents, more readily loses the command of his mind and tongue; and comes to the well-known stare, stagger, and incoherence of tipsy foolishness.

Let us take another illustration from the sub-animal; for though humbly should I say it, they are worthy examples to man, of many things in nature. Their Minds are ordained to be sufficient for their limited purposes; and they have, if one may infer from their acts, the good sense to themselves, and so to call it, an instinctive reverence not to pervert them. I here speak of animals in their wild and natural state; for when domesticated to some of the vitiated habits of humanity, their minds are subject to artificial perversion, as well as their bodies to disease. Had the sub-animal tribes been subjected to the lot, of hearing hob-goblin stories, to frighten them in the dark; false notions of their duties to each other; and indefinite conceits, and contradictions about the *immediate* will of Providence over their actions, to set each species into party, and sectarian *argument* and deadly array within itself; they would all have starved amid the abundance of their disputes; for among men, the unproductive, nay, wasteful metaphysician, is often obliged to be indirectly fed by the industrious physical workman; and thus the starving beasts would be sometimes induced by their miseries, both of sub-intellect, and of body, to follow their desponding master's example, by taking their own lives to end their distracting cares.

Look-over that wild savanna far as the eye can reach. Is there among its unnumbered herds, a single monomaniac buffalo that thinks itself a grizzly bear, to seize upon its terrified companions? Look-up through the branches of a Western forest, bending beneath the weight of a myriad crowd of pigeons. Is there one hypochondriac, to think itself a hawk, and put the rest to flight? Could you find one among them all, bird and beast, that is horrified in the notion, that it has committed the unpardonable sin, against what is not even conceivable? Are there Mad-Bull demagogues lowing-on the United herd to separation, and to fraternal strife? Is there an oracular fanatic cooing the will of providence from a hollow oak? No, no, no! God and

Nature have made them the only practical Republicans; all created and living equal; sufficient in their United-State, for their own self-government, with the plain gregarious sense to preserve it; and nothing like the knavery of human ambition, to pervert or overthrow it.

But the metaphysician will say; the sub-animal mind is material, and the human, spiritual. If it is so, alas, for the practical benefit of spirituality! But this disputed point is of no consequence here. The Almighty, in his unity of causations, has ordained one universal principle of productive thinking, under its different powers and degrees, wherever the senses and the brain exist: whether wisely in Francis Bacon, or in the Elephant, and however they may be perverted, in the waking Fanatic, or in the dreaming Fox. It is however a fact, staring at the metaphysician, that by his contradistinction, the material mind of the brute has remained perfect in its kind, as it was created. The so-called spiritual mind has undergone every variety of perversion, and corruption; quite enough to convince any one except a metaphysician, that man might have a clearer intellect and better morality, if his mind, though of the same material with that of the brute, could be alike true and dutiful to the proper exercise of its own ordained and exalted function. But all contentions about a spiritual and material mind are fictional and useless: yet certainly, from various causes, the sub-animal mind as far as the five perceptions are its instruments, is perfect in its kind, for all its purposes; and the human intellect in its general or majoritive use, is disastrously perverted. Of the former, a higher intelligence might say; Well done, thou good and faithful servant; and upon the latter, we are saved the wasteful words of a just decree; for it is doomed irreversibly to its own self-tormenting darkness.

We will not pause to consider the Herds and Flocks of Cities, which, unlike the peaceful and catholic myriads of the savanna and the forest, are dividing themselves into every form of discontent or misery, under the inefficient efforts of governments and religions to restrain them from the vicious consequences of mental obliquity. For the prevention of crime, we find after countless ages of experience, is not to be effected solely by a selfish system of rewards and punishments, here and hereafter; when some

stronger selfishness more vividly leads to its commission. Nor has it yet been accomplished in the old pretensions of Collegiate instruction, or by its miserable substitute of common Charity schools. The mind is in itself the quiescent and the actionary cause, and the only cause, of every thing good and evil, wise and foolish, in the science and business of men. The cure of error and crime, together with that of metaphysical sophism, and of insanity, which is only a more palpable sophism; if ever widely and durably practicable, must be, by an inquiry into the ordination of the working plan of the mind, and an understanding of the analytic but simple causes and method of its perversion. These, by laying a broad foundation for all other knowledge, may raise-up wise and commanding thinkers, capable of leading the intellect from its long captivity under metaphysical delusion, to the promised ways and means of its original ordination. The radical cure of error as well as of insanity, if I may be allowed the antiphrase, will then lie in the antecedent remedy of prevention. The expensive and boasted endowment of Universities and of Hospitals, with their blind and lame education, and their few and imperfect cures, will then appear to be as misapplied and ineffectual in quieting the Babels of insanity; as Common Schools, Young Ladies' Seminaries, houses of refuge, penitentiaries, tread-mills, hard labor, solitary confinement, and the whipping-post, without a broad prevention; in freeing the world from its vices and its crimes: or as the Farmer's attempt to free his district from the depredation of crows and squirrels, by offering his sons a premium for wasting time and powder upon them; when their destructive numbers would disappear before the clearing of the woods, and the full inhabiting and cultivation of the soil.

After analytic education has removed from the common uses of the mind, the predisposing causes of insanity; perhaps that will not be considered to have been so dreadful a malady, which is only an extraordinary and mischievous result of instruction in the common school of metaphysical halucination. Let parents then banish those earliest disturbers of the order and accuracy of the five perceptions; the ghost-stories of the nursery. Let them cease to employ those pedagogue professors, who to avoid the ascent to the rising ground of knowledge and virtue; which

until worn by time is slow and difficult; amuse their pupils at the foot, with fictional descriptions they cannot comprehend. Let them warily watch the Priest, and the common statesman, who respectively mingle with their promising and should-be truthful purposes; the sinful means of deluding mankind into a selfish, narrow, and stupefying life of what they call holiness; and to an ambitious, distracting, and wicked life of worldly glory. Then let the broad school of Nature teach the God-ordained, and God-adoring, not the *God-Fearing* working plan of the human mind; which by its simple instrumentality and universal scope of primary, memorial, joint, and conclusive perceptions, with their verbal signs; planned and pronounced in the *earliest* Paradise, for man to earn his exalted and comprehensive intellectual living, by his productive labor. And let there be a waving sword set up near the Cradle and the College, to keep-off the confounding, the perverting, and falsifying metaphysical instructor.

This is our peculiar view. We do not address it, nor indeed any part of the Work, to the popular mind, whether of the million, whose necessities of time and subsistence may distract their attention; or to the barely educated classes, whose obstinacy on what they have acquired, may prevent them from listening to it. But we do submit it to the inquiring and reflective Posterity of the Few, who may perhaps perceive future benefit in what is not present profit and fame; and who after a lapse of two or three centuries, may instruct the so-called Educated, how to help the irresponsibly Ignorant.



SECTION XXXII.

On the Sub-Animal Mind.

I HAD occasion, for the purpose of illustration, in the last section, to allude to the character of the sub-animal mind. This besides being a part of philosophical curiosity, may by a Com-

parative mentivity, throw a varied light on that of the human intellect; in showing the relationship of similitude between them.

The sub-animal mind like the human, appears to be a material function of the senses and the brain. And here again we meet; as where in the fictional world do we not meet; the notions of the metaphysician: for we have no positive knowledge on this disputed point. Why then in our ignorance of the occult entity of the mind, may it not be asserted; the mind of the brute is spiritual; on the like assumption, that the human is said to be not material? From the identity of some of their respective and obvious functions, and their similarity in others, we have probable grounds for belief; they proceed from a like organization of the senses and the brain in each; making it as difficult for the metaphysician to show, except through his own conceit, or the conceit of some authority no better than his own; that the sub-animal mind is not spiritual, as that the human is not material. But this question is of no consequence to our present investigation of the rules of the working plan of the minds of both.

We were somewhat interested, in our first thoughts on the subject of this Essay, to *observe-ourselves* into the belief that the mind is not a spiritual entity; for as we are convinced; a belief in its immateriality has been the principal, if not the sole motive why it has never been so strictly and clearly developed, as many other subjects of greater difficulty have been, with much less special investigation. Having however, by the physical clew, found our way, as we believe, through the old labyrinth of the scholastic mind; and being, as we would fain congratulate ourselves, beyond the witching or bewildering influence of spiritualism, Platonism, transcendentalism, whatever that means, or any other figmentism; and having no fear of relapsing into what our 'spiritual pastors and masters' had so early, and we say despotically taught us; we have no hesitation in allowing the metaphysician; if he will take any thing from a materialist; his full-blooded or etherialized spirit; provided he will let us ascribe to his Gaseous or other entity, the powers of the five perceptions and their qualities. For having at last come to a knowledge of their powers, and plans, and rules, we care not, for practical uses, in what the theoretic entity resides. Occult causes should not be particu-

larized. We desire therefore; if we have been otherwise; to be now amicable towards the metaphysician, on the mere spiritual entity; but not on the subject of the universal mischief; we believe that notion has produced. And though we were to admit; the physical may have been assumed, the very supposition has enabled us to set forth some of the laws of the functions of the senses and the brain. Whether their proximate cause lies in spirit or in matter, we are disposed to waive the question of the different entities, and to consider only the working plan and the rules of manifest and measurable perception. But as the supposition, so to call it, of materiality has served us so well, we solicit the spiritualist just to assume it, as he would a construction in a geometric, or as the symbol of an unknown quantity, in an algebraic problem; to try if it will not lead him to some useful and pervading truth; that his spiritual philosophy never dreamed, or dared to dream-of. Let him throw aside his narrow selfishness, in looking for his eternal happiness, only through the assumption of a spiritual mind. We are led analogically to believe; the great Jehovah-cause of all natural events, to be of immeasurable purpose and action; directing every thing; as the plastic material of his wisdom and power; throughout all its instrumentalities. Until then by his manifest operations he communicates to me; for I presume not to speak for others; that the fact of a future life cannot be accomplished in any way, his illimitable power over the susceptibilities of matter may ordain; I shall be unwilling to believe, that while he presents to us every-where, the unexpected constructions, and transitions of an obedient matter, he has not, under some elemental or other material form, of which we know not the conditions, ordained a future existence to man. But this is not our present subject; and we go-on to consider the fact of the sub-animal mind, in whatever entity its proximate cause may be concealed.

It was no false analogy, in the Eastern Fable supposing; the beasts, birds, insects, and fishes; to perceive, remember, compare, conclude, and to communicate perceptions by language, under most of their qualities. And though the Fable thus assumed the resemblance of the human to the sub-animal mind, in making the latter think and speak like the former; yet strangely indeed,

it never perceived the reciprocity of the analogy; and that the brute thinks and signifies his thoughts, by the same mode of organization and perceptions as the man. But Esop and his predecessors belonged to the early spiritual ages, and therefore never allowed themselves to measure, by a comparative physiology, the 'sublime intelligence' of the human, with the 'material instincts' of the brutal mind: thus furnishing an illustration of the influence of fictional metaphysics, in turning aside philosophy from the physical laws and working plan of the human intellect. And now that some advance is made towards the discovery of those laws, we may acknowledge, that in the ordination of the mind, God and Nature, high as they ranked that ordination, still left us, in the physical gradation of sub-animal perception, stepping stones, as it were, of observation, to lead inquiry to the highest order in man.

The known constituents and qualities of the superior class of the sub-animal mind, being of similar character to those of the human, we will follow a similar classification in our brief description of them. The sub-animal mind performs its purposes;

First, by a primary perception. This is always accurate, on every thing referable to the wants, support, welfare, pleasure, and pain of the individual, and to the continuation of the species. Like the human primary, it consists of images and types; and these when not perverted by the excess of some agreeable or disagreeable quality, are true in their representations.

Second, by the memorial. This is obvious in all its recognitions of persons, places, and things: for without quiescent and enduring images and types on the brain, there could be no recognition of these impressions, when again made on the senses. Recognition is a revival of knowledge; and that knowledge is preserved only in the memorial brain. Though sub-animals have actionary signs either vocal, or muscular, or both, for their sensual wants, pleasures, and pains; their quiescent perceptions on these, and on other subjects if they have them, are unknown to us. We are therefore unable to say; the relationships of other subjects form part of their memorial. They have an unmixed primary perception; and mixed primary and memorial; but we have no knowledge of their unmixed memorial, and cannot there-

fore speak of their authoritative errors. Dreams; if they do dream; may be indications of their quiescent images and types.

Third, by joint comparison. We know; sub-animals have primary-unmixed comparison, by their distinguishing one kind of food from another; and primary-mixed comparison, by distinguishing one who is feeding them from an intrusive stranger; for this employs the primary for the stranger, and the memorial for the friend. Having however, as it would seem, no abstract signs, they can apparently have no abstract perception of genus, and species. Being thus without classification, they can make their election only between individuals; and cannot gain knowledge from the generic comparison of memorial images and types. This is one of the causes of the sub-animal making no advancement in mentivity: for knowledge is mind. The metaphysician ascribes this incapacity to an anti-spiritual and blind instinct. We would go a step further in causation, and say; it is from a confused excursion, a limited election, and the want of abundant and precise, quiescent and actionary signs, to fix and to multiply the perceptions they have.

Fourth, by conclusive perceptions. These, as far as the subjects and purposes of the sub-animal extend, are as exact as in the human mind. To decide between two kinds of food, is to conclude by the agreeable quality of perception. But this is by unmixed-primary perception; and perhaps by mixed. Not knowing however, that the sub-animal has useful and unmixed memorial relationships, we cannot say; they have conclusions upon them: and we leave the question to other observers.

Fifth, by the signs of perception. Nature, who is always completing her work, has given the sub-animal certain vocal and muscular signs, perfectly accommodated to its perceptive purposes, its wants, pleasures, and pains, as far as it is necessary to communicate them to one another. They represent their perceptions of simple *thought*; so to distinguish it; and of *passionate* excitement, respectively, by the same five vocal *modes*; of Time, Force, Vocality or Kind, Abruptness, and Pitch; which are joined with language in human articulation. The vocal modes, with muscular movements, without the aid of articulation, are sufficient for the limited circle of sub-*perception*. Whereas man requires a

mingled vocal and articulated language, in the multiplicity of his *thoughts*, with their endless forms and varieties; for his *passions* or 'feelings,' as they are called, he employs like the sub-animal the vocal modes alone, or these combined with articulation.*

It is not known, that the sub-animal mind has a quiescent memorial sign, or a type of its own peculiar language, as it has of other things. Yet from its general analogy with the human, it is probable; their perception of vocal and muscular signs does react on their own ear, and eye, and silently accompany the images and types of things on the brain: in which case, there may be a limited memorial, joint, and conclusive exercise of quiescent or silent perception. But it must then be so imperfect and unproductive, that should it be even contributive to its unchangeable habits, it seems to furnish no means for progressive knowledge.

The numerous conditions, powers, varieties, and degrees of the five constituents, which we called their Qualities, are in sub-animal perceptions analogous to those of man, though perhaps not so numerous. Thus we find their correspondencies;

In Vividness or Force. This is seen in hunger and other appetites; in terror and anger: the vividness of perception being sometimes so concentrated, as to overrule every other quality except selfishness. Wild animals may have a feebleness in this quality, but never as a defect, until they are domesticated, and are cursed with the mental irregularities of their masters.

In Quick and Slow. Hunger, and other appetites are quick or slow in perception, according to their craving or satisfaction. These qualities are respectively appropriate to the passions and appetites of animals. Imperfectly viewed, something like a classification may be made of the quick with rapacious birds; and beasts of prey; and of the slow with those living upon vegetable food, which cannot escape them.

In Excursion. This quality of the sub-animal mind belongs in a degree, to the sense of sight; where many images of things are at the same time upon the field of vision. If exercised on the

* See this subject systematically explained in the Sixth, and in the Forty-eighth sections, and elsewhere, throughout the Fifth Edition of the 'Philosophy of the Human Voice.' Philadelphia; one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine.

other senses, it must be in succession; upon which however we cannot decide. In the human mind the excursive quality is productively used within the memorial constituent: but it appears; we have no exact knowledge of the memorial function in the sub-animal; and therefore are ignorant of the extent of its excursive power. We have shown under the head of the fifth constituent, that if the sub-animal has the use of the silent verbal sign, it is very limited, and applied only to self-support and defense, and to the continuation of the species. From the points of resemblance between the brute and too many of the rulers of mankind, you might make not only a horse a nominal Consul; but a foolish Prince, a King; or a narrow-minded demagogue, President: for in each case, the mental excursion like a sub-animal's is solely around himself. You cannot however make the brute a philosopher or a poet; for then his memorial flight must be over a universe of things.

In Election. If the sub-animal has a quiescent or silent verbal sign, by which its memorial images and types may be fixed, and held for comparison, the elective quality may be exercised to a certain extent. But of this condition we have no knowledge, though it has obviously the quality of choice on comparison, in the sense of sight if not in the other senses. Here it is both quick and exact.

In the Agreeable and Disagreeable. These, far as we know, are respectively, almost universal qualities, in the sub-animal, as in human perception. We know them only as they are the subjects of the primary: but without a knowledge of the amount of the memorial images and types on the sub-animal brain; of their power of excursion; and of their being accompanied by the silent verbal or muscular sign; we can say nothing of their agreeable and disagreeable memorial qualities or, as they are called, the pleasures and pains of the 'imagination.' In all the sub-animals, and in the greater part of mankind, these qualities are inseparable from selfishness.

In the Single or Few, and the Manifold. From our ignorance of the memorial in the sub-animal, we are only left to infer; their images and types are nearer the condition of the former, than of the latter quality. The primary perception in sight may have a single image, or more than one at the same time, or in succession.

In the Involuntary. From the whole history of causation, we must believe, that no actions in nature are self-moving or voluntary: but are all dependent in series, on a first and universal cause; infered from obvious analogies of Nature, and the wisdom of her unities; though not yet demonstrated. Under this contingency, every exercise of both the sub-animal and the human mind must be involuntary.

In the Quiescent and Actionary. Of the former quality we know nothing in the sub-animal mind; as it applies either to the four perceptions, or to their natural signs. The actionary, in voice, and in muscular movement, with its various sounds, is almost universal.

In the Synchronous and Successive. Of these qualities we can speak, only from the analogy of the human mind, and therefore suppose, that with exception of the sense of sight, sub-animal perception is successive.

In the Durable and Evanescent. These qualities are severally found in the sub-animal mind. The former is shown in memorial revival, or recognition, on all subjects connected with its wants, appetites, pleasures, and pains; the latter applies to every image and type; without these connections; which passes momentarily before the senses.

In the Mutative. Perceptions are changeable among themselves, by reciprocal and often unaccountable influences; and sometimes by obvious external causes. The sub-animal mutations must necessarily be quiescent before they are actionary; but they are obvious under the last condition only. It is through this quality, the sub-animal is governed and instructed.

In Independence and Conformity. The brute perceives and acts in conformity to its proper ordination; and not being enslaved by the tongue and pen of a Demagogue, Metaphysician, Fictionist, and Falsifier, lives according to the laws of its species; and is not drawn by some winged or four-footed egotist into such artful combinations as men call Parties, Associations, Sects, Clubs, and Gangs; sworn, each *for* himself, and equally sworn *against* others. The sub-animal mind is stranger to the perceptive quality; we call independence: for being born to its own truth and justice, it has no need of that human, and saving-quality, to raise itself above the conventional influence of error and wrong.

In Truth and Falsehood. Truth and falsehood are terms representing qualities of perception; and therefore have reference to the question; whether the images and types of things in one mind, correspond with the perception of these things in another; and generally determined, for human satisfaction, by the testimony of those who bring the question to the cultivated and cautious exercise of the senses; called variously observation, experiment, and demonstration. This is the only test of truth, and consequently of falsehood which is briefly called its negative. From this general view, it appears; these terms have only conventional meanings, between man and man; and that things being always as they truly exist; God, or to personify his works, Nature, sees every thing no otherwise than it is, and nothing as it is not; and therefore has no regard to the correlative terms falsehood and truth. The sub-animal mind in its various degrees is one of those aggregates of things, which have remained as intended by Nature; and being forever what it is, these terms are not applicable to it, but to the mere variation of opinions. Men in the perversion of their mind, have always been in conflict about these two vague and unnecessary qualities of perception. The sub-animal may have some perceptions that we have not; but it has none for the human contradictions of truth and falsehood.

In the Mixed and Unmixed. It was previously shown, that the sub-animal mind employs the primary mixed, and unmixed perceptions; but we know nothing of the unmixed memorial.

In Foresight. For its important, yet limited purposes, the sub-animal has a keener, and more unerring foresight, than ever served the turns of a diplomatic spy, physician, priest, or fortune-teller: since these often see too little or too much, in what they promise; the former never fails.

Under this head, we may notice a function; or as it might be called a peculiar Quality, exercised perhaps by every sub-animal; and more remarkably in some species; which leads or directs them over long migrations, or over shorter distances, by some occult influence, apparently unrelated to their common powers of perception. It does not seem to be Foresight, which is the application of the unchanging laws of nature to the unknown effects of things: **for by the condition of the case, the animal has**

neither imparted knowledge, nor experience of the path it is finding. By one of those short-hand notices of our imperfect science, it is called Instinct; which implies only a hidden cause, of greater power than that of obvious perception. And thus by an unmeaning word Naturalists are turned from a proper analysis of the function: in like manner as the unmeaning word spirit has prevented the physical investigation of the mind. On this subject, we are to consider, that no peculiar organization and perception are apparent in the working plan of the senses and the brain; and that by the unity and simplicity in natural causations, we do not require them.

In the first section, instinct is classed with the five necessary perceptions. It is alike in the sub-animal, and in the infant human-mind: and we have here only to suggest the special mode of its exercise, in the apparent peculiarities of the subject before us.

We have shown the working plan of the sub-animal mind, to be principally exercised on the primary and memorial perceptions, with a more limited use of the joint and conclusive, and of the vocal and muscular sign. Attention to the difference from the working of the human mind, may throw some light on this Path-finding power. The influence of language, both quiescent and actionary, over conclusive, joint, memorial, and even primary perception, has been repeatedly noticed in this Essay. The limitation of the sub-animal signs, circumscribing the use of the joint and conclusive, leaves the memorial and primary clearer and more exact, for all their necessary purposes. This path-finding is one of these purposes; and it may analogically assist inquiry on this subject, to reflect, that as fictional thought, combined with indefinite language, has to the million, darkened the path of human knowledge; those who have found their instructive way to the realms of science and of life, by a keener and far-reaching use of the five simple perceptions, are regarded by that ignorant million, as working by the little miracle of 'Genius,' or by the greater 'Apocalypse' of 'Inspiration.'

We are willing then to believe, that the fifth and limited constituent of the sub-animal mind being principally and strictly used for the actionary representation of the primary and memo-

rial; and these being freed from the distractions of a wild and extended excursion, with its usual speculation and falsehood; is one cause of the quickness and accuracy of its primary, and the precision of its memorial perception. To this exactness then of the primary in sight, hearing, touch, and scent; and of precision in the memorial images and types; we must ascribe the path-finding sagacity.

We do not regard the aerial mass-migration of birds and insects; since however it began, there are always older conductors, for the young and inexperienced of the swarm, and the flock; nor do we consider terrestrial migrations, under the like aggregate condition.

We here notice only individual cases of the animal returning to its haunts, by a different road from that by which it had been taken, though shut up in darkness. Pigs are said to have very acute perceptions in finding their way home; and most domestic animals have exhibited instances of it. I once gave a dog to a Captain of a vessel, coasting between the Delaware and the Chesapeake. The third or fourth morning after leaving Philadelphia, Bowse was found at my coach-house door, with a trailing rope; hungry, sleepy, and fatigued. He was a large dog, partly of the mastiff breed. When the Captain returned I heard; he broke loose from the deck when near New Castle, forty miles down the river, and swam to the Delaware shore. The way he returned is not known. Did he notice the shore as he passed, and then recognize it, under a totally different aspect from *within* its line? In which case, he must have swam the Schuylkill, of some hundred yards, and other streams that enter the Delaware. Or did he snuff the wind, with its many mingled odors from the distant City? certainly not so remarkable an acuteness, as that of a hound or even a cur, in scenting the foot of a deer, hours after it had touched the earth only for an instant.*

* There is an inverse correspondence in the synchronous scent of the sub-animal, and that of perception in the human sight. The optic nerve of the latter has upon it, at the same time, a multitude of images, different in color, form and action, and may separately perceive them all, and mark out any one from the rest. The sub-animal-olfactory has a multitude of types of different odors passing over it; but in neither case of the sight or the scent is there any confusion; and the scent, in which the difficulty would be most apt to occur, chooses at once that it de- o pursue.

While at Boarding-school, on a Maryland-farm, surrounded by a continuous line of forest, I had brought a pigeon from a distance of about seven miles. In one of those circles of flight, which are common with this bird; either for exercise, or for keeping above the diving pursuit of the hawk; after rising some hundred yards, the pigeon suddenly left the flock, and in a direct line, as far as traceable, returned to his former home. Then, his wonderful instinct was this. The face of the country is level; and at the height to which he rose, his eye must have been the center of a circuit with a diameter of from fifty to sixty miles; including the line of the Susquehanna, the expanse of the Chesapeake, and other objects familiar to his former elevated flights. When his native haunts were discovered, his unassisted eye and wing found his direct and easy way to them. All pigeons have more or less of the Carrier's eye, if not its other keen perception, which leads it at great elevation, directly to its nest: just as a kind of stumbling on the wing, which the common pigeon occasionally shows, is more frequent and remarkable in what is called the Tumbler. But why should we record examples: the Reader must have heard of instances of such strange sagacities, which after the fictions of the Wonderful Magazines, require no sub-animal miracle to explain the apparent deviation from the laws of nature, in the simple and common exercise of perception.

Cases of animals finding the way they have traveled long before, are readily accounted for, by their greater accuracy of sight, and durability of memory; from the images and types not being drowned-out by the like flood of wild and figmental excursions, that so often wash-away the primary and memorial perceptions of real things from the human mind. Of persons who travel a new road; except by *Pike*, or *Rail*; occupied by vivid memorial, joint and conclusive images and types of faith, avarice, love, hate, or ambition; not one in a hundred could find his way back alone. And this is particularly the case with women, who never look at any thing along a road except a Palace. Whereas not one of a hundred horses that may have carried them over it, would be at fault. On this principle a fanatic in any road, vividly perceiving only himself and his *saintly Beatitude*, could never find his way forward or backward, though he were carried along it a thousand

times: and certainly he will not find his way up that great hight, he is so crazing himself to reach. We are then disposed to believe; the natural ordination of the five constituents in the sub-animal mind, with their acute or vivid quality in the primary, and their durability in the memorial, are sufficient to explain the extraordinary instances of their 'Occult instinct;' just as the principles of the natural working plan of the like five perceptions are sufficient to explain the instances of what are called 'genius,' 'prophecy,' and 'inspiration,' in the human mind.

Give a telescopic eye, for the vast horizon of an eagle-hight; a magnifying vibration of the tympanum, for faint and distant sounds; an acute perception by the skin or lungs, for the winds and temperature of climates; give to the olfactory membrane a perception of the difference between the air from fresh and salt water, and their marshes, from sandy plains, and broad savannas; consider all these perceptions and the degrees of their qualities; and then admit, how many Path-leaders nature has provided for every form of migration; and for directing an animal through shorter distances to a lost and familiar home.

In Habit. There is this difference between the habit of the sub-animal, and of the human mind. The former is a perseverance in the exercise of every thing necessary for individual and for general benefit: the latter is, as it has been called, a 'bundle of habits,' with a large percentage leading only to the injury or destruction of the individual, and the torment of every dumb and human creature, within its influence.

In Selfishness. We know not which is most bound to self; the Brute or the Man; but we do know, that the brute exercises its selfishness only for its own support and protection. The greater part of mankind abuse it to their own ultimate suffering; and always to the injury, no less than the annoyance of others.

All these qualities are exercised by the mind of the sub-animal of the *Mammalian* and *Volucral* classes, variously combined, and of different degrees in the several species of each. But the mental power of perceptions and their qualities diminishes in number and degree, by descending gradation, until it disappears to human observation in the lowest animal life. And we leave it for others, to assimilate or identify the relationships of the quiescent irrita-

bility, and the actionary movements of vegetation, under the impression of touch, light, heat, and moisture, with the faint and vanishing phenomena of nervous and muscular vitality.

By this brief and systematic outline of the sub-animal mind, drawn from the similarity of its perception and its qualities, to those of the human, we are led to consider the uniformity of nature in directing the working plan of each; and to conclude, that in both cases the varied function lies in the action of a similar entity, whether called by the ever-disputable term of spirit, or of matter. But the soul-proud metaphysician; for on every thing pride is a selfish theory; does not allow a spiritual entity to the brute; fearful perhaps; he might hereafter find himself in degrading company. And thus we have by the metaphysical school, the same mental effects from *different* causal entities; and by the school of natural science, the same effects from the *same* causal entity; or, the mind of the sub-animal and of man, from the like physical organization of the senses and the brain. And here arises the selfish quality in man. Must my superior and heaven-ward intellect have the same origin with that of the earthly brute? Remember, proud Egotist, that Plato, Archimedes, Shakspeare, Bacon, Milton, Locke, Leibnitz, and Newton, while lying in their cradle, had respectively an intellect far inferior to the mind of the higher brute; and that it was by physical education alone acting on the organization of the senses and the brain, which raised them from that inferiority to the character of the spirit-boasting metaphysician, the inventive Engineer, the expansive philosopher, and the 'muse inspired' poet. Was the Rich man clothed in purple, and faring sumptuously, formed of the same clay as Lazarus, the loathsome beggar at his gate? Aye, as certainly as the rider directs, and the horse obeys, by a similar system of organized perceptions.

We have thus endeavored to fulfil the promise implied in the Title Page of this Work; by giving a comprehensive Outline, and a close analysis of the human intellect: embracing the natural history of its working plan; the sources and manner of its endless perversions, in scholastic and in common use; and the consequent necessity of rejecting the fictional theories on this perversion, together with the confused arrangement, and unset-

tled nomenclature founded upon them. Apart then from the innumerable notions, with their unsatisfactory classifications and indefinite terms; we have strictly described the functions of the mind, under the mechanical picture of a working plan; thereby figuratively to represent our belief in its physical frame, and the material mode of its action; in contradistinction to an inconceivable process, ascribed to a still more, if possible, inconceivable Spirit. This frame embraces an aggregate of physical images and types, as functions of matter produced by some occult process in the senses and the brain; but which are as certainly known to every observer who turns his attention to his own mind, as any physical and external thing. These images and types are then the materials of the mind, by the use of which all its purposes are effected.

These purposes are to furnish knowledge of the existence and relationship of all the things and actions of nature; to be applied for the uses of the possessor of that mind, in fulfilling his part in the boundless circuit of Creation. In the process of acquiring this knowledge, the images and types, here generically called Perception, perform distinct and successive functions.

The first which are perceptions by the senses, are called Primary. We divided all nature into Things; their Aggregates, and relationships of every kind; and these are represented at the same time, or in succession, severally on the five senses. The elementary things perceived collectively by the senses, were stated in the second section to be twenty-one; though they may be fewer or more.

The second kind of perceptions called Memorial are the images and types, first represented on the senses; and being subsequently transferred by some unknown process to the brain, are physically represented on it. These, either unmixed, or mixed with the primary, furnish the whole materials of the working plan of the mind.

To ascertain the Relationships of these mixed or unmixed images and types of things; a comparison is made among them, by the third kind, called Joint Perceptions.

The fourth, or Conclusive, perceives the true relationships of things, under joint comparison of their mixed and unmixed me-

memorial images and types. The truths acquired by Conclusion; for our system has no reference to fiction and falsehood; are announced, and communicated to others by the fifth, or Verbal perception.

From this extended view, with its simple divisions and nomenclature, we may deduce the whole detail of the human mind. But we have represented the five constituents as generic powers; and have ascribed their efficiency to the specific forms, conditions, and degrees, under which these powers are exercised. These Species, which we call Qualities, appear under varied forms and degrees from Vivid to Faint, or as it may be otherwise called, from Strength to Weakness; and from quick to slow; under a broad memorial flight, over images and types, for an elective choice among them; under those which are quiescent or action-ary; agreeable or the reverse; those which are mutative of one another; the durable and the evanescent; together with the rest of the eighteen species, described under the respective sections on the qualities.

This outline of perception and its qualities embraces in its simple divisions, definitions, and nomenclature, all that a strict observation can perceive in the facts and principles of the human mind. Since by the wise unity of purpose and action in Nature; and in the senses and the brain, that represent her; there is no phenomenon of the cognizable Universe, which may not be found on its all-picturing mirror; nor a human work which has not been accomplished by the intellectual means, within the perceptive resources of its all-sufficient classification.

Thus what we call the mind, is the representation of the external world, by physical images and types on the senses and the brain; and by the descriptive powers of language. There can therefore, be no science of the things of Nature, the things of Art, and the things of Human Life, that cannot be arranged under the genera and the specific qualities of perception enumerated in the Outline.

With this classification and outline, we are enabled more extensively to survey, and more definitely to name, the conditions of things and the characters of persons, than has been accomplished under the old metaphysical systems. Assisted then by

the working frame and principles of perception, as far as developed; we proceed to show, in the second volume, their application to the exact sciences, and to those subjects of thought and action, with their mingled truth and error, which occupy man thereby affording a practical illustration of the ordained functions and purposes of the Human Intellect.

PHILADELPHIA, *January* 11, 1865.

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